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ABSTRACT
The primary object of this thesis is to offer a legal analysis of 
Martial Law in Bangladesh, 1975-1979. It is divided into nine chapters.
The introductory chapter traces the birth and constitutional and 
political development of Bangladesh before the proclamation of Martial 
Law in August 1975. It examines the various uses of the term ’Martial Law1 
and the controversies which have arisen as to the basic character of 
Martial Law. The role of the doctrine of 'necessity' in the promulgation 
and continuation of Martial Law, and in the justification of all measures 
taken under Martial Law are examined. The nature of Martial Law courts 
is considered, and the history of the promulgation of Martial Law in the 
Indian subcontinent is outlined.
Chapter II considers the legality and justification of the Proclamation 
of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975, the legality of the assumption of 
the office of President by Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, the position of the 
1972 Constitution and other laws after the declaration of Martial Law. It 
examines the impact of the various coups upon the discipline of the armed 
forces, and deals with the structure of the Martial Law administration and 
the civilianisation of government and the withdrawal of Martial Law. The 
various Martial Law Regulations creating offences are discussed.
Chapter III examines the basic provisions relating to the constitution, 
powers and jurisdiction, and procedure of Martial Law courts.
Chapter IV deals with the establishment and composition of the Martial 
Law courts. It discloses the number of cases transferred arbitrarily from 
ordinary courts to Martial Law courts, and from one Martial Law court to 
another. It then looks into the implications of such transfers, and uncovers 
the number of persons convicted and acquitted by the Martial Law courts and 
examines certain cases tried by them.
3Chapter V deals with the provisions relating to the constitution, 
power and jurisdiction, and procedure of the Special Martial Law Tribunal 
and Martial Law Tribunals, and examines the trial of the conspiracy 
case by the Special Martial Law Tribunal and the functioning of Martial 
Law tribunals. It attempts to ascertain the number of persons executed 
in the aftermath of the two abortive coups of 1977.
Chapter VI describes the definition and importance of the 
'independence of the Judiciary1. It considers the independence of the 
Judiciary in Bangladesh both before and after the imposition of Martial Law 
in 1975, and the restrictions imposed on the powers and jurisdiction of the 
Judiciary by the Martial Law regime, and discusses the nature of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, 
including constitutional provisions relating to their enforcement and 
suspension during a proclamation of emergency. It examines the suspension 
of the enforcement of most of the fundamental rights under the 1974 
Proclamation of Emergency and the removal of the power of the Judiciary to 
enforce fundamental rights by the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1975, 
before the declaration of Martial Law. The chapter sets forth the 
subsequent restbration by stages of the judicial power to enforce fundamental 
rights by the Martial Law government.
Chapter VII details the definition and necessity of preventive detention. 
It portrays the possible abuse of the power of preventive detention and 
constitutional safeguards in this respect, and also examines the provisions 
of the Special Powers Act; 1974, and the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, 
relating to preventive detention and the incorporation of constitutional 
safeguards into the Emergency Powers Rules with regard to preventive 
detention in 1977 by the Martial Law administration.
Chapter VIII depicts the operation of the laws relating to preventive 
detention under the Martial Law regime. It specifies the numbers of
4detenus released under various general amnesties as well as in accordance 
with the orders of the Supreme Court, and gives some examples of the 
arbitrary exercise of the power of preventive detention. The chapter 
enumerates certain instances of writ petitions and the Supreme Court orders 
in respect of preventive detention, and also examines the case of a detenu 
who was released in accordance with the order of the High Court, only to be 
re-arrested at the prison-gate.
The last chapter summarises general conclusions. An overall assessment 
of Martial Law administration is attempted, and some suggestions offered 
for the prevention of the abuse of the power by Martial Law regimes in future 
by means of constitutional and legal provisions in respect of the promulgation 
and administration of Martial Law.
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction
I. The Birth and Constitutional and Political Development of
Bangladesh before the Proclamation of Martial Law, 1975-1979
i) General Features of Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a country of 55,598 square miles with a population of 94.7 
million in 1983.* It is now the world's eighth most highly populated country.
With 1,703 persons per square mile, Bangladesh is the most densely populated 
nation in the world, with the exception of city-states like Hong Kong and 
Singapore. The majority of the people of Bangladesh are Bengalis and have a 
mixture of Dravidian, Aryan and Mongolian ancestry. About 85 per cent of the 
people of Bangladesh are Muslims. The vast majority of the Muslims are Sunni, 
who follow the Hanafi School of Islamic Law. Bangladesh is unique among the 
countries of South Asia in that it is almost unilingual. Except for the few 
Urdu-speaking Biharis, who derive their name from the Indian province of Bihar 
when they migrated to Eastern Bengal in 1947, the language of the people of 
Bangladesh is Bengali. There are a few tribal areas in which local tribal 
dialects are also spoken.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy is 
primarily agricultural. The exports earnings are derived mainly from jute and 
jute goods; jute is the principal cash crop, produced from about two million 
acres of land. Bangladesh is the largest grower of this 'golden fibre'. It 
is a land of fertile alluvial soil washed very extensively by rivers and creeks.
The climate of Bangladesh is characterised by high temperatures, heavy rain­
fall, often excessive humidity and fairly marked seasonal variations. Except in 
the hill areas, there is little variation in temperature in most of the country, 
which ranges in the nineties in the hot months of April and May, cool slightly 
during the monsoon, and drops into the fifties during the cold weather of 
December and January. The average rainfall in the country is over 85 inches a year
1. Statistical Pocketbook of Bangladesh 1983, published by the Ministry of 
Planning, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka 1984,
pp.100, 101.
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ii) The Birth of Bangladesh
When the transfer of power took place in August 1947 under the provisions 
of the Indian Independence Act 1947, and the subcontinent was partitioned 
by the British into two sovereign states of India and Pakistan, Bangladesh 
became a province, under the name of East Bengal (later known as East 
Pakistan), of the newly-established State of Pakistan. There was no 
direct land connection between the Western and Eastern parts of Pakistani 
they were separated by 1,200 miles of Indian territory and the distance 
by sea was 2,450 miles.
However, the Panjabi-dominated Western wing of Pakistan consistently 
followed a policy of discrimination towards the Eastern wing in every 
sphere of governmental and public activity - political, social, cultural, 
economic and administrative. The denial of provincial autonomy, unequal 
representation in the civil and military services, disparity in economic 
development and division of export earnings created feelings of resentment 
and disaffection among the Eastern Pakistanis. It was widely believed 
that East Bengal was reduced to a mere colony of West Pakistan and that 
the East Bengalis had only changed their masters when India was partitioned. 
The rapidly-growing discontent among the East Bengalis against the 
domination and exploitation of West Pakistan led most of the political 
parties in East Pakistan to demand some measure of autonomy in their party 
manifestos as a way to resolve peacefully the disparities between the two 
parts of the country. The Awami League, a Bengali Party, went so far as 
to adopt a six-point formula which envisaged almost total autonomy for 
East Pakistan. Under this formula^currency and taxation were to be 
within the separate jurisdiction of East Pakistan and the Central 
Government was to have powers only in defence and foreign affairs, even 
then with certain limitations. However, the first General Elections, 
held on 7 December 1970, were the last hope for the East Pakistanis to
18
participate in a democratic, representative and civilian government 
ensuring autonomy for their province. In these elections, the Awami 
League won 160 seats out of 169 allotted to East Pakistan in the National 
Assembly, which was to have a total of 300 directly elected seats and 
thirteen nominated ones. The Awami League became the majority party 
not only of East Pakistan, but of the whole of Pakistan, without winning 
a single seat of the 144 reserved for West Pakistan, but with the right 
to form alone a national government. The inaugural session of the National 
Assembly was due to be held on 3 March 1971. However, the fear of being 
politically dominated by a new Bengali leadership under Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the Awami League leader, ultimately led the military regime of 
Yahya Khan, on 1 March 1971, to postpone the first session of the newly- 
elected National Assembly indefinitely, at the instance of the West 
Pakistani Martial Law administration and with the concurrence of certain 
West Pakistani political leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (whose Pakistan 
People's Party won 88 seats only in West Pakistan). As a protest 
against this sudden postponement of the inaugural session of the National 
Assembly, Mujib called a general strike throughout East Pakistan. The 
general strikes called, and consequent directives.issued by Mujib had 
the effect of setting up a provisional Awami League government in East 
Pakistan. All the organs of government in East Pakistan, including the 
jlidiciary, the Civil Service and the East Pakistan Unit of the armed 
forces were prepared to accept the authority and direction of Sheikh Mujib. 
While a mass movement based on non-co-operation and strikes thus gripped 
East Pakistan, Chief Martial Law Administrator Yahya entered into 
discussions with Mujib to resolve peacefully the political differences, 
especially over the question of autonomy for the Eastern wing. The 
"Yahya-Mujib" talks, which had taken place on 16 March 1971 in the capital 
of East Pakistan, Dhaka (formerly spelled 'Dacca') and continued up to
19
23 March, ultimately broke down. This was followed by the imposition 
of Martial Law in East Pakistani cities and the official military crack­
down, on the night of 26 March 1971, upon the so-called rebels in East 
Pakistan. In fact, these steps were a futile attempt to crush the East 
Pakistanis' legitimate endeavour to assert their rights, won in the 
December 1970 General Elections, and to achieve a military solution to the 
autonomy problem.
However, tension now grew rapidly and the Bengali nationalists 
proclaimed the birth of the new State of Bangladesh on 26 March 1971.
A civil war broke out between Bengali nationalists and the Pakistani Army. 
Eventually the intervention of India on the side of the Bengali 
nationalists decided the issue and Bengladesh effectively became 
independent of Pakistan on 16 December 1971 with the surrender of Pakistan 
forces in Bangladesh and the ultimate assumption of the authority by a 
government of the Awami League.
Thus the struggle of the people of East Pakistan, which initially 
started as one for the limited objective of greater provincial autonomy,
culminated in complete independence.
iii) Salient Features of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
Soon after the outbreak of civil war, Mujib was arrested and taken to 
West Pakistan. After nine-and-a-half months of solitary confinement in 
a Pakistani prison, Mujib - who had been named President of the Provisional 
Government by the rebels - was freed by Pakistan's new President, Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto, on 8 January 1972. Mujib arrived in Dhaka, the capital of 
the newly-independent Bangladesh, on 10 January, and received an enthusiastic 
welcome. He assumed the Presidency, but instead of retaining the
presidential system of government and concentrating all powers in his hands,
two days later on 12 January, Mujib promulgated th6 Provisional Constitutional
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Order, and introduced a parliamentary model of government with himself 
as the prime minister. This change confirmed his commitment to a 
Westminster form of democracy.
On 23 March 1972, the Bangladesh Constituent Assembly Order was 
promulgated for the purpose of framing a new constitution for Bangladesh.
It brought into existence a Constituent Assembly with 430 members, who 
had been elected to the Pakistan National Assembly and the East Pakistan 
Provincial Assembly in December 1970. The Constitution of the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 4 November 
1972, and it came into effect on 16 December 1972 - exactly a year after 
the independence of Bangladesh. This early formulation of the Constitution 
may be due to the fact that the Awami League government wished to provide 
a basic political framework according to its own preferences before 
serious controversies could arise over theifundamentals of the proposed 
new Constitution. In doing so, it wished to avoid the tragic experiences 
of Pakistan, where a delay of nearly nine years to frame its first 
Constitution had led to the loss of legitimacy of the Muslim League 
government.
The salient features of the 1972 Constitution were as follows:
(A) The Constitution was a written one, and consisted of 11 parts, 
containing 153 Articles and 4 Schedules.
(B) It was a rigid Constitution, as the amendment of any provisions of
the Constitution required to be passed not by a simple majority,
but by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number
2
of Members of Parliament.
(C) The Constitution declared Bangladesh as a unitary, independent,
3
sovereign Republic to be known as the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
2. Article 142(1)(a)(ii) of the 1972 Constitution*
3. Article 1, ibid.
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(D) The Constitution was the supreme law of the Republic, and if any 
other law was inconsistent with it that other law would, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void.^
(E) It established a parliamentary democracy.^ There was a cabinet 
for Bangladesh with a prime minister as its head. The President 
appointed as prime minister the Member of Parliament wha appeared 
to him to command the support of the majority of the Members of 
Parliament. All executive powers of the Republic were exercised 
by, or on the authority of, the prime minister. The cabinet was 
collectively responsible to Parliament. The President was a mere 
constitutional head.
(F) The Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature. The 
Parliament, which was to be known as the House of the Nation, 
consisted of 300 directly-elected members, and fifteen women members 
to be elected by the Members of Parliament.
7
(G) It guaranteed seventeen fundamental rights, and the High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court was given the power to enforce these
Q
fundamental rights. (A discussion of the constitutional provisions 
relating to fundamental rights is included in Chapter VI.)
(H) The Constitution adopted secularism, nationalism, democracy and
’’socialism, meaning economic and social justice” as the fundamental
9principles of state policy.
(I) The Constitution provided for the separation of the Judiciary from 
the E x e c u t i v e . I t  attempted to ensure the independence of the 
J u d i c i a r y . T h e  President was required to consult the Chief Justice
4. Article 7(2), ibid.
5. Part IV, ibid.
6. Article 65, ibid.
7. Part III, ibid.
8. Article 102(1), ibid.
9. Article 8(1), ibid.
10. Article 22, ibid
11. Part VI and Article 147, ibid.
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in making appointments of puisne judges of the Supreme Court.
The President was to appoint district judges on the recommendation 
of the Supreme Court and magistrates exercising judicial functions 
in accordance with rules made by the President in that behalf after 
consulting the appropriate Public Service Commission and the Supreme 
Court. The procedure for removal of the judges was made difficult: 
the President could remove them if a resolution for removal was passed 
by at least two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament 
on the grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The remuneration, 
privileges and other conditions of service of a judge of the Supreme 
Court could not be varied to his disadvantage during his term of office. 
The Supreme Court was given power to control and discipline the 
judicial officers of subordinate courts. (The independence of the 
Judiciary will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI.)
(J) The Constitution placed some restrictions on the powers of the
Judiciary by empowering Parliament to establish one or more
Administrative Tribunals to exercise jurisdiction in respect of
certain matters. The Administrative Tribunals would deal with
matters relating to the terms and conditions of employment of persons
in the service of the Republic and in respect of acquisition,
administration, management and disposal of any property vested in
or managed by the government. All courts were precluded from
entertaining any proceedings, or making any orders in respect of any
12
matter falling within the jurisdiction of tribunals.
(K) Perhaps with a view to strengthening the government's control over 
the bureaucracy, the Constitution provided for, in some cases, 
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of any person holding a civil
12. Article 52, ibid.
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post in the service of the Republic without giving him a reasonable
13
opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. The
Constitution also provided that "Except as otherwise provided by
this Constitution, every person in the service of the Republic shall
14
hold office during the pleasure of the President".
(L) In order to prevent the Members of Parliament from crossing the floor 
and changing their parties freely, the Constitution laid down an 
unusual provision in it to the effect that: "A person elected as a
Member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a 
candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he -
(a) resigns from that party; or
(b) votes in Parliament against that party".
Perhaps the experience of the erstwhile East Pakistan Legislature 
of March 1957, when twenty-eight Awami League members in the Provincial 
Assembly resigned from the Awami League and later in July joined the 
newly-formed National Awami Party, actuated the framers of the 
Constitution to include such provisions. There were also precedents 
of similar constitutional provisions in other Commonwealth states, 
e.g., Kenya.
iv) The First General Elections in Bangladesh
Premier Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had been proclaimed "Bangabandhu" 
(The Friend of Bangladesh) before the independence of Bangladesh and 
declared 'Father of the Nation1 after independence, in an effort to 
restore law and order, asked the guerrillas of the Liberation War to
13. Article 135(2), ibid.
14. Article 134, ibid
15. Article 70, ibid.
15a. In Kenya, a Member of Parliament who contested elections with the support 
of or as a supporter of a political party, vacates his seat if he resigns 
from that party at a time when that party is a parliamentary party.
Ghai Y.P. and McAuslan, J.P.W.B., Public Law and Political Change in 
Kenya, Nairobi, 1970, p.320.
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surrender their arms to local authorities. However, his call largely 
went unheeded, especially among the radicalist guerrillas and miscreants.
The arms and ammunition possessed illegally were freely used to eliminate 
political opponents. Political radicalism and violence threatened the 
government of Sheikh Mujib. Between February 1972 and February 1973, 
political killings claimed the lives of 800 workers of the governmental 
party of the Awami League and 500 workers and supporters of the opposition 
parties. Against such an increased use of violence by the party workers 
of both the government and the opposition parties, and after the 
Constitution had come into force, Mujib fixed 7 March 1973 as the date of 
the first General Elections in independent Bangladesh. Although Mujib 
could possibly remain in power till December 1975 without holding elections, 
he announced the date of election, perhaps, to test his popularity in the 
face of growing opposition and to receive a fresh mandate from the people 
to tighten his political grip. Accused of many failures - over law and 
order, smuggling, rising prices and corruption in its own higher ranks - 
Mujib's Awami League nevertheless won a landslide victory securing 292 
out of 300 seats in Parliament. This landslide victory in which the Awami 
League polled 73.1 per cent of the votes is reminiscent of its performance 
in the 1970 General Elections held under the Yahya regime, when the League 
had polled 72.68 per cent in erstwhile East Pakistan. It seems that 
Mujib's personal popularity was responsible for this spectacular success. 
This landslide victory showed that the euphoric support for Mujib was still 
high. However, the organizational weaknesses of the opposition parties 
also contributed to Mujib's landslide victory.
vj Overall Situation of the Country after the General Elections of 1973 
After the General Elections, the economic and law and order situations 
began to deteriorate steadily. Overall production of heavy industries,
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which were nationalized by Mujib's government and in which jobs were 
created only to be filled by inefficient, incompetent and corrupt 
relatives and supporters, fell and was below the 1969-70 level. Devastating 
floods and an impending famine in 1974, an astronomical increase in prices 
of essential commodities including increases of four to five times in the 
price of foods over the prices in 1969-70, belied the expectation of 
Bengalis who had hoped for better days after the end of Pakistani exploitation. 
A worldwide shortage of food grains and extremely high prices of oil made 
Mujib's task of reconstruction even more difficult. Smuggling became 
rampant. Corruption pervaded not only at all office levels but, in fact, 
at all levels of the ruling elite of the new Republic. Misappropriation 
of foreign grants, aids and relief goods only added to the increased 
sufferings of the people. The spirit of self-sacrifice and enthusiasm 
which had emerged at the time of the Liberation War almost disappeared 
altogether.
Although political violence decreased considerably after the election,
from September 1973 onwards it was on the increase again. The Awami
Leaguers often became targets of violent attacks for their alleged corruption
and association with the government of the day. By 1974, it was estimated
by Mujib himself that more than 3,000 members of the Awami League, including
five Members of Parliament, had been killed.^ However, a study by the
Home Ministry revealed that between March 1972 and May 1974, 4,925 people
17were killed in political violence. Attacks on police camps and 
stations in the countryside by politically-motivated extremists, as well 
as by professional criminals, also increased. Widespread labour disputes 
began.
16. Franda, Marcus, Barigladesh, the First Decade, New Delhi, 1982, p.54.
17. Far Eastern Economic Review, ,:'AsiaTT975 'Yearbook,- p-123.
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(vi) The Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973
Although he started in office with unprecedented popular support, 
discontent against Mujib was now rapidly spreading and the popularity 
of his government was declining fast. Against such decreased popularity 
in a deliberate move to concentrate power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act was passed on 
22 September 1973.
The Constitution (Second Amendment) Act for the first time enacted 
provisions recognising and regulating preventive detention, by adding 
clauses 4 and 5 to Article 33 of the 1972 Constitution, the Article which 
contained safeguards as to arrest and detention. But these clauses 
did not contain any express provision as to when a law providing for 
preventive detention could be passed or specifying the maximum period for 
which a person could be held in preventive custody. However, four months 
and twelve days after the Second Amendment, on 5 February 1974, the 
Special Powers Act was passed by Parliament "to provide for Special measures 
for the prevention of certain prejudicial activities, for more speedy 
trial and effective punishment of certain grave offences and for matters 
connected therewith". The Special Powers Act, which was passed in peace­
time as a piece of permanent legislation, provided for preventive detention 
for an unlimited period. The Awami League government claimed that this 
Act was necessary to control prevailing lawlessness, turbulence, terrorist 
activities by extreme left-wing groups and the public use of firearms.
(The provisions of the Special Powers Act relating to preventive detention 
will be examined in Chapter VII.)
The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh did not originally contain any 
provision for the declaration of an emergency. Perhaps the repeated 
misuse of emergency powers by the Government of Pakistan, during the days 
when Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) was a province of Pakistan,
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discouraged the framers of the 1972 Constitution from including such powers
in the Constitution. It seems that later, in view of the failure to
control the rapid deterioration in the economic and law-and-order
situations, emergency powers were considered essential by the government
in power to assert itself. Hence, the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act
invested the President with the power of declaring an emergency in the
country with the consent of the prime minister, at a time when the security
and the economic life of Bangladesh was threatened by war or external
18
aggression or internal disturbance. While the proclamation of an
emergency was in force, certain fundamental rights guaranteed in
Articles 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 of the 1972 Constitution could be
suspended so as to remove the restrictions imposed by these Articles on
the powers of the Legislature to make any law or the Executive to take 
19any action. Similarly, during the operation of an emergency, the
President could issue an order suspending the enforcement of any of the
20fundamental rights. (This aspect will be discussed at greater length 
in Chapter VI.)
vii) The Proclamation of Emergency, 1974
Almost a year and three months after the insertion of emergency 
provisions, on 28 December 1974, a state of emergency was declared t 
throughout the country on the ground that the security and economic life 
of Bangladesh were threatened by internal disturbances. Until then, 
Bangladesh had been the only country in the subcontinent not under 
emergency rule. However, the murders of a Member of Parliament and a 
Union Council chairman on 25 December 1974, while they were offering Eid 
prayers, furnished Premier Mujib with a convenient pretext to advise the
18. Article 141A of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
19. Article 141B, ibid.
20. Article 141C, ibid.
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President, Mohammadullah, to proclaim an emergency. Although the 
official version claimed that the proclamation was necessary to ensure 
security, public safety and the maintenance of essential supplies in 
view of the frequent acts of sabotage, murder and political violence by 
anti-social elements during the last three years, it is widely believed 
that the immediate causes of the Proclamation of Emergency were the 
threats of large-scale industrial unrest by five labour organisations 
from 18 January 1975. Many critics were of the opinion that the Emergency 
was declared because of the failure of Mujib's Awami League government to 
combat rapid inflation, food shortages, famine, smuggling and black- 
marketeering which came to pervade life after 1972 and had never reached 
such a scale even under nearly two-and-a-half decades of Pakistani 
domination. However, the enforcement of all the important fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the 1972 Constitution was suspended by the Presidential 
Order of 28 December 1972 issued as a consequence of the Proclamation of 
Emergency. (In Chapter VI this suspension of the enforcement of 
fundamental rights will be considered.)
However, the Emergency Powers Rules were issued by the Awami League 
regime on 3 January 1975. Under the Emergency Powers Rules^orders of 
preventive detention could be passed on the grounds which had already 
been the grounds for passing detention orders under the Special Powers Act, 
1974. Although the Emergency Powers Rules provided for preventive 
detention, unlike the Special Powers Act, they did not incorporate into 
them any constitutional safeguards of an Advisory Board to investigate 
the sufficiency of grounds for the detention for a period exceeding six 
months and of communicating, as soon as may be, the grounds of the order 
of detention to the detainee, as well as of affording the detainee the 
opportunity to make representation against the order. The absence of 
constitutional safeguards permitted the government to take away the
29
cherished fundamental right of the individual, personal liberty, in a 
most arbitrary manner. (A more detailed consideration will be given to 
this aspect in Chapter VII.)
(viii) The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975
The Awami League government used the emergency to amend certain 
fundamental provisions of the 1972 Constitution, curb the independence 
of the Judiciary, abolish judicial powers to enforce fundamental rights, 
replace the parliamentary form of government with a presidential one 
and do away with a multi-party democratic system. Thus, on 25 January 
1975, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was passed, the main features 
of which were as follows:
(A) The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act replaced the parliamentary 
democracy with a presidential form of government, centring around 
an all-powerful executive, the President. The President was to be 
elected by direct election, but no such election was necessary in 
the case of Premier Sheikh Mujib, who automatically became the first 
President. All executive powers of the Republic were vested in the 
President and were to be exercised by him directly or indirectly.
It provided for a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President 
in the exercise of his functions. The President, in his discretion, 
had the power to appoint a prime minister and other ministers, 
ministers of state and deputy ministers from among the Members of 
Parliament, or from persons qualified to become Members of Parliament.
(B) The Fourth Amendment virtually deprived Parliament of all powers of 
control over the Executive. The President and the ministers were 
not responsible to Parliament. The ministers were to hold office 
during the pleasure of the President. Even the procedures for the 
impeachment of the President on a charge of violating the Constitution
30
or of grave misconduct, and for his removal from office on the grounds 
of physical or mental incapacity, were made unusually difficult, 
rendering it almost impossible for Parliament to act. An initiative 
to move a motion for the President's impeachment or removal needed 
the support of at least two-thirds of the total number of Members of 
Parliament, and had to be passed by at least three-fourths of the 
total number of members.
(C) The President was now empowered to withhold assent from a bill of
Parliament submitted to him for his assent. This was virtually a
power of veto although the word 'veto', was not used in the Fourth 
Amendment.
(D) With a view to ensuring party loyalty and discipline in the Legislature, 
the Fourth Amendment provided that abstention of a member from voting
in Parliament or his absence from any sitting of Parliament in
disregard of the direction of the party concerned would be interpreted 
as if the member had voted against that party, and this would force 
him to vacate his seat in Parliament.
(E) The Fourth Amendment extended the life of the First Parliament, which
was due to end in March 1978, to January 1980.
(F) It curbed the independence of the Juduciary. The President was 
given the power to appoint the Chief Justice and other judges of the 
Supreme Court at his discretion. He could also remove them from
their offices on the grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity in
accordance with his will. He was further invested with the power to 
appoint, control and discipline the persons employed in the judicial 
service and magistrates exercising judicial functions. (These 
curtailments of the independence of the Judiciary will be examined
in greater detail in Chapter VI.)
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(G) The Fourth Amendment took away the power of the High Court Division 
of the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights. It empowered
! Parliament to establish a constitutional court, tribunal or commission
I for their enforcement. (This aspect will be discussed in Chapter VI.)
|
(H) It provided that in order to give full effect to any of the fundamental
| principles of state policy of socialism, nationalism, secularism and
| democracy, the President might, by an Order, direct that there would
I be only one political party in the country. When such an order was
I
passed, all political parties in the state would stand dissolved.
| The Fourth Amendment empowered the President to decide all matters
pertaining to nomenclature, programme^membership, organisation,
! discipline, finance and functions of the National Party. In general,
a person in the service of the Republic would be qualified to be a
member of the National Party. Once such a National Party was formed, 
a sitting Member of Parliament would lose his seat unless he became 
a member of the National Party within a time specified by the 
President. Moreover, a person would not qualify for election as 
President or as a Member of Parliament if he was not nominated as 
a candidate by the National Party.
Thus the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, undermined the 
I spirit of liberal democracy. It was a drastic amendment which gave the
President dictatorial powers. It introduced a presidential form of 
government on the American pattern without, however, its checks and 
balances, concentrating all the powers in the hands of a single person. 
Mujib, who during the Ayub regime in Pakistan had consistently expressed 
1 his commitment to parliamentary democracy, had now a complete change of
»heart and chose the presidential form of government with a view to 
concentrating all powers in his own hands as a more effective means of 
dealing with the deteriorating economic and law-and-order situations.
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(ix) The Declaration of Bangladesh as a One-Party State
Under these new powers, on 24 February 1975 Sheikh Mujib, as the 
President of the Republic, issued an Order introducing the one-party 
system in Bangladesh. The single National Party formed was to be known 
as the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL) - the Bangladesh 
Peasants* and Workers' National Party. The Party was to be headed by 
the President himself. Later, on 6 June 1975, President Mujib issued 
a new constitution of the BKSAL which revealed his attempt to tighten 
his grip over the National Party. This Party constitution gave him 
absolute power to control and oversee all the high-ranking officials of 
the Party. He headed all the high-powered committees of the National 
Party, and the fifteen-member (National) Executive Committee, which was 
at the head of the BKSAL, consisted of four of Mujib's close relatives, 
ten of his associates and Mujib himself.
Thus the structure of the National Party formally recognised the 
fact that Mujib was the unquestioned leader and key figure of the country. 
However, it should be stressed here that the National Party was in fact 
more than a political party. It was as much a state organ as the 
government or Parliament. The provision for the Party, as mentioned 
earlier, was made in the Constitution of the country itself and its 
structure was announced on 6 June 1975 by an extraordinary Gazette , 
notification.
Although for the time being there appeared to be no significant 
reaction, there were signs of the coming storm in the future. General 
Osmani, formerly the Commander^in-Chief of the Liberation Force, resigned 
from Mujib's government as a protest against the declaration of Bangladesh 
as a one-party state, and the JSD (Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal - the National 
Socialist Party) Members of Parliament refused to join the National Party 
and preferred to lose their seats in Parliament. .However, the
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transformation of Mujib, ardent supporter of liberal democracy, into an 
absolute dictator came as a shock to the politically-conscious citizens 
of Bangladesh.
Only thirteen days after the announcement of the Party constitution,
on 16 June 1975, the President, Sheikh Mujib, wound up all daily newspapers
except the (English),Bangladesh Observer and the (Bengali) Dainik Bangla
(owned by the party in power). Immediately after the Presidential Order,
two of the dissolved dailies, the (Bengali) Dainik Ittefaq and the (English)
Bangladesh Times were revived as government-owned publications. However,
the Presidential Order closed down thirteen dailies and dozens of political
21
weeklies published from Dhaka and other district towns. Since all the 
four existing newspapers were either owned by the government or by the 
party in power, there was no scope for free expression of the views or 
grievances of the people.
(x) The Resentment of the Military Forces towards the Mujib Regime
The people of Bangladesh became disenchanted with Sheikh Mujib for his 
new constitutional and political structure, and there was a growing feeling 
that Mujib intended to create a political dynasty for the benefit of his 
relatives and closest associates. The Bangladesh military forces shared, 
in general, this popular disillusionment. The military also had many 
grievances against the Mujib regime, some of which were as follows:
(A) Sheikh Mujib, who had an innate aversion to the regular army in 
whose hands he suffered most during the days of Pakistan, raised 
a strong paramilitary force, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini - the National 
Security Force - equipped and trained by Indian military forces.
The Rakkhi Bahini, which was composed of the so-called politically-
21. The Asian Recorder, 23-29 July 1975, p.12691. «
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oriented cadre of the Mujib Bahini (i.e., Mujib Army) organised 
during the Liberation War to counterbalance freedom-fighters, 
belonged to different ideological groups, and was designed primarily 
to protect Mujib and his power structures. The creation of this 
paramilitary force, commonly known as Mujib's private army, revealed 
Mujib's distrust of the regular army. The suppression of riots, 
demonstrations, terrorists and insurgents was the main task of the 
Rakkhi Bahini. The members of the Rakkhi Bahini, who were disparagingly 
described as 'storm-troopers', were given preferential treatment in 
supplies and as such were a privileged group. This created a wide­
spread discontent and disaffection among members of the regular army.
(B) In 1974 when Bengali officers of the regular .army were repatriated 
to Bangladesh from (West) Pakistan, they found, in general, a 
paradoxical situation in which many officers junior to them in the 
hierarchy before the independence of Bangladesh now occupied senior 
positions, having been "freedom-fighters" or close to the ruling party. 
The senior repatriated officers, who were absorbed into the Bangladesh 
military, had to serve under these newly-promoted officers, while 
their own claims to promotion were not considered. This made them 
feel resentful.
(C) Many repatriated officers, who maintained the Pakistani Army tradition 
of anti-Indian feeling, could not condone Mujib's pro-Indian policies. 
Even many "freedom-fighter" elements of the Bangladesh military 
forces felt that Mujib had compromised the independence for which 
they had fought by substituting India's hegemony for Pakistan.
The poorly-equipped army was disillusioned with Mujib's virtual 
failure to bring back the Pakistan Army's surrendered arms and 
ammunition that had been taken to India as war booty by the Indian 
forces.
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(D) There was a strong rumour in army circles that Mujib had a calculated 
plan in sending his second son, Sheikh Jamal, in 1973 to Sandhurst 
Military Academy for training so that after finishing his course he 
could take over the command of the Bangladesh Army. Mujib's action 
was seen as a strategical move to control the army through his son.
(E) In April 1974, Sheikh Mujib entrusted the regular army with the task
of curbing hoarding, black-marketeering and smuggling. To their utter 
surprise and disgust, the army personnel found that Mujib went out of 
his way to save his party men and family members arrested in the course 
of anti-smuggling campaigns. This undesirable intervention, as well 
as the sudden termination of the army's anti-smuggling operations in 
the face of their success, contributed, to a great extent, to raise the 
army high command's resentment and disillusionment with Mujib's regime 
at its peak.
(xi) The Declaration of Martial Law in August 1975
The grievances of the military found expression in the early hours 
of 15rAugust 1975, when Mujib and several members of his family were 
killed in a coup masterminded by a group of army officers, mostly majors, 
some of whom (Majors S.H.M.B. Noor and Shariful Hoque Dalim) Mujib had 
dismissed from the army more than a year earlier. Immediately thereafter, 
for the first time in the history of independent Bangladesh, Martial Law 
was declared throughout the country. Before offering a legal analysis 
of the 1975 episode of Martial Law in Bangladesh, it may be helpful to 
consider the general doctrines and historical experience of Martial Law 
in the Indian subcontinent.
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II. The General Doctrine of Martial Law 
i) Definition of Martial Law
According to common law doctrine, under normal conditions a citizen 
is subject to the ordinary laws of the land, civil and criminal, but in 
time of an emergency, which may arise due to a riot, rebellion, 
insurrection or war, these laws for the time may be superseded and 
displaced by a more restrictive law known as Martial Law. It is called 
a restrictive law because it curtails the ordinary rules relating to the 
manner of taking evidence, mode of trial and the relief against the 
sentence and imposes severe punishment for Martial Law offences as a 
deterrent. Therefore, Martial Law is an extreme remedy which can be 
employed in the event of imminent danger to the preservation and security 
of the state. It is essentially a law or rule of force to restore the 
country to normalcy, and to re-establish the supremacy of the ordinary 
laws. ’’The purpose of martial law’1, says F.B. Weiner, "is not to
replace the civil administration of law but to support it by brushing
. . .   22 ■ ■ ■
aside the disorders which obstruct its normal operation". So, Martial
Law is used to meet force and restore peace and tranquillity in which
the civil power can re-assert its authority. According to Joseph W.
Bishop, Jr., "In one form or another, under such names as 'state of
siege' or 'state of emergency', the concept [of Martial Law] is found
in every country. In some countries it is almost the normal type of
government. In Anglo-American law, its only proper purpose is to
restore order with a view to the restoration of civilian government,
and the degree to which the military may properly assume governmental
23functions depends entirely on the needs of the situation".
22. Weiner, F.B., A Practical Manual of Martial Law (Harrisburg, 1940), p.15.
23. Bishop, Joseph W. Jr., "Martial Law", International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, Vol.X, 1968, pp.315-316.
There are two theories about the source of the word "Martial"
in the expression "Martial Law". One theory is that the word
"Martial" was originally spelt "Marshal" which ("Marshal") id derived
from marescallus; mareschalk, a stable servant and the Marshal was
24
the Master of the Horse. Therefore, "Marshal Law", which was
subsequently spelt as "Martial Law" meant the law that was promulgated
by the Crown, with the advice of the Constable and the Marshal - the
25
leaders of the King's army, for the due order and discipline of 
officers and soldiers, in time of war and was enforced by the Court of
24. O'Sullivan, Richard, Military Law and the Supremacy of the
Civil Courts, London, 1921, p.l, footnote (a).
25. During the early days of English history, no standing army
existed. It was only in times of war or of insurrection 
that military forces were raised. So, when England had no 
standing army, "Every freeman was a soldier. Each warlike 
occasion brought the knights and their retainers to the 
field, 60,000 of the former being bound by free-hold tenures 
to respond for forty days each year to the sovereign's call 
to arms". Birkhimer, William E., Military Government and 
Martial Law, Kansas City, 2ndedn., 1904, p.372. And the 
Constable (or Comes Stabuli) and the Marshal "were two 
great ordinary officers, anciently, in the King's army;
the Constable being in effect the King's general [i.e., 
the Commander-in-Chief of the King's army], and the Marshal 
was employed in marshalling the King's army, and keeping 
the list of the officers and soldiers therein; and his 
certificate was the trial of those whose attendance was 
requisite". Hale, Matthew, History of the Common Law 
of England, 4th edn., 1779, p.34. However, the offices 
of the Constable and the Marshal were hereditary.
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26the Constable and the Marshal. "Always”, says Matthew Hale,
"preparatory to an actual war, the Kings of the realm, by advice
of the Constable and Marshal, were used to compose a book of rules
and orders, for the due order and discipline of their officers and
soldiers, together with certain penalties on the offenders; and this
27
was called martial law". And Edward Coke described the Court of
28
the Constable and the Marshal as "the fountain of the marshal law".
26. In the Middle Ages, the Court of the Constable and the Marshal, 
which was "sometimes mentioned in records by another name, the Curia 
Militaris, The Court of Chivalry0 (O'Sullivan, Richard, op.cit., p.l), 
was concerned primarily with the discipline of the army, and matters 
related thereto. Holdsworth, William, A History of English Law,
Vol.l, 1971, p.573. It took cognisance of contracts relating to 
"deeds of arms and of war out of the realm", prisoners of war, whether 
aliens or rebels, ransoms, booty and the like. It also sat as a 
(Civil) Court of Honour to settle disputes on heraldic matters and 
precedence and slanders on men of noble blood. Ridges, Edward Wavell, 
(revised and largely re-written by Keith, A. Berriedale), Constitutional 
Law of England, 6th edn., 1937, p.274. This jurisdiction of the 
Constable and Marshal’s Court was defined by a Statute in 1389 and 
another in 1399 (during the reign of Richard II). Holdsworth,
William, op.cit., p.574. The Court of the Constable and Marshal 
continued to be active throughout the medieval period in England.
On the attainder and execution of the Duke of Buckingham in 1521 
(during the reign of Henry VIII), the office of High Constable was 
forfeited to the Crown. Since that date no permanent appointment 
to the office of High Constable has been made, though the title has 
been revived from time to time on the occasion of coronations and 
other like ceremonies. (For example, in 1911 and 1937 the Lord 
High Constable's office was filled for coronation ceremonial.)
While with the disappearance of the Lord High Constable, the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chivalry came to be exercised by 
Commissions of officers (usually issued to the Generals, Lords- 
Lieutenants, and occasionally to municipal authorities), the old 
civil jurisdiction appears for a considerable period to have been 
exercised by the Earl Marshal. In 1640 (in the days of the Stuarts), 
the Court of the Marshal was declared by Parliament to be a grievance. 
And in Chambers v. Jennings (1701 7. Mod.p.125) in Anne's reign, 
it was decided that in the absence of the Constable, the Court was 
not properly constituted and was no longer a Court of Record and 
that the jurisdiction of the Marshal sitting alone was in point of 
fact a mere encroachment. However, the last case known to have been 
tried in the Court of the Marshal was Sir H. Blount's case (1737,
1 Atk.p.296). Thus in the course of the eighteenth century, the 
Court of the Marshal disappeared, though it seems never to have been 
formally abolished. O'Sullivan, Richard, op.cit., pp.5-6.
27. Hale, Matthew, op.cit., p.34.
28. Coke, Edward, The Fourth Part of the Institute of the Laws of 
England, 1797, p.122.
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However, the other theory is that "Martial" is derived from the
Latin word "martialis", an adjective meaning "pertaining to war", Mars
being the God of War, and that Martial Law means the law relating to 
29war. Of the two theories, the first is, according to Robert S. Rankin,
30
probably the correct one. F.W. Maitland also supported the first
theory when he wrote:
"Now as a matter of etymology, marshal has nothing whatever 
to do with martial - the marshal is the master of the 
horse - he is marescallus, mareschalk, a stable servant - 
while of course martial has to do with Mars, the God of 
War. Still, when first we hear of martial law in England, 
it is spelt indifferently marshal and martial, and it is 
quite clear that the two words were confused in the 
popular mind - the law administered by the constable 
and marshal was martial law".*^
William Holdsworth also held this view;
"In the Middle Ages, martial law meant the law 
administered by the Court of the Constable and the 
Marshal. To that Court we must look for the origin 
both of the military and the martial law of the 
present day".^
It appears that in this respect the recently-published Oxford Companion
to Law has just adopted the view of William Holdsworth:
"In the Middle Ages, martial law meant the law 
administered by the Court of the Constable and the 
Marshal and from that court originated both the 
martial and the military law of today".^3
29. Harper’s Latin Dictionary (edited by E.A. Andrews), quoted in
Rankin, Robert S., When Civil Law Fails, Martial Law and its
Legal Basis in the United States, 1939, p.4.
30. Ibid.
31. Maitland, F.W., The Constitutional History of England, Qambridge, 
1926, p.266.
32. Holdsworth, William, "Martial Law Historically Considered",
The Law Quarterly Review, Vol.XVIII, 1902, p.117.
33. Walker, David M., The Oxford Companion to Law, Oxford, 1980,
p.812.
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Therefore, it is evident that Martial Law originated in the disciplinary 
rules to be observed in the army, and matters related thereto be enforced 
by the Court of the Constable and the Marshal in medieval England.
The expression Martial Law1 has been used in various ways by 
different renowned writers at different times, and as such carried no 
precise meaning. It is at times incorrectly employed to denote a 
variety of forms of government or law.
(a) ,!Martial LawM as lfMilitary Law"
First, in former times the term 'Martial Law* was used to mean what
we now call Military Law, the law for the discipline and government of
the armed forces at home and abroad, in war and in peace. The term had
34this connotation up to the latter part of the eighteenth century.
So, ^when the earlier authorities like Edward Coke , Matthew Hale and even 
William Blackstone,** speak of Martial Law, it is plain they are
speaking of the law applicable to the soldier, or what in the modem 
phrase is called military law. It is plain they know of no other; and 
the fact that...such men as Lord Hale and Sir William Blackstone, with 
their accuracy of statement, call it martial law, and do not point out 
any distinction between martial law and military law as it is spoken of 
now, goes far indeed to show that they knew of no such difference, and 
that the distinction now supposed to exist is a thing that has come
into the minds of men certainly much later than when these eminent
34. As Fairman, Charles, wrote, "The words [Martial Law] had this 
connotation [to mean Military Law] at the period when the first 
American Constitutions were framed". Law of Martial Rule, 
Chicago, 1930, p.30.
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luminaries of the law of England wrote their celebrated treatises”.
This confusion in the old authorities is due to the fact that the rules 
that make up the 'Military Law1 and the 'Martial Law' of the present 
day have a common historical origin, which has been pointed out earlier, 
in the law that was administered in medieval England in the Court of the 
Constable and the Marshal. And "Law of the Marshal which then ruled 
under the prerogative the Crown during war or insurrection, included 
both the law necessary for the government of the army (raised for the 
occasion), and also for the government of the [people of the] occupied
36territory or disturbed district while the ordinary law was in abeyance".
(b) Martial Law as Military Government of Occupied Foreign Territory 
Secondly, the expression 'Martial Law' has commonly been used in 
the sense of "Military Government in occupied foreign territory", and 
means the law administered by a military commander in occupied enemy 
territory in time of war. The Duke of Wellington had this Hind of 
Martial Law in mind when in a debate on 1 April 1851 in the House of 
Lords on the question of the Ceylon rebellion in 1849, he said,
"Martial Law is neither more nor less than the will of the general who
37commands the army; in fact, martial law is no law at all" - recalling 
a remark he had used to describe his government in the Spanish Peninsula.
35. Per Cockburn C.J. charge to the grand jury in R. v Nelson and Brand, 
Special Report, pp.99-100. Cited in Holdsworth, William, A History 
of English Law, Vol.X, 1938, p.710, footnote 1. For example, when 
Hale, Matthew, wrote, "First, that in truth and reality it [Martial 
Law] is not a law but something indulged rather than allowed, as a 
law; the necessity of government, order, and discipline in an army 
is that only which can give those laws a countenance, quod enim 
necessitas cogit defendi. Secondly, this indulged law was only to 
extend to members of the army, or to those of the opposite army, and 
never was so much indulged as intended to be executed oi4 exercised upon 
others" (op.cit., pp.34-35), it is evident that here he is speaking of 
Military Law.
36. Tovey,r Hamilton, Martial Law and the Custom of* War, London, 1886, p.66.
37. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol.CXV, 17 March to 
10 April 1851, p.880.
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And for expressing this view, the Duke of Wellington "unwittingly
became an authority in American constitutional law, for his cliche has
38
been repeated tripplingly by various federal judges". Moreover,
"this definition", says Robert S. Rankin, "has been most favoured by
military men because it means that from their position the relations
with the civil population will be ideal - that is, the subordination of
39all civil law to the military". However, the Duke of Wellington's
remark about Martial Law requires some qualification: that the will of
the general must be exercised in accordance with international law and
the conventions of civilized war fare. As the Attorney-General of the
United States, Caleb Cushing, opined in 1857:
"The commander of the invading, occupying, or conquering 
army, rules the invaded, occupied, or conquered 
foreign country, with supreme power, limited only by 
international law and the orders of the Sovereign or 
Government he serves or represents. For, by the 
law of nations, the occupatio bellica in a just war 
transfers the sovereign power of the enemy's country
to the conqueror".40
At present, the restrictions which international law imposes on the 
exercise of the will of the general in occupied foreign territory are 
embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. However, 
Martial Law in the sense of Military Government, which takes the place of 
a suspended or destroyed sovereignty and replaces the previous 
governmental agencies, is quite outside the range of municipal law or
38. Fairman, Charles, "The Law of Martial Rule and the National 
Emergency", Harvard Law Review, Vol.LV, No.8, June 1942,
p.1259.
39. Rankin, Robert S., op.cit., p.4.
40. This opinion was given by Mr. Caleb Cushing, the Attorney-General
of the United States, on 3 February 1857, Opinions of the Attorney-
Generals, Vol.VIII, Washington, 1858, p.369.
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constitutional law. Martial Law, in this sense of the term, is a part,
41
not of municipal, but of international law. In this sense, Martial 
Law is recognised by Public International Law as a part Mof the jus belli. 
It is incidental to the state of a solemn war, and appertains to the law 
of nations".^
(c) Martial Law as the Use of Military Forces to Assist 
Civil Authorities in Suppressing Disorders
Thirdly, the term 'Martial Law1 is sometimes used to mea,n "the
rights and obligations of the military under the common and statuUlaw
of the country to repel force by force while assisting the civil
authorities to suppress riots, insurrection or other disorders in the
land".^ Thus, Martial Law in this form "may amount to no more than
the employment of troops, in aid of and under the direction of the civil
authorities, to supplement the regular police in the control of riots
44 '■
and other public disorders and the enforcement of the law" "without
45
the existence (i.e., proclamation) of martial law"* In this sense
it is a part of the English Constitutional Law and is called Martial 
ttu-
Law in^English sense. To quote Justice Muhammad Munir, who in Muhammad
46Umar Khan v. the Crown observed:----------------------  'i
"This form of martial law is well recognized by the (common) 
law of England and there are several ancient statutes which 
make it incumbent not only on the citizens but also 
servants of the Crown, including the army, to assist civil 
authorities in suppressing disorders in the l a n d " .47
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Muhammad Munir, C.J. in Muhammad Umar Khan v. The Crown, 
Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore, Vol.VI, 1953, p.830.
44. Bishop, Joseph W. Jr., op.cit., p.316.
45. Grayner, J.K., "(Martial Law) United States", Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, VOL,XIV, 1970, p.977.
46. Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore Vol.VI, 1953, p.825.
47. Ibid., p.830.
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About this form of Martial Law, Professor A.V. Dicey wrote:
"Martial Law is sometimes employed as a name 
for the common law right of the Crown and its 
servants to repel force by force in the case of 
invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of 
any violent resistance to the law. This right, 
or power, is essential to the very existence of 
orderly government, and is mo3t assuredly 
recognised in the most ample manner by the Law 
of England".^®
He further stated:
"If, then, by martial law be meant the power of 
the government or of loyal citizens to maintain 
public order, at whatever cost of blood or 
property may be necessary, martial law is 
assuredly part of the law of England". 9
In American Constitutional Law, Martial Law in this sense is a form
of the police power of the state and means law which has application
when the military arm does not supersede civil authority but is merely
called upon to aid such authority in the execution of its civil functions.^
In Bangladesh, in times of disorder a Magistrate can under Section 129
of the Code of Criminal Procedure call in the military to suppress a
48. Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 8th edn., 1915, p.284.
49. Ibid., p.286. It is evident that Dicey in his definition of 
Martial Law included not only the Crown's right to suppress breaches 
of the peace, but also the legal duty of every subject, whether 
soldier or civilian, whether a servant of the government such as
a policeman or a person in no way connected with the administration, 
"to assist in putting down breaches of the peace" , (p.284).
The inclusion of such duty on the part of "all loyal subjects" 
within the ambit of Martial Law does not appear to be supported 
by the modern state of the law. Moreover, Dicey's view of 
the concept of Martial Law as "a power which has in itself no 
special connection with the existence of an armed force" (p.284) 
does not seem to be accurate as no one in modem times could 
think that Martial Law can be enforced without the aid or 
employment of the armed forces. As in Ex parte Milligan (Wallace, 
United States, Vol.IV, 1866, p.2) the Supreme Court opined 
that the administration of Martial Law is a strictly military 
function. Cited in Niaz Ahmad v. Province of Sind, All Pakistan 
Legal Decisions, Karachi, Vol.XXIX, 1977, p.634.
50. Section 4 of Article iv of the American Constitution.
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riot and under Section 130 of the same Code, in the absence of a
Magistrate, a commissioned military officer may disperse an unlawful
assembly by force and nothing done in good faith by such officer is an
offence. However, where the armed forces are called upon only to
assist the civil authorities in maintaining public order, the civil
courts continue to function, and members of the civilian population
may be punished only for violations of the civil law, not for violations
of military orders other than those in implementation of civil law.^*
As regards the use of the term 'Martial Law' to mean the
employment of the armed forces in aid of civil authorities, there is
a difference of opinion among the authors. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.,
52
called this Martial Law "in its mildest form". But Justice Muhammad
53Munir in Muhammad Umar Khan v. The Crown observed;
"It is, however, a misuse of the term to describe these 
rights and duties (of citizens, including servants of 
the Crown and the military in suppressing riots and 
restoring law and order) as martial law; they are 
no more than a part of the civil law of the land".^
And Justice Karam Elahn^Chauhan, in Darevesh M. Arby v. Federation of
Pakistan^ held:
"In the English sense of Martial Law, the civil courts 
are not replaced because temporary governance through 
military courts instead of civil courts is not 
envisaged in that country and the process so deployed 
is thus not of Martial Law and nor is it so termed".
Therefore, it is evident that the right to employ the military to assist
civil authorities in suppressing riots and other public disorders is
paramount to all law and the law of every civilized country recognizes it.
51. G^ayner, J.K., op.cit., p.977.
52. Bishop, Joseph W. Jr., op.cit., p.316.
53. Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore, Vol.VI, 1953, p.825.
54. Ibid., p.835.
55. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXXII, 1980, p.206.
56. Ibid., p.243.
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And "this is not what can properly be called martial law". It seems 
that for want of a proper name, the expression 'Martial Law1 is 
employed to mean the use of the military in aid of civil authorities 
in putting down rebellion and other overpowering social disorders.
(d) Martial Law Strictly Defined as Law Promulgated by Military 
Authorities in Time of Emergency where the Civil Authority 
is Ousted or Subordinated
Fourthly, the term Martial Law is also used in its strict sense.
"Martial Law in the strict sense means the suspension of the ordinary
law, and the sutetitution therefore of discretionary government by
57the Executive exercised through the military." "Martial Law, in the
proper sense of that term", says A.V. Dicey, "means the suspension of
ordinary law and the temporary government of a country or part of it by
58military tribunals." It relates to a domestic territory in a
57. Phillips, O.Hood and Jackson, Paul, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, 6th edn., 1978, p.362.
58. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.283. The proclamation of Martial Law in the 
sense to mean the temporary and recognised government of a country or a 
district by military tribunals (which more or less supersede the 
jurisdiction of the courts) is, according to Dicey, unknown to the law of 
England and is nearly equivalent to the state of things in France and 
many other foreign countries (Latin-American countries) is known as the 
declaration of a "state of siege", p.287. The "state of siege", which
is so known in the civil law countries of continental Europe and Latin 
America, is the civil law counterpart of Martial Law which obtains in 
common law countries. Rossiter, C.L., Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948, 
p.9. It has its origin in the traditional custom of transferring all 
civil authority in a beseiged town to its military commander. Elting, 
John R., "Martial Law", Encyclopaedia Americana, Vol.XVIII, 1977, p.335. 
The French Constitution contains necessary provision for the declaration 
of the "state of siege" under which the authority vested in the civil 
powers for the maintenance of law and order passes entirely to the army. 
Such a "stage of siege" can be declared if there is a threatened or actual 
invasion by a foreign army or if there is an insurrection of considerable 
magnitude in any part of the country. "A state of siege may be decreed 
in the Council of Ministers but only Parliament may authorise its 
extension beyond twelve days". Phillips, 0. Hood and Jackson, Paul, 
op.cit., p.362. It is interesting to note that whereas in France in order 
to check the Executive abuse of the "stage of siege", it was made an 
constitutional and legel institution and brought under the control of 
the Legislature, in the Commonwealth countries as well as in the United
FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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condition of insurrection or invasion when the civil government has been
rendered inoperative or powerless by the insurrectionary or invading 
59forces and to deal with which the military may take over and the 
general commanding the army usually completely ousts or subordinates 
civil authorities. Then the law applied by the army general during the 
period of his occupation is called martial law in sensu strictiore.
In the words of George W. Hickman, Jr.:
"Martial Law, sometimes referred to as martial rule, 
is the assumption of the function of the domestic 
government by the military forces of that government 
in an effort to preserve order and ensure the public 
safety during a period of emergency. It is called 
into being in times of insurrection or invasion 
within domestic areas where the ordinary law can no . 
longer function adequately".
A similar definition is supplied by J.K. Gayner:
"Martial Law is the temporary rule by military authority 
of a designated domestic area in time of an emergency 
when the civil authorities are unable to function or 
their attempt to continue functioning for the time 
being might endanger the state". 1
An identical definition of Martial Law is to be found in Corpus Juris
Secundum:
"Martial Law or, more properly, martial rule, is the 
temporary government by military force and authority 
of territory in which, by reason of the existence of 
war or public commotion, the civil government is 
inadequate to the preservation of order and the 
enforcement of law". ^
58. (continued) States of America, there is no statutory provision for a
crisis government of the type envisaged under Martial Law in the proper
sense of that term. As Fairman, Charles, wrote, "In France the 
declaration of a state of siege, and particularly the legal results 
consequent thereto, are regulated by Statute. The state of siege is a
definite legal status. Quite different is the situation in the United
States (and for that matter, in Anglo-Saxon countries generally) where the 
law governing an exercise of martial rule is largely customary and judge- 
made". "Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection", Illinois Law 
Review, Vol.XXIII, No.8, April 1929, p.776.
59. Arnold, Frazer, "The Rationale of Martial Law", American Bar Association 
Bar Journal, Vol.XV, 1929, p.551.
60. Hickman, George W. Jr., "Martial Law", Encyclopaedia Americana,
Vol.XIX, 1977, p.81.
61. Gjayner, J.K., op.cit., p.977.
62. Corpus Juris Secundum (a complete restatement of the entire American Law 
as developed by All Reported Cases), VOL.XCIII, p.115.
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William E. Birkhimer also defined Martial Law in a similar way:
"Martial law is that rule which is established when 
civil authority in the community is made subordinate 
to military, either in repelling invasion or when 
the ordinary administration of the laws fails to 
secure the proper objects of government11.^3
Therefore, to deal with an emergency, which may arise due to a riot, 
rebellion or invasion, the military commander imposes restrictions 
and regulations upon civilians in their own country. Moreover,
Statutes and even the Constitution may be suspended or abrogated and 
replaced by ordinances of the military commander and the civilian courts 
may be superseded by Martial Law courts. Such courts, although they 
bear a generic resemblance to courts-martial, are not bound to follow 
the same procedure, but may employ whatever rules are called for by the 
needs of the emergency. So,W.F. Finlason is of the opinion that:
"Martial Law is, in short, the suspension of all law, 
but the will of the Military Commanders entrusted 
with its execution, to be exercised, according to 
their judgment, the exigencies of the moment, and 
the usages of the service, with no fixed and settled 
rules, or laws; no definite practice, and not bound 
even by the rules of ordinary Military Laws".^
And W.T. Wells observes:
"Martial law can be defined as a stage intermediate 
between law and anarchy, in which, the normal 
administration of the law having broken down, the 
authority appointed in accordance with law maintains 
order by summary methods".
In the light of the above definitions of Martial Law in its 
proper (or strict) sense, the sense in which the present study is concerned,
63. Birkhimer, William E., op.cit., p.371.
64. Finlason, W.F., A Treatise on Martial Law as Allowed in the Law 
of England in Time of Rebellion, London, 1866, p.107.
65. Wells, W.T., "Martial Law", Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.XIV, 
1970, p.976. *
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it can be said that Martial Law is an arbitrary kind of law which is 
generally promulgated and administered by and through military 
authorities in an effort to maintain public order in times of insurrection, 
riot or invasion when the civil government is unable to function or is 
inadequate to the preservation of peace and tranquillity and the 
enforcement of law and by which the civil authority as well as the 
ordinary administration of the law are either wholly suspended or subjected 
to military power.
(ii) Is Martial Law really Law?
It is interesting to mention here that there are certain scholars 
who are of the opinion that 'Martial Law' is not law at all. John R.
Elting opines:
"Actually, martial law is not law in the ordinary 
sense of that word, but simply the assumption of 
absolute power by the executive branch of the 
government, backed up by military force".^
Sir Charles Napier refers to the term "Martial Law" as:
"In truth no law at all. It is merely a term
applied to that Act of the Legislature which 
suspends social law, and places the people at the 
will of the military, or other chief". '
He then goes on to say that he considers that the expression "Martial Law"
is inaccurate, and that "the just term for such a lawless state is
despotism' as no law but that of might exists. Such a state may be
one of more or less injustice according to the will of those who hold
this absolute power; but it is clear that the will of such persons is
68the law, and that there is no other law". "Martial Law", says, W.F. 
Finlason, "is arbitrary and uncertain in its nature, (as when Martial
66. Elting, John R., op.cit., p.335.
67. Napier, Charles, Remarks on Military Law, p.2, quoted in Tovey,
Hamilton, op.cit., p.67. ’
68. Ibid.
Law is proclaimed there is no rule or law by which the officers
executing Martial Law are bound to carry on their proceedings) so much
69
so that the term 'law1 cannot be properly applied to it". "In
strictness it is not law at all, but rather a cessation of all municipal
law...and in the final analysis is merely the will of t.he officer
70
commanding the military forces". In Muhammad Umar Khan v. The 
71Grown, Justice Muhammad Munir observed:
"...the officer in chief command of the forces 
operating in the troubled area acquires for the 
time being supreme legislative, judicial and 
executive authority. In other words, he himself 
fixes the limits and definition of his own 
authority. He makes his own law, sets up his 
own courts and no civil authority, while he is 
in command, may call into question what he does.
In this sense, therefore, martial law is not law 
at all but. the will of the officer commanding 
the army".72
Thus the essence of this view is that Martial Law is not law at all, 
rather in fact the will of the general commanding the army, the will 
of whom, for the time being, is to be the law in place of ordinary law 
that the people are bound to obey and are subject to punishment, which 
this officer may choose to prescribe, in case of disobedience. He 
might consider anything he pleases an offence and any evidence sufficient 
to establish the offence without recording the evidence in full or 
following any particular procedure and even denying the accused the’ 
right to be defended by counsel of his choice.
On the other hand, there are some other authors who do not support 
this viewl'that Martial Law is not law at all and it is the simple and 
pure will of the commander. Lieutenant-Colonel Tovey opined:
69. Cited in Lowry, James M., Martial Law within the Realm of England. 
An Historical Outline, London, 1914, p.45.
70. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.XCIII, p.116.
71. Pakistan Law Reports, Vol.VI, 1953, p.825.
72. Ibid., pp.838-839.
"It appears hardly correct to state that Martial 
Law is no law at all. It is true that much is left 
to the will, or rather to the discretion, of the 
military commander, but he cannot exercise his will 
without limit. He is responsible to his sovereign, 
to his country, and to the authority who has directed 
him to act. He is limited, in case of insurrection, 
by the conditions under which Martial Law is 
proclaimed, and in case of war, by the Law of 
Nations. He is, further, in all cases limited by 
the law of natural justice to use no greater 
violence than is necessary to carry out the object 
for which Martial Law is being used, whether this 
concerns the safety of the State or the safety of 
the force under his command".
74
Justice Bashiruddin in Mir Hassan v. State held the same view.
"...if there is a Martial Law rule in the country, 
such rule is not arbitrary or uncontrolled by 
principles nor is it the simple and pure will of 
the commander....The person assuming the power is 
to ascertain the will of the people, their settled 
habits and sentiments and to make laws and 
Regulations to gain its ends. Thus...where the 
army of a country proclaims Martial Law to curb 
riots, tumults and violence to law, sovereignty 
still continues to rest with the people".
Then he quoted the observation of the then Justice Hamoodur Rahman in
Muhammad Afzal v. Commissioner, Lahore Division:
"The Martial Law proclaimed chose a system of 
government which was not to be a negation of law 
but an orderly system following a pattern of its 
own selection not dissimilar to the pattern of ^  
civil administration prevailing in the country".
Therefore, it follows that Martial Law is not purely arbitrary as to
power or uncontrolled by principle or unrestricted as to method. It
is the will of the commander of the army, subject to a few regulations.
"Like any other form of rule over human beings, it is obliged by the
circumstances to adapt itself to the circumstances in order to gain its
ends, and one such circumstance of the utmost importance is the settled
73. Tovey, Hamilton, op.cit., pp.67-68.
74. All Pakistan Legzil Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXI, 1969, p.786.
75. Ibid., p.816.
habits and sentiments of the people....It is always of importance
to a new regime to cause the minimum disturbance in the lives of the
ordinary citizens consistent with the execution of the purposes
77underlying its inception”.
(iii) Is ”Martial Law” a System of Government? ”Martial Law” or 
Martial Rule?
Martial Law in its proper sense cannot be described as a system
of government. More appropriately, it is a system of military rule.
’’Martial Law is martial rule in governmental matters exercised by the
78commander of an army...” in times of grave emergency when the military
rises superior to the civil power. But Martial Law conveys to the
people's mind the impression that there is a system of law when in fact
it only means Martial Rule. ’’People imagine”, says David Dudley Field,
’’when they hear the expression martial law, that there is a system of
law known by that name, which can upon occasion be substituted for the
ordinary system; and there is a prevalent notion that under certain
circumstances a military commander may, by issuing a proclamation, .
displace one system, the civil law, and substitute another the martial
law. I say what is called martial law, for strictly there is no such
thing as martial law; it is martial rule....Let us call the thing by
79its right name; it is not martial law, but martial rule.” Charles
Fairman also contends that Martial Law:
"is more accurately described as martial rule, which obtains 
in a domestic community when the military authority carries 
on the government, or at least some of its functions.
77. Cornelius, J. in Province of East Pakistan v. Md. Mehdi Ali Khan, 
All Pakistan Legal Decisions, S.C., Vol.XI, 1959, p.439.
78. Carbaugh, H.C., "Martial Law”, Illinois Law Review, Vol.VII, 
March 1913, p.494.
79. David Dudley Field in his argument in Ex parte Milligan> Wallace, 
United States, Vol.IV, 1866, pp.35-36.
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Martial rule may exist de facto; the term is 
noncommittal as to its legality".SO
F.B. Weiner supports the view of Charles Fairman when he states
"...the term 'law of martial rule1...may be more exact because it is
noncommittal as to the legality of the measures invoked under martial 
81'law'". But Weiner did not use the term in his discussion only
82
because "even if more exact, it is less familiar". Perhaps, it 
would be much less confusing if the term 'Martial Rule1 could be used 
instead of 'Martial Law' as the latter term is at times incorrectly 
employed to denote a variety of forms of government or law.
III. Martial Law and the Doctrine of Necessity
(i) The Role of 'Necessity' in the Proclamation of Martial Law
The doctrine of necessity, namely rendering lawful that which
otherwise is unlawful - id quod alias non est licitum, necessitas licitum
facit, is a well-established doctrine. In constitutional law, the
promulgation of Martial Law is based on this doctrine of necessity. As
regards the degree of necessity that will be sufficient for the declaration
83
of Martial Law, A.V. Dicey advocated "immediate necessity", thus
agreeing with the Supreme Court of the United States in the Ex parte
Milligan case: "Martial Law cannot arise from a threatened invasion.
The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as
84
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration".
Sir Frederick Pollock pleaded for apparent necessity when he said that
80. Fairman, Charles, Law of Martial Rule, Chicago, 1930, p.31.
81. Weiner, F.B., op.cit., p.9. I
82. Ibid., p.10.
83. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., pp.549, 552. He says, "The presence of a foreign 
army or the outbreak of an insurrection in the north conceivably so 
affect the state of the whole country as to justify measures of extra-legal 
force in every part of England but neither war nor insurrection in one part 
of the country prima facie suspends the action’of the law in other parts 
thereof, p.542.
84. Ex parte Milligan, Wallace, United States, Vol.IV, 1866, p.127.
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Martial Law may be promulgated in areas merely threatened by invasion 
85
or rebellion. The view of Pollock has been termed by Dicey, for
86the sake of convenience, as the "doctrine of political expediency".
Perhaps Martial Law may be described as the rule of reasonable necessity.
As John Salmond suggests that:
"...even within the realm itself, the existence of a 
state of war and of national danger justifies in 
law the temporary establishment of a system of 
military government and military justice in 
derogation of the ordinary law of the land, in so 
far as this is reasonably deemed necessary for 
the public safety".8?
J.I.C. Hare contends that:
"In saying that martial law cannot arise from a 
threatened invasion, Mr. Justice Davis (in the 
Ex parte Milligan case) may gone too far, and 
unduly limited the right of the military 
authorities to provide for the safety of the 
community. Nothing short of a necessity 
can justify a recourse to martial law; but 
such a necessity may exist before the blow 
actually falls....All that can be said with 
certainty is that there must be reasonable 
and probably cause for believing in the 
imminency of a peril that suspends the ordinary 
rules..."88
And F.B. Weiner also states that:
"Martial law is the public law of necessity.
Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies 
its exercise....That necessity is no formal, 
artificial, legalistic concept but an actual 
and factual one: it is the necessity of taking
action to safeguard the state against insurrection, 
riot, disorder or public calamity. What 
constitutes necessity is a question of fact in each
case".89
85. Pollock, Frederick, "What is Martial Law?", The Law Quarterly 
Review, Vol.XVIII, April 1902, pp.155-156.
86. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.551.
87. Salmond, John, Jurisprudence, 7th edn., pp.100-101.
88. Hare, d.I.C., American Constitutional Law, Vol.II, Boston, 
1889, pp.964-965.
89. Weiner, F.B., op.cit., p.16.
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"When because of internal commotion, the bonds of society are loosened,
and the people, stripped of that protection which government is instituted to
afford, or when, in presence of an invading army, it becomes necessary to
concentrate every element of resistance to repel it, the necessity for enforcing
90martial law arises". Therefore, the declaration of Martial Law would, in
cases of foreign invasion, mainly serve the purpose of enabling the
forces of the country to be better utilized for its defence and in
cases of rebellion or other serious internal disorder, would enable
the government to arrest persons, resisting its authority summarily try and
promptly punish when the ordinary course of justice is, for its slow
and regulated pace, utterly inadequate to serve the said purpose when
every moment is critical. "Hence", says, A.V. Dicey, "martial law
comes into existence in times of invasion or insurrection when, where,
and in so far as the King’s peace cannot be maintained by ordinary
91means, and owes its existence to urgent and paramount necessity."
He further states:
"The justification and the source of the exercise 
in England of extraordinary or, as it may be termed, 
extra-legal power, is always the necessity for the 
preservation or restoration of the King's peace'?.
Sir James Mackintosh, speaking in the House of Commons on 1 June 1324, in
support of Lord Brougham's motion condemning the use of Martial Law in
Demerara, said on this point:
"The only principle on which the law of England 
tolerates what is called Martial [law], is 
necessity: its introduction can be justified
only by necessity....When foreign invasion or 
civil war renders it impossible for courts of 
law to sit, or to enforce the execution of their 
judgements, it becomes necessary to find some 
rude substitute for them, and to employ, for that 
purpose, the military, which is the only remaining 
force in the community".
90. Birkhimer, William, E., op.cit., p.427.
91. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.539.
92. Ibid., p.544.
93. Hansard, T .C ., The Par1iameritary Debates, New Series, London, Vol.XI, 
March-June 1824, p.1046.
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Therefore, Martial Law being the law based on necessity can be employed
in times of grave emergency, when society is disordered by civil war,
insurrection or invasion by a foreign enemy, for the speedy restoration
of peace and tranquillity, public order and safety in which the civil
authority may function and flourish, but is limited by the emergency
itself. Despite the fact that the promulgation of Martial Law suspends
fundamental rights of the citizen and the right to enforce them in a
court of law for the period of emergency, it becomes necessary only v
because there looms a greater emergency which might put an end to these
rights forever, if steps are not taken to remedy the situation. Thus
MThe right of resorting to such an extremity”, as jointly opined by
Attorney-General Sir John Campbell and Solicitor-General Sir R.M. Rolfe,
”is a right arising from and limited by necessity of the case - quod
94necessitas cogit, defendit”, - what necessity forces, it justifies.
So, the true test of the right to establish Martial Law has been said 
to be, whether the civil authorities are able, by the ordinary legal 
process, to preserve order, punish offenders and compel obedience to 
the laws. In other words, the test is whether the interference by the 
military is necessary, when it becomes evident that the civil authorities 
are unable to function, or that because of impending grave danger it 
would be unsafe for them to function, in order to perform the duty .of 
repelling force and restoring such condition of things as will enable 
the civil authorities to resume charge. Martial Law is, therefore, a 
measure which is used only as a last resort when less drastic measures 
have failed.
94. Forsyth, William, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and 
Various Points of English Jurisprudence, London, 1869, p.198.
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(O.) The Role of Necessity in the Proclamation of 
Martial Law and the Concept of Open Court
Here it may be pointed out that it is contended that the role
of the doctrine of necessity in deciding the question of promulgation
95
of Martial Law "cannot be separated from the concept of open court".
This doctrine of 'open court' may be traced from early English history,
96
through the Theobald Wolf Tone case, its transfer to America, and its
adoption as law in the majority decision of the Ex parte Milligan case.
97It was held in the Ex parte Milligan case that:
"Martial law can never exist where the courts are open, 
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their 
jurisdiction". °
This observation reveals that in promulgating Martial Law what should 
be taken into consideration is that the courts should not only be open 
but should be functioning properly and effectively, as it is possible 
that in times of invasion, insurrection or rebellion the court might be 
open yet its jurisdiction be disturbed and obstructed. In other words, 
"when, by invasion, insurrection, rebellions or such like, the
95. Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. in Zia-ur-Rahman, v. State, All 
Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXIV, 1972, p.397.
96. Howell, T .B., State Trials, English, Vol.XXVII, 1798, p.613. The 
trial of Theobald Wolf Tone (Wolf Tone, an Irish resident and 
formerly a member of the Irish Bar, was sentenced to death by the 
court-martial in November 1798 and subsequently a motion was made 
in the Court of King's Bench) is a leading case on the subject of 
Martial Law in which the question came up whether a court-martial 
could proceed against a person who was not commissioned in the 
army of the King and whether military tribunals or courts-martial 
could try civilians when the civil courts were open and unobstructed 
in the performance of their functions (p.625). But these two most 
important issues could not be adjudicated upon as the motion in the 
Court of King's Bench failed due to the fact that the writ of 
habeas corpus could not be served and the prisoner brought to the 
Court on account of the prisoner having died of the wounds he had 
received in an attempt to cut his own throat.
97. Wallace, United States, Vol.IV, 1866, p.2.
98. Ibid., p.127.
peaceable course of justice is disturbed and stopped, so as the
court of justice be, as it were, shut up, et silent leges inter arma"
then only the question of promulgating Martial Law arises. Therefore,
if the term "open court" is considered to mean a "court really and
practically open for remedy or redress, so that the common law can have
its course", then the true limit of Martial Law with respect to open
court would be that when the civil courts are open to distribute justice
to all and function properly and effectively, there is no necessity for
a recourse to Martial Law. "At a time and place", says A.V. Dicey,
"where the ordinary civil courts are open, and fully and freely exercise
their ordinary jurisdiction, there exists, presumably, a state of peace,
99and where there is peace there cannot be martial law".
However, the contention that there is no necessity for declaring 
Martial Law when the civil courts are open and in the proper as well as 
undisturbed performance of their jurisdiction does not seem to find 
unqualified support and perhaps it no longer holds good. Commenting 
on the majority decision in Ex parte Milligan, West W. Willoughby stated
"It is correct to say that 'the necessity must 
be actual and present', but it is not correct 
to say that this necessity cannot be present 
except when the courts are closed and deposed 
from civil administration, for, as the minority
justices correctly pointed out, there may be
urgent necessity for martial rule even when 
the courts are open. The better doctrine, then, 
is...to test the legality of an act by its 
special circumstances. Certainly the fact that 
the courts are open and undisturbed will in all 
cases furnish a powerful presumption that there 
is no necessity for a resort to martial law, but 
it should not furnish an irrebuttable presumption'.'.
H. Earle Richards considers the rule of 'open court' to determine the
necessity of Martial Law as "an artificial rule which does not commend
99. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.545.
100. Willoughby, Westel W., The Constitutional Law of the United States, 
Vol.Ill, New York, 2nd edn., 1929, p.1602.
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itself, apart from authority, to reason'1. " T h e r e  is no merit in
the argument", says Charles Fairman, "that the courts of a state are
closed by the very fact that the governor has declared the existence
102of an insurrection." The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
103in Ex parte D.F. Marais also abandoned the historic doctrine that 
where the courts are open, martial rule cannot prevail: the fact that
some courts were exercising uninterrupted jurisdiction was not conclusive 
that war was not raging. It was held:
"The fact that for some purposes some tribunals had been 
permitted to pursue their ordinary course (in a 
district in which martial law has been proclaimed) is 
not conclusive that war is not raging".
As regards the decision in Ex parte D.F. Marais, Sir Frederick Pollock
said:
"As to Ex parte D.F. Marais, the only point it really 
decided in my opinion, was that the absence of 
visible disorder and the continued sitting of the 
courts are not conclusive evidence of a state of 
peace. This, I venture to think, is right..."105
Therefore, it can be 'said that the Ex parte D.F. Marais case put an
end to the "open court" rule, which did hold the field for a long time.
Modem scientific knowledge and technological developments have
revolutionised the very concept of warfare and it seems that new
developments in the mode of fighting make it possible for the civil
courts to be open and functioning and yet be in the actual fighting
zone as in December 1941 Martial Law was declared in Hawaii following
101. Richards, H. Earle, "Martial Law", The Law Quarterly Review,
Vol.XVIII, April 1902, p.141.
102. Fairman, Charles, "Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection", 
Illinois Law Review, Vol.XXIII, No.8, April 1929, p.787.
103. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 1902, p.109.
104. Ibid., p.114.
105. Pollock, Frederick, op.cit., p.157.
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the Japanese bombing (of Hawaii) on 7 December 1941 when "the federal
court in Hawaii was open...and was capable of exercising criminal
jurisdiction".*^ The criterion of the courts being open or closed is,
as Charles Fairman expresses it, "a fiction which served well in the
time of the Stuart Kings, but may easily be too restrictive in time of 
107
modern War” . A.V. Dicey is right when he says, Mthis rule cannot...
108be laid down as anything like an absolute principle of law” and 
should "not be accepted as a rigid rule".*^a
Therefore, it would appear to be fair to state that the fact 
that courts are open and uninterrupted is but one of many factors (e.g., 
failure of the civil authorities to maintain law and order) relevant 
to determine the necessity of the promulgation of Martial Law.
(b) Necessity Operates Independently of a Proclamation
"Just as Martial Law may not be declared when no necessity exists,
so the declaration of Martial Law is not necessary to the validity of
109measures of military rule when the necessity is actually present."
Necessity operates independently of a Proclamation of Martial Law and
as such the existence of Martial Law does not in any way depend upon
its proclamation. The Proclamation of Martial Law is merely an official
declaration of an existing fact. As Caleb Cushing expresses it:
"When martial law is proclaimed under circumstances of 
assumed necessity, the proclamation must be regarded 
as the statement of an existing fact, rather than 
the legal creation of that fact".
And Charles Fairman states:
106. United States Supreme Court Reports, Vol.327[CCCXXVII],
October Term 1945, p.332.
107. Fairman, Charles, Law of Martial Rule, Chicago, 1930, p.147.
108. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.544.
108a. Ibid., p.545.
109. Weiner, F.B. op.cit., pp.19-20.
110. Opinions of the Attorney-Generals of the United States, Washington,
Vol.VIII, 1858, p.374.
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MThe proclamation of martial law is...only evidence 
of a finding of the necessity for the commander's 
assuming control of the functions of civil 
government. It will be the emergency which 
called it forth, not the fact of proclamation, 
which justifies the extraordinary measures 
taken". 11
To the same effect, it is also said:
"...it is not the proclamation which makes martial 
law, but events which have created the emergency....
A proclamation may be evidence of such a state 
being already in existence, but it cannot change 
existing conditions from a peace-time footing 
to one of war within the realm".m
Therefore, in the absence of the necessity of the crisis which demands
the initiation of Martial Law, a proclamation of Martial Law has no
authority as the mere fact of a proclamation can in no way be the
justification for enforcing Martial Law. If the exigencies of the
situation call forth Martial Law, a formal proclamation is not necessary.
As long as the forcible and exceptional measures are necessary for the
purpose of restoring law and order, "they might be taken without any
113proclamation [of Martial Law] at all". Lord Halsbury supports this
view when he observes:
"The right to administer force against force in 
actual war (or rebellion) does not depend upon 
the proclamation of martial law at all. It 
depends upon the question whether there is war 
(or rebellion) or not. If there is war (or 
rebellion), there is the right to repel force by 
force".114
"The proclamation of Martial Law is not a generating source of 
115
power." It does not add to the power or right inherent in the
government to use force for the suppression of disorder, or resistance to
111. Fairman, Charles, "The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency", 
Harvard Law Review, Vol.LV, No.8, June 1942, p.1288.
112. Wade, E.C.S., and Bradt&v, Constitutional Law, 8th edn., 1970, p.410.
N 113. Cited in O'Sullivan, Richard, op.cit., p.26. ’
114. In Tilonko v. The Attorney-General of the Colony of Natal, The Law 
Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 1907, p.94.
115. Fairman, Charles, op.cit., p.1288.
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invasion. Also it does not confer upon the government any power which
the government would not have possessed without it. The object and
the effect of the proclamation can only be to give notice to the
inhabitants of the place with regard to which Martial Law is proclaimed,
of the course which the government is obliged to adopt for the purpose
of defending the country, or of restoring tranquillity.
"A proclamation of martial law", says F.W. Maitland, "can have no
other legal effect than this - it is a proclamation by the King, or by
persons holding office under the King, announcing that a state of things
exists in which it has become necessary that force shall be repelled
and suppressed by force; it is a warning that the part of our common
law which sanctions such repulsion and suppression, has come into 
117play." In almost the same way, Sir David Dundas states:
"The proclamation of martial law is a notice to all 
those to whom the proclamation (of martial law) 
is addressed that there is now another measure of 
law and another mode of proceeding than there was 
before...”118
that proclamation. Of the like opinion is Earl Grey, who, as Secretary
for the Colonies, wrote in a despatch upon the Ceylon case:
"The proclamation of martial law is, in fact, no 
more than a declaration that, under circumstances 
of urgent public danger, all the law is for a 
time suspended, and that, for the safety of the 
state, the government deems it necessary to set 
aside the ordinary rules of law by military force,
116. Joint Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General, Sir John 
Campbell and Sir R.M. Rolfe, as to the power of the Governor of 
Canada to proclaim Martial Law, Forsyth, William, op.cit., p.198.
117. Maitland, F.W., op.cit., pp.491-492.
118. Attorney-General Sir David Dundas in his evidence as to the nature 
and legality of Martial Law, imposed in Ceylon in 1848, to suppress 
a rebellious rising in Kandy, before a Committee of the House of 
Commons, quoted in Stephen, James Fitzjames, A History of the Criminal 
Law in England, Vol.I, London, 1883, p.213.
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and to proceed summarily to put down the rebellion, 
or to punish those who are concerned in it".H^
Therefore, the proclamation of Martial Law is nothing but a formal
establishment of a system of military rule and justice in times of
grave emergency and it serves merely as a notice or warning to all whom
it may concern that the military forces are about to assume absolute
control for the speedy restoration of peace and tranquillity, public
order and safety. "The principal practical value of a proclamation
of martial law”, says F.B. Weiner, "is its effect in putting the public
on notice that the situation demands military measures and restrictions
broader than those ordinarily enforced by the civil authorities. A
proclamation may also have a certain emotional value in that it suggests,
at least to the ordinary citizen, that the situation is a grave one and
that the enforcement of law and order has been vested, in whole or in
120part, in outside agencies".
(ii) The Role of Necessity* in the Justification of All 
Measures Taken during Martial Law
Since the initiation of Martial Law is based on necessity, the
justification of all measures adopted during a regime of Martial Law
should also be based on necessity. "The fact that necessity", says
A.V. Dicey, "is the sole justification for martial law or, in other
words, for a temporary suspension of the ordinary rights of English
citizens during a period of war or insurrection, does, however place a
very real limit on the lawful exercise of force by the Crown or by its 
121servants." Necessity measures the extent and the degree to which
122Martial Law may be employed. It justifies taking of those measures
119. Quoted in Finalson, W.F., A,Review of the Authorities as to the 
Repression of Riot or Rebellion, London, 1868, p.96.
120. Weiner, F.B., op.cit., pp.20V21. ’
121. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.542
122. Weiner, F.B., op.cit., p.16.
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which in the normal conditions wpuld be trespass, and thus unlawful.
In general, the military commander should confine the exercise of his 
exceptional powers to taking such measures as can, on the restoration 
of order, be shown to have been necessary for ensuring the safety of 
his troops and suppressing rebellion, insurrection or riot. "While 
the laws are silenced", says Sir James Mackintosh, "by the noise of 
arms, the rulers of the armed force must punish, as equitably as they
123
can, those crimes,which threaten their own safety and that of society.1?
In order to attain the object of restoring the condition of things that
will enable the civil authority to resume charge, the military commander 
may issue such orders, and enforce them in such manner as may be necessary; 
for that purpose only and should not interfere beyond what is necessary 
for the restoration of order. His authority is, for the time being, 
supreme, but in practice the amount of his interference with the civil 
administration and the ordinary courts is measured by military necessity.
It is rightly contended:
"The Military Officer must at all times be guided by 
military exigencies of the situation. Having 
provided for these, he should confine himself to 
action directed to the restoration of order. It
should be borne in mind that improved administration
is not the object of Martial Law, that example 
and punishment are not its ends, but only its means 
and allowable only so far as necessary for its 
legitimate object; and that its severities can only 
be justified when they are necessary for the restoration 
of order and their establishment of civil authority".12^
Therefore, it is clear that necessity must be the justification for
every act during Martial Law.
(iii) The Role of ’Necessity* in the Continuation of Martial Law
Since Martial Law owes its existence to necessity, its continuance
123. Hansard, T.C., The Parliamentary Debates, New Series, Vol.XI, 
March-June 1824, p.1046. «
124. Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore, Vol.yi* 1953, p.846.
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124a
also depends on necessity. As in Queen v. Bekker acting Chief
Justice Buchanan observed;
"That as necessity justifies the proclamation of 
martial law, so also does necessity justify its
continuance".^25
Inasmuch as Martial Law is a temporary measure, it is to be continued
only so long as the exigency giving rise to its initiation prevails.
Martial Law, as A.V. Dicey puts it, "always lasts so long, and so long
only, as the circumstances exist which necessitate the use of force...,
the right to use force in putting an end to a riot ceases when order
is restored, just as it only begins when a breach of the peace is
126
threatened or has actually taken place". So, it is allowed to govern
by Martial Rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity
creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for if this government is
127continued after order is restored it is a gross usurpation of power.
The continuance of Martial Law, as Sir James Mackintosh expresses it,
Requires precisely the same justification of necessity; and if it
survives the necessity on which alone it rests for a single minute, it
becomes instantly a mere exercise of lawless violence...every moment
128
beyond [necessity] is usurpation".
Therefore, Martial Law ceases when the emergency comes to an end, 
when the country is sufficiently tranquil to permit the ordinary agencies 
of government to cope with existing conditions and as such the political 
branches of the government terminate it by some formal act.
124a Supreme Court Reports, Cape of Good Hope, Vol.XVII, part II, 
1900, p.340.
125. Ibid., p.348.
126. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.544.
127. In Ex parte Milligan case, Wallace, United States, Vol.IV, 1866, 
p.127.
128. Hansard, T.C., op.cit., p.1046.
66
IV. Martial Law Courts
The courts that are used to administer Martial Law in the United
States are called ’Military Commissions' in order to distinguish them from
129the courts-martial which (courts-martial) enforce military law within
the army as authorised by statute, articles of war and the Manual for
Courts-Martial. In England it was long the custom to apply the name
130courts-martial to military tribunals indiscriminately. But since
131
the Ex parte D.F. Marais case of 1901, 'military tribunals',
132
or 'military court' has come to be the accepted name for the courts 
that are employed to administer Martial Law. Perhaps it would be 
more appropriate to describe these bodies as Martial Law Courts or 
Martial Law Tribunals since they are set up during the Martial Law 
period to try Martial Law offences.
A Martial Law court is an almost inevitable incident of the resort 
to Martial Law to administer prompt and speedy justice for the restoration 
of law and order. The machinery of the civil law is sometimes considered 
inadequate in times of emergency because of its slow and ponderous 
proceedings. It is established because "Many of the offences which have 
to be suppressed are offences, not against the ordinary law, but against
129. Tovey, Hamilton, op.cit., p.101.
130. As Edward James and James Fitzjames Stephen in their joint 
opinion in 1866 on Martial Law with reference to the insurrection 
(of negroes) which took place in 1865 at Morant Bay in Jamaica 
said, "The courts-martial, as they are called, by which martial 
law...is administered; are not, properly speaking, courts- 
martial..." Forsyth, William, op.cit., p.560; Stephen, James 
Fitzjames, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol.I,
London, 1883, p.216
131; The LAW Reports, Appeal Cases, 1902, London, p.114.
132. In Clifford and O'Sullivan, The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, Vol.II, 
1921, London, p.570.
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some rule, which for military reasons the commander has found it
133 134
necessary to enact". As in the King v. John Allen Chief Justice Molony,
who delivered the unanimous judgment of the court, observed:
"...that during the continuance of hostilities, and 
while martial law exists, the necessities of the 
situation are for the decision of the military 
authorities, and that they may...try the prisoner 
by military Court at once..."135
Lord Halsbury also observed in Tilonko v. The Attorney-General of the 
136Colony of Natal, that if there is war or rebellion:
"...there is the right to repel force by force, 
but it is found convenient and decorous, from 
time to time, to authorize what are called 
'courts' to administer punishments, and to 
restrain by acts of repression the violence 
that is committed in time or war (or rebellion), 
instead of leaving such punishment and repression 
to the casual action of persons acting without 
sufficient consultation, or without sufficient 
order or regularity in the procedure in which 
things alleged to have been done are proved....
Such acts of justice are justified by necessity, 
by the fact of actual war (or rebellion)".
Therefore, Martial Law courts are set up by a military commander with
a view to punishing people promptly for contravention of Martial Law
Regulations or Orders,
But Martial Law courts are not really courts at all, they are 
merely advisers to the military commanders and that as such their orders 
are essentially in the nature of executive action taken with the object 
of preventing mischief and disorder during the Martial Law period. As 
Edward James and James Fitzjames Stephen observed, the Martial Law 
courts,
133. Richards, H. Earle, op.cit., p.138.
134. The Irish Reports, Vol.II, 1921, Dublin, p.241.
135. Ibid., p.273.
136. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, 1907, London, p.93.
137. Ibid., pp.94-95.
"...are not, properly speaking...courts at all.
They are merely committees formed for the purpose 
of carrying into execution the discretionary power 
assumed by the Government...They are justified in 
doing, with any forms and in any manner, whatever 
is necessary to suppress insurrection, and to 
restore peace and the authoritity of the law".
139
In Clifford and O'Sullivan, Viscount Cave on the Woolsack also held,
with whom Lord Dunedin, Lord Atkinson and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline
concurred, in a similar way that a Martial Law court is not a "court or
140
judicial tribunal in any legal sense of those terms". To "the same
effect, Chief Justice Molony in the .King v... John Alleny. observed:
"In considering any question arising out of the 
administration of martial law by military Courts, 
we must not lose sight of the fact that they are 
not, in strictness, Courts at all".*^
"AMartialLaw Court id'Vas Viscount Cave held, "a body of military
officers entrusted by the commanding officer with the duty of inquiring
into certain alleged breaches of his commands contained in the
proclamation, and of advising him as to the manner in which he should
1 A O
deal with the offences". It sits, "not as a tribunal for hearing
charges of crime, but as a military committee for considering a matter 
arising under the proclamation and advising the commanding officer 
thereon".
Thus a Martial Law court forms no part of the judicial system; 
it is not in any way similar to the ordinary court of justice and a
138. Forsyth, William, op.cit., pp.560-561; Stephen, James Fitzjames, 
op.cit., p.216.
139. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, Vol.II, 1921, London, p.570.
140. Ibid., p.581.
141. The Irish Reports, Dublin, Vol.II, 1921, p.270.
142. In Clifford and O'Sullivan, The Law Reports, Appeal Cases,
Vol.II, 1921, London, p.581.
143. Ibid., p.582.
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case tried before it is not, properly speaking, a"criminal cause or 
144matter". It exists as court neither by statute nor by the common
law but by an order of the commanding officer during the Martial Law
period. "It is nothing more than a sort of better-regulated decimation,
founded upon choice, instead of chance..."*^ To attempt to make the
proceedings of Martial Law courts, "administering summary justice under
the supervision of a military commander, analogous to the regular
146proceedings of Courts of justice is quite illusory". "The proceedings
144. Ibid., Viscount Cave (in Clifford and O ’Sullivan) held that as the 
so-called military Court is not a Court in any legal sense, so the 
charges that are brought before that body are not in any legal 
sense charges of crime. Ibid., p.581. "The term 'criminal cause 
or matter1 involves the existence of a properly constituted Court, 
and, in fact, there being no Court there can be no cause or matter. 
The question does not depend on the quality of the act but is a 
question of procedure." Quoted in ibid., p.575. Viscount Cave 
observed that "in order that a matter may be a criminal cause or 
matter it must...fulfil two conditions which are connoted by and 
implied in the word 'criminal1. It must involve the consideration 
of some charges of crime, that is to say, of an offence against 
the public law (Imperial Dictionary, tit. 'Crime' and 'Criminal'); 
and the charge must have been preferred or be about to be preferred 
before some Court or judicial tribunal having or claiming 
jurisdiction to impose punishment for the offence or alleged offence. 
If these conditions are fulfilled, the matter may be criminal,
even though it is held that no crime has been committed, or that 
the tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with it". Ibid., p.580. 
Since the proceedings of the military tribunal do not fulfil 
either of these conditions (p.581) they are in no sense criminal 
proceedings, p.582. "This is not a criminal proceeding, although 
the topic is what is called a criminal matter, because the charge 
is not made under the law of the land, but is made under the 
proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief'!, p.575.
145. Sir James Mackintosh speaking in the House of Commons on 1 June 
1824 in the debate on the Demerara case of 1823, Hansard, T.C., 
Parliamentary Debates, New Series, Vol.XI, March-June 1824,
London, pp.1048-1049.
146. Lord Halsbury in Tilonko v. The Attorney-General of the County of 
Natal, The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, 1907, London, p.95.
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147
of a military Court”, as it is held in the King v. John Allen (by Chief 
Justice Molony) derive their sole justification and authority from the 
existence of actual rebellion (or invasion), and the duty of doing
148
whatever may be necessary to quell it, and to restore peace and order”.
Therefore, it can be said that a Martial Law court is not a court 
of law or is not a judicial tribunal, but a body of military (or civil) 
officers appointed by the commanding officer with a view to deal promptly 
with the breaches of Martial Law Regulations or Orders and its sentences, 
if confirmed, derive their force from the authority of the commanding 
officer and as such its proceedings are essentially in the nature of 
executive action.
V. The Historical Experience of Martial Law in the Indian Subcontinent
(i) Martial Law in Undivided India during the Rule of the East India Company
The East India Company, which started as a trading concern in India 
149in 1613, ultimately acquired administrative functions in 1765, when it
obtained from the Emperor Shah Alam of Delhi (the then nominal ruler of
India) a Charter, making the Company the Dewan*^ or Administrator of Bengal, 
151Bihar and Orissa. By "the middle of the nineteenth century, the Company
emerged as the undisputed ruler of India, while two-fifths of India's
152
territory remained 'independent' under Native Rulers".
147. The Irish Reports, Vol.II, 1921, Dublin, p.241.
148. Ibid., p.271.
149. Mukherjee, Ramkrishna, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company 
Bombay, 1973, p.224.
150. That meant the Company got the entire revenue and financial 
administration of these areas.
151. Bose, Subhas Chandra, The Indian Struggle 1920-1942, compiled by 
the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta, pp.11-12; Mukherjee, 
Ramkrishna, op.cit., p .269.
152. Ibid., p.282.
However, the East India Company encountered hostile powers like 
the Marathas (hostilities between the Marathas and the East India 
Company lasted till the second decade of the nineteenth century), who 
threatened the safety and public order of the Company's territorial 
possessions. Moreover, the Company confronted active opposition from 
the Indian people. In order to deal with the situation, the Bengal 
State Offences Regulation (Regulation X of 1804) was passed in 1804.
This Regulation empowered the Governor-General-in-Council "to declare 
and establish Martial Law...for the safety of British possessions and 
for the security of the lives and property of the inhabitants thereof 
by the immediate punishment of persons.. .who may be taken in arms in 
open hostility...or in the actual commission of any overt act of 
rebellion...or in the act of aiding and abetting..."
The series of revolts that took place in India in the nineteenth 
century during the East India Company's rule necessitated the declaration 
of Martial Law on a number of occasions. Thus Martial Law was declared 
in Cuttack in 1817-1818, in Vizagapatam and Palkonda in 1832, in Kimedi 
in 1833, in Gumsur in 1835, in Savantwadi in 1844, and in the Division 
of Varanasi (Benares) and Alahabad during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857.
Of all these, the Martial Law promulgated in 1857 deserves special 
attention because, as a consequence of the Sepoy Mutiny (described by 
the Indians as the "First War of Independence"), India saw the end of 
the East India Company's rule.
During the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, for "a considerable time, and over 
a large extent of territory, all civil law was necessarily suspended by 
the act of the rebels. The civil officers were driven away, and the 
courts were Closed. No authority other than the military was in 
existence and it had to act summarily, and on the spur of the moment, as
153
a matter of self preservation". On 9 June 1857, Martial Law was
declared in the Divisions of Varanasi (Benares) and Allahabad. "While
the hostile forces were face to face, everyone who appeared to belong to
154
or to be siding with, the rebels, was dealt with as an enemy."
Thus it is evident that Martial Law was declared in India from 
time to time during the East India Company's rule under the common law 
doctrine of necessity, the necessity to suppress revolt or mutiny and 
to restore the authority of the civil government.
It may be mentioned here that, after the declaration of Martial 
Law in Varanasi and Allahabad in 1857, there was for nearly sixty years 
no rebellion or insurrection necessitating the declaration of Martial 
Law in India.
(ii) Martial Law in Undivided India during the Rule of the Crown 
The Government of India Act, 1858, which was passed after the 
suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny, put an end to the East India Company's 
rule in India. With the introduction of this Act, Queen Victoria 
issued a Royal Proclamation on 1 November 1858 and by this Proclamation, 
the East India Company was dissolved and its Indian possessions came 
under the control of the Crown.
(a) The Proclamation of Martial Law in the Five Districts 
of the Panjab Province in 1919
The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, 1919, which was passed 
to deal with the situation resulting from the lapse of the Defence of 
India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act, 1915, after the end of World War I 
and which was to continue in force for three years from the date of the
153. Mayne, John D., Criminal Law of India, Part II, 4th end., 1914, p.109
154. Ibid.
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termination of war, provided special law and procedure to supplement 
the ordinary law for dealing with subsersive and revolutionary activities. 
This Act, commonly known as the Rowlatt Act after the name of the 
President of the Sedition Committee, Rowlatt, who was a Judge of the 
King's Bench Division in the United Kingdom, created considerable 
resentment and met with very widespread opposition throughout India from 
people of all shades of political opinion. The Indians considered the 
Act as "the Black Act which would seriously curtail their personal and 
individual f r e e d o m " . M . K .  Gandhi, the great Indian leader, started 
his Satyagraha* ^  movement against the Rowlatt Act at Ahmedabad on 
24 February 1919 and later, on 1 March, announced at Bombay that those 
taking the Satyagraha vow would offer civil disobedience to the Act. 
Although the observance of the hartal, called for by Gandhi in furtherance 
of his Satyagraha movement, on 6 April in a number of provinces (such as 
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and the Panjab) did not result in serious clashes 
between the police and the crowds, there were many signs of growing 
excitement and unrest among the people. Yet the strikes that took 
place, following the reported arrest of Gandhi on 9 April, at Amritsar, 
Lahore and other places on 10 April saw violent outbreaks, especially 
at Amritsar. The Civil Authorities of Amritsar, being unable to 
restrain the rioting, killing and looting, on 11 April made over charge 
to the Officer-Commanding, General R.E. Dyer, under Sections 130-131 of
155. Hunter, William, Panjab Disturbances 1919-20, Vol.II, British 
Perspective (originally published under the title, Report of the 
Disorders Inquiry Committee 1919-20), New Delhi, 1976, p.96.
156. The root meanihg of the term Satyagraha is 'holding on to truth'; 
hence truth-force. It means vindication of truth, not by 
infliction of suffering on the opponent, but one's own self and, 
therefore, excludes the use of violence in any form. Thus a 
true Satyagrahi invites pain and suffering upon himself with a 
view to inducing government to alter a measure to which he is 
opposed.
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the Criminal Procedure Code, and asked him to take such steps as he 
thought necessary to re-establish civil control. This amounted to 
the establishment of de facto Martial Law. However, the firing, on 
the meeting held in Jallianwala Bagh in the afternoon of 13 April 1919 
in defiance of General Dyer's proclamation forbidding processions of 
any kind or gatherings of four men, resulted in the killing of 379 
persons and the injury of about 1,200 persons. This firing strained 
the temper of the people to breaking point. The disturbances on and 
after 14 April in the districts of Gujranwala, Gujrat,and Lyallpur 
were the results of the sensational reports about the Jallianwala Bagh 
incident and false rumours about the damaging of the Golden Temple.
The main targets of attack were railway stations, lines and bridges, 
banks, telegraphs offices, telegraph wire and post offices. A few 
innocent Europeans were also murdered.
Thus non-violent resistance to the Rowlatt Act turned into violent
outbreaks and disorders. This showed that it is easy enough to
undermine respect for the law, but it is not equally easy to inculcate
the self-suffering necessarily involved in civil disobedience to the
laws of a state in order to secure reforms or redress of grievances.
However, Gandhi frankly admitted that he had made a blunder of
157'Himalayan' dimensions in prematurely embarking on a mass civil • 
disobedience campaign which had enabled ill-disposed person, not true 
passive resisters at all, to perpetrate disorders, and he immediately 
announced the suspension of his movement.
However, on 15 April 1919, Martial Law was declared in the districts 
of Lahore and Amritsar (of the Panjab province) by the Lieutenant-Governor
157. Williams, L.F. Rushbrook, India in 1919, Calcutta, 1920, p.36.
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of the Panjab, in accordance with the direction of the Governor-General,
Lord Chelmsford, on the ground that a state of open rebellion against
the authority of the government had existed in those two districts.
Later, by subsequent notifications, Martial Law was extended on the same
ground to the districts of Gujranwala on 16 April, Gujrat on 19 April,
and Lyallpur on 24 April. It is noteworthy that Martial Law was
proclaimed in these districts under the Bengal State Offences Regulation
of 1804, which had been extended to the Panjab by the Panjab Laws Act,
1872. However, several (five) Martial Law Ordinances were promulgated
by the Governor-General for the administration of Martial Law.
There were controversies with regard to the justification of the
imposition of Martial Law in the five districts of the Panjab. Many
Indian lawyers and politicians were of the opinion that there was no
concerted action on the part of the people to overthrow the British
government in India and that there was no open rebellion to justify the
158declaration of Martial Law. On the other hand, while the majority
159
of Lord Hunter^s Committee of Inquiry (i*e»* the Disorders Inquiry 
Committee, 1919-20) found that a state of rebellion existed, necessitating 
or justifying the declaration of Martial Law, the minority of that
158. For example, Alfred Nundi, a leading lawyer of the Panjab, in his 
discussion (The Present Situation with Special Reference to the
Panjab Disturbance, Dehra Dan 1920) made an attempt to show that-there 
was no open rebellion in Lahore (pp.85-104). He contended that 
"a mob of 'city riff-raff and students' does not come within the 
category of rebels, and their wishing to take a promenade in the 
Mall, ordinarily favoured by the presence of Europeans, cannot 
constitute an act of open rebellion" (p.104), so as to justify the 
proclamation of Martial Law in Lahore.
159. Lord Hunter's Committee of Inquiry submitted their recommendations 
in the form of a majority and minority report. The majority 
report was signed by the President Lord William Hunter and four 
members of the Committee, Justice Rankin, General George Barrow, 
and Messrs. W.F. Rice and Thomas Smith. The minority report was 
signed by Sir C.H. Setalvad, Pandit Jagat Narayan and Sardar 
Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan
7 6
Committee considered that the disorders did not amount to rebellion 
and that the disturbances might have been suppressed and order restored 
without suspending the control of the civil authorities or calling in 
military force save as auxiliary to the civil power.
The majority were of the opinion that "An intention to paralyse 
the arm of Government by extensive destruction of Government buildings 
and of means of communication can hardly find vent in practice upon 
a considerable scale and at the same time fall short of open rebellion. 
Where the Government is British and a comparatively insignificant number 
of the inhabitants are Europeans, most of them Government servants, 
and this intention is seen to culminate at prominent points in a murderous 
attack on Europeans simply as such, it may be said with some certainty 
that the Government so attacked is in face of an open rebellion in all 
reasonable implications of the phrase."*^ They believed that "Apart 
from the existence of any deeply laid scheme to overthrow the British, 
a movement which had started in rioting and become a rebellion might 
have rapidly developed into a r e v o l u t i o n " . T h e r e f o r e ,  the majority 
of Lord Hunter's Committee justified the proclamation of Martial Law 
as "the situation which had arisen in the Panjab was one of extreme 
gravity".
According to the minority, the anti-government and anti-British'
outburst was not previously designed, but was the result of the frenzy
with which the crowds became seized at the moment, it was a sudden
163
development at the time. Further, there was no organization even
for bringing about the disturbances and the atrocities which were
164
committed by the mobs seized by the frenzy of the moment. "If
160. Hunter, William, op.cit., p.109.
161. Ibid., p.103.
162. Ibid., p.118.
163. Ibid., p.158.
164. Ibid., p.155.
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there was not organised or concerted attempt to bring about these
disorders” , says the minority, ”it follows that there was no organisation
for a rebellion...that in no place were the mobs provided with any firearms
or swords or other weapons of that character. The evidence further
shows that at no time was any attempt made by the crowds to obtain arms
by raiding the houses of license holders or the ammunition shops in
the disturbed areas....In several cases in the beginning of the
disturbances, they had not come armed even with...sticks....The official
evidence is unanimous that the rural population, as a whole, had
nothing to do with these disturbances...outside the larger towns the country
folk seemed c o n t e n d e d . M o r e o v e r ,  the Indian members of the armed
166
forces took no part, directly or indirectly, in the disorders.
Therefore, the minority were of the opinion that, there being no 
organised or preconceived conspiracy to subvert the British rule behind 
these disturbances, the vast rural tract in the districts of Lahore, 
Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur having remained tranquil and 
loyal, there having been disturbances only in a few places in the urban 
area, and even in those few places the majority of the residents not 
having taken any part in the disturbances, there was no open rebellion 
as alleged, and no justification in consequence for the proclamation of 
Martial Law.
Moreover, according to the minority, before the dates on which 
Martial Law was declared in the five districts of the Panjab, the 
disturbances had been quelled with the assistance rendered by the 
military and, as such, there was no justification for the proclamation 
of Martial Law. It was stated that:
165. Ibid., p.157.
166* Panjab Disturbances, 1919-20, Vol.I, Indian Perspective, p.153.
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M...so far as the actual state of affairs was concerned 
there was no necessity for the introduction of 
martial law. The disturbances had been quelled, no 
doubt, by calling in the aid of the military, and 
on the 13th [April] when the Panjab Government 
moved the Government of India and on the 15th when 
martial law was actually proclaimed at Lahore and 
Amritsar and later at other places, there were no 
actual disturbances at those places which required 
such a step to be taken. The military by whose 
aid peace and order had been restored were 
available if any emergency arose....All that was 
necessary to be done in order to quell the 
disturbances had already been done by the civil 
authorities and all measures of immediate 
necessity like the curfew order and the like had 
been taken before the introduction of martial 
law".167
They also said:
"If the actual disturbances were so quelled by 
the assistance of the military and the civil 
authorities had by such assistance practically 
regained control, it appears to us no 
sufficient reason why at a time when there 
were not actual disturbances the civil 
administration should have been superseded by 
introducing martial l a w " .*68
Thus the minority expressed the view that Martial Law was declared
i
in the five districts of the Panjab not for the purpose of quelling 
disturbances and restoring law and order but for the purpose of 
preventing the recrudescence of such disturbances or, as Mr. Kitchin 
(the Commissioner of Lahore, who as such was in charge of the 
districts of Amritsar, Lahore and Gujranwala) put it, "to prevent
167. Ibid., pp.170-171. It is noteworthy that, in his evidence 
before Lord Hunter's Committee of Inquiry, Deputy Commissioner 
H.S. Williamson of Gujrat said that by the time Martial Law was 
proclaimed there was no riot or disturbance: they had ceased. 
Therefore, Martial Law was not necessary for the quelling of 
riot or disturbances, but in view of the general situation he 
expressed his opinion that as a precaution against further trouble 
the promulgation of Martial Law was a very wise precaution
(pp.169-170, 114-115). Similarly, when Martial Law was proclaimed 
in Lyallpur on 24 April 1919, "the district was quiet at the time. 
The Superintendent of Police,Mr. Smith,said th'at the introduction 
of Martial Law was desirable but not essential. There were only 
petty disturbances and they had all ceased by 19 April" (p.170).
168. Ibid., p.177.
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the spread ojdnfection" and for the prupose of creating a machinery
for the speedy trial of the large number of people that had been arrested
169
during disturbances and of those whose arrests were contemplated.
However, Martial Law was withdrawn piecemeal: it was withdrawn
from Gujrat on 28 May, from the districts of Amritsar, Gujranwala and
Lyallpur on 9 June and from Lahore on 11 June 1919. Yet Martial Law
continued on the railway lands until 25 August 1919.
Although the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab said, on 26 April
170
1919, that ’’Order has been restored almost everywhere...", Martial
Law continued in the Panjab for some weeks .thereafter. This continuation
became subject to more criticism than its original declaration.
Notwithstanding tjiat the majority of Lord Hunter's Committee of Inquiry
asserted "it cannot be said that this state [of open rebellion] continued
171
for the whole period during which martial law was in operation", they
contended that earlier withdrawal of Martial Law might have been followed
172
by a recrudescence. Therefore, the conclusion of the majority was
that "those responsible for the maintenance of martial law did not prolong 
it beyond the time during which to the best of their judgment it was
173necessary for the maintenance and restoration of order in the provinces".
Like the introduction of Martial Law, the minority differed widely
from the majority on the question of the continuance of Martial Law in
the Panjab. Assuming that the introduction of Martial Law was necessary
174they said that "it should not have been continued beyond a few days".
The Panjab government, although the disorders had ceased, intended 
to continue Martial Law only "to establish a morale which would afford
169. Ibid., p.171.
170. Ibid., p.180.
171. Ibid., p.119.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid., p.124.
174. Ibid., p.179.
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a guarantee against the recrudescence of disorders, to safeguard railway
and telegraph communications against further interruptions, to restore
the position of Government as the guarantor of peace and good order
175which had been sacrificed between the 10th and 17th April".
Moreover, the Panjab government suggested that Martial Law should be
continued as "it has undoubtedly a steadying effect on the population"
within the Martial Law areas as well as also outside, in order to
enable the authorities to fix prices of commodities, in order to enable
certain incidental expenses to be recovered from the population of the
disturbed areas by means of a levy, in order to complete the trials of
the principal offenders before the Martial Law Commission so that
176demonstrations could be avoided. The reason for continuing Martial
Law in the rural area of Lyallpur district was to avoid "trouble in
177getting in [land} revenue".
These showed how far the Panjab authorities had gone beyond the 
principle that the continuance of Martial Law depends upon the necessity 
which led to its declaration. In other words, the common law principle 
that Martial Law should remain in force no longer than the public safety 
demands had not'been kept in view.
fb) The Proclamation of Martial Law in Malabar in 1921
The rebellion in the district of Malabar, which broke out in
August 1921, waj due to the influence of the Khilafat movement among
the poor and fanatical Muhammadan community (known as Moplahs) of the
178area in the Madras Presidency. The doctrine spread that "government
175. Ibid., p.181.
176. Ibid., p.182.
177. TFIcT., p.184.
178. Ker Campbell J., "Subversive Movements" in Political India, 1852-1952, 
edited by Sir John Cumming, pp.237-238. ’
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was satanic11 and should be paralysed so that "Swaraj11, or an independent
Khilafat kingdom in Malabar, might be set up. Knives, swords and
spears were secretly manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected and
preparations were made to proclaim the coming of the Kingdom of Islam.
Soon policemen were obstructed in the course of their duty. Police
stations were attacked by the rebels. A number of rifles and shotguns
were captured from isolated police posts and Europeans. A few Europeans
were murdered. As soon as the administration had been paralysed, the
Moplahs declared that Swaraj was established. A certain Ali Musaliar
179
was proclaimed Raja, and Khilafat flags were flown. Every effort
made in the first instance to cope with the situation by means of the
troops available in the Madras district failed. Therefore, on 22 August 
1921, Martial Law was declared and by the end of November the rebellion 
was quelled.
It seems that by this time there were better grounds for the 
declaration of Martial Law than those in the five districts of the Panjab 
province. In fact, the declaration of Martial Law in the Malabar district 
satisfied the test of necessity, a necessity to suppress a formidable 
Moplah rebellion. The measures adopted by the government for the 
suppression of the Moplah rebellion were generally approved, and provoked 
few complaints even in the Indian press. However, Martial Law was 
withdrawn from Malabar on 25 February 1922.
Lacs
(c) The Declaration of Martial^in Sholapur in May 1950
Riots broke out in Sholapur on 7 May 1930 following the arrest of
M.K. Gandhi on 6 May: a large crowd threw stones at the District
Superintendent of Police and a small body of armed police, and liquor and
179. Williams, L.F. Rushbank, India in 1921-22, Calcutta, 1922, pp.73-74.
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toddy shops were wrecked. After the arrest of six or eight persons 
in connection with the riots, the District Magistrate and the police 
found the road blocked by a large crowd who were carrying Congress 
flags, sticks and stones. The District Magistrate and the police 
were continually stoned. The police fired, some persons were wounded 
and the crowd thereupon revenged itself by murdering an Excise Sub- 
Inspector and by attacking a police station (Mangalwar Police Chowki) 
where two police constables were killed. The unarmed police were 
disorganised and many of them did not report for duty for days. Troops 
had to be requisitioned. On 8 May, a company of military arrived.
No further outrages took place although on 11 May a police station 
within two hundred yards of a military post was looted and its contents 
were burnt on the road. Further military assistance arrived on 12 May. 
Yet the District Magistrate, Mr. Knight, considering that it was not 
possible to carry on the normal civil administration, reported to the 
facts to the Government of Bombay and with their approval handed over 
charge of the town to the military authorities at 8.30 pm on 12 May.
In the evening of the same day Martial Law was proclaimed. Later, 
on 15 May, the Governor-General issued at Simla the Sholapur Martial 
Law Ordinance No.IV of 1930 reciting that "an emergency had arisen in 
Sholapur which made it necessary to provide for the proclamation of’ 
Martial Law in the town of Sholapur and its vicinity". In accordance 
with the provisions of Section 2 of the Ordinance and of an order made 
by the Government of Bombay on 17 May, Martial Law was proclaimed at 
3.45 pm on 18 May.
What seems interesting is that Martial Law had already been declared 
in Sholapur on 12 May before the Sholapur Martial Law Ordinance was 
passed and Martial Law was declared under it on 18 May. Moreover, it
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was the District Magistrate, not the Governor-General who decided in 
the first instance that there was an emergency necessitating the 
declaration of Martial Law.
It is contended that after 8 May 1930, there was no serious 
disturbance in the town of Sholapur; certainly on 12 May, the town was 
completely quiet. No firing was admittedly resorted to after 8 May. 
Yet Mr. Knight, as the senior executive officer, on 12 May without any 
justification whatsoever, handed over the control of Sholapur to the 
military authorities and Martial Law was proclaimed. Even when the 
civil authorities found themselves unable to cope with the situation 
the next stage was to invoke the aid of the military forces under 
Section 129 of the Criminal Procedure Code (which empowers, in times 
of disorder, a Magistrate to call in the military to suppress a riot) 
without abdicating their function. But in this case, without taking 
the assistance of the military authorities, they were in fact placed in 
charge of the town and Martial Law was unjustifiably declared on 12 May
when rioting had admittedly ceased and peace restored. In Emperor v .
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Chanappa Shantirappa and others, the question of the necessity for 
declaring Martial Law in Sholapur was discussed by the learned Judges 
of the Bombay High Court. Chief Justice Beaumont observed:
"If I thought it necessary definitely to determine 
whether the condition of affairs on the 12th 
constituted such a state of insurrection 
amounting to war as to justify handing over the 
control of Sholapur to the military, I should 
require some further evidence (other than the 
facts stated in the affidavit of Mr. H.F. Knight, 
the District Magistrate of Sholapur, dated 
16 August 1930, which were relied on as 
establishing the necessity for handing over 
control to the military) on the matter, I am not 
altogether satisfied that it would not have
180. Indian Law Reports, Bombay Series, Vol.LV, 1931, P.263.
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been possible for the civil authorities to have 
got the situation under control by calling in 
the military in aid of the civil authority",
Another Justice, MadgaVkar, held that "abdicating himself in fayour
of the military with the abolition of the ordinary law...is not the
first stage in the suppression of any disorder but the last resort
182
of the civil power", when all other means are exhausted. After
pointing out that "on the question of necessity in the present case,
the only material, strictly speaking, is the affidavit of the District 
183Magistrate", the learned Judge observed:
"While I am satisfied that the unarmed police had 
become disorganised and an addition to the armed 
force at the disposal of the executive was 
necessary, the point on which I am not satisfied 
is why, as in the case of similar riots in 
Ahmedabad in 1921, military aid alone did not 
suffice, without the handing over of charge by 
the civil authority to the military, which in 
law makes all the difference p o s s i b l e " . 184
It may be noted here that Sholapur remained under Martial Law 
for about seven weeks. On 30 June 1930, Martial Law was withdrawn.
(d) The Proclamation of Martial Law in Peshawar in 1930
The disturbances in Peshawar began on 23 April 1930 when serious 
rioting broke out directly as a result of the arrest of members of the 
provincial Congress committee. At a time when acute tension prevailed 
in Peshawar itself, a formidable incursion of Afridi tribesmen, who 
posed as liberators, from beyond the frontier into Peshawar took place 
on the night of 4/5 June. They (the Afridis) were forced by ground troops 
arid from the air, to withdraw into the hills without having actually
181. Ibid., pp.282-283.
182. Ibid., pp.295-296.
183. Ibid., p.298.
184. Ibid., p.300.
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achieved any material result from their raid. Nevertheless, the second
Afridi attack on Peshawar took place on 9 August. Action was taken
against armed Afridis both by ground troops and aeroplanes, which also
attacked the villages, in the Bara and Waran valleys that allowed them
£the Afridis) to pass. By 12 August, harassed by the operations conducted
by the military and air force, and discouraged by the absence of support
from other tribes, the Afridis began to realise they had no prospect of
success and, three days later, almost all of them had filtered back over
185the border. Yet Martial Law was proclaimed in the district of
Peshawar on 16 August 1930 under the (first part of the) Martial Law 
Ordinance, 1930 (No.VIII of 1930).
It is evident that Martial Law was imposed in Peshawar at a time 
when the crisis produced by the Afridi incursion had passed. Thus 
there was no necessity to proclaim Martial Law to repel force by force, 
to restore law and order. Even the then Government of India admitted 
this fact when it was stated:
"With the failure of the second Afridi attempt to 
enter Peshawar, the most dangerous phase of the 
Frontier disturbances may be said to have been 
over - though it should be noted that it was the
welcome given to the invaders by the villagers
around the city that finally decided the 
authorities, on the 15th of August, that it was 
necessary to establish martial law".-^®^
It appears that although the local authorities succeeded in clearing 
the district of Peshawar of all Afridis, it was believed that a serious 
situation still existed in the district because of the presence of the 
hostile villagers around the city who gave every assistance within their
185. India in 1930-31, published by the Government of India, Calcutta, 
pp.16-19.
186. Ibid., p.20.
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means to the intruders. Thus Martial Law was declared as a deterrent 
against the possible renewal of danger. Nevertheless, after the 
declaration of Martial Law, no danger of a sufficiently serious nature 
occurred to justify it. It may be that the proclamation of Martial Law 
acted as an effective deterrent and tended to prevent the Afridis from 
making further incursions. However, in spite of the absence of serious 
disturbances, Martial Law remained in force for about five months.
Since no special courts were set up during the continuance of Martial Law 
in Peshawar, although the (second part of the) Martial Law Ordinance 
No.VIII of 1930 provided for the constitution of five classes of special 
courts to deal with the offences declared under the Ordinance, this was 
interpreted by many critics as proof that there had been no need for the 
declaration of Martial Law. Martial Law was abrogated on 24 January 1931.
(e) The Declaration of Martial Law in Sind in 1942
In 1942, the Hurs, a criminal tribe of Sind and the neighbouring 
states, terrorised certain parts of Sind by committing murder, sabotage 
and dacoity. The civil authorities found it difficult to cope with the 
situation. A special force of troops was sent to the area to aid the 
civil authorities in restoring law and order. Under the common law 
power of the Executive to repel force by force, the Military Commander 
was given instructions to take all necessary steps for the rapid 
restoration of civil security and order. In order to achieve this 
objective, the Military Commander declared Martial Law in certain parts 
of Sind on 1 June 1942.
It is to be noted that no legislative provision was enacted for the 
promulgation and administration of Martial Law in Sind as had been done 
on previous occasions. In other words, Martial Law was proclaimed and
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enforced in Sind without resort to legislation. However, Martial Law 
remained in force up to 31 May 1943.
The Martial Law (Indemnity) Ordinance, 1943 (XVIII of 1943), 
indemnified all servants of the Crown as well as persons who acted under 
orders of the servants of the Crown for any act done in the Martial Law 
area in order to maintain or restore order or to carry into effect any 
Regulation, order or direction issued by the Martial Law authority
provided that the act was done in good faith and in the reasonable belief
that it was necessary for the purpose intended to be served thereby. The 
Ordinance also validated orders for the seizure and destruction of 
property passed by the Martial Law authority of the Crown, and sentences 
of Martial Law courts.
(iii) Martial Law in Pakistan
(a) Martial Law in Lahore in 1953
In Pakistan, which came into existence in August 1947 as a separate
state for the Muslim minority of the Indian subcontinent, Martial Law
was proclaimed for the first time in the city of Lahore on 6 March 1953,
187when orthodox Muslims resorted to direct action against Ahmediyas.
The objects of the anti-Ahmediya agitation, which was organised by the 
Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam (an orthodox Muslim organisation) and wholeheartedly 
joined by the Jamaat-i-Islam, were three in number: the Ahmediyas to be
declared a separate non-Muslim minority; Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, 
the then Foreign Minister, who was an Ahmediya, to be removed from the 
cabinet; and all Ahmediyas to be relieved of key posts in the country.
187. Ahmediyas (or Qadianis or MirzaiS) form a sect, which has its origins in 
the Panjab, founded in 1901 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed who claimed to be a 
prophet as well as to be the promised Messiah and as such, the 
fundamental difference between the Ahmediyas a^ id the Muslims is on 
the finality of the Prophet Muhammad (S).
The agitators began direct action on 27 February 1953. Mass 
demonstrations interrupted normal life in Lahore and other towns in 
the Panjab. By 4 March 1953, certain areas of the walled city of 
Lahore had been taken over by the agitators and the police had lost all 
control of the situation. By 6 March, communications were disrupted 
and the supply of electricity was partly cut. Civil administration 
for all practical purposes ceased to exist. In accordance with the 
instructions of the central government, the General Officer-Commanding 
Tenth Division, Major-General Muhammad Azam Khan, proclaimed Martial 
Law at 1.30 pm on 6 March 1953. The military forces restored order in 
a matter of six hours.
It is noteworthy that the Martial Law imposed in Lahore was an extra­
constitutional act as the interim Constitution of the country, the 
Government of India Act, 1935 (which was adopted as the interim Constitution 
of both India and Pakistan with certain modifications under the Indian
Independence Act, 1947) did not contain any provision for the declaration 
Lend
of Martial. However, like the 1942 Martial Law of Sind, Martial Law
A
was proclaimed in Lahore under the common law doctrine of necessity 
without recourse to any legislation. This proclamation of Martial Law 
satisfied the test of necessity, the necessity to restore law and order.
Although under Martial Law during 1953 in Lahore, ordinary criminal 
courts were permitted to exercise jurisdiction (under Martial Law 
Regulation 2) in respect of offences other than those created by the 
Regulations or connected with the disturbances, offences created by 
Martial Law Regulations were tried by Special and Summary Military 
Courts (under Regulation 1[a]) composed wholly of military officers.
Seventeen days after the declaration of Martial Law, on 23 March 
1953, Chief Martial Law Administrator Azam Khan declared that the first 
phase of Martial Law, which was to restore law and order, was over and
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that the second phase, the object of which was a constructive one, 
had begun. Thus after the restoration of law and order, the Martial 
Law administration launched 'the cleaner Lahore campaign1 to give a 
better look to the city. Some of the noteworthy army achievements 
were improved sanitary conditions, effective eradication of hoarding 
and black-marketeering and enforcement of traffic regulations.
Therefore, it is clear that the Martial Law administration failed
to realise that Martial Law owes its existence to necessity and the
justification of all acts done under Martial Law depends on their being 
necessary to restore law and order. It did not keep in view that 
improved administration, not on the grounds of military necessity, is 
not the object of Martial Law. The sole duty of the Martial Law 
administration is to restore a situation that will enable the civil 
authority to resume control. Since the restoration of law and order 
was achieved by 24 March 1953, the continuation of Martial Law thereafter 
in Lahore for constructive purposes was unjustifiable. Although the 
Martial Law (Indemnity) Ordinance, 1953, (II of 1953), promulgated by 
the Governor-General acting under Section 42 of the Constitution Act on 
9 May 1953, empowered the central government to withdraw Martial Law, 
the government waited till 13 May 1953 to abrogate Martial Law, although 
the necessity for it was ended by 24 March, when the Martial Law area 
had become sufficiently tranquil to permit the civilian authority to run 
the administration. However, the Indemnity Ordinance indemnified the 
servants of the Crown and other persons in respect of acts done by them
in good faith under Martial Law, and validated sentences passed by the
Military Courts.
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(b) Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958
Parliamentary government in Pakistan was ended by a coup d'etat
on 7 October 1958, when Major-General Iskander Mirza, the first
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under the Constitution
of 1956, placed the country under Martial Law. In his Proclamation
of Martial Law, the President stated the circumstances which led him
to declare Martial Law in order "to save Pakistan from complete
disruption". The reasons given for declaring Martial Law were:
political leaders had become 'ruthless in their struggle for power',
corrupt, opportunist, unscrupulous, and malignant; the country faced
a shortage of food; the smuggling of food, medicines and other necessities
of life was rampant and the 1956 Constitution was unworkable.
It is noteworthy that these facts were not previously regarded in
the Commonwealth as justifying a proclamation of Martial Law. Under
the common law, the imposition of Martial Law, as has been mentioned
earlier, was only justified by necessity to suppress riot, rebellion or
insurrection and to restore peace and order. Evidently, Mirza's
Proclamation made no mention of any riot, rebellion or insurrection.
The country was tranquil. The civil courts were open and exercising
their ordinary jurisdiction fully and freely. Yet Martial Law was
declared throughout Pakistan apparently out of the so-called necessity to
inculcate a civic sense in the people and to purify social life.
Commenting on the imposition of this Martial Law, the then Chief Justice
of the West Pakistan High Court, Kayani, said: "If martial law means
188enforcing on the people a sense of citizenship then you need it".
188. Justice Kayani expressed this view in an address to the Karachi 
and West Pakistan Bar Associations in December 1958, The Dawn,
Karachi, 16 December 1958.
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President Mirza not only imposed Martial Law, he also abrogated 
the 1956 Constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, 
dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies and banned all political 
parties. It is difficult to interpret all these as being "meant merely 
to steady the country through a brief squall". It seems that Mirza 
proclaimed Martial on 7 October 1958 as a trump card in his contest 
with political rivals when he did not foresee any change of becoming 
President for the second time after the General Election scheduled for 
February 1959 and to obviate any public opposition he might encounter 
for abrogating the Constitution and banning political parties.
It can be said that, whatever may have been the motive of Iskander 
Mirza in declaring Martial Law on 7 October, the proclamation of Martial 
Law did not satisfy the commoii law doctrine of necessity, i.e., a 
necessity to restore law and order.
It is noteworthy that the only reference to Martial Law in the 1956
189Constitution was in Article 196, which provided that laws of indemnity 
might be passed in respect of any act done "in connection with the 
maintenance or restoration of order in any area in Pakistan where martial 
law was in force". However, there was a significant lacuna in the 
Constitution which made no other provision in respect of the imposition 
or definition of Martial Law. It is strange that the constitutionnnakers
189. Article 196, which was placed under 'Emergency Provisions' in Part XI 
of the 1956 Constitution, and was in all essentials a reproduction 
Of the provisions of Article 34 of the Indian Constitution, provided 
that "Nothing in the Constitution shall prevent Parliament from 
making any law indemnifying any person in the service of the Federal 
or the Provincial Government, or any other person, in respect of any 
act done in connection with the maintenance or restoration of order 
in any area in Pakistan where martial law was in force, or validating 
any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, forfeiture ordered or 
other act done under martial law in such area".
saw no need to provide definitions or controls in relation to Martial
Law. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that, under Article 196 of the
1956 Constitution of Pakistan, Martial Law could only be declared under
the common law doctrine of necessity.
It is to be noted that Mirza's Proclamation of 7 October for the
first time in the history of Martial Law administration in the subcontinent
placed the entire country under Martial Law in times of peace, whereas
previously Martial Law had been declared in a part of the country in
times of emergency and confined only to the disturbed area.
However, President Mirza's Proclamation of 7 October 1958 was an
extra-legal act inconsistent with the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan.
Had the Constitution remained in force, the Proclamation would have been
wholly void, for the Constitution did not permit its abrogation or the
imposition of Martial Law in times of peace. Nevertheless, twenty days
after the proclamation of Martial Law, on 27 October 1958, the Pakistan
190Supreme Court in the State v. Dosso accorded legal recognition to the
action taken by Iskander Mirza. In order to interpret some of the
191
provisions of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, which was
promulgated by President Mirza on 20 October 1958 and provided a legal
framework for continuity of the legal system after the abrogation of the
1956 Constitution, Chief Justice Munir in Dosso's case considered it’
"necessary to appraise the existing constitutional provision in the light
of the juristic principles which determine the validity or otherwise of
192
law-creating organs in modern states". Thus the learned Chief Justice,
190. All Pakistan Legel Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.X, 1958, p.533.
191. The general effect of its the Laws (^Continuance in Force Order) 
promulgation was the validation of the laws, other than the 
annulled 1956 Constitution and restoration of the jurisdiction of 
all courts iHeAuding the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
192. A11 Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, 1958, p.538.
9who delivered the main judgment of the majority comprising the court, 
began his judgment with a discussion of certain theoretical assumptions 
to be adopted in the case and observed:
"It sometimes happens, however, that a Constitution 
and the national legal order under it is disrupted 
by an abrupt political change not within the 
contemplation of the Constitution. Any such change 
is called a revolution, and its legal effect is not 
only the destruction of the existing Constitution 
but also the validity of the national legal order....
But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that 
the persons assuming power under the change can 
successfully require the inhabitants of the country 
to conform to the new regime, then the revolution 
itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter 
its own legality is judged not by reference to the 
annulled Constitution but by reference to its own 
success....Thus the essential condition to determine 
whether a Constitution has been annulled is the 
efficacy 6f the change....If the territory and the 
people remain substantially the same...the 
revolutionary government and the new Constitution 
are, according to International Law, the legitimate 
government and the valid Constitution of the State.
Thus a victorious revolution or a successful coup 
d16tat is an internationally recognised legal 
method of changing a Constitution".*93
"After a change of the character I have mentioned", the learned Chief
Justice continued, "has taken place, the national legal order must for
its validity depend upon the new law-creating organ. Even Courts lose
their existing jurisdictions, and can function only to the extent and
194
m  the manner determined by the new Constitution."
In support of his view, Chief Justice Munir quoted Professor Hans 
Kelsen of the (Analytical) Positivist School of Jurisprudence, who said:
"From a juristic point of view, the decisive criterion 
of a revolution is that the order in force is 
overthrown and replaced by a new order in a way which 
the former had not itself anticipated...it is never 
the Constitution merely but always the entire legal 
order that is changed by a revolution.
193. Ibid., pp.538-539
194. Ibid., p.539.
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This shows that all norms of the old order have 
been deprived of their validity by revolution 
and not according to the principle of legitimacy. 
And they have been so deprived not only de facto 
but alsode jure. No jurist would maintain that 
even after a successful revolution the old 
Constitution and the laws based thereupon remain 
in force, on the ground that they have not been 
nullified in a manner anticipated by the old order 
itself. Every jurist will presume that the old 
order - to which no political reality any longer 
corresponds - has ceased to be valid, and that 
all norms, which are valid within the new order, 
receive their validity exclusively from the new 
Constitution. It follows that, from this 
juristic point of view, the norms of the old 
order can no longer be recognised as valid 
norms1'. '
Then, the Chief Justice, Munir, proceeded to observe:
"If what I have already stated is correct, then 
the revolution having been successful it satisfies 
the test of efficacy and becomes a basic law - 
creating fact. On that assumption the Laws 
(Continuance in Force) Order, however transitory 
and imperfect it may be, is a new legal order and 
it is in accordance with that Order that the 
validity of the laws and the correctness of the 
judicial decisions have to be determined".196
Thus Chief Justice Munir held that President Mirza's Proclamation 
of 7 October 1958, by which the 1956 Constitution was annulled and Martial 
Law was declared, constituted an 'abrupt political change', not within 
the contemplation of the said Constitution, in other words a revolution, 
that the revolution had been a successful one and that a revolution was 
an internationally recognised legal method of changing a Constitution. 
Ultimately, the learned Chief Justice accorded its approval to the new 
regime of Iskander Mirza on the grounds of its 'efficacy' and 'success' 
and held the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, was the instrument 
which defined a "new legal order"
195. Cited in ibid., pp.539-540.
196. Ibid., p .540.
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It is interesting to mention here that Chief Justice Munir himself,
as he subsequently disclosed in November 1968, had a hand in the drafting
of the Laws (Continuance in-Force) Order, 1958. Being asked by
President Mirza, he had to "scrutinise the draft" of the Laws (Continuance in
Force) Order and "suggested certain modifications, particularly with
reference to the Superior Courts' power to issue writs and validation of
197the judgements which had been delivered after the Proclamation".
Therefore, it can be said that by doing so, the learned Chief Justice 
had already committed himself to granting legal recognition to the 
regime of Iskander Mirza and its Laws (Continuance in Force) Order.
So, he had to find some basis for giving his approval to the extra­
constitutional action that had been taken by Mirza and relied, instead 
of the rule of the common law, on Kelsen's Theory of the Law and the 
State.
It is pertinent to note that the then Chief Justice of the Pakistan
Supreme Court, Muhammad Munir, during his Chief Justiceship of the Lahore
High Court for the first time gave in Pakistan a learned discussion of
198 .
the concept of Martial Law in Muhammad Umar Khan v. the Crown m  1953.
In that case, he said that "In constitutional jurisprudence, martial law
199is used at least in four different senses: firstly to mean the law
relating to discipline in the armed forces of the state, secondly, to 
mean military government in occupied territory, thirdly, to mean the 
rights and obligations of the military under the common and statute law of 
the country to repel force by force while assisting the civil authorities
197. Munir, Muhammad, "Days I Remember", The Pakistan Times, 11 November 1968; 
Chaudhury, Nazir, Hussain, Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, His Life, 
Writings and Judgments, Lahore, 1973, p.87.
198. Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore, Vol.VI, 11, 1953, p.825.
199. Ibid., p.828.
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to suppress riots, insurrections, or other disorders in the land, and
lastly, to mean the law applied by the general commanding the army, who
takes over in times of riot, rebellion or insurrection as the civil
authorities become powerless to deal with it and completely ousts or
subordinates civil authorities in the country, during the period of his
occupation1’ He also held that ’’Martial Law is the law of military
201necessity, actual or presumed in good faith".
Yet in Dosso's case, while giving legal sanction to the Martial
Law imposed by Iskander Mirza, the learned Chief Justice did not enter
into any discussion to show into which of the four categories the
Martial Law imposed in Pakistan on 7 October 1958 would fall, or whether,
in"the existing circumstances, the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan
could at all be justified under the common law doctrine of necessity.
Instead resort was had to Professor Kelsen's 'General Theory of the Law
and State' for the proposition that a victorious revolution or a
successful coup d ’etat was an internationally recognised method of changing
a Constitution, notwithstanding that the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan
had provisions for its own amendment. It seems that by holding the
Proclamation of 7 October to be a revolution (not within the contemplation
o£ the Constitution), Chief Justice Munir apparently followed Iskander Mirza,
who,'On 10 October 1958, had claimed that his authority was revolutionary.
202
m  origin without sanction of law or of the Constitution.
It is evident that the decision in Dosso’s case was based primarily 
on Kelsen's General Theory of Law. It should be stressed here that the 
learned Chief Justice failed to realise the fact that the theory propounded
200. Ibid., pp.828-838.
201. Ibid., p.827.
202. The Asian Recorder, 25-31 October 1958, p.2310.
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by Kelsen in its abstract form was at best a theory - merely a jurist's
proposition about law - and was not a part of the national legal order
of any state. Kelsen himself was aware of the fact that he did not lay
down any legal norm or legal norms which are "the daily concerns of
judges". As he himself wrote, in replying to certain criticisms
launched against his Pure Theory of Law by Professor Julius Stone of
the Unversity of Sydney, Australia:
"Never, not even in the earliest formulation of the 
Pure Theory of Law did I express the foolish 
opinion that the proposition^of the Pure Theory of 
Law 'bind' the judge 'in the way in which legal 
i norms bind^him' (the quotation is from Professor 
Julius Stone). Insofar as the judge in 
performing his function of applying and creating 
law adopts a theory of law, his position is the 
same as that of any other lawyer. And as far as 
the lawyers are concerned, I tried, of course, to 
convince them that my theory is correct.... But this 
does not mean that I considered the propa/siKorvj of 
the Pure Theory of Law as legally binding".203
He also stated:
"The essence of my view of the relationship between 
the validity and efficacy of legal norms is that 
'the efficacy of the legal order is only the 
condition of validity, not the validity itself...' 
positing (setzung) of the norms and efficacy 
(Wirksamkeit) of the norms are 'conditions of 
the validity'; efficacy in the sense that the 
established legal norms must be by and large . 
obeyed and, if not obeyed, applied; otherwise 
the legal order as a whole iust as a single norm, 
would lose its validity".
It is noteworthy that the question of the legality of the declaration of
Martial Law, or of the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution or of the
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, was not directly challenged in
Dosso's case. Moreover, the case was decided within twenty days of the
imposition of Martial Law. Sufficient evidence and relevant material
203. Kelsen, Hans, "Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law", 
Stanford Law Review, Vol.XVII, 1965, p.1134.
204. Ibid., pp.1139-1140.
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were not placed before the Court for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the so-called revolution or the coup d ’etat had by then succeeded.
Therefore, it can be said that, since the question of the legality
of the imposition of the Martial Law in 1958, or the legality of the
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, or the question of the
accomplishment and success of the revolution had not been raised in
Dosso1s case, it was not strictly necessary for the Supreme Court to
accord its legal sanction to the Martial Law declared or the Laws
(Continuance in Force) Order on the basis of Kelsen's Theory of Law or
to uphold the success of the revolution by accepting Mirza's Proclamation
of 7 October. "Indeed, it was the recognition by the Court which made
205the new Government de jure..." as "however effective the Government
of a usurper may be, it does not within the National Legal Order acquire
206
legitimacy unless the Courts recognise the Government as de jure".
It is widely believed that the effects of such a recognition were to
encourage revolutions and to hold out the promise to future adventurers
that if their acts of treason are crowned with success, the courts will
act as their accomplices. As Justice Fieldsend, A.J.A., of the Appellate
Division of the Rhodesian High Court observed in Madzimbamuto v .
207
Lardner-Burke N.O. and Another:
"Nothing can encourage instability more than for any 
revolutionary movement to know that, if it 
succeeds in snatching power, it will be entitled 
ipso facto to the complete support of the pre- 20g 
existing judiciary in their judicial capacity".
However, in view of the removal of President Iskander Mirza by his
205. Justice Yaqub Ali in Asma Jilani's case, All Pakistan Legal 
Decisions, Supreme Court, 1972, p.246.
206. Ibid., p.229.
207. South African Law Reports, Vol.II, 1968, p.284.
208. Ibid., p.430
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appointee Chief Martial Law Administrator, Ayub Khan, only twenty
days after the Proclamation of 7 October 1958, on the night of
27 October (on that very day the judgment in Dosso1s case was delivered),
the legal recognition given to the regime of Mirza in Dosso's case on the
grounds of its 1 efficacy1 and 'success' proved to have been premature.
The decision in Dosso's case was to hold good for nearly |jourcteen
years, from 27 October 1958 until 20 April 1972 when the judgment in
209
Asma Jilana v. Government of the Panjab overruled it. The decision
in "Dosso's case was to be rejected, not only because the Supreme Court 
there had been wholly premature in finding that President Iskander 
Mirza has effectively abrogated the 1956 Constitution, but also because 
Kelsen's doctrine of the law-annulling effect of revolution and coups 
d'€tat is not a rule or principle of law to be applied by courts and
210judges, but merely a theory about law (and a controverted one at that)".
The Chief Justice, Hamoodur Rahman, whilst rejecting the decision in
Dosso's case, observed that:
"...the learned Chief Justice [Munir]...erred both in 
interpreting Kelsen's theory and applying the same 
to the facts and circumstances of the case before 
him. The principle enunciated by him is...wholly 
unsustainable, and...it Cannot be treated as good 
law either on the principle of stare decisis or 
even otherwise".
Thus the decision in Asma Jilani's case "rests on a long-awaited 
judicial recognition of the fallacies inherent in any such 'application' 
of Kelsen's theory of revolution and legal discontinuity as has become
209. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XXIV, 1972, p.139.
210. Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1972, p.53.
211. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, 1972, p.183.
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common in Commonwealth Courts since Dosso’s case in 1958...11
and straightforwardly accepts "one critique of Kelsenian jurisprudence
that is really and properly telling in a judicial context - viz., that
a theory professing to be 'pure* of all normative reference to values
and all practical principles and implications is betrayed, on its own
terms, if it is put to normative use as a practical principle for
214
guiding judicial decision and action".
However, Martial Law, which had been proclaimed in Pakistan on
7 October 1958, was withdrawn on 8 June 1962. It is noteworthy that
Mirza, only eight days after the declaration of Martial Law, on
15 October 1958, expressed his intention to withdraw Martial Law within
the shortest possible time and declared that, thereafter the country
would be administered for some time by a National Council of twelve to 
215
fifteen persons. This announcement was in conformity with a hint
given in the Proclamation of 7 October that until alternative arrangements
212. The Dosso1s case, with its apparent misinterpretation of Kelsen's 
Theory of Law,,was totally accepted by the Chief Justice, Udo Udoma, 
in Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, ex parte Mptovu (Eastern Africa 
Law Reports, Uganda, 1966, pp.535, 538-539). It was approvingly 
referred to in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke and another (South 
African Law Reports, Vol.II, 1968, pp.313-318, 327-329) by the 
Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle of the Appellate Division of the 
Rhodesian High Court. When the Madzimbamuto’s case came
before the Judicial Comirtittee of the Privy Council, Lord Reid,’ 
referring to the judgment of Muhammad Munir in Dosso's case (as 
well as to the judgment of-Chief Justice Sir Udo Udoma in Motovu1s 
case of Uganda) held: "Their Lordships would not accept all the 
reasoning in these judgments but they see no reason to disagree 
with the results" (All England Law Reports, Vol.Ill, 1968, p.574) 
which also appears to lend support to the decision in Dosso's 
case. Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle of Rhodesia again approvingly 
referred to the Dosso’s case in R. v. Ndhlovu and Others (South 
African Law Reports, Vol.IV, 1968, p.522).
213. Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law, 1972, p.52.
214. Ibid., pp.53-54.
215. The Asian Recorder, 15-21 November 1958, p.2350.
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were made, Pakistan would come under Martial Law. However, Mirza's
associate in the coup d’6tatf General Ayub Khan, had a different idea
because on 17 October 1958 Ayub Khan issued a press statement to the
effect that there would "be no premature lifting of Martial Law" until
the political, social, economic and administrative mess in the country
216
had been cleared up. Even a few days after assuming the Presidency,
Ayub Khan expressed his intention to use Martial Law as a base for
introducing major reforms, as he said:
"We want martial law cover for the reforms we want 
to introduce, such as settlement of refugees... 
and land reforms. For the bulk of the population j- 
it is a good thing, but it is bound to hurt some".
Thus it is clear that Ayub Khan had gone a long way beyond the common law
purpose of Martial Law, the purpose to restore law and order and to
establish peace and security. His avowed purpose was to achieve social
and economic reforms and to purify Social life. Thus the so-called
Martial Law Administration of Ayub Khan had no precedent in the history
of the common law.
(c) Martial Law in Pakistan in 1969
For the third time in the nearly twenty-one-and-a-half-year history 
of Pakistan, Martial Law was declared on 25 March 1969 by General A.M. 
Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. He had not 
wrested power from the constitutional government of Ayub Khan. It was, 
in fact, Ayub himself who had voluntarily relinquished his office of 
President in the wake of widespread political unrest. The agitation, 
which had erupted late in 1968 following the tenth anniversary of Ayub’s
216. Ibid., p.2349; Khan, Muhammad Ayub, Friends not Masters, 
London, 1967, p.86.
217. The Dawn, Karachi, 31 October 1958; Khan, Muhammad Ayub, 
Friends not Masters, 1967, p.86.
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accession to power, gathered momentum every day and was accompanied
by widespread violence, riot and resistance to law throughout the
country. The opposition parties demanded, inter alia, the replacement
of the presidential form of government with a parliamentary government,
the introduction of direct election for the members of the National and
Provincial Assemblies, replacing the existing indirect "basic democracy"
system (in which 120,000 members of urban and rural councils would elect
the President and the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies),
218
dismemberment of the "One Unit" scheme in West Pakistan, abolition 
of the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan, full regional 
autonomy for the provinces and the ending of the State of Emergency 
that was declared in 1965 during the Indo-Pakistani war.
Ayub conceded the demands of the opposition parties, with the 
exception of those relating to the abolition of the One-Unit scheme 
in West Pakistan and greater autonomy for East Pakistan. He also 
announced his decision not to seek re-election for the third term (the 
Presidential election was scheduled for winter 1970). Yet the political 
leaders who had now succeeded in building up an anti-Ayub agitation 
throughout the country decided to press their advantage further and 
wished to overthrow his regime altogether. Meanwhile, the political 
situation of the country continued to deteriorate progressively.
Ayub gave his reasons for stepping down from the Presidency in his 
letter of 24 March 1969 addressed to Yahya. He stated, inter alia, 
that "all civil administration and constitutional authority in the 
country had become ineffective" and "the country has plunged into an
218. The amalgamation of the four provinces of the Panjab, North West 
Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan into the province of West 
Pakistan (on 4 October 1955) was known as the One-Unit scheme.
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abyss of senseless agitation" which "has made it impossible for the 
Government to maintain any semblance of law and order or to protect 
the civil liberties, life and property of the people". Since the 
situation went "beyond the capacity of the civil government to deal 
with", the "Defence Forces must step in" as they "represent the only 
effective and legal instrument...to retrieve the situation..."
Therefore, Ayub called upon the Commander-in-Chief of the army to 
discharge his "legal and constitutional responsibility...to save it 
(the country) from internal disorder and chaos...to preserve the security 
and integrity of the country and to restore normal social, economic and 
administrative life". The aforesaid letter of 24 March was followed by 
Ayub's last address to the nation broadcast over the radio network at 
7.15 pm on 25 March 1969. His radio address described the existing 
situation in the country in the same vein.
It is to be noted that under Article 30 of the 1962 Constitution, 
the President had the power to proclaim an emergency at a time when the 
security or economic life of Pakistan was threatened by internal 
disturbances. Yet without resorting to such power, Sandhurst-trained 
soldier-statesman, Ayub, handed over the administration to a fellow- 
Pathan, General Yahya Khan. This handover was a parting kick from 
Ayub to the politicians who, in the preceding four months, had harcus/^ 
and humiliated him. However, under the 1962 Constitution, the President 
had no power to hand over the country to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
army. Article 16 of the Constitution only empowered the Speaker of the 
National Assembly to assume the office of acting President, in case the 
sitting President wished to resign or step down.
However, Yahya Khan's Proclamation of Martial Law, issued on 25 March 
1969, more or less repeated what Ayub had said in his farewell address to
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the nation. Later, on 26 March 1969, Yahya in his radio broadcast 
said that his "sole aim in imposing martial law" was "to protect life, 
liberty and property of the people and put the Administration back on 
the rails” , "to bring back sanity and to ensure that the Administration 
resume its normal functions to the satisfaction of the people" and to 
put an end to "administrative laxity and chaos". At the same time, he 
claimed that the only object of the armed forces was to create 
"conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government". 
The prerequisite for such a government was a "clean and honest 
administration" which would ensure "a sane and constructive political life" 
and "a smooth transfer of power to a government elected freely and 
impartially on the tasis of adult franchise".
Thus it is clear that unlike the 1958 declaration of Martial Law
in Pakistan, in 1969 Martial Law was not proclaimed by the civil authority.
Although the 1962 Constitution did not specify by whom and in what
circumstances Martial Law could be proclaimed, it seems that under 
219Article 223-A of the Constitution, which empowered Parliament to make 
laws of indemnity in respect of any:act done in connection with Martial 
Law administration, there was some scope for imposing Martial Law for 
the sake of the "maintenance or restoration of order in any area in 
Pakistan". However, since Martial Law was declared on 25 March 1969
219. Article 223-A of the 1962 Constitution, the only Article which 
contained the words Martial Law and which was virtually the 
reproduction of Article 196 of the 1956 Constitution, provided that 
"Nothing in this Constitution shall prevent the Central Legislature 
from making any law indemnifying any person in the service of the 
Central or a Provincial Government, or any other person, in respect 
of any act done in connection with the maintenance or restoration 
of order in any area in Pakistan where Martial Law was in force, 
or validating any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, 
forfeiture ordered or other act done under Martial Law in such 
area".
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to quell riots and acts of indiscipline and to restore law and order,
it is evident that it satisfied the common law doctrine of necessity.
It is interesting to note that, although Martial Law was proclaimed
to restore law and order, a large number of offences, which were created
under Martial Law Regulations between 25 March 1969 and 20 March 1971,
had nothing to do with the purpose of securing peace and security.
220Some of the offences so created were smuggling; adulteration of food,
, . , , 221 . . . .  222 
drink, or drugs; improper acquisition of property, etc.
Yahya not only proclaimed Martial Law, but, taking a leaf out of 
Mirza's book, abrogated the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, dissolved the 
National and Provincial Assemblies, and dismissed the central and 
provincial cabinets. Although Yahya prohibited political activities 
temporarily, unlike Mirza, he did not ban the political parties.
Yahya's abrogation of the 1962 Constitution was an extra­
constitutional act as the Constitution did not permit its abrogation.
The outgoing President had only asked Yahya, as pointed out earlier, to 
perform his "legal and constitutional responsibility" of saving the 
country from "internal disorder and chaos". In fact, by abrogating 
the Constitution, Yahya Khan deprived himself of the right to perform 
his so-called "legal and constitutional responsibility". It is 
noteworthy that when Martial Law was imposed by the British government 
in India in five districts of the Panjab in 1919, in Malabar in 1921, in
Sholapur in 1930, in Sind in 1942 and by the Pakistan government in
Lahore in 1953, there was no question of abrogating the fundamental law
22%
of the country. However, in Asma Jilani v. Government of the Panjab,
220. Martial Law Regulation No.23.
221. Martial Law Regulation No.36.
222. Martial Law Regulation No.37.
223. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XXIV, 1972, p.139.
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in which the Supreme Court of Pakistan felt it necessary to consider the
legal recognition that had been given to successive manoeuvrings for
usurpation of power under the pseudonym of Martial Law by the decision in
Dosso1s case, Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman declared that the imposition of
1*161 CdTvjViluKw
Martial Law in 1969 and the abrogation Of were illegal. As he observed:
"...The Proclamation of Martial Law does not by itself 
involve the abrogation of the civil law and the 
functioning of the civil authorities and certainly does 
not vest the Commander of the Armed Forces with the 
power of abrogating the fundamental law of the 
country. It would be paradoxical indeed if such 
a result could flow from the invocation in the aid of
a State of any agency set up and maintained by the
State itself for its own protection from external 
invasion and internal disorder. If the argument is 
valid that the proclamation of the Martial Law by 
itself leads to the complete destruction of the legal 
order, then the armed forces do not assist the state 
in suppressing disorder but actually create further 
disorder, by disrupting the entire legal order of the 
state....Whatever was done in March 1969, either by 
Field-Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan or General Agha 
Muhammad Yahya Khan was entirely without any legal 
foundation....On the stepping aside of the constitutional 
President the constitutional machinery should have 
automatically come into effect and the Speaker should 
have taken over as Acting President until fresh 
elections were held for the choice of a successor.
The political machinery would then have moved 
according to the Constitution and the National and 
Provincial Assemblies would have taken steps to 
resolve the political disputes, if any, if the 
Military Commander had not by an illegal order 
dissolved them. The Military Commander, however, 
did not allow the constitutional machinery to come 
into effect but usurped the functions of Government 
and started issuing'all kinds of Martial Law 
Regulations, Presidential Orders and even 
Ordinances...therefore, there can be no question 
that the military rule sought to be imposed upon 
the country by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan 
was entirely illegal....The Martial Law 
introduced by him was illegal".^24
It is interesting to note that President Zulfiqar Alii Bhutto, who had
replaced Yahya as President on 20 December 1971, had announced on
224. Ibid., pp.190-198.
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14 April 1972 that Martial Law would be withdrawn on 20 April 1972 and 
the judgment in Asma Jilani's case was delivered on the same day.
However, the 1969 Martial Law regime witnessed the disintegration 
of Pakistan and, as such, the birth of Bangladesh as a new, sovereign 
and independent state.
/
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CHAPTER II
The Imposition of Martial Law 
in Bangladesh, 1975-1979
I. The Coup d'Etat and the Proclamation of Martial Law in August 1975 
The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, as has been 
discussed earlier,* changed the fundamental character of the 1972 
Constitution of Bangladesh. It replaced parliamentary democracy with 
a presidential form of government, curbed the independence of the 
judiciary, abolished judicial power to enforce fundamental rights, 
invested the President with the power of vetoing a Bill passed by 
Parliament, made the procedure for the impeachment of the President very 
difficult and gave the President the power of declaring Bangladesh a 
one-party state, a power which he exercised to establish a one-party state 
from February 1975. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman used the phrase ’second 
revolution' to describe this adroit political manoeuvre, which proclaimed 
him President of Bangladesh for a five-year term from 25 January 1975 to 
25 January 1980.
Under the Fourth Amendment, an initiative to introduce a motion for 
impeaching the President on a charge of violating the Constitution or of 
grave misconduct required the support of at least two-thirds of the total 
number of Members of Parliament, and had to be passed by at least three- 
fourths of the total number of Members. Moreover, as Bangladesh had 
become a one-party state from 24 February 1975, all Members of Parliament 
were members of the National Party headed by President Sheikh Mujib.
In these circumstances, a constitutional change of government had 
become wellnigh an impossibility. Consequently, it seemed to Mujib's 
opponents that the only course open to them to remove Mujib from power
1. See supra, Chapter I, pp. 29-31.
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was by violent means or assassination. Eventually, a group of
forty-seven army officers, who were in the main majors, captains, and
lieutenants under the leadership of six majors - Shariful Hossain Dalim,
2
S.H.M.B. Nur, Earook Rahman, Khandaker Abdul Rashid, Abdul Hafiz and 
M. Huda - supported by more than one thousand troops under their command 
carried out a coup in the early morning of 15 August 1975, and assassinated 
Sheikh Mujib.
Thus the politics of the 'second revolution' came to an abrupt end
only about seven months after its inception. In fact, the August coup
was a culmination of a long period of disenchantment with the Awami
League regime of Sheikh Mujib because of its "corruption, mismanagement
and autocratic proclivities". However, the coup was announced on the
morning of 15 August over Radio Bangladesh Dhaka by Major (retd.)
Shariful Hossain Dalim, one of the coup leaders, in these words:
"I am Major Dalim announcing the fall of the 
autocratic government of Sheikh Mujib. Sheikh 
Mujib has been killed and the armed forces have 
seized power in the greater interest of the 
country under the leadership of Khandaker Moshtaque 
Ahmed, who has taken over as President of 
Bangladesh. Martial Law is declared".^
It is evident from the foregoing announcement that Martial Law was
declared by Major Dalim, and not by Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed in whose
name the armed forces had seized power. But the Proclamation made on
20 August 1975 by Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, who was Minister for Trade
2. Both Major Dalim and Nur, who were sacked by Sheikh Mujib in
July 1974 after they had arrested some Awami League politicians
in Comilla district of Bangladesh for alleged involvement in 
smuggling, bore personal grudges against Sheikh Mujib.
3. Quoted in Lifschultz, Lawrence, "The Army's Blueprint for a
Takeover", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 1975, p.16;
Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1976 Yearbook, p.110.
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and Commerce in Sheikh Mujib's cabinet at the time of the coup and 
a senior Vice-President of the National Party, stated that he had 
"placed, on the morning of the 15th August,1975, the whole of Bangladesh 
under Martial Law by a declaration broadcast from all stations of Radio 
Bangladesh".
4
It is to be noted that in an interview with the author, Moshtaque 
went on to say that he had not declared Martial Law, that he had no 
connection or association with the coup, that he had no prior knowledge 
of it and that he had first heard the news of the coup and the declaration 
of Martial Law over the radio. According to him,the coup leaders chose 
to use his name because of his political prestige and his differences with 
Mujib in certain policy matters. He further asserted that he had been 
taken on the morning of 15 August 1975 by one of the coup leaders from 
his house to the Dhaka Radio Station and, after about three hours of 
discussion, he had agreed to accept the office of President on the 
condition that he would establish a civil administration, that the 1972 
Constitution of Bangladesh would remain in force, that Parliament would 
remain in existence, and that the army would return to barracks giving 
him a free hand to run the country.
However, we have a somewhat different version of the involvement of 
Moshtaque in the coup from one of the coup leaders, Major Farook. • In 
November 1975, while in Thailand, Farook disclosed that he had planned 
the August coup, that he himself had drawn up the tactical plan for the 
coup, and that Moshtaque knew roughly what was going to happen although 
he did not know the detailed plan.^
4. The interview with Khandaker Moshtaque took place on 10 October 
1984.
5. The Asian Recorder, 10-16 December 1975.
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Whatever his involvement in the coup, Moshtaque in his broadcast** 
to the nation over radio and television on 15 August 1975 justified 
the action of the armed forces in seizing power.
In his address, Moshtaque accused Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of 
conspiring "to monopolise power and cling to it permanently" instead of 
devoting his efforts to improve the lot of the people. He further 
alleged that Mujib had ignored the task of nation-building and had 
frittered away his energy in endless moves on the political chess board 
while corruption and nepotism were allowed to run rampant and the 
resources of the country were concentrated in the hands of a few favoured 
persons. As regards the country's economy, Moshtaque said that it was 
on the brink of collapse. The jute industry was almost destroyed and 
people had become helpless victims of hunger and starvation. He also 
declared that all avenues for the expression of the grievances of the 
people were closed. Furthermore he asserted that the coup had become 
inevitable as the suffocating political atmosphere created by Mujib had 
made its impossible for a peaceful and constitutional change of 
government.
Therefore, it is clear that Moshtaque, like a typical leader of a 
coup d'etat, sought to justify the extra-constitutional action of the army 
by quoting the misdeeds of the overthrown regime of Mujib with which he 
had been associated first as a Minister for Irrigation and Flood Control 
up to 1973 and later as a Minister for Trade and Commerce until the 
August coup. However, it can scarcely be denied that many of Moshtaque's 
statements could be objectively justified with regard to the prevailing 
condition of the country. It is noticeable that Moshtaque did not pose 
as the saviour of the nation, but gave all the credit to the armed
6. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 16 August 1975. *
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forces for rescuing the country from political and economic chaos.
However, in the true tradition of a coup leader, Moshtaque made 
alluring promises for the future when he said:
"Justice has to be established in the country and 
the values have to be rehabilitated in the society 
so that a man could establish himself with dignity.
Our Government will take the necessary steps 
quickly for the achievement of these goals and 
will extend strong support to measures taken at 
individual and collective levels to fulfil this 
objective...this Government has no compromise 
with corruption, nepotism or social vices’1.^
II. The Justification of the Promulgation of Martial Law
Although Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh on 15 August 1975, 
immediately after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, no proclamation 
was issued, as had been done in Pakistan in 1958 and in 1969 by Iskander 
Mirza and General Yahya Khan respectively, stating the circumstances 
which had paved the way for it. It is noteworthy that even Moshtaque, 
in his address of 15 August 1975 to the nation, made no reference 
whatsoever to the declaration of Martial Law or its continuance, although 
he had justified the overthrow of the government of Mujib by the armed 
forces.
It is worth mentioning that the Proclamation, which was issued on 
6 April 1979 and contained the declaration of the withdrawal of Martial 
Law, described the causes of the promulgation of Martial Law in these 
words: "in the interest of peace, order, security, progress, prosperity
and development of the country, the whole of Bangladesh was placed 
under Martial Law on the 15th August 1975".
In fact, Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh at a time when the 
country was peaceful and the civil courts were open and exercising their
7. Ibid.
113
ordinary jurisdiction in the normal way. In view of the common law 
doctrine of necessity, under which the imposition of Martial Law 
could be justified out of the necessity to suppress riot, rebellion or 
insurrection, and to restore peace and order, the promulgation of Martial 
Law on 15 August 1975 in Bangladesh in peace-time cannot be justified.
In this respect, the observations of Justice Cornelius of the Pakistan
g
Supreme Court in the Province of East Pakistan v. Md.Mehdi Ali Khan are 
noteworthy:
MWe think of Martial Law generally in terms of 
military occupation...within the municipal sphere, 
as the entrustment of plenary powers to the armed 
forces for the purpose of restoring law and order 
in a part of the municipal territory where 
conditions have reached a point of disturbance 
beyond the capacity of the civil authorities to 
control. It is not at all common to find 
Martial Rule being introduced over a whole ^ 
country in circumstances of general peace".
A similar view was expressed by Justice Hamoodur Rahman in Asma Jilani v .
Government of the Panjab and another
"...Martial Law as a machinery for the enforcement 
of internal order...is normally brought in by a 
proclamation issued under the authority of the 
civil Government and it can displace the civil 
Government only where a situation has arisen in 
which it has become impossible for the civil 
courts and other civil authorities to function...
The maxim inter armes leges silent applies in 
the municipal field only where a situation has 
arisen in which it has become impossible for 
the Courts to function, for, on the other hand, 
it is an equally well-established principle that 
where the civil courts are sitting and civil 
authorities are functioning, the establishment 
of Martial Law cannot be justified".
However, it seems that Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh on
15 August 1975 to meet any disturbances which might arise as a consequence
8. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XI, 1959, p.387.
9. Ibid., p.439.
10. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XXIV, 1972, p.139.
11. Ibid., p.187.
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of the assassination of Sheikh Mujib and the military takeover.
It is to be noted that Martial Law was proclaimed at a time when 
Bangladesh was already under an emergency which had been imposed on 
28 December 1974, but the emergency powers evidently seemed to the 
authorities to be inadequate to deal with the situation.
It should be stressed here that not only in Bangladesh, but in 
many other countries (such as Pakistan), the usual practice by which 
Martial Law comes into existence is that a group of army officers 
(sometimes in partnership with some politicians) overthrow a legitimate 
civilian regime by means of a coup d'etat and proclaim Martial Law, not 
for the purpose of restoring law and order and for establishing peace
and security, but to obviate any public opposition to their extra­
constitutional acts. The authorities on Constitutional Law in Great 
Britain do not deal with this kind of Martial Law. However, in 1963
Justice Murshed of the East Pakistan High Court in Lt.-Col. G.L. Bhattacharya 
12v. the State held, with reference to the imposition of Martial Law in 
Pakistan in 1958, that the declaration of Martial Law after a revolution 
constituted a new departure and had little to do with ’Constitutional 
Martial Law1. He observed that there is a
"kind of Martial Law brought about by a successful
revolution which had abrogated an ’existing 
Constitution' thereby bringing about a total new 
dispensation...[this] kind of Martial Law, that 
is, one brought by a revolution or a coup d ’etat... 
is outside the scope of constitutional law...
What had happened on the 7th of October 1958, 
was in fact, a revolution and coup d ’etat which 
imposed a Martial Law on the entire country.
This kind of revolution or imposition of Martial 
Law constitutes a class apart and has nothing to 
do with 'Constitutional' Martial Law".^
12. Pakistan Law Reports, Dhaka series, Vol.XIII, 1963, p.377.
13. Ibid., pp.431, 420-421.
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It is to be noted that although Martial Law was declared in 
Bangladesh on 15 August 1975, the basic norm or the total legal order 
of the country, the 1972 Constitution of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh, was neither abrogated nor suspended. The Martial Law 
government decided to govern the country by means of the 1972 Constitution 
and Proclamation and Martial Law Regulations. The Constitution remained 
the fundamental law of the country subject to the Proclamations,
Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders. (The position of the 
1972 Constitution under the new regime will be examined in greater 
detail at a later stage in this chapter.) The judiciary continued to 
function normally, subject to any limitations placed on its jurisdiction 
by the Martial Law Authorities. The judges of the Supreme Court were 
not required to take a new oath of office under the Martial Law regime.
Therefore, it appears that, since the existing legal order was
not destroyed and replaced by a new one, the change-over which occurred
in Bangladesh on 15 August 1975 cannot be described as a 'revolution'
14in Kelsenian terms. In fact, it seems that the military takeover in 
Bangladesh was in the nature of a constitutional deviation rather than 
a 'total new dispensation', and the declaration of Martial Law by the 
army was a precautionary measure against possible resistance to the 
regime.
The 1975 Martial Law of Bangladesh can, therefore, be described 
as Martial Law sui generis - fundamentally different from Martial Law 
in the sense in which it is generally used in the common law. It is 
in a class by itself and, to repeat Justice Murshed's phrase, "has 
nothing to do with Constitutional Martial Law".
14. For Kelsen's view in respect of revolution, see supra, 
Chapter I, pp.93-94.
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III. The Legality of the Imposition of Martial Law
The declaration of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975 was an extra-
legal act inconsistent with the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. The
1972 Constitution does not envisage the imposition of Martial Law.
Throughout the text of the Constitution, no reference has been made to
Martial Law. Although the term 'Martial Law' had duly occurred in
Article 196*^ of the 1956 Constitution and Article 223-A*** of the 1962
Constitution of Pakistan, the Articles which enacted provisions for
passing an Act of Indemnity in relation to acts done in connection
with Martial Law administration, it has significantly been omitted from
17corresponding Article 46 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh that 
empowered Parliament to pass an Act of Indemnity in respect of any act 
done in connection with the national liberation struggle or the maintenance 
or restoration of order in any area in Bangladesh. This shows that 
although in Pakistan Articles 196 and 223-A of the 1956 and 1962 
Constitutions respectively, recognised the possibility that Martial Law 
might be imposed under the common law doctrine of necessity for the 
purpose of "the maintenance or restoration of order in any area in 
Pakistan", no such recognition was given in Bangladesh where the phrase 
Martial Law was omitted from the analogous Article 46 of the 1972 
Constitution.
15. See, supra, Chapter I, p.91.
16. See, supra, Chapter I, p.104.
17. Article 46 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh states that
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of
this Part [i.e., Part III which guarantees some important fundamental 
rights to the citizen], Parliament may by law make provision for 
indemnifying any person in the service of the Republic or any other 
person in respect of any act done by him in connection with the 
national liberation struggle or the maintenance or restoration of 
order in any area in Bangladesh or validate any sentence passed, 
punishment inflicted, forfeiture ordered, or other act done in any 
such area".
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Therefore, it appears that in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, 
there is no provision whatsoever for the imposition of Martial Law under 
any circumstances, even for the sake of restoring law and order.
Thus it can be strongly argued that the declaration of Martial Law in 
Bangladesh in 1975 was illegal.
18
However, it is noteworthy that, unlike the cases of Dosso and 
19
Asma Jilani (the cases in which the legality of the imposition of
Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958 and 1969 was examined), in Bangladesh
the legality of the declaration of Martial Law in 1975 was not discussed
by the Supreme Court in any case either during the continuance of, or
even after the withdrawal of Martial Law.
It is true that if, during the continuance of Martial Law, the
Supreme Court, established under the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, had
declared that the imposition of Martial Law on 15 August 1975 was illegal,
it might itself have been suspended or had its jurisdiction restricted,
or the judges concerned might have been removed by the new regime.
Moreover, it is improbable that the judgment of the Court as to the
legality of Martial Law would have made the slightest difference to the
continuance of the Martial Law in practice. In this context, the
observations of Justice Fieldsend, A.J.A. of the Appellate Division of
the Rhodesian High Court in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke N.O. and •
20another are worth quoting:
"It may be a vain hope that the judgment of a 
court will deter a usurper, or have the effect 
of restoring legality, but for a court to be 
deterred by fear of failure is merely to 
acquiesce in illegality".21
It should, however, be added that after the withdrawal of Martial Law,
when the threat to the existence or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
18. See, supra, Chapter I, ^p.92-94.
19. see, supra, Chapter I, pp.105-106.
20. South African Law Reports, Vol.II, 1968, p.284.
21. Ibid., p.430.
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has disappeared, it could have determined the legality of the declaration 
of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975 as it interfered with many decisions 
of Martial Law courts.
IV. The Legality of the Assumption of the Office of
President by Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed
Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, in whose name the August coup was 
announced, was sworn in as the President of the country by the acting 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Syed A.B. Mahmud Hossain, at 
Bangabhaban (official residence of the President) in Dhaka in the 
afternoon of 15 August 1975.
It is to be noted that the assumption of the office of President 
by Khandaker Moshtaque was not in accordance with Article 55 of the 1972 
Constitution, according to which the Vice-President will succeed the 
President if there is a vacancy until a new President is elected.
Moreover, the administration of the oath of office to the President by 
the acting Chief Justice was also contrary to the provisions of Form I 
of the Third Schedule of the Constitution, which required the President 
to be sworn in by the Speaker of the House of the Nation. It is 
noteworthy that the oath of office of the President was administered 
by the acting Chief Justice at a time when the Speaker of the House had 
not ceased to hold office, since Parliament had not then been dissolved 
by Moshtaque. (The continuance and ultimate dissolution of Parliament 
will be discussed at a later stage in this chapter.)
22
Eventually, Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed issued a Proclamation on 
20 August 1975, five days after the declaration of Martial Law, in an 
attempt to legalise the new situation. In fact, this Proclamation was 
a brief but comprehensive document which completed the legal and 
constitutional formalities of his taking over "all and full powers of
22. The Proclamation of 20 August 1975 is reproduced in the appendix 
of the thesis.
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the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh with effect from 
the morning of 15 August 1975". This Proclamation, however, was itself 
unconstitutional.
The Proclamation of 20 August 1975, which provided the legal 
framework for Moshtaque's new government, stated that with effect from
the morning of 15 August 1975 he had suspended the provisions of
23 24 25Articles 48 and 55 and modified the provisions of Article 148
and Form I of the Third Schedule of the 1972 Constitution to the
effect that the oath of office of the President of Bangladesh would
be administered by the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and that the
President might enter upon office before he took the oath.
Therefore, it is clear that these amendments were introduced by
this Proclamation in order to provide a retrospective legal sanction
for Moshtaque's assumption of, and succession to, the office of the
President.
V. The Position of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
Unlike the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions of Pakistan abrogated on 
7 October 1958 and 25 March 1969 respectively, the 1972 Constitution of 
the People's Republic of Bangladesh was not abrogated at the time of the 
proclamation of Martial Law on 15 August 1975, neither was it suspended 
at any time.
23. Article 48 of the 1972 Constitution relates to the election of the 
President of the country.
24. Article 55 states, inter alia, that if a vacancy occurs in the office 
of President or if the President is unable to discharge the functions 
of his office on account of absence, illness or any other cause, the 
Vice-President shall act as President until a new President is elected 
to fill such vacancy enters upon his office, or until the President 
resumes the functions of his office, as the case may be.
25. Article 148 provides for taking the oath of office before entering 
upon the office of President.
26. Form I of the Third Schedule of the Constitution required the 
President to take the oath administrered by the Speaker.
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Although the 1972 Constitution remained in force throughout the 
period of Martial Law, it was reduced to a subordinate position to 
that of Proclamation of 20 August 1975, known as the First Proclamation. 
The unamended and unsuspended constitutional provisions were kept in
| force and allowed to continue subject to the First Proclamation and
|
| Martial Law Regulations or Orders made by the President. As the
i
| Proclamation declared that "the Constitution of the People's Republic
i
; of Bangladesh shall, subject to this Proclamation and the Martial Law
f Regulations and Orders made by me [i.e., the President] in pursuance
27
thereof, continue to remain in force". Moreover, it was stated that
the First Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations and Orders should
have effect, notwithstanding anything continued in the 1972 Constitution
28
or in any law for the time being in force.
Therefore, it is evident that the Constitution of Bangladesh was 
allowed to remain in force on the condition that the Proclamation,
r
Martial Law Regulations and Orders, made by the President, would prevail 
over the provisions of the Constitution during the Martial Law period.
In other words, under the First Proclamation the Constitution lost its 
character as the supreme law of the country. In this respect, the
observations of Justice Fazle Munim in the case of Halima Khatun v .
29
Bangladesh are worthy of note:
"What appears from the Proclamation of August 20, 1975, 
is that, with the declaration of Martial Law on 
August 15, 1975, Mr. Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed who 
became the President of Bangladesh assumed full 
powers of the Government and by clauses(d) and (e) 
of the Proclamation made the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, which was allowed to remain in force, 
subordinate to the Proclamation and any 
Regulation or Order as may be made by the President 
in pursuance thereof.. It may be true that whenever
27. Clause (e) of the First Proclamation.
28. Claude (d) of the First Proclamation.
29. Dhaka Law Reports, Supreme Court, Vol.XXX, 1978, p.207.
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there would be any conflict between the 
Constitution and Proclamation or a Regulation 
or an Order the intention, as appears from the 
language employed, does not seem to concede 
such superiority to the Constitution. Under 
the Proclamation which contains the aforesaid 
clauses the Constitution has lost its 
character as the Supreme Law of the country.
There is no doubt, an express declaration in 
Article 7(2) of the Constitution to the 
following effect: 'This Constitution is, as
the sol^emn expression of the will of the people, 
the supreme law of the Republic and if any 
other law is consistent with this Constitution 
that other law shall to the extent of the 
inconsistency be void'. Ironically enough, 
this Article, though it still exists, must 
be taken to have lost some of its importance 
and efficacy. In view of clauses (d), (e) 
and (g) of the Proclamation the supremacy 
of the Constitution as declared in that 
Article is no longer unqualified. In spite 
of this Article, no constitutional provision 
can claim to be sacrosanct and immutable.
The present constitutional provision may, 
however, claim superiority to any law other 
than a Regulation or Order made under the 
Proclamation".^0
Therefore, it is evident that the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh 
ceased to exist as the Supreme Law of the country as it was circumscribed 
by the First Proclamation and Martial Law Regulations or Orders made 
by the President (later by the Chief Martial Law Administrator).
Although the President took an oath under (Form I of) the Third 
Schedule of the 1972 Constitution "to preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution", he amended the Constitution from time to time during the 
Martial Law period by issuing Proclamations (Amendments) Orders. It 
is noteworthy that, under Article 142 of the 1972 Constitution, only 
Parliament could amend any provisions of the Constitution and by a 
majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of its Members. 
Moreover, at any time when Parliament stood dissolved or was not in
30. Ibid., p.218.
«
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session, the President had no authority under Article 93 of the 1972 
Constitution to make and promulgate any Ordinance for altering or 
repealing any provision of the Constitution.
VI. The Position of Other Laws
Along with the 1972 Constitution, all laws in force, before the
declaration of Martial Law on 15 August 1975, were to continue in force
subject to the Martial Law Regulations and Orders made by the President.
The Proclamation of 20 August 1975 declared that "All Acts, Ordinances,
President's Orders and other Orders, Proclamations, rules, regulations,
bye-laws, notifications and other legal instruments in force on the
morning of the 15th August 1975, shall continue to remain in force until
31repealed, revoked or amended".
Thus the legal continuity of the country was not interrupted by the 
1975 Martial Law regime of Bangladesh. In this respect, it followed 
the constitutional practice in the subcontinent where at any time an 
existing legal order had ceased to be operative, whether legally or 
illegally, the new dispensation allowed the existing laws to continue 
in force. Beginning from the Government of India Act, 1919 (consolidated . 
in 1924) down to the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, and the 
Proclamation of Martial Law by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, issued 
on 25 March 1969, the existing laws continued to be valid in this way.
VII. The Successive Coups and Their Impact on the Discipline 
of the Armed Forces
By announcing the overthrow of the government of Sheikh Mujib on 
15 August 1975, Major Dalim unknowingly opened the flood-gates of the 
battle for power in the Bangladesh army. Between 15 August 1975 and
31. Clause (f) of the First Proclamation.
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6 April 1979, Bangladesh witnessed eight successive coup attempts
and mutinies. Of these, four took place between November and December
1975; three between March and April 1976; and two between September
and October 1977. The only mutiny which was successful was the
Soldiers' Uprising of 7 November 1975. Although, preceding this
uprising, there had been a successful coup on 3 November 1975, that coup
proved very short-lived and, in fact, lasted for only four days.
Before we discuss these coups in detail, it may be useful to examine
the immediate impact of the August coup upon the chain of command in
the Bangladesh army.
In the August coup of 1975, which was planned and carried out by junior
officers mainly of the rank of major, none of the higher echelons was 
32
involved. This coup was a classic example of the way in which
an elected government can be overthrown by a handful of junior army
officers. Although the senior officers of the army were not involved in
the coup plan, the three chiefs of the armed serviced accepted a fait
accompli, reportedly at (the majors') gun-point. They made brief
broadcasts declaring their allegiance to the new government which had
been set up under Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, and urged their respective
forces to carry out the instructions of the government in a disciplined 
33manner.
32. It is alleged that Major-General Ziaur Rahman, the then Deputy 
Chief of Army Staff, was approached on 20 March 1975 by Major Rashid 
(one of the coup leaders) to support and lead the coup already worked 
out by the junior officers and was reported to have said, "I am a 
senior officer. I cannot be involved in such things. If you 
junior officers want to do it, go ahead", World in Action, Granada 
Television, August 1976, quoted in Lifschultz, Lawrence and
Bird, Kai, "Bangladesh: Anatomy of a Coup", Economic and Political
Weekly, 8 December 1979, p.2003.
33. The Barigladesh Times, Dhaka, 16 August 1975.
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However, during the first few days of the August coup, the majors, 
who had carried out the coup and whose real strength lay in the personal 
loyalty they commanded from their troops, began to behave like generals.
They refused to demobilise their troops or to subordinate themselves to 
their superiors, presumably apprehending that they would be disarmed.
Instead of going back to barracks, they stayed with President Moshtaque 
at the Presidential palace (called Bangabhavan) guarded by tanks and 
apparently continued to play a vital role in the policy-making decisions 
of the government.
Therefore, it is clear that the senior officers of the army failed 
to re-establish their authority over the majors and bring them back 
to active military duty. Thus the August coup not only eliminated 
Sheikh Mujib, but also shattered the chain of command in the army. It 
raised the fundamental question as to who rulejtthe state - the army, 
or the civilian President - and further as to who ruled the army, the 
supreme command or the majors.
However, shortly after the coup, President Moshtaque took steps 
adroitly to isolate the majors, to form an alliance with the supreme command 
by means of new appoints, to merge the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini with the 
regular army, and to rectify "the past neglect and derogation" of the 
country's defence services. *
Firstly, Moshtaque removed the existing Chief of Army Staff, Major- 
General Shafiullah, who had been appointed by Sheikh Mujib to this post 
in January-1974 and who was junior in rank of Ziaur Rahman. Major-
General Shafiullah was replaced on 24 August 1975 by the then Deputy 
Chief of Army Staff, Major-General Ziaur Rahman, who had declared the 
independence of Bangladesh on 26 March 1971 and had played a vital role 
in the War of Liberation. The elevation of Ziaur Rahman satisfied those
125
critics who had felt that Mujib had done an injustice to Zia by 
disregarding his senority over Shafiullah and his role in the fight for 
freedom. However, Brigadier H.M. Ershad, a Pakistani repatriate, 
was promoted to the rank of major-general and appointed as Deputy Chief 
of Army Staff. Another brigadier, Q.K. Dastagir, was also promoted 
to major-general and made Director-General of the border patrols, the 
Bangladesh Rifles, in place of Khalilur Rahman, who had been a major- 
general of the Pakistan army and was appointed to the aforesaid post by 
Sheikh Mujib. Moreover, Moshtaque created two new posts - the Defence 
Adviser to the President, and Chief of Defence Staff in the Ministry of 
Defence. The post of Defence Adviser was filled on 24 August 1975 by 
General M.A.G. Osmani, who had resigned as the Chief of Army Staff in 
January 1974 during the regime of Sheikh Mujib and had been Commander- 
in-Chief of the Liberation Army. The other less sensitive post, the 
office of the Chief of Defence Staff, was given to Major-General Khalilur 
Rahman. Thus Moshtaque built up a chain of command in the army 
favourable to himself by removing Mujib’s appointees and replacing them 
by his own nominees, on whom he could rely for unqualified support.
Secondly, Moshtaque promulgated an Ordinance providing for the 
absorption into the army of the members of the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini 
(the National Security Force), a paramilitary force created by Mujib as 
a countervailing force to the regular army on the basis of recruitments 
drawn from an organisation affiliated with the Awami League and commonly 
referred to as Mujib's private army. The Ordinance, called the Jatiya 
Rakkhi Bahini (Absorption in the Army) Ordinance, 1975, came into force 
on 3 September 1975 and provided that any members of the Rakkhi Bahini 
willing to serve in the army and found suitable would be appointed in the 
army under terms and conditions determined by the government. Thus the
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Ordinance provided for the pacification of the most abrasive paramilitary 
force and removed, according to many critics, a potential Indian fifth 
column.^
Third, and finally, President Moshtaque announced in September 1975
that steps would be taken to give a ’’place of honour” and to provide
reasonable ’’fringe benefits" to those members of the armed forces who
had valiantly fought in the War of Liberation. Subsequently, it was
further declared that a high-powered committee would be set up in each
service headquarters in order to review the cases of "undue benefits"
(i.e., premature promotion, and fringe benefits) granted to defence
personnel, or of "victimisation" (i.e., premature retirement and arbitrary
removal from service) to see whether they had been done in violation of
departmental rules, normal practices and conventions and to take remedial 
35measures. But no application was required to be submitted for this 
purpose by the defence service personnel.
It seems that the object of Moshtaque in announcing such moves was 
not only to rectify "the past neglect and derogation" of the country’s 
defence services, but also to win over their unquestioned loyalty to 
his new regime. It may be that the majors persuaded Moshtaque to 
announce these steps to suit the cases of fifteen young officerto 
including Major Dalim and Major Nur, who had been sacked in 1974 b y ‘the 
previous regime.
(i) The Coup of 3 November
Moshtaque’s army appointments and other steps to have a solid
34. The Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini was considered "a potential Indian fifth 
column" as their officers had been initially trained by Indian army 
officers in their headquarters at Savar and later trained at Dehra 
Dun - India's Sandhurst.
35. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 9 and 10 September 1975.
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alliance among, and backing from, the armed forces came to nothing 
because he himself was overthrown as a result of the coup which took 
place on 3 November 1975.
This counter-coup was engineered by Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, who 
had been appointed as the Chief of the Army's General Staff by Sheikh 
Mujib and who had retained that position under Moshtaque. He arrested 
Chief of Army Staff Major-General Ziaur Rahman and Air Vice-Marshal 
G.M. Tawab. He also asked the majors, who were staying with the 
President at the Presidential palace guarded by tanks, to surrender.
An uneasy and tense situation developed but, at 1 ast, a compromise 
was struck through the mediation of General Osmani, Defence Adviser 
to President Moshtaque. It was agreed that seventeen of the officers 
actively involved in the August coup would fly into exile - to 
Bangkok.
However, before their departure, the "August coup majors" assassinated 
four ministers of Sheikh Mujib's cabinet - Tajuddin Ahmed, A.H.M. 
Kamruzzaman, Mansur Ali and Sayed Nazrul Islam - inside the Dhaka Central 
Prison. This was an unprecedented event in the history of Bangladesh. 
However, this action of the majors showed that they had wished to foil 
Khaled's power bid and wipe out the possibility of a 'pro-Mujib' and 
'pro-Indian' regime.
Confusion and pan^^mionium prevailed in the country from 3 to 4 
November 1975, and no one knew who was running the country - President 
Moshtaque or the counter-coup leaders. However, on the night of 
4 November, power changes were formalised. The coup leader, Khaled
35a. Mattem, William, "Bangladesh: Day of the Generals", Far Eastern
Economic Review, 14 November 1975, pp.10-11; Mattern, William, 
"Bangladesh: Burying the Memory of Mujib", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 21 November 1975, pp.18, 20.
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Mosharraf, was promoted to the rank of major-general and was appointed 
as Chief of Army Staff in place of Major-General ZiaurRahman. On the
I
next day, a Revolutionary Council was set up consisting of the four 
service chiefs and the Chief of Defence Staff. At the instance of the 
counter-coup leaders of 3 November, President Moshtaque on 6 November 1975 
named his own successor, Chief Justice A.M. Sayem of the Bangladesh
36
Supreme Court, under the Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, 1975.
(ii) The Soliders1 Uprising of 7 November 1975
Khaled Mosharraf was destined to hold power for no more than four
days as his coup quickly gained the stigma of being an India-backed and
pro-Mujib putsch. Leaflets were circulated among the soldiers of the
army at the Dhaka Cantonment by the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (National
Socialist Party) and Sammabadi Dal (Communist Party) describing the coup
of 3 November as an attempt by the Delhi-Moscow axis to establish their
control over Bangladesh, and urging the soldiers to revolt against Khaled
Mosharraf. On 7 November 1975, the soldiers of the Dhaka Cantonment
revolted en masse against Khaled Mosharraf's putsch, reportedly at the
initiative of the soldiers belonging to the Biplobi Gfijno Bahini
(Revolutionary People's Army) - a cell of the military front of the Jatiya
37
Samajtantrik Dal in the Bangladesh Army. Khaled Mosharraf was killed
36. The Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, 1975 (Proclamation Order No.II 
of 1975) issued on 6 November 1975 and deemed to have come into effect on 
20 August 1975, empowered an incumbent President, in case of his inability 
to discharge the functions of the office of President for any reason or in 
case of his willingness to vacate the office of President, to nominate 
his successor.
37. On 5 November 1975, the BiplabiGdno Bahini distributed thousands of 
leaflets (issued by the Biplo.bi Shainik Sangstha - Revolutionary Soldiers' 
Organisation) throughout the country's military cantonments urging the 
soldiers to cease being pawns of officers' "selfish and ambitious scrambles 
for power through staging one putsch after another" and to ready themselves 
for a general uprising. It is said that under^(retired) Lieutenant-Colonel 
Abu Taher's leadership, the JSD activated its military organisation, the 
Revolutionary People's Army and Revolutionary Soldiers' Organisation. It is 
also claimed that Abu Taher was the mainspring of the soldiers' uprising of 
7 November of 1975; Maniruzzaman, Talukdar, :Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall
of the Mujib Regime and its Aftermath", Asian Survey. Vol.XVI, 1976, p.125.
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by the mutineers. Ziaur Rahman was freed from captivity and took 
over as the Chief of Army Staff.
Although the Jatiya Samajtaritrik Dal and their associates within the 
army claimed that they had set the wheels of the rebellion in motion, 
many observers believed that the Soldiers' Uprising of 7 November was 
spontaneous as a reaction to the Indian-backed coup of 3 November. 
However, the mutiny of the soldiers on 7 November 1975 was the first of 
its kind to have taken place since the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 under the 
British Raj.
Despite the fact that Justice A.M. Sayem was a nominee of Khaled 
Mosharraf, he was retained as President by the leaders of the new coup 
on the grounds of his neutral position and solid judicial experience.
However, the soldiers had a two-fold objective: the first was
to overthrow Khaled Mosharraf and to release Major-General Ziaur Rahman; 
the second objective sought to oust "the bourgeois officers from the 
upper echelons of the army" and eradicate "the power of the bourgeoisie 
in the state". The release of Zia was a symbol of the uprising, while 
the demands of the soldiers were the principal basis of the revolt.
These demands of the soldiers were twelve in number and were put forward 
in the form of a leaflet.
The demands of the soldiers called for the immediate "release of 
all political prisoners", the removal of differences as well as 
discrimination between officers and soldiers; an end of recruitment of 
officers from the country's privileged elite through special schools 
and the introduction of the selection of officers from among the ranks 
of the common soldiers, and changing the existing "British rules and 
regulations", especially the abolition of the 'batman' system in which 
rank-and-file sepoys were used as household servants by higher officers.
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A number of economic demands were put forward, such as improved wages 
for soldiers and an end to the rent payments for their accommodation. 
However, the most important of the "Twelve Demands" was a call for the
38establishment of new organs of military authority and decision-making.
Thus unlike the two coups which preceded it, the uprising of 
7 November 1975 was revolutionary in nature because of the radical 
character of the "Twelve Demands" put forward by the soldiers. Such
demands had never been made by any regular army in South Asia. The
source can be traced back to Bangladesh's War of Liberation in 1971, when 
many Bengali officers and soldiers of the Pakistan army participated in 
fighting for the freedom of Bangladesh and came into contact with the 
members of various raJUcal groups that had fundamentally changed their 
traditional ideas in respect of the military structure and the polity at 
large.
However, ultimately, the government refused to fulfil the so-called 
radical demands thrown up by the Soldiers' Uprising of 7 November.
Nineteen leaders of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), including (retired) 
Lieutenant-Colonel Abu Taher who was reportedly the leader of the uprising, 
were arrested. (Their trial, held under the Special Martial Law Tribunal 
Regulation, 1976, will be discussed in Chapter V.) By 25 November 1975, 
discipline was restored in the Bangladesh army and two of the army • 
battalions were disarmed because of their strong affiliation with the 
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal. Thus the "principal basis of the revolt" ended 
in a dismal failure.
38. Lifschultz, Lawrence, "The Twelve Demands", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 5 December 1975, p.33.
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*583.
(iii) Other Insignificant Coup Attempts of 1975 and 1977
A few insignificant coup attempts and mutinies took place between 
13 November 1975 and 30 September 1977. These, in chronological order, 
were as follows:
(a) The mutiny of the Bangladesh navy at Chittagong on 
13 November 1975.
(b) The mutiny at the naval base at Chittagong in early 
December 1975.
(c) The mutiny of the soldiers of the Chittagong Brigade in 
March 1976.
(d) The rebellion of one of the August coup leaders, Colonel 
Farook Rahman, at the Bogra Cantonment in April 1976.
(d) The attempted coup of Air Vice-Marshal M.G. Tawab in 1976.
(e) The revolt of the rightest military elements at the Bogra 
Cantonment on 29-30 September 1977.
These sporadic and unco-ordinated mutinies were suppressed without 
much difficulty by the government.
(iv) The Coup Attempt of 2 October 1977
A more important coup was attempted at Dhaka on 2 October 1977, 
when a gnoup of non-commissioned air force officers, junior commissioned 
officers and soldiers from the army succeeded in capturing a number of 
air force officers and executed eleven of them by firing squad. The 
rebels, who had declared themselves to be members of a People's Army, 
briefly captured the Dhaka Radio Station and announced a revolution of
38a. Lifschultz, Lawrence, "Mutiny on Behalf of the People", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 5 December 1975, p.34; Hearst, David, "Ziaur Shrugs 
off the Coup-makers", Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 June 1976, 
p.21; The Bangladesh'Times, Dhaka, 5 October 1977.
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the workers, peasants and students. However, the government succeeded
38bin putting an end to this uprising within a matter of a few hours.
In comparison with the other sporadic uprisings mentioned earlier, 
it seems that the attempted coup of 2 October 1977 at Dhaka was a planned 
effort to overthrow the Government of Bangladesh with a view to a radical 
restructuring of both the military system and the polity of the country.
The various coup attempts within a short period of time made the 
government acutely aware that it had to take stern action to depoliticise 
the army in order to safeguard the stability of the country. Consequently, 
the government promulgated the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977.
Its provisions, and the trials held under it, will be examined in 
Chapter V.
VIII. The Structure of the Martial Law Administration
(i) The Initial Retention of the Structure of the Civil Administration 
Despite the fact that Martial Law was declared throughout the 
country and that Moshtaque had assumed the office of the President of 
Bangladesh on 15 August 1975, he neither assumed the office of Chief 
Martial Law Administrator nor appointed any Martial Law Administrators.
In fact, unlike Iskander Mirza of Pakistan in 1958, he retained the 
structure of the previous civil administration. He appointed 
Mohammadullah, who was the first Speaker of the House of the Nation and 
at the time of the August coup was Minister for Land Reforms and Land 
Administration in Mujib’s cabinet, as Vice-President of Bangladesh. He formed 
a civil cabinet, taking ten of the eighteen ministers and eight of the nine 
ministers of state of the assassinated President Mujib’s cabinet.
38b. The Asian Recorder, 22-28 October 1977, p.13989 (corrected p.101435); 
The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 4 October 1977.
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Therefore, soon after the August coup, with the retention of most of 
the ministers of the deposed government, it became evident that the 
majors, who led the coup, had hardly looked beyond the immediate removal 
of Sheikh Mujib and they had no programme about what would follow after 
they had toppled the government of Mujib. About this Daniel Burger wrote:
MThe coup was carried off without either clear-cut 
political ideas or leading personalities capable 
of lifting the whole affair above a purely 
operational level and bringing a new order out 
of the potential for chaos it has opened up".^
(ii) The Assumption of the Power of Issuing Martial Law Regulations
It is to be noted that, although President Moshtaque retained the 
structure of civil administration and did not assume the office of 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, unlike Iskander Mirza of Pakistan, he 
assumed on 20 August 1975 the power to make Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders. He could issue Martial Law Regulations and Orders:
(a) Providing for setting up special courts or tribunals 
for the trial and punishment of any offence under such 
Regulations or Orders and of offences under any other law;
(b) Prescribing penalties for offences under such Regulations 
or Orders and special penalties for offences under any 
other law;
(c) Empowering any court or tribunal to try and punish any 
offence under such Regulation or Order; and
(d) Barring the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal from 
trying any offence specified in such Regulations or Orders.^
39. Burger, Daniel, "Bangladesh: The Sheikh's Legacy of Confusion",
Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 1975, p.16.
40. Clause (b) of the First Proclamation, issued on 20 August 1975 by 
President Moshtaque.
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This assumption by President Moshtaque of the power to issue 
Martial Law Regulations and Orders constituted a clear departure from 
the usual practice followed in a Martial Law regime where the Martial Law 
Regulations or Orders are issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, 
as had been done in Pakistan in 1958 and 1969.
However, by promulgating the Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, 
1975 (Proclamation Order No.I of 1975) on 19 September 1975, Moshtaque 
extended the ambit of objects for which Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders could be issued. Under this Proclamation, he could make Martial 
Law Regulations and Orders "on any other subject or in respect of any 
other subject or in respect of any other matter, including any subject 
or matter specified in, or regulated or provided by the Constitution of 
the People's Republic of Bangladesh".
Thus President Moshtaque assumed the power of amending the provisions
of the 1972 Constitution which, as has been pointed out earlier, had
formerly been within the sole jurisdiction of Parliament. It is
noteworthy that, unlike Iskander Mirza and Yahya Khan of Pakistan,
Moshtaque did not dissolve Parliament. Even after assuming the power
of amending the 1972 Constitution, on 16 October 1975 President Moshtaque
addressed the members of the House of the Nation (the name of Parliament)
41
at the Presidential palace instead of Parliament House. It seems that 
the object of convening this meeting was to ascertain the measure of 
support of the members of Parliament, elected during the regime of Sheikh 
Mujib, for the new government of Moshtaque. In fact, the presence of 
260 Members (out of a total number of 315 Members) of Parliament in the 
meeting, including Speaker Abdul Malik Ukil and Chief Whip Abdur Rouf, 
was an encouraging event for the extra-constitutional regime of Moshtaquq.
41. The Bangladesh Times. Dhaka, 17 October 1975.
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(iii) The Introduction of Full-fledged Martial Law Administration
However, it was Major-General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief of Army
Staff, who for the first time assumed the office of Chief Martial Law
Administrator on the morning of 7 November 1975 - the day of the Soldiers'
Uprising. Yet by the evening of the same day, he had stepped down from 
42
this post perhaps to demonstrate that he was not power-hungry.
Thereafter, President Sayem, who had replaced Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed
as President on 6 November 1975, assumed the powers of Chief Martial
Law Administrator despite his civilian status. He appointed the Chief
of Army Staff, Major-General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief of Naval Staff,
Commodore M.H. Khan, and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal
M.G. Tawab, as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators "for the effective
enforcement of Martial Law". He declared that Martial Law Regulations
and Orders would be made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator and all
Martial Law Regulations and Orders in force immediately before 8 November
1975 would be deemed to have been made by the Chief Martial Law
Administrator and would continue to remain in force until amended or
43repealed by the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Chief Martial Law 
Administrator Sayem divided the whole of Bangladesh into seven zones 
and appointed seven Zonal Martial Law Administrators on 5 December 1975.^
Later, on 7 February 1976, the whole country was divided into eight
45 46 47
zones, in May and August 1976 it was divided into nine and eleven
, 48
?ones respectively. Again it was divided into seven zones in October
42. Ibid., 8 November 1975.
43. Clauses (a) and (b) of the Proclamation, issued on 8 November 1975 
by President Sayem.
44. Order No.856 - Law, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs and 
Justice, issued on 5 December 1975.
45. Order No.117 - Law, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, issued 
on 7 February 1976.
46. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 9 May 1976.
47. Ibid., 11 August 1976. ’
48. Ibid., 2 October 1976.
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1976. Accordingly Zonal Martial Law Administrators were also appointed.
A Zonal Martial Law Administrator was charged with the duty of preserving
49
general law and order in his zone. However, on 19 October 1976, the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator divided three zones into seven sub-zones 
and appointed seven Sub-Zonal Martial Law Administrators.^
Thus it is clear that one-time Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Bangladesh, A.M. Sayem, assumed the task of administering Martial 
Law (which was unprecedented in the history of Martial Law) and it was 
he who introduced full-fledged Martial Law administration in the 
country. Although Martial Law was declared in peace-time and there 
was no question of suppressing civilian disturbances or rebellion, Sayem 
brought the military personnel into his system of administration, which 
led to the gradual politicisation of the army.
However, in his address to the nation over the radio and television 
network on 7 November 1975, President Sayem declared that the permanent 
civil servants would have the responsibility to implement the policies 
of the government.^* Like most of the senior military officers of the 
country, civil servants had been trained in the Pakistan traditions 
of Martial Law. However, it can be said that the post-coup system 
of government in Bangladesh was a partnership of the military and civil 
bureaucracy.
(iv) The Dissolution of Parliament
Following the example of the 1958 and 1969 Martial Law regimes of
49. The Zonal Martial Law Administrators (Functions) Orders, 1975, 
(Martial Law Order No.II of 1975), issued on 24 December 1975.
50. Order No.1014 - Law, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 
issued on 19 October 1976.
51. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 8 November 1975.
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Pakistan, Justice Abusadat Mohammad Sayem, who "assumed responsibility
as the head of a neutral and non-party interim government" on 6 November
1975, in his first address to the nation over radio and television on
the night of 6 November announced the dissolution of the House of the
Nation to enable his government to accomplish the task of establishing
a democratic government through a free and fair general election in the
shortest possible time - by the month of February 1977 or if possible,
52
even earlier. The Proclamation of 8 November 1975, which was deemed
to be a part of the Proclamation of 20 August 1975, also declared that
53
Parliament would stand dissolved with effect from 6 November 1975.
Thus, almost three months after the proclamation of Martial Law,
undtar Marh'al
Parliament was dissolved by the second President of the country. By
A
dissolving Parliament, Sayem freed himself from constitutional restraints
and took a giant step along the path of authoritarianism because any
checks exercised by Parliament were revoked at one stroke by its
dissolution. The persons holding office as Vice-President, Speaker,
Deputy Speaker, Ministers and Whips, immediately before 8 November, were
also declared to have ceased to hold office with effect from 6 November 
541975. Thus the structure of civil administration, which had been 
retained by President Moshtaque, came to an end.
(v) The Removal of A.M. Sayem as the President 
and the Chief Martial Law Administrator
Initially President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, A,K. Sayem, 
was assisted by a three-member council comprising the three service 
chiefs appointed as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators - Major-General
52. Ibid., 7 November 1975.
53. Clause (c), Proclamation issued on 8 November 1975 by President 
A.M. Sayem.
54. Clause (d), ibid.
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Ziaur Rahman, Commodore M.H. Khan, and Air Vice-Marshal M.G. Tawab.
By January 1976, a nine-member Council of Advisers to the President, 
consisting of the three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators and 
six civilians (three educationists, one former civil servant, one doctor 
and one female social worker), was set up. Yet the Deputy Chief Martial 
Law Administrators retained the key portfolios: Chief of Army Staff
and DCMLA, Major-General Ziaur Rahman held the charge of the Ministries 
of Finance, Home Affairs, Information and Broadcasting; Chief of Air 
Staff and DCMLA Air Vice-Marshal M.G. Tawab held the portfolios of Food, 
Petroleum, Civil Aviation and Tourism; and Chief of Naval Staff and 
DCMLA Commodore M.H. Khan remained in charge of the Ministries of Water 
Resources and Power, Flood Control, and Communication and Transport.
It is noticeable that the most important portfolios - Home Affairs, 
Finance and Broadcasting - were held by Ziaur Rahman. Hence it was 
widely believed that he became the virtual wielder of state power and 
played the de facto role of chief political decision-maker. However, 
it is noteworthy that Ziaur Rahman was not given charge of the Minstry 
of Defence. During an interview^ with the author, President Sayem 
gave special emphasis to the fact that he had retained in his own hands 
the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. He made the point that 
his aim in retaining the portfolio of Defence was to exercise a close 
control and supervision over the armed forces. He also constituted 
an eleven-member National Committee on Defence which would act as 
the highest policy planning body of the government for the purpose of 
formulating policies on national defence. Sayem himself was the 
Chairman of the Committee.
55. The interview with former President Sayem took place on
4 October 1984.
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It is significant, however, that President Sayem1s strategy in
retaining the portfolio of Defence proved of little use when he was
forced to give up first the post of Chief Martial Law Administrator
in November 1976 and then that of the President in April 1977. In an
interview^ with the author, Sayem said he was invited on 28 November
1976 by the senior officers of the armed forces to abdicate the office
of Chief Martial Law Administrator in favour of Ziaur Rahman.
Ultimately, he had to yield to this pressure. On 29 November 1976,
the nation was informed that President Sayem felt "that it is in the
national interest that the powers of the Chief Martial Law Administrator
should be exercised by Major-General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief of Army 
57Staff". Accordingly, the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator
was handed over to Ziaur Rahman with powers to amend the Proclamations,
to make Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders, or to do
anything or to take any action necessary "in the national interest or
58for the enforcement of Martial Law".
Thus Ziaur Rahman, who had stepped down from the office of the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator on the evening of 7 November 1975 at 
his own will, took up the s&me post on 29 November 1976 and crowned his 
de facto powers as Chief Martial Law Administrator with the appropriate 
titles. The new arrangement made President Sayem even more of a 
figurehead and confirmed Ziaur Rahman as the country's ultimate authority.
Yet even the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator was not 
considered enough by Ziaur Rahman. He now aspired to the post of 
President^ His desire was conveyed to President Sayem through Justice 
Abdus Sattar, the Special Assistant to the President. This time Sayem
56. Ibid.
57. The Third Proclamation, issued on 29 November 1976.
58. Ibid.
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59at once agreed to relinquish the office of President. He resigned 
from the post on the ground of failing health and nominated Major-General 
Ziaur Rahman as President of Bangladesh under the Proclamation (First 
Amendment) Order, 1975 (Proclamation Order No.II of 1975). Ziaur 
Rahman assumed the office of the President of the country on 21 April 1977.
Thus Ziaur Rahman became the President of Bangladesh only about 
five months after assuming the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator.
It is clear that Ziaur Rahman proceeded step by step in a careful and 
calculated way, after taking appropriate measures to strengthen his 
power base in the army. Finally, when he felt confident enough, he 
did not hesitate to push Sayem out of the office of President as well. 
However, the assumption of full state powers by Ziaur Rahman is 
somewhat comparable with that of General Ayub Khan of Pakistan in October 
1958. At first, General Ayub Khan was only the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, but on 27 October he sent three of his generals - Azam 
Khan, Burki and Khalid Sheikh - to see President Iskander Mirza and 
force him to step down as President in his favour.
The new President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Ziaur Rahman, 
on 9 November 1977 repealed with immediate effect all orders issued by 
his predecessor relating to the creation ^ zones and sub-zones and the
appointment of Zonal Martial Law Administrators and Sub-Zonal Martial
Law Administrators.^
This shows that Ziaur Rahman had no desire to politicise the army 
officer corps by allowing it to be involved in the Martial Law 
administration for a prolonged period.
59. Based on an interview with former President A.M. Sayem which took 
place on 4 October 1984. Sayem expressed his regret that he could
not materialise his earnest desire to hand over power to the
politicians by holding a general election.
60. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 10 November 19771
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IX. The Civilianisation of Government and the Withdrawal of Martial Law
So far Zia's actual constituency was the highly politicised faction-
ridden army. In June 1978, Ziaur Rahman broadened his constituency by 
moving into real politics when he contested the Presidential election as 
a candidate of the "Nationalists' Front", consisting of the government- 
sponsored Nationalist Democratic Party formed in February 1978 and five 
other political parties. He won the election, securing 76 per cent of 
the total votes cast.
Thus Ziaur Rahman became the first President of the country directly 
elected on the basis of universal adult franchise and the Presidential 
election was an important step towards the restoration of democratic order.
However, after converting himself into a civilian President, Zia, 
who did not believe in ideology-oriented politics, in September 1978 
transformed the "Nationalists' Party" into a fully-fledged, reorganised 
governmental party to be known as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He 
then declared the general nineteen-point economic programme as its 
ideological platform. In order to complete the process of democratic 
transition, Zia announced 12 February 1979 as the date for a national 
parliamentary election in which Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party won 
206 out of 300 seats in Parliament.
Finally, Martial Law was withdrawn when the newly-elected Parliament 
met for its first session on 6 April 1979, and as such marked Bangladesh's 
'transition to democracy1.
X. A Survey of Martial Regulations Issued
A number of Martial Law Regulations, issued during the Martial Law 
period, created certain offences. The offences so created were: the
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61 62 
possession of illegal arms, corruption and criminal misconduct,
63
the possession of illegally acquired property, the seduction of
members of the defence services with a view to subverting or destroying
the defence services,^ non-payment of taxes,^ criticising the imposition,
operation or continuance of Martial Law,^ creating fear among the
public,^ involvement in prejudicial acts,^ enhancement of certain
r e n t s , s m u g g l i n g , ^  mischief by fire or explosive substances to jute,
71 72
etc., extortion, kidnapping or abducting a person under the age of
73 74
fifteen, misappropriation of relief goods, etc., waging war and
75 76insurrection, hoarding, profiteering and dealing in the black market.
It is interesting to note here that all the offences created by
Regulations were, with very few exceptions (e.g., criticising the
imposition, operation and continuance of Martial Law; enhancement of
certain rents; misappropriation of relief goods), already offences under
the ordinary law of the country. The Martial Law Regulations, in general,
only prescribed more severe punishments than the general law for a similar
offence. They prescribed penalties ranging from death or life imprisonment
to rigorous imprisonment and confiscation of properties. The only
61, Regulation 10 of the
62. Regulation 11* ibid.
63. Regulation 12, ibid.
64. Regulation 13, ibid.
65. Regulation 14, ibid.
66. Regulation 15, ibid.
67. Regulation 16, ibid.
68. Regulation 17, ibid.
69. Regulation 18, ibid.
70. Regulation 19, ibid.
71. Regulation 21, ibid.
72. Regulation 22, ibid.
73. Regulation 23, ibid.
74. Regulation 24, ibid.
75. Regulation 25, ibid.
76. Regulation 26, ibid.
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Regulation which provided punishment with imprisonment for less than 
five years was Regulation 14. Regulation 14 made the offence of 
non-payment of taxes punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
might extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
However, the creation of offences like corruption and criminal 
misconduct, the possession of illegally acquired property, smuggling, 
profiteering and dealing in the black market etc., under the Martial 
Law Regulations gives the impression that Martial Law had been promulgated 
to combat anti-social activities. The prescription of more severe 
punishments for such offences under the Martial Law Regulations, 
apparently with a view to curbing their commission, has no justification 
as punishments are not the end of Martial Law, but only a means. It 
seems that the 1975 Martial Law administration of Bangladesh followed 
the 1958 and 1969 Martial Law regimes of Pakistan when it provided for 
severe punishments by creating offences under the Martial Law 
Regulations which had already been offences under the ordinary law.
However, the severe punishments can have some justification only 
for those offences the creation of which was necessary for the restoration 
of law and order and the establishment of civil authority. Under the 
common law doctrine, all acts which would tend to hinder, delay or 
obstruct the work of military forces in restoring law and order can be 
made offences under Martial Law Regulations. As in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Martial Law in Demerara, Sir James Mackintosh said:
’’When the laws are silenced by the noise of arms, 
the rulers of the armed force must punish as 
equitably as they can, those crimes which ^
threaten their own safety and that of society11.
77. Hansard, T.C., The Parliamentary Debates, New Series, London,
Vol.XI, March-June 1824, p.1046.
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(i) The Possession of Illegal Arms
Whereas under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act (XI of 1878) unlicensed 
possession of firearms, or ammunition,was punishable "with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both", 
Regulation 10(1) made the Unlicensed "possession of any firearm, 
ammunition or explosive" punishable with "death, or with transportation 
for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
fourteen years". Under the Regulation, the person concerned could 
"also be liable to fine or to suffer confiscation of the whole or any 
part of his property".
Thus the punishment provided by the Regulation was much more severe 
than that of the Arms Act. It is noteworthy that when Martial Law was 
promulgated in Pakistan in 1969 to restore law and order, Regulation 12, 
issued by the 1969 Martial Law regime, like that of Regulation 12 of the 
1958 Martial Law regime, provided a maximum punishment of fourteen years 
rigorous imprisonment for "actual or constructive possession of any 
firearm, ammunition, explosive or sword without a bona fide licence".
But the Martial Law government of Bangladesh not only made the offence 
of possession of illegal arms punishable with rigorous imprisonment which 
could extend to fourteen years but provided death sentences for the 
possession of illegal arms., At the same time, it went so far as to 
provide that a person accused of such an offence so punished could also 
simultaneously be liable to a fine or to suffer confiscation of the whole 
or any part of his property.
It seems that the Martial Law regime was actuated to provide for 
severe punishment because the arms acquired by guerrillas during the 
Liberation War were still possessed by many of them and were used to 
commit political murders and other anti-social activities. The repeated 
calls by the previous government had met with inadequate response;, and it seems
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that the Martial Law authorities thought that the prescription of more 
severe punishment would prompt a more positive response from the guerrillas.
It is interesting to note that Regulation 10(2) embodied a very- 
unusual provision to the effect that:
"Where any firearm, ammunition or explosive is found 
in any place (place 'includes any house, building, 
premises, vehicle or vessel') and no person claims 
it to be his own, the owner or occupier of the 
place shall, unless he proves to the satisfaction 
of the Court that he was not aware of the existence 
of such firearm, ammunition or explosive in such 
place, be deemed to be a person in possession of 
such firearm, ammunition or explosive without 
licence".
Never before in the history of Martial administration in the Indian 
subcontinent had such a provision been made. By virtue of this 
Regulation, an innocent person could be implicated for possession of 
illegal arms for which he was not, in fact, responsible. For example, 
a person bearing a grudge against another could plant firearms, 
ammunition or explosive in the place owned by the latter and thus subject 
him to the punishment provided by Regulation 10(1). This could result 
in grave injustice and victimisation.
(ii) Smuggling
With regard to the punishment of the offence of smuggling in general, 
Section 156(8) of the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) provided that:
"If any goods be smuggled into or out of Bangladesh, 
such goods shall be liable to confiscation and any 
person concerned in the offence shall be liable to 
a penalty not exceeding ten times the value of the 
goods; and upon conviction by a Magistrate he shall 
further be liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six years and to a fine not exceeding 
ten times the value of such goods, and if the 
Magistrate in his discretion so orders, also to 
whipping".
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Section 25B of the Special Powers Act, 1974, as amended in July 1974 by
the Special Powers (Amendment) Act 1974, and the Emergency Powers Rules
1975, made the offence of smuggling ’’punishable with death, or with
transportation for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to fourteen years" and also with fine.
Yet Regulation 19(1) made not only smuggling but also conspiracy
for smuggling punishable, without prejudice to any confiscation or
penalty to which the goods or the person concerned could be liable under
any law for the time being in force, with "death, or with transportation
for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to
fourteen years". The person concerned could also be liable to fine or
to suffer confiscation of the whole or any part of his property.
Thus the Regulation went much further than the Special Powers Act
and the Emergency Powers Rules in the punishment for the offence of
smuggling by providing for the "confiscation of the whole or any part"
of the property of the person accused of such an offence. This punishment
was not resorted to either by the 1958 or 1969 Martial Law regimes of
Pakistan, both of which provided only death as the maximum punishment for
78
"smuggling of all kinds".
However, Martial Law Regulation 19(2) contained a very unusual 
provision, never enacted by any Martial Law administration of the ." 
subcontinent, to the effect that:
"Where any goods are seized in the reasonable belief 
that they have been smuggled into Bangladesh in 
contravention of any prohibition or restriction 
imposed by or under any law for the time being in 
force, the burden of proving that they are not 
smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose 
possession the goods are seized".
78. Martial Law Regulation 27 of 1958 and Martial Law Regulation 23 
of 1969.
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79Thus this provision was virtually a reproduction of that of Rule 18(2) 
of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975 of Bangladesh. However, this 
stipulation contravened Section 101 of the Evidence Act. 1872:
’’Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as 
to any legal right or liability dependent on 
the existence of facts which he asserts, must 
prove that those facts exist. When a person 
is bound to prove the existence of any fact, 
it is said that the burden of proof lies on 
that person".
Thus under this Section, the accused persons are innocent until proven
guilty. It was the prosecution and not the accused which had to prove
the offence in respect of any goods seized in the reasonable belief that
they were smuggled goods. In this respect, the observations of Justice
80
Muhammad Munir in Shaker Hussain v. the State (of Pakistan) 
are of direct relevance:
"Subject to certain exceptions the most important 
of which is to be found in Section 105 of the 
Evidence Act, the admitted and otherwise firmly 
established principle being that, before the 
prosecution can ask for conviction of a criminal 
offence, it is its duty to prove each ingredient 
of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt".
Justice Stone held the same view in the case of the Paper Sales Ltd. v .
82Chokhani Bros., when he observed:
"The law presumes against an illegality, and the 
burden of proving that an illegality has taken 
place rests on the party who so asserts". ^
79. Rule 18(2) of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, provided that 
"Where any goods are seized in the reasonable belief that they 
have been smuggled into Bangladesh in contravention of the 
prohibitions or restrictions aforesaid (i.e., for the time 
being in force under the provisions of or by virtue of Sections 
15 and 16 of the Customs Act, 1969), the burden of proving 
that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from 
whose possession the goods are seized".
80. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.VIII, 1956, p.417.
81. Ibid., p.418.
82. All'India Reporter, Bombay, Vol.XXXIII, 1946, p.429.
83. Ibid., p.434.
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It is noteworthy, however, that it was only in respect of the offence 
of smuggling that the existing law relating to burden of proof was 
changed by the Martial Law regime.
(iii) Hoarding, Profiteering and Dealing in the Black Market
Under Section 25 of the Special Powers Act, 1974, as amended by 
the Special Powers (Amendment) Act, 1974 (No.LIX of 1974), "the offence 
of hoarding or dealing in the black market" was punishable "with death, 
or with transportation for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a 
term which may extend to fourteen years" and also with fine.
On the other hand, Regulation 26 made the offences of hoarding, 
profiteering and dealing in the black market "punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years", and also with 
"whipping not exceeding ten stripes", and the person concerned would 
further be liable to fine. Moreover, a court convicting of such an 
offence "shall order the forfeiture to Government of anything in respect 
of which the offence was committed".
Thus the 1975 Martial Law administration of Bangladesh provided less 
severe punishment for the offences of hoarding and dealing in the black 
market than that of the civilian government of 1974. It is to be noted 
that this is the only instance in which the punishment provided by-the 
Martial Law administration was less severe than that provided by the 
civilian regime.
(iv) Corruption and Criminal Misconduct
Under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the 
offence of misconduct was punishable with "imprisonment for a term which 
may extsnd to seven years, or with fine, or with both".
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Nevertheless, Regulation 11 prescribed more severe punishment for 
corruption and misconduct committed either before or after 20 August 
1975. These offences were made punishable with death, transportation 
for life, imprisonment for a maximum period of fourteen years and fine 
or confiscation of the whole or any part of the property of the person 
concerned.
It is noticeable that Regulation 11 applied not only to current
offences, but it was also retrospective in its effect. Thus it was an 
84
ex post facto Regulation as it changed the punishment, inflicted a 
greater punishment than the Prevention of Corruption Act annexed to the 
offence when committed and imposed new punishments such as death, 
transportation for life and confiscation of property. With regard to 
the offences committed before 20 August 1975, Regulation 11 violated 
the provisions of Article 35(1) of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
As Article 35(1) of the Constitution provided that "No person shall be 
convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the 
time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected 
to a penalty greater than, or different from, that which might have been 
inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
offence". This Regulation not only violated the provisions of Article 35(1)
84. The nature of an ex post facto law has been explained in the Corpus
Juris Secundum thus: "Ah ex post facto law is one which makes criminal
and punished an act which was done before the passage of the law and 
which was innocent when done, aggravates a crime or makes it greater 
than it was when committed, changes the punishment and inflicts a greater 
punishment than was prescribed when the crime was committed, or alters 
the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than 
was required to convict at the time the offence was committed. Further, 
an ex post facto law may be one which, assuming to regulate civil rights 
and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty on the deprivation of a 
right for something which, when done, was lawful, deprives persons 
accused of crime of some lawful protection or defence previously 
available to them, such as the protection of a former conviction or 
acquittal, or of a proclamation of amnesty, or generally, in relation to 
the offence or its consequences, alters the situation of an accused to 
his material disadvantage". Corpuo Juris Secundum, Vol.XVIA, 
Constitutional Law, Article 435, pp.140-141.
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of the 1972 Constitution, it also contravened the stipulations of the 
International Agreement in respect of punishment, as Article 7(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights provided that no one could be
'’imposed" or subjected to "a heavier penalty...thanthe one that was
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed". Article 15(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, echoed 
exactly the same stipulations.
(v) Enhancement of Certain Rent
It is interesting to note that, in 1976, Chief Martial Law 
Administrator Sayem issued Regulation 18, which prohibited the enhancement 
of certain rent. This Regulation forbade the increase in rent of any 
premises which was under one thousand taka per month on 1 December 1975.
The breach of the Regulation was made "punishable with imprisonment for 
a term which may extend to five years” . It is noteworthy that never 
before in the history of Martial Law administration in the subcontinent 
had such a Regulation been issued.
Conclusion
(i) The Proclamation of Martial Law in 1975, Its Nature and Legality 
The foregoing discussion reveals that, for the first time in the 
history of Bangladesh, Martial Law was declared on 15 August 1975, 
immediately after the assassination of the President of the country,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Martial Law was declared not to restore law and 
order, but to forestall any possible resistance which might arise consequent 
upon the assassination of Sheikh Mujib and the seizure of power by the 
army. It was declared at a time when the country had already been in 
a State of Emergency imposed on 28 December 1974. It seems that emergency 
powers were not considered adequate and that Martial Law was declared
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as a precautionary measure to meet any public opposition and a possible 
threat to the newly-established regime.
Martial Law has been proclaimed in many countries, such as Pakistan,
by the leaders of a coup d'6tat after the overthrow of a legitimate
civilian regime by force, to obviate any public resistance. The
authorities on Constitutional Law in Great Britain do not deal with
this kind of Martial Law. It is said that "this kind of Martial Law
brought about by a successful revolution constitutes a class apart and
85
has nothing to do with 'Constitutional' Martial Law". In fact, the 
military takeover in Bangladesh cannot be called a "revolution" in 
Kelsenian terms as the basic norm or the total legal order of the country, 
the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, was neither abrogated nor suspended.
The Constitution remained the fundamental law of the country subject to 
the Proclamation, Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders. Moreover, 
the judges of the Supreme Court were not required to take a new oath of 
office under the Martial Law regime and continued to exercise their 
normal powers and functions subject to any limitations placed on its 
jurisdiction by the Martial Law regime.
Therefore, it seems that the military takeover in Bangladesh in 
August 1975 was in the nature of a constitutional deviation rather than 
a 'total new dispensation' Martial Law proclaimed in Bangladesh 
immediately after the military takeover can be described as Martial Law 
sui generis - fundamentally different from the sense in which it is 
generally used in the common law. It is unnecessary to say that since 
Martial Law was proclaimed in peace-time and there was no' question of 
restoring law and order, the proclamation of Martial Law on 15 August 1975 
did not satisfy the test of the common law doctrine of necessity.
85. See supra, p.114.
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The declaration of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975 was an extra­
constitutional act as there is no mention whatsoever of Martial Law in 
the 1972 Constitution. Unlike Article 196 of the 1956 Constitution and 
Article 223-A of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, the corresponding 
Article 46 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, that empowered 
Parliament to pass an Act of Indemnity in respect of any act done in 
connection with the national liberation struggle or the maintenance or 
restoration of order in any area in Bangladesh, do not contain the words 
Martial Law. This omission of the words Martial Law from Article 46 
of the 1972 Constitution has thus eliminated the possibility of a 
constitutional imposition of Martial Law and as the Constitution is the 
Supreme Law, it surely also excludes invocation of the common law doctrine 
of necessity as a basis for Martial Law even for the purpose of restoring 
law and order.
Therefore, it is difficult to find any basis upon which to maintain
/•
that the declaration of Martial Law in Bangladesh on 15 August 1975 was 
legal. Unfortunately this is an issue upon which there is no direct 
judicial authority. For, unlike the Supreme Court of Pakistan (in the 
cases of Dosso, Asma Jilani, etc.), the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has 
had no occasion upon which to examine and determine the legality of the 
imposition of Martial Law whether during the continuance, or after-the 
withdrawal, of Martial Law. It should be stressed here that, after the 
withdrawal of Martial Law when the threat to the existence or jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court had disappeared, it could have ascertained the 
legality of the Proclamation of Martial Law in 1975 as it quashed 
in a number of cases (e.g., in Khahdaker Moshtaque Ahmed1s case which will 
be discussed in Chapter V) the sentences passed by Martial Law Courts.
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(ii) The Legality of the Assumption of the Office of
President by Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed
The assumption of the office of President by Khandaker Moshtaque 
Ahmed after the assassination of President Sheikh Mujib and his swearing-in 
as President by the acting Chief Justice on 15 August 1975 were illegal, 
being clearly inconsistent withe relevant provisions of the 1972 
Constitution. Under this Constitution, if a vacancy occurs in the office 
of President, the Vice-President is to act as President until a new 
President is elected and the oath of office of President is to be administered 
by the Speaker of the House of the Nation.
However, these steps were retrospectively validated when on 
20 August 1975, five days after the military takeover, Moshtaque issued 
a Proclamation in order to legitimise^ and provide a legal framework for,
his assumption of full powers of government. This proclamation suspended
the provisions of the 1972 Constitution relating to the election of
President, the appointment of a new President in case of a vacancy. It
also modified the provisions of the Constitution concerning the oath of 
office of President and enacted that the Presidential oath would be 
administered by the Chief Justice of Bangladesh.
(iii) The 1972 Constitution and Other Laws
Unlike the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions of Pakistan, the 1972 
Constitution of Bangladesh was not abrogated by the 1975 Martial Law 
administration. Neither was it suspended at any time during the Martial 
Law period (1975-1979). Although the 1972 Constitution remained in 
force, it ceased to exist as the Supreme Law of the country because it 
was made subject to the (First) Proclamation and Martial Law Regulations or 
Brders issued by the Martial , Law regime. .In case of a Conflict between a provision
of the 1972 Constitution and the Proclamations, Martial Law Regulations
1
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or Orders, the latter were to prevail. Thus the 1972 Constitution 
assumed a subordinate status.
Although under the 1972 Constitution only Parliament had the power 
to amend it and the President had no authority to make and promulgate 
any Ordinance for altering or suspending any provision of the Constitution, 
the President assumed on 19 September 1975 the power of making orders 
on any subject specified in or provided by the 1972 Constitution by 
promulgating the Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, 1975 (Proclamation 
Order No. I of 1975). Accordingly, he amended the Constitution from 
time to time by issuing Proclamations (Amendments) Orders. In fact, this 
was contrary to his oath of office taken in accordance with (Form I of) 
the Third Schedule "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution".
However, following the constitutional practice in the subcontinent, 
all laws in force before the declaration of Martial Law on 15 August 1975 
were to continue in force, subject to the Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders made by the Martial Law Administration.
(iv) Martial Law Regulations Issued
Like the 1958 and 1969 Martial Law administrations of Pakistan, the 
1975 Martial Law administration of Bangladesh created a large number of 
offences under the Martial Law Regulations, most of which had already 
been offences under the ordinary law. The Martial Law regime, in general, 
provided more severe punishments for these offences although punishments 
are not the end of Martial Law but only a means. Moreover, a large 
number of offences so created related to anti-social activities. Thus 
the Martial Law administration of Bangladesh went far beyond the object of 
Martial Law for which Martial Law Regulations are issued under the common 
law. It failed to realise that under this law, the creation of offences 
by the Martial Law Regulations is limited to the ne’cessity for the 
restoration of law and order.
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CHAPTER III
Basic Provisions Relating to Martial Law Courts
The President contemplated in the Proclamation (issued five days 
after the proclamation of Martial Law, on 20 August 1975), as pointed 
out earlier, the setting up of a special court or tribunal by issuing 
Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders for the trial and 
punishment of any offence under Regulations or Orders or for contra­
vention thereof, and of offences under any other law.^ Two days after 
the issue of this Proclamation, on 22 August 1975, the President 
promulgated the Martial Law Regulations, 1975 (Regulations No.I of 1975) 
which provided for, inter alia, the creation of two types of special 
courts, namely (a) Special Martial Law Court and (b) Summary Martial 
Law Court.
Therefore, it is evident that a new name, i.e. Martial Law Courts,
2was used for the special courts created to administer Martial Law. 
However, it seems that the Martial Law,regime of Bangladesh provided for 
the setting up of two kinds of Martial Law Courts following the example 
of Pakistan where in 1958 and 1969 two types of special courts of 
criminal jurisdiction, namely the Special Military Court and Summary
respectively.
Regulation 2(1) provided that "The Government may, by notification
1. Clause b(i) of the Proclamation.
2. .Because in the United States of America, such courts are called
"Military Commission" (Tovy, Hamilton, Martial Law and the Custom of 
War, London, 1886, p.101). In England, it was the long custom to 
apply the name court-martial to such courts indiscriminately. But 
since the Ex parte David Francois Marais Case (The Law Reports, 
Appeal Cases, . London, 1902, p.109) military tribunal and later on 
military court (as used in Clifford and O ’Sullivan, The Law Reports, 
Appeal Cases, Vol.IL, 1921, p.570) has come to,be the accepted name 
for the courts that are used to administer Martial Law.
Court had been set up under Regulation 1-A and Regulation 2
156
in the official Gazette, constitute Special Martial Law Courts and
Summary Martial Law Courts for such areas as may be specified in the
notification". The government was also empowered to appoint "the
Chairman and members of the Special Martial Law Courts and the members
3
of Summary Martial Law Courts".
Thus Regulation 2(1) conferred on the government the power to
constitute Martial Law Courts. In this respect, it resembled the
Panjab Martial Law Ordinance, 1919 (issued on 14 April 1919 by the
Governor-General of India, Lord Chelmsford) which had invested the
government with the authority to appoint a ’Commission' to try offences
4
under the Bengal State Offences Regulation of 1804, the Regulation 
that was extended to the Panjab in 1872.
5 .Later in December 1976, by an amendment, the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator was substituted for government as the authority to 
establish Special and Summary Martial Law Courts.
So it is evident that unlike the Martial Law,regimes of Pakistan 
of 1958 and 1969, no Zonal Martial Law Administrator was empowered to 
set up Martial Law Courts. Rather the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
was invested with such power following the Peshawar Martial Law 
Ordinance, 1930 (No.VIII of 1930), which had provided that the Chief
3. Regulation 2(5).
4. Article 2 of the Bengal State Offences Regulation (Regulation X of 
1804) empowered the Governor-General-in-Council to establish Martial 
Law in any part o£ the British territories for any period of time 
while the British government in India might be engaged in war with 
any native or other power, as well as during the existence of open 
rebellion against the authority of the government and to hold 
immediate trial by courts martial of persons (owing allegiance to the 
British government in India) who might take arms in open hostility to 
the British government or actually commit an overt act of open 
rebellion or openly aid or abet the enemies of the British 
government.
5. The Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976, 
(Regulations No.XXXIII of 1976), issued on 28 December 1976.
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Administering authority of Martial Law could convene a Military Court 
to try certain offences for restoring and maintaining order.
I The Composition of the Martial Law Courts
(i) The Composition of the Special Martial Law Courts
Regulation 2(2) stated that "A Special Martial Law Court shall 
consist of a Chairman and two other members ...." The chairman of the 
Court "shall be appointed from among Sessions Judges or Additional 
Sessions Judges, and of the two other members of such Court, one shall 
be appointed from among officers of the Defence Services not below the 
rank of Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent and the other from among 
Assistant Sessions Judges or District or Additional District Magistrates".
Thus a Special Martial Law Court was to be headed by a sessions>
jtidge or additional sessions judge and composed mostly (i.e. two out of 
three) of judicial officers serving in the Courts of Sessions or Courts 
of the Magistrates of the first class.^ Thus the Special Martial Law
Court, when consisted of two judges from the Courts of Sessions, bore
some resemblance to that of the Commission set up under the Panjab 
Martial Law Ordinance No. I of 1919 as at least two out of three members 
of this Commission were to be persons who had served as sessions judges 
or.additional sessions Judges for a period of not less than three, years
or persons qualified under Section 101 of the Government of India Act,
\
1915, for appointment as judges of a High Court. However, as the 
majority of the members of this Special Martial Law Court were to be
6. Regulation 2(3).
7. Here it may be pointed out that there are five different classes of 
criminal courts in Bangladesh as provided by Section 6 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, namely (1) High Court, (2) Courts of Session 
(that is Courts of Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and 
Assistant Sessions Judge), (3) Courts of Magistrates of the first 
class, (4) Courts of Magistrates of the second class, and (5) Courts 
of Magistrates of the third class.
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civilians, its decisions could not be dominated by the member 
representing the defence services.
But nearly six months later, on 12 February 1976, this
composition of the Special Martial Law Court was countermanded. The 
Martial Law (Twelfth Amendment)'Regulations, 1976, (Regulations No. VII 
of 1976) provided that "The Chairman of a Special Martial Law Court 
shall be appointed from among Sessions Judges or Officers of the Defence 
Services or Bangladesh Rifles not below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel 
or equivalent, and of the two other members of such Court, one shall be 
appointed from among officers of the Defence Services or Bangladesh 
Rifles not below the rank of Major or equivalent and the other from 
among Magistrates of the first class".
Therefore, under the new arrangement, a Special Martial Law Court 
could be headed by officers of the defence services or Bangladesh Rifles. 
Moreover, as a consequence of this new arrangement, two out of three 
members of the Special Martial Law Court could be from the officers of 
the defence services or Bangladesh Rifles and one from among magistrates 
of the first class whereas there were to be no members from the Courts 
of Sessions. This possibility of the inclusion of the majority of the 
members from the defence services or Bangladesh Rifles reduced the
chances that the Special Martial Law Court would be impartial and •
independent in the dispensation of justice as contemplated in Article 
10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Because such officers, 
who would dominate the decision of the Court, were part of the Martial 
Law administration, or the Executive; they could easily be influenced in
8. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
10 December, 1948, provided that "Everyone is^entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligation ...."
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the discharging of their judicial duties. Moreover, they were career 
army officers having no legal training or judicial experience to afford 
the accused the best security for the exercise of a fair judgment.
Since Martial Law was not declared under the common law doctrine of 
necessity to suppress rebellion or insurrection, such composition of the 
Special Martial Law Court was unjustified in the light of the views 
expressed by Charles Clode:
"When necessity arises "for the trial of civilians by Courts- 
martial, the Commanding Officer will be careful to compose 
those Courts, of Men (Civil or Military) whose experience 
and character afford to the criminal the best security for 
the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion in the most 
solemn function of Judicial Administration .... The Court 
should be formed as near to the model of the highest 
Criminal Court as possible".^
In 1978, the composition of the Special Martial Law Court was again
changed by the Martial Law (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Regulations,
1978 (Regulations No. I of 1978). It provided that "The Chairman of a
Special Martial Law Court shall be appointed from among Sessions Judges
or Officers of the Defence Services or Bangladesh Rifles not below the
rank of Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent, and of the two other members
of such Court, one shall be appointed 'from among Assistant Sessions
Judges or Officers of the Defence Services' or Bangladesh Rifles not
below the rank of Major or equivalent and the other from among
Magistrates of the first class".
Therefore, under this amendment a Special Martial Law Court could
be composed of two members either from the Courts of Sesssions or from
• ^
the officers of the defence services and one from among magistrates of
9. Clode, Charles, The Administration of Justice Under Military and 
Martial Law, London, 1872, p.167.
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the first class. By providing for the possibility of such a Court 
coreisting of two members from the Courts of Sessions and one from 
amcng magistrates of the first class, the amendment widened the scope 
of dispensing fair justice to the accused by judges who were obviously 
not part of the Martial Law administration. Such a composition of the 
Special Martial Law Court was unexampled in the history of Martial Law 
Administration in the subcontinent.
(ii) The Composition of the Summary Martial Law Courts
Regulation 2(2) provided that "... a Summary Martial Law Court
shall consist of only one member". Regulation 2(4) stated that "The
member of a Summary Martial Law Court shall be appointed from among
Magistrates of the first class or officers of the Defence Services not
below the rank of Major or equivalent".
This composition of the Summary Martial Law Court resembled that
of Summary Military Courts established in Pakistan in 1958 and 1969
under Regulation No.l-A^ and Regulation No.2 ^  respectively. Since
there was a scope for constituting this one member-Court with an 
\
officer of the defence services having no legal training and who was 
part of the Executive, this Court, when so constituted, could not be 
called independent and impartial in dispensing fair justice to the* 
accused.
10. As Regulation No.l-A, issued on 7 October, 1958, provided that "An 
Administrator of Martial Law may, by general or special order, 
empower any Magistrate of the first class or any military or naval 
or air force officer provided that he has been specially selected 
for this particular duty to hold a Summary Military Court in his 
area of administration for the trial of any offence committed in 
that area ...." i
11. Regulation No.2 of 1969 was the exact reproduction of Regulation 
No.l-A of 1958.
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II Provisions Regarding the Trial of Offences by the Martial Law Courts 
Elaborate provisions were made for the summary trial of offences 
by the Martial Law Courts (i) determining the power and jurisdiction of 
such courts, (ii) providing procedure for taking cognizance of offences 
both under Martial Law Regulations and ordinary law, (iii) denying the 
right to be defended by lawyer on trial before a Summary Martial Law 
Court, (iv) placing the admitting of bail at the will of the 
prosecution, (v) barring appeal to any court of law against the judgment 
of the Martial Law Courts, (vi) granting review by way of relief,
(vii) providing for the confirmation of death sentences and sentences of 
life imprisonment by the President, (viii) allowing the transfer of 
cases from ordinary courts to the Martial Law Courts, and finally 
(ix) prohibiting all courts, including the High Court and the Supreme 
Court, from calling into question any order, judgment or the proceedings 
of the Martial Law Courts.
(i) The Powers and Jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts
Regulation 2(6) of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975 (Regulations
No. I of 1975) provided that "A Martial Law Court may try any offence
punishable under these Regulations or under any other law". Later the
words 'these Regulations' were replaced by words "any Martial Law
Regulation or Order".
Thus Regulation 2(6) introduced identical provisions with regard
12
to the powers of the Martial Law Courts as Regulation No.l-A of
12. Regulation No.l-A stated, inter alia that "... Special Military and 
Summary Military Courts shall have the power to try and punish any 
person for contravention of Martial Law Regulations or Orders or 
for offences under the ordinary law". When Martial Law was 
promulgated in Pakistan on 25 March, 1969, the provisions of this 
Regulation No.l-A were also reproduced intoto ’in Regulation No.2 of 
1969.
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Paki.stan, issued on 7 October 1958, had provided for. However, 
Regilation 2(6) invested the Martial Law Courts with a very wide 
jurisdiction: they were empowered to try not only offences punishable 
under Martial Law Regulations or Orders but their jurisdiction waa also 
extended to offences punishable under ordinary law or under any special 
act at the expense of the civilian courts. Thus the Martial Law Courts 
were given concurrent jurisdiction with the criminal courts over offences 
under the ordinary law of the land and with any special tribunal over the 
offences under the special statutes.
But the criminal courts were not given concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Martial Law Courts to try offences under the Martial Law Regulations 
although the ordinary criminal courts were retained and they continued 
with their respective jurisdiction. In other words, while the Martial 
Law Courts apart from offences under Martial Law Regulation would also 
try offences under the ordinary law, the ordinary criminal courts would 
not try cases under Martial Law Regulations. In this respect, the Martial 
Law government of Bangladesh departed from the tradition of providing the 
criminal courts with the power to try Martial Law cases as established by
the British Martial Law administration in India and the Martial Law<
13regimes of Pakistan m  1958 and 1969.
13. Because when Martial Law was promulgated in Malabar in 1921 by the 
British g6vernment in India, the ordinary criminal courts were 
empowered under the Martial Law Ordinance (Ordinance No.II of 1921) 
to try any offence in respect of which the military commander made 
such a direction to the court and also any offence against a Martial 
Law Regulation or Martial Law Order which was not triable by a 
Summary Court. Similarly, when Martial Law was proclaimed in the 
town of Sholapiir (of India) in May 1930 to suppress riot, ordinary 
criminal courts, instead of Martial Law Courts, were given power to 
deal with all offences (of assisting, relieving, concealing or 
harbouring any mutineer, rebel and rioter) punishable under the 
Sholapur Martial Law Ordinance No.IV of 1930. The Martial Law 
Ordinance No.VIII of 1930, under which Martia’l Law was declared in 
Peshawar on 16 August, 1930 to cope with a formidable incursion of
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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However, since the ordinary courts were allowed to function normally 
during the Martial Law period, the extension of the jurisdiction of 
Martial Law Courts to try offences under the ordinary law is difficult to
justify. As Justice Mushtaq Hossain in the case of Mir Hassan v. the 
14
State observes that:
during the Martial Law, "when the ordinary courts are open and 
functioning, persons accused of offences against ordinary law 
have to be brought before them, and them alone, to be dealt 
with according to the law".
A similar view was expressed' by Robert M. King:
"It is, however, the duty of those enforcing Martial Law not 
to interfere unnecessarily with the exercise by the ordinary 
courts of their civil and criminal functions, in matters not 
affecting the conduct of the war."
Afridi tribesmen (who posed as liberators) from beyond the frontier 
into Peshawar, also granted to uhe ordinary criminal courts the power 
to try offences against a Regulation or Martial Law Order with the 
exception of those which were to be tried by the special courts 
created by the Ordinance. Following this British tradition, the 
Martial Law regime of Pakistan in 1958 under Regulation Nos.l-A and 2 
invested the criminal courts/in addition to their normal jurisdiction, 
with the power to try and punish any person for contraventions of 
Martial Law Regulation or Orders although that was countermanded 
within five months of the promulgation of Martial Law by Martial Law 
Regulation No.66 (issued on 28 February, 1959). The Martial Law 
v government of Pakistan in 1969 empowered the criminal courts to try 
only those Martial Law cases which were transferred to them.
} (Clause C of Martial Law Regulation No.3 of 1969)• Martial Law 
Regulation No.45, which was issued by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator on 28 May •1969 and reconstituted Martial Law 
Regulation No.3, also provided that "Notwithstanding anything 
contained in these regulations the ordinary courts, including a High 
Court, shall exercise their respective jurisdiction in respect of 
(a) offences other than offences created by these regulations; and 
cases relating to offences created by these regulations which are 
transferred to such courts for trial".
14. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXI,’ 1969, p.786.
15. Ibid., p.811.
16. King, Robert M., "Martial Law II", The Cape Law Journal, Vol.XVII, 
1900, p.136.
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This view was also held by the law officers of the Crown, the then 
Attorrey-General Sir John Campbell (afterwards Lord Campbell) and
j Solicitor-General Sir R. M. Rolfe (afterwards Lord Cranworth), who were
\
i called upon to give an opinion as to the legality of adopting punitive
i
measures against the Canadian insurgents in the rebellion of 1837 to 
1838:
"It is hardly necessary for us to add that, in our view of 
the case, Martial Law can never be enforced for the ordinary 
purposes of civil or even criminal justice, except in the 
latter, so far as the necessity arising from actual 
resistance compels its adoption."1?
Regulation 2(7) laid down that "A Special Martial Law Court may pass
any sentence authorised by the Regulation or law for the punishment of
the offence tried by it, and a Summary Martial Law Court may pass any
sentence authorised by the Regulation or law for the punishment of the
offence tried by it except death, transportation or imprisonment for a
term exceeding five years".
Thus in respect of the powers of imposing sentences by a Special
Martial Law Court, this Regulation was, so to say, identical with 
18
clause b(ii) of Regulation No.l-A of Pakistan, issued on 7 October,
1958, which had empowered the Special Military Court "to pass any 
sentence authorised by law or by these Regulations". But Regulation 
2(7) invested the Summary Martial Law Court with wider powers of 
passing sentences of transportation or imprisonment for a term not exceeding
17. Forsyth, William, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and 
Various Points of English Jurisprudence, London, 1869, p.199.
18. When Martial Law was proclaimed m  Pakistan in 1969 and Special 
Military Court was created under Regulation No.2, this clause 
b(ii) of Regulation No.l-A of 1958 was reproduced in Regulation 
No.2 of 1969 as clause B(II).
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five years in comparison with clause c(iv) of Regulation No.l-A of 
Pakistan which had given the Summary Military Court the power to pass 
only a sentence of transportation or imprisonment not exceeding one 
year. Thus it is evident that although a magistrate of the first class 
under Section 32 of the Criminal Procedure Code could pass any sentence 
of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, such a magistrate 
when appointed to hold a Summary Martial Law Court was empowered under 
Regulation 2(7) to impose a higher sentence of imprisonment for a term 
up to five years,
Regulation 3(3), which dealt with territorial jurisdiction of 
Martial Law Courts, laid down that "Proceedings in respect of an offence 
triable under these (i.e. Martial Law) Regulations alleged to have been 
committed by any person may be taken before a Martial Law Court having 
jurisdiction in the place where that person is for the time being or 
where the offence or any part thereof was committed".
20This Regulation is, so to say, the reproduction of Section 27(2)
of the Special Powers Act, 1974, the Act which came into operation on
9 February 1974 and was enacted by the Bangladesh Parliament to provide
for "special measures for the prevention of certain prejudicial
activities, for more speedy trial and effective punishment of certain
21
grave offences and for matters connected therewith". However, the 
provisions contained in Regulation 3(3) in the matter of territorial
19. Clause c(iv) of Regulation No.l-A of 1958 of Pakistan provided
that the Summary Military Court "may pass any sentence authorised
by law or by these Regulations except death, transportation or 
imprisonment exceeding one year or whipping exceeding 15 stripes". 
This was also reproduced in Regulation No.2 of 1969 as clause C(iv).
20. Section 27(2) of the Special Powers Act, 1974 read: "Proceedings 
in respect of an offence triable under this Act alleged to have 
been committed by any person may be taken before the Special
Tribunal having jurisdiction in the place where that person is for
the time being or where the offence or any part thereof was 
committed."
21. Preamble of the Special Powers Act, 1974.
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jurisdiction are, to a great extent, identical with Section 177 of the
Criminal Procedure Code^which deals with ordinary place of inquiry or
trial except for the words "where that person is for the time being".
23
Later in 1976 an explanation was added to Regulation 3(3) which
S'
provided for extra territorial jurisdiction in respect of an offence 
v/
triable under the Martial Law Regulations committed outside Bangladesh.
As it stated that "when an offence triable under these (i.e. Martial
Law) Regulations is committed outside Bangladesh, it shall be deemed to
have been committed within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction
of the Martial Law Court in which the person committing the offence is
2 Afound" "or was ordinarily residing before he left Bangladesh".
Although the provisions embodied in this explanation were not
. . . . . . 25dissimilar to the general provisions contained in Section 118 of the
Criminal Procedure Code relating to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the criminal offences, the explanation did not embody the two provisoes
26
which were to be found in that Section.
22. Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code provided that "Every 
offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court 
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed".
23. The explanation was added to Regulation 3(3) by the Martial Law 
(Ninth Amendment), Regulations 1976, (Regulations No.Ill of 1976).
24. The words "or was ordinarily residing before he left Bangladesh" 
were added to the explanation by the Martial Law Regulations 
No.XXXI of 1976.
25. The general provisions as contained in Section 188 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code are: when a citizen of Bangladesh commits an offence 
at any place without and beyond the limits of Bangladesh or when 
any person commits an offence on any ship or aircraft registered in 
Bangladesh wherever it may be, he may be dealt with in respect bf 
such offence as if it had been committed at any place’ within 
Bangladesh at which he may be found.
26. Proviso 1 of Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code speaks of 
political agents to certify fitness of enquiry into charges. It 
states that where the offence'is committed at any place without and 
beyond Bangladesh, no charge as to any such offence shall be 
inquired into in Bangladesh unless the political agent, if there is. 
one, for the territory in which the offence is alleged to have been 
committed, certifies that, in his opinion, the charge ought to be 
inquired into in Bangladesh; and, where there is no political agent,
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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(ii) The Procedures of the Martial Law Courts
When Martial Law was proclaimed in the Panjab in 1919, in Malabar
in 1919, and in Peshawar in 1930 during British rule in India, provisions
were made to the effect that Commissions in the case of the Panjab or
the Military Courts in the two other cases would follow the procedure
regulating trials by the General Courts-Martial, and the Summary General
27
Courts-Martial respectively as prescribed by the Indian Army Act, 1911.
Similarly^ in Pakistan when Martial Law was proclaimed in 1958 and 1969,
the Special Military Courts and Summary Military Courts constituted were
to follow the same procedure as the Field General Court-Martial and
Summary Court-Martial respectively convened under the Pakistan Army Act,
281952 except in certain matters. But the Bangladesh Martial Law 
regime, instead of following this practice, laid down elaborate 
procedures for trials by the Martial Law Courts, which in most cases 
bore some resemblance to the procedure of Special Tribunal established 
under the Bangladesh Special Powers Act, 1974.
the sanction of the government shall be required.
Proviso 2 provides that any proceedings taken against any 
person under Section 188 which would be a bar to subsequent 
proceedings against such person for the same offence if such 
offence had been committed in Bangladesh shall be a bar to further 
proceedings against him under the Extradition Act, 1903, in 
respect of the same offence in any territory beyond the limits of 
Bangladesh.
27. Under the Panjab Martial Law Ordinance, 1919, the Commission had 
to follow in all matters the procedure regulating trials by 
General Courts-Martial prescribed by the Indian Army Act, 1911.
The Malabar Martial Law (Military Courts) Ordinance, 1921 and the 
Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance 1930 (No.VIII of 1930) laid down 
that a Military Court would follow the same procedure as a Summary 
General Courts-Martial convened under the Indian Army Act except 
that a memorandum of evidence given at the trial and the statement, 
if any, made by the accused were required to be recorded. The 
finding and sentence of a Military Court were to be confirmed by 
the convening officer, and a sentence of death was required to be 
reserved for confirmation by the General Officer commanding the 
district.
28. Regulation No.l-A of 1958, and Regulation No.2 of 1969, Pakistan.
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(a) The Conditions Requisite for the Initiation of Proceedings
Regulation 3(1) described the conditions requisite for the 
initiation of proceedings before Martial Law Courts. It provided that:
"A Martial Law Court shall take cognizance of an offence on a report in 
writing made by a Police Officer not below the rank of Deputy Super­
intendent or an officer of any of the Defence Services not below the rank 
of Major or equivalent". But there was a proviso to the effect that "no 
report shall be entertained by a Martial Law Court in respect of an 
offence under any law, other than these Regulations, if there is no 
order of the Government directing the making of such report to such 
Court".
Thus Regulation 3(1) provided a very limited scope for the
purpose of taking cognizance of an offence triable both under the
Martial Law Regulations and any other law. Unlike the Criminal
Procedure Code, this Regulation provided only one procedure for taking
cognizance, namely, upon a report of the officers concerned, and
precluded the exercise of jurisdiction by any court by taking cognizance
suo motu, upon information from any person other than the officer
29
mentioned, or upon receipt of a complaint.
However, the provisions contained in Regulation 3(1) in the
matter of taking cognizance of an offence only upon a report of the 
officers concerned bore some resemblance to Section 27(1) of the 
Special Powers Act, 1974 inasmuch as the latter also had provided for 
only one procedure of taking cogniznace, namely on a report in writing
29. As Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code states that District 
Magistrate, or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or any Magistrate 
specially empowered, may take cognizance of an offence upon -
(a) receiving a complaint; (b) a police-report in writing;
(c) information from any person other than a police-officer; and
(d) his own knowledge or suspicion.
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30made by a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector.
It is evident that Regulation 3(1) did not provide for the
commitment procedure which was the normal procedure under the Criminal
Procedure Code. Thus the Summary Martial Law Court could not refer any
case to the Special Martial Law Court when it considered that the facts
and circumstances of the case called for a greater punishment than it
had jurisdiction to impose. However, here it may be pointed out that
under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Court of Session
does not take cognizance of an offence as a court of original jurisdiction
31unless the accused has been committed to it by a competent magistrate. 
Additional sessions judges and assistant sessions judges try such cases 
as the government may direct them to try or the sessions judges may make 
over to them. But when a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge 
was appointed to act as a chairman of the Special Martial Law Court, or 
an assistant sessions judge as a member of it, they were to take 
cognizance of an offence under the ordinary law, apart from Martial Law 
offences, on a report in writing made by an officer concerned on the 
order of the government directing the making of such report to such 
court.
30. As Section 27(1) of the Special Powers Act, 1974 states that a 
"Special Tribunal ... shall not take cognizance of any such offence 
(i.e. offences triable under the Act) except on a report in writing 
made by a police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector*7
31. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, any District Magistrate, Sub- 
Divisional Magistrate or first class Magistrate or any Magistrate 
specially empowered by the Government may commit any person for 
trial to the Court of Session or High Court. No person triable by 
the Court of Session is committed to the High Court (Section 206). 
After taking evidence and examining the accused, if the Magistrate 
is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the 
accused for trial, he frames a charge declaring the offence which 
he is charged with. (Section 210). After examining the witness, 
the Magistrate may make an order committing the accused for trial 
by the High Court or Court of Session and, briefly records the 
reasons for such commitment. But if he is satisfied that there are 
not sufficient grounds for committing the accused, he may cancel 
the charge and discharge the accused. (Section 213).
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No guidelines were provided in Regulation 3(1) or by any Martial
Law Regulation or Order as to the nature or class of offences under the
ordinary law which were to be reported on the direction of the
government to any Martial Law Court for taking cognizance. It enabled
the government to give such direction arbitrarily, which in effect
contravened the right of equality before the law guaranteed by Article
27 of the 1972 Constitution. This aspect will be discussed in greater
detail towards the close of this chapter. However, if the Martial Law
Court took cognizance of an ordinary offence in the first instance, the
question of appeal did not arise, as there was no right of appeal against
its decisions. In this context the observation of Justice S. A. Mahmood
32 .
in the case of Ghazi v. the State is worth quoting:
"Substantive rights such as right of appeal comes into 
existence when a civil action is brought and not when cause 
of action accrues. Similarly such right accrues in 
criminal cases when cognizance of an offence is taken by a 
court and not before ...."33
Later, on 28 December 1976, Regulation 3(1) was amended by the Martial 
Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976 (Regulations No.XXXIII of 
1976). After amendment, the Regulation read:
"Except as otherwise provided in any Martial Law Regulation 
or Order, a Martial Law Court shall take cognizance of an 
offence punishable under any Martial Law Regulation or Order 
on a report in writing made by a Police Officer not below 
the rank of Inspector or an officer of the Bangladesh Bureau 
of Anti-Corruption not below the rank of Inspector or Deputy 
Assistant Director or an officer of any of the Defence 
Services not below the rank of any Commissioned Officer".
32. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XIV, 1962, p.662.
33. Ibid., p.672. *
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But there was an exception to the effect that "Martial Law Court may 
take cognizance of an offence (of smuggling) under Regulation 19 on a 
report in writing made by a Sub-Inspector of Police or an Assistant 
Inspector of the Bangladesh Bureau of Anti-Corruption". With regard 
to the cognizance of a civil offence by a Martial Law Court, it was 
provided that "A Martial Law Court shall take cognizance of an offence 
punishable under any other law on a report in writing made by a Police 
Officer or any Officer of the Bangladesh Bureau of Anti-Corruption if 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator directs the making of such report 
to such Court".
Therefore, it is evident that the amended Regulation 3(1) brought 
about changes in the rank of the officers concerned, on whose report 
a Martial Law Court would take cognizance of an offence punishable under 
any Martial Law Regulation or Order. Originally, any police officer 
not below the rank of deputy superintendent or any officer of any of the 
defence services not below the rank of irfajor or equivalent had been 
given the power Of making such report. But now any police officer not 
below the rank of,inspector or an officer of any of the defence services 
not below any commissioned officer was invested with such power. 
Therefore, the junior officers of both the defence services and the 
police force were given this power. Moreover, the amended Regulation 
authorised, for the first time, an officer of the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Anti-Corruption not below the rank of Inspector or deputy assistant 
director to make such a report. Thus the effect of the amended 
Regulation 3(1) was that it expanded the number of officers who were 
empowered to report Martial Law offences to the Martial Law Court.
34. Regulation 3 (la) as added by the Martial Law (Twenty-Third 
Amendment) Regulations, 1976.
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On the other hand, like the original Regulation 3(1), Regulation 3 (la)
did not authorise an officer of any of the defence services not below
the rank of major or equivalent to make a report before the Martial
Law Court on an offence punishable under ordinary law for taking
cognizance by it. Instead, apart from a police officer, any officer of
the Bangladesh Bureau of Anti-Corruption was empowered to make such a
report. Unlike the original Regulation 3(1), Regulation 3 (la) invested
any police officer irrespective of his rank with the power of making a
report before the Martial Law Court on a civil offence, following a 
35
Section 190(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The newly added 
Regulation 3 (la) also replaced the, government by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator as the authority to pass an order directing the making of 
a report before a Martial Law Court on any offence punishable under 
ordinary law. But like the original Regulation 3(1), no guidelines 
were provided for the classes of offences punishable under the ordinary 
law which were to be reported to the Martial Law Court by the officers 
concerned on the direction of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
(b) Times of Sittings and Places of the Martial Law Courts
Regulation 3(4) provided that "A Martial Law Court may sit at
such times and places as it deems fit or as the Government may direct".
This Regulations was the reproduction of the provisions contained 
36in Section 27(3) of the Special Powers Act, 1974. However, later in
35. Section 190(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code provided that any
District Magistrate, or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other
Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance
of any offencetupon a report in writing of facts which constitute 
such offence made by any police officer.
36. Section 27(3) of the Special Powers Act, 1974, stated that "A
Special Tribunal may sit at such times and places as it deems fit
or as the Government may direct". *
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. . 371976 the Chief Martial Law Administrator was substituted, for the
government as the authority to direct a Martial Law Court with regard 
to its time of sittings and places.
(e) Trial in Camera by the Special Martial Law Courts
Almost one year after the Proclamation of Martial Law,provisions
were made by the Martial Law (Nineteenth Amendment) Regulations, 1976
(Regulations No.XXIII of 1976), issued on 30 July, 1976, for trial in
camera by a Special Martial Law Court. It provided that "if the
Chairman of a Special Martial Law Court so decides it may sit in 
38
camera". Later, in August 1976, it was provided that "Where a
Special Martial Law Court sits in camera, the Chairman of the Court may,
if he deems necessary, require any person attending or otherwise
participating in the conduct of the trial to make an oath of secrecy
that he will not disclose anything that may come to his knowledge in,
or in connection with, such trial; and the disclosure of any information
in contravention of the oath shall be punishable with imprisonment for
39a term which may extend to three years and with fine".
The provisions relating to trial in camera did not strictly 
violate the fundamental right of the accused to a "public trial" because 
clause 6 of Article 35 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh states 
that public trial as envisaged in clause 3 of Article 35 will not "affect 
the operation of any existing law which prescribes any ... procedure for 
trial". In fact, this preserves the provisions of Section 352 of the
37. By the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976, 
Regulations No.XXXIII of 1976, issued on 28 December, 1976.
38. The words in inverted commas were added to Regulation 3(4).
39. The Martial Law (Twenty-First Amendment) Regulations, 1976, 
Regulations No.XXVI of 1976, issued on 23 August, 1976.
174
Criminal Procedure Code which, although ensuring that the courts are to
be open, provide that "the presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if he
thinks fit, order at any stage of any inquiry into, or trial of, any
particular case, that the public generally, or any particular person,
shall not have access to, or be or remain in, the room or building used
by the Court". However, the provisions relating to trial in camera
contravened the accepted standards of international human rights of law
as contained in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which read: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of
his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him". Thus,
by providing provisions for trials in camera, the Martial Law regime
acted contrary to the very purpose of public trial, the purpose "to
guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly 
40
condemned". It can be said that publicity in the administration of
justice is one of the surest guarantees of liberty.
(d) The Adjournment of Trial by the Martial Law Courts
Regulation 3(6) provided that "A Martial Law Court shall not adjourn 
any trial for any purpose unless such adjournment is, in its opinion, 
necessary in the interest of justice".
These provisions contained in this Regulation were exactly
41identical with those of Section 27(5) of the Special Powers Act, 1974.
40. Justice Clark in the case of Estes v. Texas, United States Supreme 
Court Reports, Lawyers1 Edition, Second Series, Vol.XIV,
p.548.
41. As Section 27(5) of the Special Powers Act, 1974, laid down that "A 
Special Tribunal shall not adjourn any trial for any purpose unless 
such adjournment is, in its opinion, necessary in the interest of 
justice".
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The Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance, 1930 (No.VIII of 1930) had also
. . 42
embodied similar provisions. However, unlike the Criminal Procedure 
43 *Code, Regulation 3(6) did not require the Court to record the reasons 
for adjournment. Neither did it specify the reasons except the vague 
words "in the interest of justice" for which adjournment could be made. 
Instead, it invested the Martial Law Court with the discretionary power 
to adjourn any trial.
(e) The Summary Trial of the Martial Law Offences
Regulation 3(5) provided that "A Martial Law Court trying an 
offence under these (i.e. Martial Law) Regulations shall try such 
offence summarily and in trying such offence such Court shall follow the 
procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 
1898), ... for summary trial of summons cases".
42. The Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance, 1930, provided that the 
Special Tribunals were not bound to adjourn the trial for any 
purpose unless such adjournment was considered by them to be 
necessary in the interest of justice.
43. Sections 344(1), 508 and 526(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code deal 
with the adjournment of trial or inquiry. Section 344(1) provides 
that "If, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable 
cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commence­
ment of or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the Court (of Magistrate) 
may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons 
therefore, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such 
terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable ...." 
Section 508 of the Code states that in every case in which a 
commission is issued for the examination or taking of the evidence
of a witness whose evidence is necessary for the ends of justice, 
the inquiry, trial or other proceeding may be adjourned for a 
specified time reasonably sufficient for the execution of the 
commission and its return.
Section 526(8) of the Code lays down that if, in the course of any 
inquiry or trial, or before the commencement of the hearing of any 
appeal, the Public Prosecutor, the complainant or the accused 
notifies to the Court his intention to make an application of 
transfer, the Court adjourns the case or postpones the appeal for a 
reasonable time for the application to be mad^ e and an order to be 
obtained thereon.
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The provisions contained in this Regulation were just the
44reproduction of Section 27(4) of the Special Powers Act, 1974.
Here it may be pointed out that "summons cases" are those cases
which are punishable with imprisonment for six months or under, the
45rest are all "warrant cases". Since all Martial Law offences, most 
of which were already offences under ordinary law as pointed out 
earlier, were punishable with death, transportation or imprisonment for 
a term exceeding six months, the cases relating to such offences were
obviously warrant cases, and they were liable to be tried under warrant
. 46procedure as laid down m  the Criminal Procedure Code. The trial of
such offences under procedure prescribed for summary trial of summons
cases meant that the recording of the evidence of the witness or
framing of a formal charge was not necessary, although in some cases
the recording of the substance of the evidence of each witness was to 
47be made. Here it may be stressed that in a summary trial under the 
Criminal Procedure Code, "No sentence of imprisonment for a term
48exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction"
and if a longer sentence of imprisonment exceeding three months is
necessary in the interest of justice, "the procedure prescribed for
summons cases shall be followed in summons cases, ahd the procedure
49prescribed for warrant cases shall be followed in warrant cases" 
according to the nature of the offence.
44. Section 27(4) of the Special Powers Act, 1974 stated that "A
Special Tribunal trying an offence under this Act shall try such
offence summarily and in trying such offence such Special Tribunal 
shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code (of Criminal 
Procedure) for summary trial of summons cases".
45. Clauses (l)(v) and (l)(w) of Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code.
46. The warrant procedures are laid down in Sections 252-259 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code.
47. Sections 263 and 264, the Criminal Procedure^Code.
48. Section 262(2) ibid.'
49. Section 262(1), Tbid.
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Later the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976, 
(Regulations No.XXXIII of 1976) issued on 28 December 1976, stated that 
"A Martial Law Court shall make a memorandum of the substance of the 
evidence of each witness as the examination of the witness proceeds".
It also provided that "The Chairman of a Special Martial Law Court may 
make such arrangements as he deems necessary for the making of the 
memorandum of substance of evidence, writing of judgment and administration 
of the affairs of the Court".
The provisions embodied in this Regulation in the matter of 
recording evidence were, so to say, identical with Section 355(1)^ of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, since all Martial Law cases 
were warrant cases, under Section 356 of the Code, the evidence of each 
witness, not the memorandum of the substance of the evidence, was 
liable to be taken down in writing.
(f) The Martial Law Courts and Absconding Persons
Regulation 3(7) provided that "If a Martial Law Court has reason 
to believe that an accused person has absconded or is concealing himself 
so that he cannot be arrested and produced before it for trial, it may, 
by order notified in the official Gazette, direct the said person to 
appear before it within such period as may be specified in the order; 
and if the said person fails toicomply with such direction, he may be 
tried in his absence and his property may be forfeited to the 
Government".
50. Section 355(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that in
summons-cases tried before a Magistrate (not summarily) and in
trial of certain offences by a Magistrate of the first or second-
class, "the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of the substance
of the evidence of each witness as the examination of the # * 
witness proceeds.
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Thus it is apparent that, unlike Section 87 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, the Regulation did not state the minimum time of 
thirty days to be given to the accused absconding or concealing himself 
from the date of the publishing of Such an order of the Martial Law 
Court and did not require the order to be published by (a) publicly 
reading it in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which the
absconding person resides; (b) affixing it to some conspicuous part of
the house or homestead in which he resides or to some conspicuous place 
of such a town or village; and (c) affixing its copy to some conspicuous 
part of the court-house. Instead Regulation 3(7) gave the Martial Law 
Court the discretionary power to fix any period within which the absconding 
person would have to appear before the court and the order of such 
Court was to be notified in the official Gazette. This was not 
appropriate particularly because Government^ Gazettes were not easily 
available in villages where most of the accused absconding or concealing 
themselves lived.
Under Regulation 3(7), the property of the absconding accused 
would be forfeited to the government if he did not appear before the 
Martial Law Court within the period specified in its order notified in 
the official gazette. But under the Criminal Procedure Code, although 
the court issuing proclamation for compelling appearance of absconding 
persons was empowered under Section 88(1) at any time to order the
attachment of any property belonging to the proclaimed person, "the
property under attachment shall be at the disposal of the Government" 
if the proclaimed person did not appear within the time specified in 
the proclamation, and such property "shall not be sold until the 
expiration of six months from the date of the attachment ....""^
Even, if within two years from the date of the attachment, such a
51. Section 88(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
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proclaimed person appeared or was apprehended and brought before the
court, and proved to the satisfaction of such a court that he had not
absconded or concealed himself, and that he had no notice of the
proclamation requiring him to attend within the time specified therein,
such property, or if it had been sold, the net proceeds of the sale was,
after deducting all costs incurred in consequence of the attachment,
52
delivered to him". Thus, if within two years from the date of
attachment, the accused absconding failed to satisfy the court as to the
reason for his absence, only then his property under attachment or sale
proceeds of such property stood forfeited to government, But
Regulation 3(7) provided provision for straight forfeiture of the
property of the absconding accused to the government and contained no
provision for the restoration of the property to the absconding accused.
Regulation 3(7) empowered the Martial Law Court to try an absconding
accused inr1^  absentia who had failed to appear before the court in
accordance with the time specified in the order notified in the official
gazette. But under the ordinary law of the land, there was no provision
53for the trial of such an accused in his absence.
52. Section 89 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
53. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court,f after issuing a 
proclamation for compelling appearance of the
and attachment and sale of property of such a person, may proceed 
under Section 512 if the absconder is an accused person. Section 
512 states that "If it is proved that an accused person has 
absconded, and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting 
him, the court competent to try or commit for trial such a person 
for the offence complained of may, in his absence, examine the 
witnesses (if any) produced on behalf of the prosecution, and 
record their depositions. Any such deposition may, on the arrest 
of such a person, be given in evidence against him on the inquiry 
into, or trial for, the offence with which he is charged, if the 
deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or his attendance 
cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or 
inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be 
unreasonable".
(g) Trial De Novo
Regulation 5, which put a bar on trial de novo, stated that "A
Martial Law Court, unless it otherwise decides, shall not be bound
to recall or re-hear any witness whose evidence has already been
recorded, or to re-open proceedings already held, but may act with
evidence already produced or recorded and continue the trial from the
stage which the case has reached".
The provisions contained in this Regulation were just the
54
reproduction of Section 31 of the Special Powers Act, 1974. Regulation
55
5 was also identical with Section 350(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, with the exception that it did not contain the most important 
provision which gave the accused the right to demand that the witness or 
any of them be re-summoned and re-heard.
(iii) Provisions Relating to Legal Representation
With regard to legal representation, Regulation 3(8) stated that 
"No lawyer shall appear or plead before a Summary Martial Law Court on
54. .Section 31 of the . Special Powers Act, 1974, provides that "A
Special Tribunal, unless it otherwise decides, shall not be bound 
to recall or re-hear any witness whose evidence has already been 
recorded or to re-open proceedings already held, but may act oh 
the evidence already produced or recorded and continue the trial 
from the stage which the case has reached".
55. Section 350(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that
"whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the 
whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases
to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another
Magistrate who has and who exercises such jurisdiction, the 
Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his 
predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly 
recorded by himself; or he may re-summon the witnesses and 
recommence the inquiry or trial:
Provided as follows:
(a) in any trial the accused may, when the second Magistrate 
commences his proceedings, demand that the witness or any 
of them be re-summoned and re-heard.; ...."
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behalf of the accused, but the accused may be assisted and advised by 
any person he chooses who shall be called the friend of the accused".
Thus this Regulation denied the right to a person accused of an 
offence either under Martial Law Regulation or under ordinary law to be 
defended by a legal practitioner before a Summary Martial Law Court, 
but not before a Special Martial Law Court. No such discrimination 
between the accused persons is recognised under Section 340(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code which states that "Any person accused of an 
offence before a criminal court, or against whom proceedings are 
instituted under the Criminal Procedure Code in any such court, may of 
right be defended by a pleader". However, Regulation 3(8) violated 
the right of an arrested person to be defended by a lawyer as guaranteed 
by Article 33(1) of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh which provides 
that "No person who is arrested shall be ... denied the right to 
consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice". It 
should be noted here that the right of defence by a legal practitioner 
given to the arrested person by Article 33(1) extends to defence in a 
trial in a criminal court as the arrest of a person on the accusation of 
a crime is a step in an intended criminal proceedings against him and 
it is at his subsequent trial in the criminal court for the alleged 
crime he is to be defended by a counsel.
Although an accused before a Summary Martial Law Court was not 
allowed to be defended by a lawyer, he was allowed to be helped and 
advised by a person of his own choice who would be called the friend 
of the accused. But such a friend might have little or no knowledge of 
law to help and advise the accused person in any substantial way. So 
no trial for an offence under Martial Law Regulations or under any 
other law in a Summary Martial Law Court could be fairly conducted and 
justice accorded to an accused who was not represented by a lawyer.
It is generally agreed that any person brought into court cannot be
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assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. The need 
of an accused person for a lawyer has been forcefully described by 
Justice Sutherland of the American Supreme Court in the case of Powell 
v. A l a b a m a . A s  he observes:
"The right to be heard would be in many cases of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated lawyer has small and sometimes 
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable, generally of determining for himself whether the 
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on 
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately 
to prepare his defence, even though he have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, 
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how 
to establish his innocence."^7
Thus the denial of the right of the accused to the services of a lawyer 
in a trial before a Summary Martial Law Court exposed him to the danger 
of being convicted upon insufficient, irrelevant or inadmissible evidence 
and without a proper charge. In this context, it may be pointed out that 
even under Section 113 of the Bangladesh Army Act Rules, 1954, an accused 
person at a trial by Summary Court-martial could have a "legal adviser"
to assist him during the trial.
(iv) Provisions Relating to the Grant of Bail:
With regard to the power of the court to admit to bail, Regulation
6(2) stated that "No person accused or convicted of an offence «
punishable under these Regulations shall, if in custody, be released on 
bail by a Court or Tribunal without the consent of the prosecution".
56. United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers’ Edition, Vol.LXXVII, 
p.158.
57. Ibid, p.170.
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Thus under this Regulation, the ultimate authority to grant bail 
in cases relating to offences punishable under Martial Law Regulations
was given, instead of to the Martial Law court or tribunal, to the prosecution.
Therefore, the granting of bail depended on the will of the prosecution
rather than the discretion of the Martial Law Court. But under the
Criminal Procedure Code, there was no such restriction on the power of
the criminal court to grant bail: no consent of the prosecution was at
all necessary. Under it, the power of the High Court or Court of
58
Session to admit to bail was discretionary. This discretionary power 
was not arbitrary but was judicial and was governed by established 
principles.^
In this context, it may be mentioned here that the restriction 
imposed by the Martial Law regime of Bangladesh on the power of the 
Martial Law Court to grant bail had not been resorted to by the Martial 
Law regimes of Pakistan in 1958 and 1969. For example, Martial Law 
Order No.8 , issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan on 
27 April 1969, provided that "Whereas it is expedient to grant bail, 
pending investigation or trial, to persons charged under Martial Law 
Regulation/Orders in certain cases ... the President of the (Special
58. For example, Section 498 of the Criminal Procedure Code provided 
that "... the High Court or Court of Session may, in any case, 
whether there be an appeal on conviction or not, direct that any 
person be admitted to bail or that the bail required by a pdlice- 
officer or Magistrate be reduced".
59. In exercising the discretionary power of granting bail, the 
following matters are generally taken into consideration: the 
seriousness of the charge (i.e. whether the offence charged is 
heinous and is under public condemnation); the nature of the 
evidence; the severity of the punishment prescribed for the offence; 
whether the accused is a habitual offender in the crime with which 
he is charged, or is, in other respects, of criminal bent of mind; 
whether on account of his detention his dependents would be deprived 
of their subsistence# age, health and sex of the accused; whether 
the accused, if at liberty, would tamper with* and destroy the 
evidence intended to be adduced against him.
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Military) Court or the Summary Military Court after examining the case 
and the gravity of the offence so committed by the accused, may order 
bail of the accused against appropriate cash or personal sureties. The 
bail will only be granted when it is not apprehended that the accused 
would either tamper with prosecution evidence or that he would abscond 
and the case against him is not of a serious nature". Thus under this 
Martial Law Order, the principles which governed the decisions of 
Military Courts to grant bail were not dissimilar to those followed by 
an ordinary criminal court.^
(v) Provisions Relating to Appeal from the Judgment of the Martial Law 
Courts
Originally Regulation 4(1) of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975
(Regulations No.l of 1975) provided that "No appeal shall lie from
any unanimous judgment or decision of a Special Martial Law Court or
from any judgment or decision of a Summary Martial Law Court". But
"If any judgment or decision of a Special Martial Law Court is not
unanimous, an appeal from such judgment or decision shall lie to an
Appellate Tribunal which shall consist of one member to be appointed by
the Government from among persons who are or have been Judges of the
Supreme Court or of any High Court that functions at any time in the
territory of Bangladesh".^ Such an appeal "shall have to be preferred
62
within fifteen days of the delivery of judgment". The Appellate
Tribunal could, "on appeal, confirm, set aside, enhance, vary or
modify any judgment or sentence and the decision of such tribunal shall 
63
be final". It "shall, for the purpose of hearing an appeal, have the 
same powers and follow as nearly as possible, the same procedure as are
60. Ibid.
61. Regulation 4(2).
62. Regulation 4(6).
63. Regulation 4(7).
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. . .  64vested m  and followed by the High Court Division under the Code”.
Thus it is evident that no appeal was allowed from any unanimous 
decision of the Special Martial Law Court and from any judgment of the 
Summary Martial Law Court, including the judgment pronounced by them 
while trying civil cases. Appeal was provided for only against those 
decisions or judgments of Special Martial Law Courts which were not 
unanimous. But, instead of empowering any court of law to hear such 
an appeal, a separate forum of appeal, i.e. the Appellate Tribunal, 
was created. However, the provision for a limited appeal to an 
Appellate Tribunal against the decision of a Martial Law Court was 
unprecedented in the history of Martial Law Administration in the 
subcontinent.
Here it may be pointed out that the provisions contained in the
Regulation relating to the composition, power and procedure of
Appellate Tribunal were, to a great extent, the reproduction of 
6 S
Section 30 of the Special Powers Act, 1974 (XIV of 1974).
64. Regulation 4(8).
65. Originally* under Section 30 of the Special Powers Act, 1974, appeals 
from the judgments of the Special Tribunal would lie to the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. But these 
provisions of Section 30 were amended by the Special Powers
(Amendment) Act, 1974 (No.LIX of 1974). And the provisions ojf this
amended Section were largely reproduced in clauses 2, 6 , 7 and 8 of 
Regulation 4. The amended Section 30 provided that: "(1) An appeal 
from the judgment of, or sentence passed by, a Special Tribunal may 
be preferred to the Appellate Tribunal ... within thirty days of the 
delivery or passing thereof ... (2) The Government shall, for the 
purposes of this Act, constitute an Appellate Tribunal consisting of 
one member to be appointed by the Government. (3) The member of the 
Appellate Tribunal shall be a person who is, or is qualified to be
appointed as, a Judge of the Supreme Court. (4) The Appellate
Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, enhance, vary or modify 
any judgment of, or sentence passed by, a Special Tribunal, including 
a direction under Section 34A, and the decision of the Appellate 
Tribunal in an appeal shall be final. (5) The Appellate Tribunal 
shall, for the purpose of hearing an appeal under this Act, have the 
same powers and follow, as nearly as possible, the dame procedure
as are vested in and followed by the High Court Division under the 
Code. (6 ) Where a Special Tribunal passes a sentence of death, the 
proceedings shall be submitted forthwith to the Appellate Tribunal 
and the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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Whatever limited appeal was provided for against the decision of 
a Special Martial Law Court that itself was taken away on 28 December 
1976 by the promulgation of the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) 
Regulations, 1976. As this Regulation read: "No appeal shall lie from 
any order, judgment or sentence of a Martial Law Court1'.
Thus the Martial Law regime of Bangladesh ultimately prohibited 
any kind of appeal against any judgment or sentence including death 
sentences or sentences of life imprisonment passed in a Martial Law case 
or a civil case by any Martial Law Court, Special or Summary. Therefore^ 
a person convicted of a Martial Law offence or of a civil offence was 
denied the right of taking the decision of a Martial Law Court to a 
court of law or to any appellate authority with a view to ascertaining 
whether the judgment pronounced against him was sustainable. Since 
Martial Law was not proclaimed under the common law doctrine of 
necessity to restore law and order, most of the Martial Law offences 
were already offences under ordinary law, and above all, the Martial 
Law Courts were empowered to try ordinary offences, the denial of the 
right of appeal against judgment of Martial Law Courts cannot be 
justified.
(vi) Review of Sentences Passed by the Martial Law Courts
Originally^Regulation 4(3) of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975
(Regulations No.l of 1975) provided that "All proceedings of Special
Martial Law Courts shall be submitted to the Government for review ...."
But all proceedings of Summary Martial Law Courts were "to be submitted
to the Sessions Judge, within whose jurisdiction they held the trial,
66for review". "The Government or a Sessions Judge, as the case may be,
the Appellate Tribunal".
6 6 . Regulation 4(4).
6 7
may, on review, reduce any sentence”. Regulation 4(10) provided that 
”No lawyer shall appear or plead before the Government or a Sessions 
Judge at the time of review of a case".
Thus review was granted to the convicts as a remedy against the 
judgment of Martial Law Courts, the remedy for which there was no 
provision in the Criminal Procedure Code of Bangladesh. However, it is 
evident that, although review was granted by way of relief, no particular 
mode of disposing of a review matter was provided for. This enabled 
the government and the sessions judges, as the reviewing authorities of 
the judgments of Special and Summary Martial Law Courts respectively, to 
dispose of the review as they saw fit. Moreover, the convicts were not 
given any right of hearing, legal representation or personal appearance 
at the time of review of the judgments of cases. Therefore, it seems 
that the review was not a judicial but an administrative review. Since 
there was no provision for review in the Criminal Procedure Code, it 
can be said that the Sessions Judge, when acting as the reviewing 
authority under clauses (4) and (5) of Regulation 4, acted not as a 
criminal court but as a persona designata.
However, the conferment of the power of reviewing the decisions of 
Martial Law Courts on the government and the, sessions Judge was 
unprecedented in the history of Martial Law administration in the * 
subcontinent.^
67. Regulation 4(5).
6 8 . For example, when Martial Law was declared in Pakistan in 1958 and 
in 1969, all proceedings of Special Military Courts, after 
confirmation by the Administrator, were to be sent to the Judge 
Advocate-General for final review. (Martial Law Order No.l of 
1958, the provisions of which were exactly reproduced in Martial Law 
Order No.2 of 1969). Of course, later on 18 April 1959, the Martial 
Law regime of Pakistan changed the forum of review by promulgating 
Martial Law Regulation N0 .66-A which read; "Nothing in this 
Regulation shall prevent a review of sentence,- (a) by the Deputy 
Chief Martial Law Administrator where the sentence is not less
than seven years' rigorous imprisonment; or (b) by the Martial Law
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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However, the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations,
1976 (Regulations No,XXXIII of 1976), issued on 28 December 1976 by 
Major-General Ziaur Rahman who had replaced President A. M. Sayem as 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator on 29 November 1976, changed the 
forum of review. With regard to the reviewing authority of the decision 
of the Special Martial Law Court, it provided that "All proceedings of 
a Special Martial Law Court shall, immediately after the termination 
thereof, be submitted to the Chief Martial Law Administrator for review". 
He "may, on review, set aside, vary or modify any order, judgment or 
sentence or make orders for retrial of such other orders as he deems 
necessary for the ends of justice".
Thus the government was replaced by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator as the reviewing authority of the judgments of Special 
Martial Law Courts. Unlike the Chief Martial Law Administrators of 
Pakistan in 1958 and 1969, the Chief Martial Law Administrator of 
Bangladesh took such power, perhaps, in order to assume an effective 
and dominant role in the dispensation of justice and, as such, he 
widened the scope of the review power. Previously the government as 
the reviewing authority, could, on review, only reduce any sentence 
passed by the Special Martial Law Court. But now the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator might, on review, set aside, vary, or modify any 
order, judgment or sentence or make orders for retrial or such other 
orders as he deemed necessary for the ends of justice. Thus he assumed
Administrator concerned in all other cases - where the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator sees fit, by general or special order, 
to direct such review".
With regard to the review of the judgment of Summary 
Military Courts, clause (c)(v) of Regulation No.l-A of 1958, 
Pakistan,provided that "The proceedings of every Summary Military 
Court shall without delay be forwarded for review to the 
Administrator of Martial Law in the area in which the trial was 
held". This was reproduced in clause (c)(v)'of Regulation No.2 
of 1969 of Pakistan.
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the ultimate authority of providing relief in respect of judgments of
Special Martial Law Courts, the authority which was largely parallel
69
to the powers of Appellate Court in disposing of appeal under the 
Criminal Procedure Code.
Later on 4 June 1977, The Martial Law (Twenty-Fourth Amendment)
; Regulations, 1977, (Regulations No.Ill of 1977) provided that "All
| proceedings of Special Martial Law Courts shall, immediately after the
I
| termination thereof, be submitted to the Government for review". "The
i Government may, on review, set aside, vary or modify any order,
!
I judgment or sentence or make orders for retrial or such other orders as
it deems necessary for the ends of justice".
Thus only five months later, the power of review reverted to the 
I , ) government, i.e., the government was substituted for the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator as the reviewing authority. In an interview, the 
then Principal Staff Officer (Martial Law Affairs) said that this was 
done as the task of carrying out review was considered as an additional 
burden.^0 However, although the Chief Martial Law Administrator was 
replaced by the government as the reviewing authority, the wide power 
oonferred on the Chief Martial Law Administrator by the Martial Law 
(Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976, was retained.
With regard to the review of sentences passed by the Summary 
Martial Law Court, the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations,
69. Section 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowered the Appellate 
Court, inter alia, in an appeal from conviction to - (a) reverse 
the finding and sentence, and (i) acquit or discharge the accused, 
or (ii) order him to be retried by a court of competent, 
jurisdiction or committed for trial; or (b) alter the finding, 
maintaining the sentence; or (c) reduce the sentence; or (d) alter 
the nature of the sentence but not so as to enhance the same. It 
may, in an appeal from an order, alter or reverse such order. It 
may also make any amendment or any consequential or incidental 
order that may be just or proper.
70. The interview took place in September 1984.
1976 (Regulations No.XXXIII of 1976), the Regulations which replaced 
the government by the Chief Martial Law Administrator as the reviewing 
authority of sentences passed by a Special Martial Law Court, provided 
that "All proceedings of Summary Martial Law Courts shall, immediately 
after the termination thereof, be submitted to the Zonal Martial Law 
Administrator, within whose jurisdiction the trials were held, for 
review"L! "A Zonal Martial Law Administrator may, on review, set aside, 
vary or modify any order, judgment or sentence or make order for retrial 
or such other orders as he deems necessary for the ends of justice".
But "no order setting aside any order, judgment or sentence or for 
retrial shall be made by a Zonal Martial Law Administrator without the 
prior approval of the Chief Martial Law Administrator."
Thus the sessions judge was replaced by an army personnel having 
no legal background as the review authority in respect of sentences 
passed by a Summary Martial Law Court. Therefore, this new forum of 
review of judgments pronounced by Summary Martial Law Court became 
identical with that of Summary Military Court constituted in Pakistan 
during 1958 and 1969 Martial Law.^ But unlike the 1958 and 1969 
Martial Law regimes of Pakistan, the Martial Law regime of Bangladesh 
defined the scope of the review power of the Zonal Martial Law
Administrator. Before the promulgation of the Martial Law (Twenty-
/  ,
Third Amendment) Regulation, 1976, the sessions judge had been given 
independent power, on review, to reduce any sentence passed by the 
Summary Martial Law Court. But this Regulation conferred on the Zonal 
Martial Law Administrator the wider power of review. He could, on 
review, set aside, vary or modify any order, judgment or sentence or 
make orders .for retrial or such other orders as he deemed fit. Although
71. Supra, footnote no.6 8 , pp.187-188.
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the Zonal Martial Law Administrator could pass an order to vary or 
modify any order, judgment or sentence of Summary Martial Law Court 
independently, while to pass the order setting aside any order, judgment 
or sentence or for retrial, he had to obtain prior approval of the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator to this effect. But no such 
restriction whatsoever was imposed by the Martial Law regimes of
Pakistan in 1958 and 1969 on the review power accorded to the Martial
. . 72
Law Administrator.
Later the Martial Law (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Regulations, 1977 
(Regulations No.VIIIA of 1977), issued on 14 November 1977, provided 
that "All proceedings of Summary Martial Law Courts shall, immediately 
after the termination thereof, be submitted to the Sessions Judge 
within whose jurisdiction the trials were held, for review". "A Sessions 
Judge may, on review, set aside, vary or modify any order, judgment or 
sentence or make orders for retrial or such other orders as he deems 
necessary for the ends of justice".
Thus the power of review in respect of sentences passed by the 
Summary Martial Law Court was given back to the sessions judge: Zonal 
Martial Law Administrator was substituted by the sessions judge as the 
reviewing authority. The change of the forum of review was inevitable 
in view of the fact that on 9 November 1977, five days before the 
promulgation of the Martial Law (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Regulations, 
1977, all orders relating to the creation of zones and the appointment 
of Zonal Martial Law Administrators had been repealed with immediate 
effect. Although this change occurred as a result of necessity arising 
out of such repeal, the return of the power of review to the sessions 
judge was a healthy step in the direction of the administration of
72. Ibid.
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justice. However, the wide power of review as conferred on the Zonal 
Martial Law Administrator was also given to the sessions judge. But 
unlike the Zonal Martial Law Administrator, the sessions judge could 
independently, on review, pass any order setting aside the judgment 
or make orders for retrial; no prior approval of the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator was necessary.
(a) The Finality of the Sentences Passed by the Martial Law Courts 
upon Review
With regard to the finality of the sentences passed by Martial 
Law Courts, the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976, 
provided that "Subject to review, all orders, judgments and sentences 
of a Martial Law Court shall be final".
Thus the proceedings of Martial Law Courts received finality 
upon review by the appropriate authority. But under Section 430 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, generally all judgments and orders passed by 
an Appellate Court upon appeal were to be final.
(vii) Confirmation of Certain Sentences Passed by the Special Martial 
Law Courts
Regulations 4(2) provided that "... all sentences of death or
transportation for life shall have to be confirmed by the President".
The conferment o*n the President^the power to confirm death
sentences passed by Martial Law Court was unexampled in the history of
73
Martial Law Administration in the subcontinent. However, apart from
73. Because, under the Malabar Martial Law (Military Courts) Ordinance, 
1921, and the Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance, 1930 (No.VIII of 
1930), a sentence of death passed by the Military Court was required 
to be reserved for confirmation by the General Officer Commanding 
the district and the General Officer Commanding-in- Chief 
respectively. Even the Martial Law regime of Pakistan in 1958 made 
the provisions that all death sentences passed by the Special 
Military Court were required to be confirmed by Martial Law
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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death sentences, the sentences of transportation for life passed by the
Special Martial Law Court were also to be confirmed by the President.
But under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code, only the death
sentences passed by the Courts of Session were liable to be confirmed
and the authority for such confirmation was the High Court.
Although the President was empowered to confirm death sentences,
he could not pass any other sentence warranted by law or annul the
conviction or acquit the accused person or order a fresh trial while
74
discharging his duties as the sentences and judgments of Martial Law 
Courts were invested with finality on review. It would, therefore, 
appear that this power of confirmation was conferred on him as a matter 
of routine without any real significance. Here it may be mentioned 
that under Article 57 of the 1972 Constitution, the President had the 
power to grant pardon, reprieve.and respite, and to remit, suspend or
Administrator (Clause b(ii) of Regulation No.l-A, issued on 
7 October 1958) although a few days later it was provided that all 
sentences of death imposed under the Martial Law Regulations both 
by criminal courts and Special Military Courts were to be kept 
reserved for confirmation by the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
(Martial Law Order No.5, issued on 11 October 1958). The 1969 
Martial Law Administration also provided that all death sentences 
passed by the Special Military Court were to be reserved for 
confirmation by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Clause B(III) 
of Martial Law Regulation No.2 of 1969.
74. But under Section 375(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, if, when 
proceedings of death sentences passed by the Court of Sessions are 
submitted, the High Court thinks that a further inquiry should be 
made into, or additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing 
upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make 
such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to be made 
or taken by the Court of Session.
Section 376 of the Code states that when a death sentence passed 
by the Session Judge is submitted to the High Court, it - "(a) may 
confirm the sentence, or pass any other sentence warranted by law, 
or (b) may annul the conviction, and convict the accused of any 
offence of which the Sessions Court might have convicted him, or 
order a new trial on the same or an amended charge, or (c) may 
acquit the accused person . ...,f
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commute any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or other authority. 
But the question of exercising such powers only arose on the submission 
of mercy petitions to him.
(viii) Provisions for Transfer of Cases
Regulation 3(2) of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975, provided 
that "The Government may transfer a case from one Martial Law Court 
to another Martial Law Court or from a Criminal Court or Special 
Tribunal to a Martial Law Court". Subsequently, the Martial Law 
Regulations No.XXIII of 1976 also empowered the government to transfer 
a case from a Special Martial Law Tribunal to a Special Martial Law 
Court. However, on 28 December 1976, the Martial Law (Twenty-Third 
Amendment) Regulations, 1976, added an explanation to Regulation 3(2) 
which read: "A case triable by a Court of Session pending before a 
Magistrate for inquiry may also be transferred to a Martial Law Court 
for trial". It also replaced the government by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator as the authority of transferring cases.
It is evident that no guidelines were provided in Regulation 3(2) 
as to which of the cases were liable to transfer from a criminal court 
or a Special Tribunal to a Martial Law Court. The absence of such a 
guideline provided the scope for the government/the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator to exercise the power of transferring cases by a process 
of picking and choosing. Moreover, no reasons were specified in this 
Regulation for the transfer of a case from an ordinary court to a 
Martial Law Court or from one Martial Law Court to another. Provisions 
were not even made for the hearing of the accused concerned before 
making such a transfer. Therefore, as a result of such an arbitrary 
transfer, the accused concerned was deprived of the protection that he
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normally enjoyed under Chapter XLIV7'5 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
However, the transfer of a case from a criminal court to a
Martial Law Court deprived the accused of the right of -
(a) legal representation, if tried before a Summary Martial Law Court,
(b) appeal, and
(c) equality before the law.
(a) As pointed out earlier, under Section 340(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code any person accused of an offence before a criminal
court or against whom proceedings are instituted under the Criminal
Procedure Code in any such court, may of right be defended by a pleader.
But if such a case was transferred from a criminal court to a Summary 
♦
Martial Law Court, the accused concerned was deprived by Regulation 3(8) 
of the right to be defended by a lawyer.
(b) It is said that "the right of appeal is not a matter of
procedure, but is a substantive right, that the institution of a suit 
carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force 
are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the 
suit, that the right of appeal is a vested right and exists as on and
75. For example, under Chapter XLIV of the Criminal Procedure Code,
whenever it appears to the High Court (1) on the report of the lower 
court, or (2) on the application of a party interested; or (3) on 
its own initiative that - (a) a fair and impartial inquiry or trial 
cannot be had in any criminal court, or (b) some question of law of 
unusual difficulty is likely to arise, or (c) a view of the place 
in or near which any offence has been committed may be required for 
satisfactory inquiry or trial, or (d) an order under this Section 
will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witness,
(e) such an order is expedient for the ends of justice, or is 
required by any provision of this Code: it may order that - (i) any 
offences be inquired into or tried by any court not empowered under 
SS.177 to 184, but in other respects competent to inquire into or 
try such offence; (ii) any particular case or appeal be transferred 
from a criminal court to any other criminal court of equal or 
superior jurisdiction, (iii) any particular case or appeal be 
transferred to and tried before itself; or (iv) an accused person 
be committed for trial to itself or to a Court of Session. (Clauses 
1 and 3 of Section 526). Thus the Criminal Procedure Code did not 
allow arbitrary transfer of cases, it allowed the transfer on 
certain specified grounds.
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and from the date the lis commences and not by the law that prevails 
at the date of its decision and that this vested right can be taken
away only by subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by
# 76
necessary intendment and not otherwise1'. Therefore, since the right
to file an appeal is a vested right and it becomes vested the moment a
proceeding or lis commences or prosecuhbn is lodged in a court of law,
the transfer of a case from the ordinary criminal court to a Martial
Law Court would entail the loss of that right to move the superior
courts in the normal judicial hierarchy of the country a,s against the
decision of a Martial Law Court there was no right of appeal.
Similarly, the transfer of a case from the court of a Special Tribunal
to a Martial Law Court deprived the accused of the right to an appeal
before an Appellate Tribunal provided for by the Special Powers Act, 1974.
(c) The arbitrary transfer of an ordinary case from a criminal
court or a Special Tribunal to a Martial Law Court violated the right of
equality before the law as guaranteed by Article 27 of the 1972
Constitution. Because in one case the accused, if tried by a criminal
court, could have a lawyer to defend himself and the right of appeal to
a superior court whereas in an exactly similar case, another accused
would be deprived of the right of appeal if he was tried by a Special
Martial Law Court. However, the situation was even worse if the accused
was tried by a Summary Martial Law Court as in this case he would be
deprived not only of the right of appeal but also the right of legal
representation. Thus the arbitrary transfer of a case from an
ordinary court to a Martial Law Court led to differential treatment of
the persons accused of similar offences. In this respect, the
observation of Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury of the High Court
*
76. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XIV, 1962, p.671.
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division of the Supreme Court (as he then was in 1978) in the case of 
flaji Joynal Abedin v. the State‘S  is worthy of note. He observed that:
”a law which provides for trial of particular cases by 
special court or by procedures which differs substantially 
from the ordinary procedure to the prejudice of the accused 
is a violation of equality before law if there is no 
classification and if the enactment does not give any under­
lying policy to determine as to which cases will go before 
special court ...."7®
3ut in 1981, the same Justice while sitting at the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh contradicted himself and expressed
79
a totally different view in the case of Ehteshamuddiri v. Bangladesh :
In this case "the transfer (to the Special Martial Law Court) 
was done by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, whereas, in 
the case of Haji Joynal Abedin it was done by the Government 
as the law stood then. Therefore the question of such 
supplying guide-line to the executive achieved some importance 
in view of the argument that basis for arbitrary exercise of 
power has been laid by.such a wide conferment of power without 
supplying any guide-line. In the present case, the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator has transferred the case and since 
this power has been conferred upon him, the question of 
guide-line would not be relevant. He himself has passed the 
law and then acted under it .... Whether such power of transfer 
may operate in discriminatory manner ... will be decided in an 
appropriate c a s e " .
It should be stressed here that what is of vital importance is not as 
to who transfers the case from a criminal court or a Special Tribunal 
to a Martial Law Court but the fact that in the absence of guidelines 
the arbitrary transfer contravened the principle of equality before the law.
77- Dhaka Law Reports, Vol.XXX, 1978, p.371.
78 - Ibid., p .395 .
79- Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol.XXXIII, 1981, p.154.
80- Ibid., pp.173-174.
1 98
(ix) The Exclusion of the Jurisdiction of Civil Courts from Questioning 
the Judgments or Proceedings of the Martial Law Courts:
Regulation 4(9) of the Martial Law Regulations stated that "... no
order, judgment, decision or sentence of a Martial Law Court shall be
called in question in any manner whatsoever in or before any Court,
81
including (the High Court and) the Supreme Court". These provisions
were not considered enough and, as such, later on 28 December 1976, it
was enacted that "No Court, including the High Court and the Supreme
Court, shall call for the records of.the proceedings of any Martial
82Law court for any purpose whatsoever".
The above provisions bore resemblance to clause 8 of Regulation 
83
No.61, as reconstituted and issued on 4 February 1959 by the Chief
. . . 84Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, and Article 3(iii) of the
Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, issued on 10 October 1958 by 
President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan. The effect of these provisions 
was that no court, including the High Court and the Supreme Court, shall 
have any normal power to call in question any judgment or sentence of 
the Martial Law Court even when it involved a death sentence or a 
sentence pronounced in a criminal case. Even the power of the criminal 
court to call for and examine the records of any proceeding before 
Martial Law Court in respect of a case under both ordinary law and
81. The words within square brackets were added to Regulation 4(9) by 
the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976.
82. Ibid.
83. Clause 8 of Regulation No.61, as reconstituted on 4 February 1959, 
provided that "The constitution or jurisdiction of any Military 
Court whether designated as a Special Military Court or as a Summary 
Military Court and the proceedings before any such Court, and orders 
passed or sentences imposed in any such proceedings, shall not, on 
any ground whatsoever be called, in question in any Court, including 
the High Court and the Supreme Court".
84. Clause (iii) of Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 
1958, stated that no court nor any person could call or permit to 
be called in question any finding, judgment of orders of a Special 
Military Court or of a Summary Military Court.
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Martial Law Regulations for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order
recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such
85
a court was ended. Thus the jurisdiction of any court to give any 
form of relief to an accused person during his trial or conviction by 
a Martial Law Court, whether in a Martial Law case or in a civil case, 
was completely ended - a state of affairs which is contrary to the 
principle of natural justice.
Conclusion
To sum up, like the 1958 and 1969 Martial Law regimes of Pakistan, 
the 1975 Martial Law regime of Bangladesh provided for the setting up 
of two types of Martial Law Courts, namely the Special Martial Law 
Court and the Summary Martial Law Court, parallel to the existing 
civilian courts. Like the Military Courts established in Pakistan 
during 1958 and 1969 Martial Law, the jurisdiction of Martial Law Courts 
of Bangladesh was extended to the trial of offences under the ordinary 
law - which had previously been the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
civilian courts. Provisions were made for the transfer of cases from 
ordinary court to Martial Law Court or from one Martial Law Court to 
another. But no guidelines were provided for such a transfer. As a 
result, the transfer could be random without any set standards or
85. But under Section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High 
Court, a Sessions Judge, a District Magistrate, or any Sub- 
Divisional Magistrate specially empowered has power - (1) to call 
for and examine the record of any proceedings before an inferior 
criminal court, within its or his jurisdiction, for the purpose 
of satisfying itself or himself as to ; (i) the correctness, 
legality, or propriety, of any finding, sentence, or order;
(ii) regularity of any proceedings of such court; (2) to direct
that the execution of any sentence be suspended, and the accused,
if in confinement, be released on bail or on his own bond pending
the examination of the record.
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criteria, depending on the capricious will of the Government/the Chief
Martial Law Administrator which ultimately violated the right of equality
before the law. However, unlike the British Martial Law
administration in India and the Martial Law regimes of Pakistan in
1958 and 1969, the ordinary criminal courts were not given concurrent
jurisdiction to try offences under Martial Law Regulations. The Martial
Law Courts comprised members who were career armed forces officers
with no legal training or qualification and, as such, could not be
expected to exercise a fair judgment. Unlike the previous Martial Law
administration in the subcontinent^ the detailed procedures of Martial
Law Courts were laid down which mostly resembled the Special Powers
Act, 1974 of Bangladesh rather than the procedures of any courts-
martial under the Army Act. However, as a result of the trial before a
Martial Law Court, an accused suffered a number of disabilities. The
evidence was not required to be taken in full. The accused could not
be defended by a lawyer in a trial before the Summary Martial Law Court.
Trials before the Special Martial Law Court could be held in camera.
Contrary to the normal procedure, the granting of bail to a person
accused or convicted of a Martial Law offence was made subject to the
consent of the prosecution. Ultimately, the right of appeal was
extinguished. Unlike the British Martial Law administration in India
which in Malabar in 1929 and in Peshawar in 1930 had allowed the right
86
of appeal against sentences of death and life imprisonment, even no
86. As the Malabar Martial Law (Supplementary) Ordinance, 1921
(No.Ill of 1921) and the Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance, 1930 
(No.VIII of 1930), which made provisions for the constitution of 
Special Tribunals to try any offence connected with the event 
which necessitated the enforcement and continuance of Martial 
Law, provided that in case of a sentence of death, transportation 
for life or for imprisonment for ten years or more, an appeal 
would lie to the High Court.
provision was made for the right of appeal in case of such sentences. 
For the first time in the history of Kartial Law Administration in the 
subcontinent^ President was invested with the power to confirm
death sentences. He was also empowered to confirm sentences of life 
imprisonment. But he could not interfere with these sentences while 
exercising the power of confirmation. Only review was provided for by 
way of remedy. Unlike the Martial Law administration in Pakistan in 
1958 and 1969, the powers of review in respect of sentences passed by 
Summary Martial Law Court and Special Martial Law Court were given to 
sessions judge and the government. Thus no Justice of the High Court 
or the Supreme Court was given the power to review any sentence passed 
by a special Martial Law Court although the sessions judge was invested 
with the power to review any sentence passed by the Summary Martial Law 
Court. However, since no personal hearing, legal representation or 
particular procedure for review was provided for, the remedy of review 
failed to give the convict any substantial relief. Like the 1958 
Martial Law regime of Pakistan, the jurisdiction of the courts, 
including the High Court and the Supreme Court, was excluded from 
calling the records of the proceedings or calling in question any order 
judgment, decision or sentence of Martial Law Courts. Thus the 
constitutional and legal safeguards to ensure a fair trial and natural 
justice disappeared and, indeed, allowed for the miscarriage of justice
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CHAPTER IV
Establishment and Operation of Martial Law Courts 
Having considered the basic provisions relating to Martial Lawi
Courts in the previous chapter, attention will now be given to the 
establishment, composition and functioning of Martial Law Courts. The
i
| forthcoming discussion will show how a dual system of justice was
j established: the new Martial Law Courts existed side by side with
! the ordinary criminal courts. It will further reveal how, in general,
i
| legally trained judges were excluded from Martial Law Courts and how
I
cases were arbitrarily transferred from criminal courts or Special 
| Tribunals to Martial Law Courts or from one Martial Law Court to
another. It will in addition demonstrate that sometimes Martial Law 
Regulations were amended to suit the trial of a particular person and 
the way in which the Judiciary asserted themselves after the with­
drawal of Martial Law. The discussion will also show the manner in 
which at times the administration of Martial Law justice was carried out.
I The Establishment and Composition of the Special Martial Law Courts 
The Martial Law administration of Bangladesh set up ten Special 
Martial Law Courts for the whole of Bangladesh between 28 August 1976 
and July 1977. It constituted the first two Special Martial Law 
Courts, Special Martial Law Court No.I and II, on 28 August 1975, 
only thirteen days after the promulgation of Martial law. The com­
position of these two courts is shown in Table I:
1
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Tsble I1
Member from Member from the
Name of Court Chairman the Armed Forces Courts of Sessions
Special Martial Law Sessions Lieutenant Assistant
Court No.I Judge Colonel Sessions Judge
Special Martial Law Sessions Wing Assistant
Court No.II Judge Commander Sessions Judge
Thus the majority of the members of the Special Martial Law
Courts Nos.I sind II, including the chairmen, were from the Courts of
Sessions. But this composition of the courts was not destined to
remain in existence for long. On 25 February 1976, the Martial Law
Government renamed the Special Martial Law Court No.I and Special
Martial Law Court No.II as Special Martial Law Court No.I, Dhaka and
Special Martial Law Court No.II, Dhaka, respectively and changed the
original composition of these two courts by virtue of the Martial Law
2
(Twelfth Amendment) Regulations, 1976. The composition of these 
two Special Martial Law Courts and the other eight Special Martial 
Law Courts established during the Martial Law period, are shown in 
Table II:
1. Table I is prepared on the basis of Notification No.1068-JIV/Con-
4/75, issued by the Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs, and
Justice on 28 August 1975.
2. See supra. Chapter III, p. 158.
1
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Table II3
Name of Court Chairman
Member 
from the 
Armed Forces
Member from 
First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.I, Dhaka
Sessions Judge Squadron
Leader
First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.II, Dhaka
Wing Commander Major 
(who had previous­
ly been the mem­
ber of the eourt)
First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.Ill, Comilla
Lieutenant
Colonel
Major First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.IV, 
Chittagong
Lieutenant
Colonel
Major First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.V, Rang Pur
Lieutenant
Colonel
Major First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.VI, Jessore
Sessions Judge Major First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.VII, Bogra
Lieutenant
Colonel
Major First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.VIII, Dhaka
Colonel Lieutenant
Colonel
First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.IX, Sylhet
Additional 
District Judge
Major First Class 
Magistrate
Special Martial Law 
Court No.X, 
Mymensingh
Additional 
District Judge
Major First Class 
Magistrate
There were nineteen districts in Bangladesh. Although the above ten
Special Martial Law Courts were named after eight districts, their
jurisdiction was extended for the whole of Bangladesh. Special
3. Table II is prepared on the basis of Notification No.l28-JIV/Con- 
4/75 issued by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs on 
25 February 1976; The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 9 March 1976; 
Notification No.704-JIV/Con-4/75 issued by the Ministry of Law 
and Parliamentary Affairs on 1 September 1976; Notification Nos. 
321/1(1)/CMLA, 321/1(2)/CMLA, 321/1(3)/CMLA, issued by the Office 
of the Chief Martial Law Administration on 18 January, 1 May and
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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Martial Law Court No.I, while sitting in Dhaka, for example, could 
try a case from Dhaka district or any other district of the country. 
It is evident from Table II that the majority of the Special Martial 
Law Courts were headed by officers of the army and air force. This 
shows that the Martial Law regime preferred officers of the armed 
forces without legal qualification or experience to sessions judges 
as chairmen of the Special Martial Law Courts.
II The Establishment and Composition of the Summary Martial Law Courts 
In October 1975, the Martial Law government of Bangladesh con­
stituted nineteen Summary Martial Law Courts for all the nineteen
districts of the country. Later, between February 1976 and July 1977,
4
it set up twenty Additional Summary Martial Law Courts. It also 
set up fifty Summary Martial Law Courts in the fifty sub-divisions
5
of the nineteen districts between 8 September 1976 and 6 November 
1976. The composition of these Summary Martial Law Courts are 
shown below:
3. (continued)
1 June 1977, respectively. Here it may be pointed out
that Special Martial Law Courts Nos.Ill, IV, V, VI, VII were 
set up in 1976 and Special Martial Law Courts Nos.VIII, IX and •
X were set up in 1977.
4. Two additional Summary Martial Law Courts were established for 
the district of Dhaka.
5. The fifty Summary Martial Law Courts set up at the sub-divisional
level and the Additional Summary Martial Law Court of Tangail
district were dissolved on 10 July 1977, the day on which fifteen
Additional Summary Martial Law Courts were established. Notifi­
cation No.322/2/CMLA/7-77 issued by the Office of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator, on 10 July 1977.
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Table III6
Name of Court
No. of Courts 
Composed of 
First Class Magistrate
No. of Courts 
Composed of 
Major
Summary Martial Law Court 
at district level
14 Courts composed of 
First Class Magistrates
5 Courts composed 
of Majors
Additional Summary Martial 
Law Court at district level
17 Courts composed of 
First Class Magistrates
3 Courts composed 
of Majors
Summary Martial Law Court 
at sub-divisional level
50 Courts composed of 
First Class Magistrates
Nil
The above table shows that the majority of the Summary Martial Law
Courts were composed of first class magistrates and only a very few 
consisted of itiajors, who had no legal experience or training and, 
as such, could not be expected necessarily to act in accordance with 
the strict requirements of law.
Ill Martial Law Courts and Ordinary Courts: A Dual System of Justice 
Here it may be recalled that the question of establishing 
Martial Law Courts arises when it is necessary to administer prompt 
and speedy justice for the restoration of law and order. Since the 
1975 Martial Law of Bangladesh was not declared in time of war, or 
to suppress open rebellion or armed insurrection amounting to war, 
the setting up of such a vast number of Summary Martial Law Courts 
and Special Martial Law Courts cannot be justified. As Chief Justice
6. Table III is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs of Bangladesh in 
1975 and 1976 and the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
in 1977: Notification Nos.l253-JIV/lT-4/75 (issued on 20 October 
1975); 129-JIV/1-T-4/75 (issued on 25 February 1976); 248-JIV/1T- 
4/75 (issued on 17 April 1976); 724-JIV/1T-3/76 (issued on 8 Sep­
tember 1976); 725-JIV/1T-3/76 (issued on 8 September 1976); 739- 
JIV/1T-3/76; 740-JIV/1T-3/76; 741-JIV/1T-3/76; 742-JIV/1T-3/76 
(these four notifications were issued on 14 September 1976); 803- 
JIV/1T-3/76 (issued on 13 October 1976); 865-Jltf/lT-3/76 (issued 
on 6 November 1976); 322/l/CMLA/4-c/77 (issued on 10 July 1977).
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Muhammad Munir in the case of Muhammad Umar Khan v. the Crown 
observed:
"Now the setting up of special military courts with a 
view to punishing people for contravention of Martial 
Law Regulations or orders can be justified only to the 
extent that the orders passed by such courts were during 
the martial law period considered necessary for the pre­
servation or restoration of order".
Moreover, the ordinary courts of the land were open and effectively 
functioning. Therefore, they could try the Martial Law offences spe­
cified by the Martial Law regime, most of which were already offences 
under the ordinary law. There was no need to establish Martial Law 
Courts. As in 1838, the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, Sir 
John Campbell and Sir R.M. Rolfe, had given their joint opinion against 
the trial of Canadian rebels by Martial Law Courts, while the civil 
courts were open:
"...we are of opinion that the prerogative (of His Majesty 
for the public safety to resort to the exercise of martial 
law against open enemies or traitors) does not extend be­
yond the case of persons taken in open resistance, and 
with whom, by reason of the suspension of the ordinary 
tribunals, it is impossible to deal according to the 
regular course of justice. When the regular courts are 
open, so that criminals might be delivered over to them 
to be dealt with according to law, there is not, as we 
conceive, any right in the Crown to adopt any other course 
of proceeding. Such power can only be conferred by the 
Legislature, as was done by the Acts passed in consequence 
of the Irish rebellions of 1798 and 1803, and also of the 
Irish Coercion Act of 1833".^
7. Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore, Vol.VI, 1953, p.825.
8. Ibid., pp.842-843.
9. Forsyth, William, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and 
Various Points of English Jurisprudence, London, 1869, pp.198-199. 
Here it may be pointed out that the Irish Parliament in 1799 in 
the Act of 39 Geo 3, c.ll removed any doubt that might have
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
A similar view was expressed by Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah 
in the case of Zia-ur Rahman v. the State
"when the Courts are open and functioning effectively 
under the normal law, there is no justification for 
establishing Special Military Courts for trial of 
Civilians"*
Although Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975 was declared in times of 
peace and the ordinary courts were open and functioning, even the 
exercise by the ordinary courts of their civil and criminal functions 
was interfered with. After the setting up of Martial Law Courts, the 
cases pending before criminal courts under the ordinary law of the 
land or the cases pending before Special Tribunals under the Special 
Powers Act, 1974, were transferred to the Martial Law Courts. The 
number of cases transferred between 1975 and 1978 from criminal 
courts or Special Tribunals to Martial Law Courts, or from one Martial 
Law Court to another or from Special Martial Law Tribunal to Martial 
Law Court are shown below:
Table IV12 
Cases Transferred in the Year 1975
Name' of Court from Where Name of Court to Which Number of Cases
Cases were Transferred Cases were Transferred Transferred
Special Tribunal Special Martial Law Court 4
Courts of Session ii ii it 3
Special Magistrate it n ii 2
Total 9
9. (continued)
existed on the point by specially enacting that persons might be 
punished according to Martial Law, whether the ordinary courts of 
justice should or should not at such time be open.
10. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXIV^ 1972, p.382.
11. Ibid.. p.397.
12. Table IV is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs and Justice in 1975
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
209
Table V13 
Cases Transferred in the Year 1976
Name of Court1 from Where Name of Court to Which Number of Cases
Cases were Transferred Cases were Transferred Transferred
Special Tribunal Special Martial Law Court 208
Courts of Sessions i t t i i t 11
First Class Magistrate i i i i n 20
Sub-Divisional Magistrate i i n i i 15
Special Martial Law Court i i i i i i 7
Special Martial Law 
Tribunal i i i i i i 1
Summary Martial Law Court i i i i i i 9
Summary Martial Law Court Summary Martial Law Court 3
Special Tribunal n t i t l 41
Courts of Sessions i i i t I I 5
First Class Magistrate i i n II 75
Sub-Divisional Magistrate i i i i I I 21
Total 416
12. (continued)
Notification Nos. 1094-JIV/Sec.-4/75 (issued on 2 September); 
1143-JIV/Sec-l/75 (issued on 15 September); 1503-JIV/Sec-l/75 
(issued on 29 December).
13. Table V is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs and Justice in 
1976. Notification Nos: 72-JIV/Sec.1/75 (issued on 29 January); 
96-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 9 February); 123-JIV/2T-8/76 (issued
on 23 February); 162-JIV/2T-2/76 (issued on 5 March); 163-JIV/2T- 
9/76 (issued on 6 March); 164-JIV/2T-4/76 (issued on 6 March); 
171-JIV/2T-12/76 (issued on 10 March); 233-JIV/2T-4/76 (issued' 
on 2 April); 274-JIV/2T-4/76 (issued on 27 April); 197-JIV/'
7/76 (issued on 19 March); 202-JIV/2T-6/76 (issued on 20 March); 
215-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 24 March); 230-JIV/2T-11/76 (issued 
on 31 March); 232-JIV/Sec.1/75 (issued on 1 April); 250-JIV/2T- 
10/76 (issued on 19 April); 256-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 21 April); 
274-JIV/2T-4/76 (issued on 27 April); 277-JIV/2T-2/76 (issued on 
27 April); 284-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 29 April); 295-JIV/2T-17/76 
(issued on 4 May); 296-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 4 May); 297-JIV/ 
2T-17/76 (issued on 4 May); 325-JIV/2T-10/76 (issued on 12 May); 
326-JIV/2T-2/76 (issued on 12 May); 332-JIV/2T-14/76 (issued on 
17 May); 346-JIV/2T-11/76 (issued on 24 May); 347-JIV/2T-14/76 
(issued on 25 May); 368-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 3 June); 370-JIV/ 
2T-14/76 (issued on 3 June); 372-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 5 June); 
373-JIV/2T-6/76 (issued on 7 June); 376-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 
7 June); 377-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 7 June); 382-JIV/2T-17/76 
(issued on 8 June); 418-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 12 June); 467-
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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14Table VI
Cases Transferred in the Year 1977
Name of Court from Where Name of Court to Which Number of Cases
Cases were Transferred Cases were Transferred Transferred
Special Tribunal Special Martial Law Court 85
Courts of Sessions i i  i t i i 177
First Class Magistrate i t  i i i i 619
Second Class Magistrate i t  i i i t 1
Resident Magistrate n i i i t 2
Sub-Divisional Magistrate ii n i t 252
Special Martial Law Court i i  i i i i 70
Summary Martial Law Court i i  i i i t 2
Special Tribunal Summary Martial Law Court 122
Courts of Sessions i i  i i 11 69
First Class Magistrate n ii fl 788
Second Class Magistrate n ii II 17
Sub-Divisional Magistrate ii n 11 452
Summary Martial Law Court Additional Summary Martial 
Law Court
2
Total 2658
13. (continued)
„ . JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 28 June); 471-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 28
June); 489-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 3 July); 514-JIV/2T-17/76 
(issued on 6 July); 525-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 6 July); 526-JIV/ 
2T-3/76 (issued on 6 July); 557-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 16 July); 
565-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 19 July); 592-JIV/2T-9/76 (issued on 
27 July); 599-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 28 July); 626-JIV/Secret- 
5/76 (issued on 2 August); 634-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 5 August); 
635-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 5 August); 683-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued 
on 25 August); 686-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 26 August); 687-JIV/ 
2T-17/76 (issued on 26 August); 700-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 2 
September); 766-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 29 September); 722-JIV/ 
2T-17/76 (issued on 30 September); 789-JIV/ on-4/75 (issued on 
9 October); 804-JIV/2T-2 76 (issued on 13 October); 812-JIV/3M- 
25/76 (issued on 15 October); 820-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 16 Octo­
ber); 825-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 20 October); 835-JIV/2T-76 
(issued on 25 October); 852-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 28 October); 
905-JIV/2T-11/76 (issued on 6 November); 876-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued 
on 10 November); 926-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 27 November); 928- 
JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 29 November); 931-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 
30 November); 972-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 14 December); 991-JIV/ 
2T-17/76 (issued on 23 December).
14. Table VI is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administration in 1977. 
Notification Nos:322/3//CMLA/1-77 (issued on 22* January); 321/3/
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Table VII15 
Cases Transferred in the Year 1978
Name of Court from Where Name of Court ’to Which Number of Cases
Cases were Transferred Cases were Transferred Transferred
Courts of Sessions Special Martial Law Court 1
First Class Magistrate ” " " 1
Sub-Divisional Magistrate M " " 7
Special Martial Law Court M " M 6
Summary Martial Law Court " " " 1
Additional Summary Martial " " " 1
Law Court
Special Martial Law Court Summary Martial Law Court 2
Total 19
These four tables show that the total number of cases transferred 
from criminal courts or Special Tribunals to Martial Law Courts, or 
from one Martial Law Court to another was 3102. Out of these 3102 cases, 
2998 cases were transferred from ordinary criminal courts and Special 
Tribunals to Martial Law Courts.
1 4 .  C M L A / 2 - 7 7  (issued 1 9  Feb.); 3 2 1 / 3 / C M L S / 2 - 7 ?  (issued 2 7  Feb.); 3 2 1 / 3 /
( c o n ) C M L A / 3 - 7 7  (issued on 1 5  March); 3 2 2 / 3 / C M L A / 2 - 7 7  (issued on 1 5  March);
321/3/CMLA/2-77 (issued on 10 February); 322/3/CMLA/2-77 (issued 
on 10 February); 322/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 24 March); 322/3/CMLA/
4-77 (issued on 17 April); 321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 17 April); 
321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 20 April); 322/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 
20 April); 321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 1 May); 322/3/CMLA/5-77 ’ 
(issued on 5 May); 321/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 15 May); 322/3/CMLA/
5-77 (issued on 15 May); 321/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 2 June); 322/ 
3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 2 June); 321/3/CMLA/6-77 (issued on 17 June); 
322/3/CMLA/6-77 (issued on 17 June); 321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issued on
4 July); 321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issued on 17 July); 321/3/CMLA/10-77 
(issued on 3 October); 321/3/CMLA/10-77 (issued on 2 November);
322/3/CMLA/10-77 (issued on 2 November); 321/3/CMLA/11-77 (issued 
on 18 November); 322/3/CMLA/11-77 (issued on 18 November).
15. Table VII is prepared on the basis of notifications issued by the
Office of the Chief Martial Law Administration in 1978. Notifica­
tion Nos; 321/3/CMLA/1-78 (issued on 4 February); 322/3/CMLA/2-78 
(issued on 10 February); 321/3/CMLA/2-78 (issued on 4 March); 
321/3/CMLA/5-78 (issued on 31 May); 321/3/CMLA/8-78 (issued on
30 August); 321/3/CMLA/8-78 (issued on 7 September); 321/3/CMLA/
10-78 (issued on 3 November); 321/3/CMLA/10-78 (issued on 12 
October).
Since no guidelines were provided in any Martial Law Regulation 
or Order as to the class of cases liable to be transferred, no cri­
teria whatsoever were followed in transferring such vast numbers of 
cases from criminal courts and Special Tribunals to Martial Law 
Courts. In other words, the powers of transferring cases appear to 
have been exercised arbitrarily. Here it may be recalled that such 
an arbitrary transfer of cases deprived the accused of the right of 
(a) appeal; (b) legal representation, if the cases were transferred 
to a Summary Martial Law Court; and (c) equal protection of law.
As no uniform principle or standard was followed in transferring 
cases, the same type of cases were transferred arbitrarily sometimes 
to the Summary Martial Law Court and sometimes to the Special Martial 
Law Court. This aspect will become clearer from Tables VIII and IX.
«
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Table VIII
Examples of Cases Transferred from the Courts of Magistrate 
to Summary Martial Law Courts
Name of Law Examples of Offences
1. The Penal Code, Dacoity; dacoity with murder; robbery or dacoity
1860 with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt;
making preparation to commit dacoity; assembling
for the purpose of committing dacoity; dishonestly
receiving property stolen in the commission of a
dacoity; robbery; voluntarily causing hurt in
committing robbery; theft; theft in dwelling
house; theft after preparation made for causing
death, hurt or restraint in order to commit theft;
dishonestly receiving stolen property; assault or
criminal force in an attempt to commit theft of
property carried by a person; extortion; voluntarily
causing grievous hurt to extort property or to constrain
to an illegal act; murder; attempt to murder; tiilpable 
homicide not amounting to murder; causing death 
by negligence; cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property; cheating by personation;
forgery for purpose of cheating; forgery of valu*- •
able security, will, etc.; using as genuine a forged
document; criminal breach of trust; criminal breach
of trust by carrier etc.; criminal trespass; house
trespass; house trespass in order to commit offence
punishable with death; rioting; rioting armed with
deadly weapon; voluntarily causing hurt; voluntarily
causing hurt by dangerous weapons; voluntarily
_______________________causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons.______
2. The Arms Act, Unlicensed manufacturing, converting or selling or
1878 keeping, offering or exposing for sale, any arms,
ammunition or military stores; unlicensed possession 
of any arms, ammunition or military stores or posses­
sion of arms of any description without license 
_______________________prohibited in certain place.__________________
3. The Explosive 
Substance Act, 
1908
Unlawful and malicious explosion of any explosive 
substance likely to endanger life or to cause serious 
injury to property.
4. The Bangladesh 
Control of Essen­
tial Commodities 
Act, 1956
Contravention (by any person) of the government order 
providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, 
supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities.
5. The Customs Act, 
1969
Acquiring possession of, or in any way concerning in 
carrying, removing, harbouring, keeping or concealing 
or in any manner dealing with any goods unlawfully 
removed from a warehouse, or for which chargeable 
duty was not paid.
6. The Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 
1947
Committing or attempting to commit criminal misconduct 
by any public servant.
*
16. Table VIII has been prepared on the basis of various notifications 
issued by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs in 1976,
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE BUT ONE
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17Table IX
Examples of Cases Transferred from the Courts of Magistrates 
to Special Martial Law Courts
Name, of Law Examples of Offences
1. The Penal Code, Dacoity; dacoity with murder; robbery or dacoity
1860 with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt; making
preparation to commit dacoity; assembling for the
purpose of committing dacoity; dishonestly receiving
property stolen in the commission of a dacoity; 
robbery; voluntarily causing hurt in committing 
robbery; theft; theft in dwelling house; theft after 
preparation made for causing death, hurt or restraint 
in order to commit theft; dishonestly receiving stolen 
property; assault or criminal force in an attempt to 
commit theft of property carried by a person; extor­
tion; voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort 
property or to constrain to an illegal act; murder; 
attempt to murder; culpable homicide not amounting to 
murder; culpable homicide by causing death of person 
other than person whose death was intended; causing 
death by negligence; cheating and dishonestly inducing 
delivery of property; cheating by personation; forgery 
for purpose of cheating; forgery of valuable security, 
will, etc.; using as genuine a forged document; criminal 
breach of trust; criminal breach of trust by clerk or 
servant; criminal trespass; house trespass; house tress­
pass in order to commit offence punishable with death; 
rioting; rioting armed with deadly weapon; voluntarily 
causing hurt; voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous 
weapons; voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
 ___________________weapons._______________________________________________
2. The Arms Act, Unlicensed manufacturing, converting or selling or
1878 keeping offering or exposing for sale, any arms,
ammunition or military stores; unlicensed posses­
sion of any arms, ammunition or military stores or 
possession of arms of any description without
_______________________license prohibited in certain place.__________________
3. The Explosive Unlawful and malicious explosion of any explosive
Substance Act, substance likely to endanger life or to cause serious
1908_______________ iniurv to property.____________________________________
4. The Bangaldesh Contravention (by any person) of the government order
Control of Essen- providing for regulating or prohibiting the production,
tial Commodities supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities.
Act, 1956__________________________________________________________________
5. The Customs Act, Acquiring possession of, or in any way concerning in
1969 carrying, removing, harbouring, keeping or concealing
or in any manner dealing with any goods unlawfully 
removed from a warehouse, or for which chargeable 
__________duty was not paid._____________________________________
6. The Prevention of Committing or attempting to commit criminal misconduct
Corruption Act, by any public servant.
1947
For footnote 17, please see following page.
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The powers of Special Martial Law Courts and Summary Martial 
Law Courts in the matter of trial of any offence under Martial Law 
Regulations or under the ordinary law were co-extensive, but there 
was a restriction on the power of Summary Martial Law Courts in 
respect of passing sentences. Whereas the Special Martial Law Court 
was empowered to pass any sentence authorised by Martial Law Regula­
tions or any other law, the Summary Martial Law Court was given power 
to pass any sentences except the death sentence or sentences of 
transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding five years.
Therefore, as a result of the transfer of some cases of the 
same type to Summary and Special Martial Law Courts, there was every 
chance of variation in respect of sentences that would be passed by 
Summary and Special Martial Law Courts against persons accused of 
similar offences. For example, cases relating to the offence of 
dacoity with murder were transferred both to Summary and Special
16. (continued)
and Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977.
Notification Nos; of 1976: 164-JIV/2T-4/76 (issued on 6 March);
202-JIV/2T-6/76 (issued on 20 March); 256-JIV/2T-3/76
(issued on 21 April); 372-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 5 June); 687-JIV/2T- 
17/76 (issued on 26 August); 700-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 2 September); 
772-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 30 September); 820-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued 
on 16 October); 876-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 10 November).
Notification Nos. of 1977: 322/3/CMLA/1-77 (issued on 22 January); 
322/3/CMLA/2-77 (issued on 10 February); 322/3/CMLA/2-77 (issued 
on 15 March); 322/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 24 March); 322/3/CMLA/
4-77 (issued on 17 April); 322/3/CMLA/5 (issued on 15 May); 322/ 
3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 2 June); 322/3/CMLA/11-77 (issued on 18 November.
17. Table IX has been prepared on the basis of different notifications 
issued by the Ministry of law and Parliamentary Affairs in 1976, and 
by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977. Noti­
fication Nos. of 1976: 162-JIV/2T-2/76 (issued on 5 March); 163-JIV/ 
2T-9/76 (issued on 6 March); 296-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 4 May); 592- 
JIV/2T-9/76 (issued on 27 July); 686-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 26 
August); 766-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 29 September).
Notification Nos. of 1977: 321/3/CMLA/2-77 (issued on 10 February); 
321/3/CMLA/2-77 (issued on 19 February); 321/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 
15 March); 321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 1 May); 321/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued 
on 15 May); 321/3/CMLA/,6-77 (issued on 17 June); 321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issued 
on.4 July); 321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issued on 17 July); 321/3/CMLA/10-77 , 
(issued on 2 November).
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Martial Law Courts; the offence was punishable under Section 396 
of the Bangladesh Penal Code with death, or transportation for life, 
or rigorous imprisonment for a term which could extend to ten years 
and fine. In trying such cases, the Summary Martial Law Court could 
pass the maximum sentence of imprisonment of five years, but the 
Special Martial Law Court could pass death sentences or sentences of 
transportation for life or any sentence of imprisonment exceeding 
five years.
Here it may be recalled that the Martial Law government did 
not provide in any Regulation for Summary Martial Law Courts to refer 
cases to the Special Martial Law Courts when the Summary Martial Law 
Court considered that under the facts and circumstances of a particu­
lar case greater punishment than it was competent to pass was necessary. 
However, between 1976 and 1978, only thirteen cases were transferred 
by the Government/the Chief Martial Law Administrator from Summary or 
Additional Summary Martial Law Courts to Special Martial Law Courts. 
These cases related to the offences under the Penal Code, the Customs
Act, the Arms Act, the Explosive Act, the Special Powers Act and the
18Martial Law Regulations. But in transferring these cases, the con­
sideration was not always that the accused concerned deserved sentences 
of imprisonment exceeding five years which the Summary Martial Law 
Court could not pass. For example, on 30 November 1976, Martial Law
18. Notification Nos.: 250-JIV/2T-10/76 (issued on 19 April 1976); 
370-JIV/2T-14/76 (issued on 3 June 1976); 820-JIV/2T-17/76 
(issued on 16 October 1976); 931-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 30 
November 1976); 972-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 14 December 1976); 
991-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 23 Dec. 1976) (all these notifica­
tions were issued by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs). 
321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issupd on 4 July 1977); 321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issued 
on 17 July 1977); 321/3/CMLA/8-78 (issued on 30 August 1978); 321/ 
3/CMLA/10-78 (issued on 12 October 1978) (the^e notifications 
were issued by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator).
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Case No. 68/76 was transferred from the Summary Martial Law Court, 
Netrokona of Mymensingh District, to Special Martial Law Court No. I, 
Dhaka. This case, which related to the offence of criminal breach 
of trust, was punishable under Section 406 of the Bangladesh Penal 
Code with imprisonment of either description for a term which could 
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Therefore, it is 
evident that the Summary Martial Law Court concerned was quite com­
petent to try the case and to pass necessary sentence as it deemed 
fit. Despite this, the executive order was made to transfer the 
case and it appears that this was done in order to serve government's 
purposes rather than the ends of justice.
However, the transfer of the same class of cases from the Courts 
of Magistrates to both Summary Martial Law Courts and Special Martial 
Law Courts led to different treatment of the persons accused of 
similar offences in respect of legal representation. For example, 
when a case relating to dacoity or attempt to murder was transferred 
to the Summary Martial Law Court, the accused concerned was denied 
the right of defending himself by lawyer as ensured by Section 340(1) 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. But when a similar case was trans­
ferred to the Special Martial Law Court, the accused concerned 
exercised his right of defending by lawyer.
Thus, such an arbitrary transfer of cases from Courts of Magis­
trates to Martial Law Courts ultimately contravened the provisions 
of Article 27 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh which provided 
that "all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal 
protection of law".
19- Notification No. 931-JIV/2T-17/76, issued by the Ministry of Law 
and Parliamentary Affairs on 30 November 1976.
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It seems that the cases relating to certain offences (e.g. cases
relating to dacoity with murder or cases relating to murder punishable
with death or transportation for life, and fine) triable by Courts
of Sessions pending before magistrates for inquiry were transferred
to Martial Law Courts.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the powers of a magistrate
of the first class and the Sessions Court in the matter of trial of
certain offences are concurrent. But there is a restriction on the
power of the, magistrate in respect of awarding sentences. Whereas a
sessions judge or an additional,sessions judge may pass any sentence 
20authorised by law and an,assistant, sessions judge may pass any
sentence authorised by law, except a sentence of death or of imprison-
21ment for a term exceeding seven years, a first class,magistrate may
pass sentences of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years
22and a fine not exceeding one thousand takas. Therefore, when the
niagistrate considers that under the facts and circumstances of the
case, the offender deserves greater punishment, the case is committed
23for trial to the Court of Sessions. As pointed out earlier, a Court
of Sessions does not take cognizance of an offence as a court of
original jurisdiction unless the accused has been committed to it by 
. 24
a competent magistrate. But the government/Chief Martial Law Adminis­
trator transferred cases from the Courts of Sessions not only to 
Special Martial Law Courts but also to Summary Martial Law Courts 
comprised of first class magistrates/majors as detailed in Tables X and XI.
20. Section 31(2), the Criminal Procedure Code.
21. Section 31(3), ibid.
22. Section 32(1), ibid. Here it is to be noted that the Law Reforms
Ordinance, 1978 Ordinance No.XLIX of 1978), issued on 5 December 
1978, authorised a first class Magistrate to pass sentences of
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and a fine not
exceeding five thousand takas.
23. Sections 210 and 213, ibid.
24. Section 193, ibid.
25
Table X
Examples of Cases Transferred from Courts of Sessions 
to Summary Martial Law Courts
Name of Law Examples of Offences
1. The Penal Code, Dacoity; making preparation to commit dacoity;
1860 assembling for purpose of committing dacoity;
dishonestly receiving property stolen in the 
commission of a dacoity; attempt to murder; acts 
done by several persons in furtherance of common 
intention; rioting; rioting armed with deadly 
weapon; every member of unlawful assembly guilty 
of offence committed in prosecution of common object; 
criminal breach of trust; criminal breach of trust 
by carrier; criminal breach of trust by public 
servant or by banker etc.; cheating; cheating by 
personation; cheating and dishonestly inducing 
delivery of property; house trespass; forgery; 
forgery of record of court or of public register, 
etc.; forgery of valuable security, will, etc.; 
forgery for purpose of cheating; using as genuine 
a forged document.
2. The Arms Act, 
1878
Unlicensed manufacturing, converting or selling 
or keeping, offering or exposing for sale, any 
arms, ammunitions or military stores; unlicensed 
possession of any arms, ammunition or military 
stores or possession of arms of any description 
without license prohibited in certain place.
3. The Prevention 
of Corruption 
Act, 1947
Committing or attempting to commit criminal mis­
conduct by any public servant.
4. The Explosive 
Act, 1884
Manufacturing, possessing or importing an explo­
sive in contravention of the government prohibition.
5. The Customs Act, 
1969
Smuggling of goods into or out of Bangladesh.
25. Table X is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977, 
Notification Nos: 322/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 24 March); 322/3/ 
CMLA/4-77 (issued on 17 April); 322/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 5 May); 
322/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 15 May); 322/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 
2 June)i
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Table XI26
Examples of Cases Transferred from Courts of Sessions 
to Special Martial Law Courts
Name of Law Examples of Offences
1. The Penal Code, 
1860
Dacoity; dacoity with murder; robbery or dacoity 
with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt; making 
preparation to commit dacoity; assembling for pur­
pose of committing dacoity; dishonestly receiving 
property stolen in the commission of a dacoity; 
theft; murder; culpable homicide not amounting to 
murder; attempt to murder; acts done by several 
persons in furtherance of common intention; rioting; 
rioting armed with deadly weapon; every member of 
unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in 
prosecution of common object; criminal breach of 
trust; criminal breach of trust by public servant, 
or by banker etc.; cheating by personation; 
cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of pro­
perty; house trespass; forgery; forgery of record 
of court or of public register, etc.; forgery of 
valuable security, will, etc.; forgery for purpose 
of cheating; using as genuine a forged document.
2. The Arms Act, 
1878
Unlicensed manufacturing, converting or selling 
or keeping offering or exposing for sale, any 
arms, ammunitions or military stores; unlicensed 
possession of any arms, ammunition or military 
stores or possession of arms of any description 
without license prohibited in certain place.
3. The Prevention 
of Corruption 
Act, 1947
Committing or attempting to commit criminal 
misconduct by any public servant.
26. Table XI is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs in 1975 and 1976; 
and by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977 
and 1978. Notification Nos. of 1975: 1094-JIV/Sec.-4/75 (issued 
on 2 September); 1143-JIV/Sec.-1/75 (issued on 15 September).
Notification Nos. of 1976: 197-JIV/2T-7/76 (issued on 19 March); 
230-JIV/2T-11/76 (issued on 31 March).
Notification Nos. of 1977: 321/3/CMLA/10-77 (issued on 3 October); 
321/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 15 March); 321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 
17 April); 321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 20 April),; 321/3/CMLA/4-77 
(issued on 1 May); 321/3/CMLA/7-77 (issued on 4 July); 321/3/CMLA/
11-77 (issued on 18 November); 321/3/CMLA/10-77 (issued on 2 November).
Notification No. of 1978: 321/3/CMLA/1-78 (issued on 4 February).
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Tables X and XI show that the same group of cases were somi£U7ne>9 
transferred arbitrarily from the Courts of Sessions to both Special 
Martial Law Courts and Summary Martial Law Courts. Therefore, the 
same criticism which has been made earlier in connection with the 
arbitrary transfer of the same type of cases from Courts of Magistrates 
to Special Martial Law Courts and Summary Martial Law Courts applies 
here, namely, discrimination with regard to legal representation and 
chance of variation in respect of punishment that ultimately contra­
vened the right of equality before the law.
As pointed out earlier, the Special Powers Act, 1974, was 
passed "to provide for special measures for the prevention of certain 
prejudicial activities, for more speedy trial and effective punishment 
of certain grave offences and for matters connected therewith". It 
provided for the creation of a Special Tribunal and stated that "Every 
Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Judge shall,
for the areas within his sessions division, be a Special Tribunal for
27
the trial of offences triable under this Act". A Special Tribunal 
was to try offences specified by the Act, certain offences punishable
under the Penal Code of 1860, offences punishable under the Arms Act,
28 *1878 and the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Later in 1975, its
jurisdiction was extended (by Act I of 1975) to try offences punishable
under any rules made under the Emergency Powers Act, 1975. It was to
take "cognizance of an offence triable under this Act without the
accused being committed to it for trial, but shall not take cognizance
of any such offence except on a report in writing made by a police
29officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector". The Martial Law
27. Section 26(2), the Special Powers Act, 1974.
28. Section 26(1), ibid*
29. Section 27, ibid.
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regime of Bangladesh also arbitrarily transferred the same group 
of cases from Special Tribunals to both Special and Summary Martial 
Law Courts which have been set out in Tables XII and XIII.
3 0
Table XII
Examples of Cases Transferred from Special Tribunals 
to Summary Martial Law Courts
Name of Law Examples of Offences
1. The Penal Code, Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery;
dacoity; dacoity with murder.
2. The Arms Act, Unlicensed manufacturing, converting or selling 
1878 or keeping, offering or exposing for sale, any
arms, ammunition or military stores; unlicensed 
possession of any arms, ammunitions, or military 
stores or possession of arms of any description 
without license prohibited in certain place.
3. The Explosive Manufacturing, possessing, using, selling, trans- 
Act, 1884 porting or importing explosives in breach of
the government rules.
4. The Special Prejudicial act; hoarding or dealing in black 
Powers Act, market; smuggling; adulteration of, or sale of 
1974 adulterated food, drink, drugs or cosmetics.
30. Table XII is prepared on the basis of various notifications issued 
by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs in 1976 and by 
the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977. Noti­
fication Nos. of 1976: 171-JIV/2T-12/76 (issued on 10 March); 
197-JIV/2T-7/76 (issued on 19 March); 635-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued 
on 5 August); 825-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 20 October); 972-JIV/ 
2T-17/76 (issued on 14 December).
Notification Nos. of 1977: 322/3/CMLA/1-77 (issued on 22 January); 
322/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 24 March); 322/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued 
on 17 April); 322/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 5 May); 322/3/CMLA/
5-77 (issued on 15 May).
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Table XIII
Examples of Cases Transferred from Special Tribunals 
to Special Martial Law Courts
Name of Law Examples of Offences
1. The Penal Code, Robbery; voluntarily causing hurt in committing 
1860 robbery; dacoity; dacoity with murder; robbery or
dacoity with attempt to cause death or grievous 
hurt; attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when 
armed with deadly weapon; kidnapping or abducting 
in order to murder; waging or attempting to wage 
war, or abetting waging of war, against Bangla­
desh; collecting arms, etc., with intention of 
waging war against Bangladesh; sedition.
2. The Arms Act, 
1878
Unlicensed manufacturing, converting or selling 
or keeping, offering or exposing for sale, any 
arms, ammunition or military stores; unlicensed 
possession of any arms, ammunitions, or military 
stores or possession of arms of any description 
without license prohibited in certain place.
3. The Special 
Powers Act, 
1974
Prejudicial act; sabotage; hoarding or dealing 
in the black market; ^muggling; counterfeiting 
currency notes and government stamps.
4. The Emergency 
Power Rules, 
1975
Prejudicial act; smuggling; carrying and posses­
sion of arms, ammunition and explosives.
The same criticisms which have been levelled against the trans­
fer of cases from Courts of Magistrates or Sessions to Martial Law 
Courts are applicable to transfer of cases from the Special Tribunals 
to Martial Law Courts.
31. Table XIII is prepared on the basis of various notifications
issued by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs in 1976 
and by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977. 
Notification Nos. of 1976: 96-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 9 February); 
215-JIV/2T-3/76 (issued on 24 March); 248-JIV/1T-4/75 (issued on 
17 April); 295-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 4 May); 297-JIV/2T-17/76 
(issued on 4 May); 325-JIV/2T-10/76 (issued on 12 May); 377-JIV/2T- 
17/76 (issued on 7 June); 382-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 8 June); 489- 
JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 3 July); 514-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 6 
July); 521-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 6 July); 557-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued 
on 16 July); 928-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 29 November); 972-JIV/2T- 
17/76 (issued on 14 December); 991-JIV/2T-17/76 (issued on 23 
December).
Notification Nos. of 1977: 321/3/CMLA/3-77 (issued on 15 March);
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
Since the Special Martial Law Court was empowered to pass any 
sentence including death sentences and sentences of life imprisonment 
and the Summary Martial Law Court was invested with the power of passing 
any sentence except death or imprisonment for a term exceeding five 
years, the transfer of cases from the Special Martial Law Court to 
Summary Martial Law Court, as it was done in 1978, could not be jus­
tified. In February 1978, two Martial Law cases were transferred from
Special Martial Law Court No.II, Dhaka, to Summary Martial Law Court,
32Dhaka. The cases were under Martial Law Regulation No. 19, the Regu­
lation which provided that the persons accused of the offences of 
smuggling would be "punishable with death, or with transportation for 
life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine or to suffer confisca­
tion of the whole or any part of his property". The transfer of these 
two cases from the Special Martial Law Court to Summary Martial Law 
Court deprived the accused of the opportunity of legal representation 
whereas this opportunity of legal representation was recognised in a 
trial before the Special Martial Law Court. On the other hand, as the 
cases of accused were transferred from the Special Martial Law Court 
to Summary Martial Law Court, they were assured of a lesser punishment. 
It is not quite clear as to what the ulterior motives were of the 
executive orders in such transfers.
In total eighty-three cases were transferred from one Special 
Martial Law Court to another Special Martial Law Court from 1976 to
31. (continued)
321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on 17 April); 321/3/CMLA/4-77 (issued on
1 May); 321/3/CMLA/5-77 (issued on 17 May).
32. Notification No. 322/3/CMLA/2-78 issued by the Office of the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator on 10 February 1*978.
1978, out of which eighty were cases under the ordinary law which
had been previously transferred to them for trial. But in transferring
the cases from one Special Martial Law Court to another, no hard and
fast rule was followed. Sometimes cases were transferred from the Special
Martial Law Court of one district to the Special Martial Law Court of 
33another district. Sometimes cases were transferred from the criminal 
courts or Special Tribunal of a district having no Special Martial Law 
Court of its own to the Special Martial Law Court of a neighbouring dis­
trict. Later some of these cases were transferred to the Special Martial 
Law Court of another remote district.^ It seems such transfer orders 
were not expedient for the ends of justice. However, at times a good 
number of ordinary cases were transferred from existing Special Martial 
Law Courts to newly created Special Martial Law Courts. For example, 
the districts of Sylhet and Mymensingh had no Special Martial Law Courts 
of their own. Therefore, some cases under the ordinary law arising in 
Sylhet district were transferred to the Special Martial Law Court No. Ill, 
Comilla and some cases under the ordinary law arising in Mymensingh dis­
trict were transferred to the Special Martial Law Court Nos. I and II, 
Dhaka. But after the setting up of Special Martial Law Court No. IX, 
Sylhet, thirty-nine cases of Sylhet district, which had previously been
transferred to the Special Martial Law Court No. Ill, Comilla, were
35transferred to it on 17 July 1977. Similarly, shortly after the crea­
tion of Special Martial Law Court No. X, Mymensingh, twenty-five cases 
of Mymensingh district which had been formerly transferred to the Special
33. Notification Nos.: 347-JIV/2T-14/76 (issued by the Ministry of Law 
and Parliamentary Affairs on 25 May 1976); 321/3/CMLA/5~7i7 (issued 
by the Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator on 2 June 1977); 
321/3/CMLA/1-78 (issued on 4 February 1978 by the Office of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator). '
34. Notification No. 321/3/CMLA/7-77 issued by the Office of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator on 4 July 1977.
35. Notification No. 321/3/CMLA/7-77 issued by the Office of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator on 17 July 1977.
Martial Law Court Nos. I and II were transferred back on 17 July 1977
36to this newly created Court. Thus, such transfer orders of cases were 
obviously of general convenience to the parties or witnesses concerned.
But later on cases were again transferred from the Special Martial Law 
Court No. X, Mymensingh, to Special Martial Law Court No. I and 11,
37Dhaka by administrative order of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Sometimes the manner in which the cases were transferred from one
Special Martial Law Court to another Special Martial Law Court was very
curious. For example, one case relating to criminal conspiracy and
criminal breach of trust was transferred from the Court of Magistrate,
Daulat Pur Sub-division of Khulna district to Special Martial Law Court
No. II, Dhaka. Later, on 1 April 1976, this case, numbered as Martial
Law case no. 2 of 1976, was transferred to Special Martial Law Court
38No. VI, Jessore. Apparently it might seem that the case was transferred
to this newly-created court for consideration of the general convenience
of the parties or witnesses of the case, as the Special Martial Law
Court No. VI, Jessore, was nearer to the place of origin of the case.
But only one month and nine days later, on 10 May 1976, this case was
again transferred from Special Martial Law Court No. VI, Jessore, to
39Special Martial Law Court No. I, Dhaka. Thus it seems that such 
transfer orders were not made in the interests of justice or for the 
general convenience of the accused and witnesses.
36. Ibid., and Notification No. 321/3/CMLA/7-77 issued by the Office 
of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
37. Notification Nos. 321/3/CMLA/10-77 (issued on 2 November 1977); 
321/3/CMLA/2-78 (issued on 4 March 1978) and 321/3/CMLA/5-78 
(issued on 31 May 1978). These notifications were issued by the 
Office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
38. Notification No. 232-JIV/Sec-l/75 issued by the Ministry of Law 
and Parliamentary Affairs on 1 April 1976.
39. Notification No. 313-JIV/Secret-l/75 issued on id May 1976 by the 
Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs.
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IV. The Functioning of Martial Law Courts
(i) Number of Accused Convicted or Acquitted by Martial Law Courts
In May 1979, the then Home Minister said in Parliament that the
40
number of accused convicted by Martial Law Courts was 2862. Although 
he disclosed the number of the accused convicted by Martial Law Courts, 
he did not state the number of the accused sentenced to death by Special
j Martial Law Courts, or the number of the accused acquitted by Martial
i
41
; Law Courts. According to statistics published in the Bangladesh Press
i
from time to time during the imposition of Martial Law, 47 accused were
42 43sentenced to death, and 271 accused were acquitted of various
charges, including 64 of the charge of murder.
In view of the number of the accused convicted by Martial Law
Courts, it seems that most of the cases tried were ordinary cases
44
transferred to them. As a result of convictions by Martial Law Courts,
40. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 27 May 1979.
41. It seems that the Bangladesh press did not publish the entire figure 
relating to the accused who were sentenced to death or acquitted by 
Martial Law Courts, as the figures given by the Home Minister about 
the number of convicts don't tally with the figures published in 
the press.
42. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 6 December 1975; 21 December 1976; 10 
February, 30 April, 7 May, 2 September, 8 October and 12 December 1977;
3 March, 6 and 18 August 1978. Out of forty-seven persons sentenced
to death, two were sentenced to death for misappropriation of 165 bales 
of cotton yarn worth over taka 8 lakhs, one for joining an insurrection 
and waging war against the Government of Bangladesh, eleven for com­
mitting dacoity with murder and the remaining for the offence of murder.
43. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 26 September, 6, 13 and 25 December 1975;
12, 13, 15 and 17 February 1976; 9, 10, 14, 23 and 31 March 1976; 1, 3, 
8, 9, 17 and 20 April 1976; 1, 4, 16, 20 and 27 May 1976; 1, 3, 4, 8,
17, 23, 28 and 30 June 1976; 29 July 1976; 13 and 20 August 1976; 4, 5, 
7, 15, 17, 22 and 23 September 1976; 17, 20 and 27 October 1976; 14,
16, 24 and 25 November 1976; 15, 23 and 26 December 1976; 26 January 
1977; 6, 16 and 23 February 1977; 2, 4, 6, 11, 18 and 20 March 1977;
6, 9, 24 and 29 April 1977; 7 and 8 May 1977; 17 July 1977; 7 August 
1977; 4 September 1977; 28 December 1977; 3 and 12 March 1978; and 
18 August 1978.
44. The number of cases transferred from criminal courts or Special
Tribunals to Martial Law Courts was 2998. See supra p.211.
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the persons accused of ordinary offences, who ought to have been tried 
before courts of law, could not exercise their normal rights of appeal. 
Even those accused who were sentenced to death by the Special Martial 
Law Courts for offences under the ordinary law were unjustifiably 
deprived of the opportunity to exercise their rights of appeal.
(ii) Some Specific Examples of Trials by Martial Law Courts
(a) A Murder Case Tried by Special Martial Law Court No. II, Dhaka
A case relating to murder tried by the Special Martial Law Court
No. II, Dhaka, will be taken as an example to show the way the dis­
pensation of justice was sometimes carried out.
The Special Martial Law Court No. II convicted and sentenced eight 
persons to death for murdering a man in broad daylight on 26 May 1976
at a public place in Nawabgonj Police Station of Dhaka district. The
Court in its judgment said:
"The murder case took place after the imposition of Martial 
Law in the country when the authority had been frantically 
endeavouring to improve the law and order situation in the 
country. For bringing abnormalcy in the country, the
murderers are to be met with deterrent punishment which
is the normal punishment for this offence. We also do not
find any grounds for the award of any punishment lesser 
than the sentence of death though it is very painful to .‘
award eight death sentences for the murder of one. But 
considering the gravity of the offence and the circumstances 
under which it took place, i.e. a gruesome and cold-blooded 
murder in broad daylight in a public place, such award of 
sentence of death to all 
for the ends of justice"•
It is clear from the above observations that the Martial Law Court itself
was conscious of the harshness of the punishment meted out to the accused.
But the justification offered needs some comment. It is evident that
the convicted persons is essential
45. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 12 October 1978.
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the objectives behind the punishment were to underline the authority 
of the Martial Law regime. It would appear to go beyond the ends of 
justice to impose eight death sentences for one murder. If the motive 
was deterrent, life imprisonment, which is also an alternative punish­
ment or sentence for murder, would have been more in keeping with the 
ends of justice.
(b) The Case of Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed
The trial of Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed was of unusual interest, 
because it was under his leadership that the Armed Forces of Bangladesh 
had seized power on 15 August 1975, and he it was who had placed the 
country under Martial Law and assumed the office of President. It is 
ironical that although Moshtaque in his first address to the Nation a 
few hours after his assumption of the office of President, on 15 August 
1975, declared that his "Government has no compromise with corruption, 
nepotism, or social vices", later, nearly sixteen months after his forced 
resignation as President, he was tried and convicted on the charges of 
corruption and abuse of official position. However, the interesting 
features of this case are that before the trial of Moshtaque took place, 
the Martial Law regime had amended certain existing Martial Law Regula­
tions in a calculated manner in order to fulfil the objective it had 
in mind.
On 8 November 1975, President A.M. Sayem, who replaced Moshtaque 
as President, promised that the General Election would be held before 
the end of February 1977. But later, on 21 November 1976, he announced 
the postponement of the General Election for an indefinite period on 
the grounds that the general public did not want it. In protest Moshtaque,
who had founded a new political party called the Democratic League,
issued a statement, on 26 November 1976, criticisng the postponement
of the election and urging the government to allow open political
activities in the country and to announce a definite date for the
General Election. Three days later, on 29 November 1975, he was
arrested in his village home without any warrant and no reason was
given for his arrest.
Since a person's right of personal liberty cannot be interferred
with by arrest without informing him on what charge or on suspicion of
what crime he is arrested, Moshtaque should have been given the grounds
of his arrest by the person who made the arrest. As Justice Hidayatullah
46observed in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam:
11A warrant of a Court and an order of any authority must show 
on their face the reason for arrest, where there is no such 
warrant order, the person making the arrest must inform the 
reason for his arrest".47 ,
The reason why a person should be given the grounds for his arrest has 
been clearly described by Lord Simonds in the case of Christie v. Leachinsky
"....it is the right of every citizen to be free from arrest 
unless there is in some other citizen, whether a constable 
or not, the right to arrest him....it is the corollary of the 
right of every citizen to be thus free from arrest that he 
should be entitled to resist arrest unless that arrest is 
lawful. How can these rights be reconciled with the pro­
position that he may be arrested without knowing why he is 
arrested? ....Blind unquestioning obedience is the law of 
tyrants and of slaves.... I would, therefore, submit the 
general proposition that it is a condition of lawful arrest, 
that the man arrested should be entitled to know why he is 
arrested, .... This approach to the question has....a double 
support. In the first place, the law requires that, where 
arrest proceeds on a warrant, the warrant should state the 
charge on which the arrest is made, I can see no valid reason 
why this safeguard for the subject should not equally be his
46. All India Reporter, Supreme Court, Vol.LIII, 1966, p.1910.
47. Ibid.. 1917.
48. All English Law Reports, House of Lords, Vol.l, 1947, p.567.
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when the arrest is made without a warrant. The exigency 
of the situation, which justifies or demands arrest 
without a warrant, cannot.... justify or demand either 
a refusal to state the reason of arrest or a mis-statement 
of the reason. Arrested with or without a warrant, the 
subject is entitled to know why he is deprived of his 
freedom, if only in order that he may without a moment's 
delay take such steps as will enable him to regain it. In 
the second place....common justice and common sense required 
that the...(person arrested) should know why he should on 
such and such a day be brought before the King's justices 
at Westmin.ster or wherever it might be....that it is not 
essential condition of lawful arrest that the constable should 
at the time of arrest formulate any charge at all, much less 
the charge which may ultimately be found in the indictment, 
but this, and this only, is the qualification which I would 
impose on the general proposition. It leaves untouched the 
principle, which lies at the heart of the matter, that the 
arrested man is entitled to be told what is the act for which 
he is arrested. The 'charge' ultimately made will depend on 
the view taken by the law of his act'.49
Although clause (2)(d) of Regulation 7, as amended on 1 October 1975 by 
the Martial Law (Second Amendment Regulations, 1975) authorised the 
officer concerned "to arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably 
suspects of having committed any offence punishable under any Martial 
Law Regulation or Order and commit him to such custody as the government 
may, by general or special order, specify", the person so arrested ought 
to have been produced before a Magistrate. As Section 167 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, which was in force and applicable to persons arrested 
both under the ordinary law and Martial Law Regulation, provided that 
"Whenever any person is arrested without a warrant, and detained in 
custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed 
within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 61, and there 
are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well- 
founded, the police officer is required to send a copy of the entries 
in the diary relating to the case along with the accused to the nearest
49. Ibid., pp.574-576.
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Magistrate. The Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded may
authorise the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding
fifteen days in the whole, including one or more remands".
But Moshtaque was not produced before any magistrate after his
arrest. He was brought to the capital Dhaka from his home district
Comilla and lodged in the Central Jail.
Here it is pertinent to note that Moshtaque was arrested on the
very day when the Chief of Army Staff assumed the office of the Chief
Martial Law Administrator replacing President A.M. Sayem. It is said
that this arrest was made on the order of the new Chief Martial Law
50Administrator. As during an interview, President Sayem said that he 
was not at all involved in the decision to arrest Moshtaque, and sub­
sequent to Moshtaque's arrest, he attacked the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator for not consulting him before taking such a step.
President Sayem's version receives support from the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator's own action when one month after the arrest of Moshtaque, 
on 28 December 1976, he issued the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) 
Regulations, 1976 (Regulations No. XXXIII of 1976). This introduced 
substantial changes in certain existing Regulations and law, apparently 
to serve the ulterior motives of the military junta.
This amendment superseded the existing law relating to the accused
/ k
being produced before a Magistrate after his arrest as clause 2(a) added 
to Regulation 7 (which dealt with enquiry and investigation) provided that:
"An officer making an arrest under paragraph 2(d) of Regulation 
shall forthwith inform in writing the Zonal Martial Law Adminis­
trator, within whose jurisdiction the arrest has been made, of 
the facts and circumstances relating to such arrest, and if 
such officer fails to make any report to any Martial Law Court ,
against the person arrested by him within thirty days of the 
arrest he shall order the release of that person from custody
50. The interview with President Sayem took place on 4 October 1984.
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unless he obtains in the meantime from the Zonal Martial Law Adbni-niy>bwto*- 
permission in writing for the keeping of that person in cus­
tody beyond that period".
But there was a condition to the effect that "the Zonal Martial Law Ad­
ministrator may order, subject to such conditions, if any, as he may 
deem fit to specify, the release of any such person from custody at any
time if he is of opinion that it is not necessary for the purpose of
enquiry or investigation to keep that person in custody".
Thus, instead of producing Moshtaque before the magistrate, one month
after his arrest provision was made to the effect that the report in respect of the 
person arrested without warrant on reasonable suspicion of having committed 
any offence punishable under any Martial Law Regulation was to be made to 
the Zonal Martial Law Administrator, who was an integral part of the Mar­
tial Law administration. This new provision did not require the person so 
arrested to be produced before the Zonal Martial Law Administrator.
By the same Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, the
Chief Martial Law Administrator took the power of constituting the Martial
51Law Courts which had previously belonged to the,government. Regulation 
4(2), which provided for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal from the de­
cision of Special Martial Law Court which was not unanimous, was amended
52and the right even to this limited appeal was abolished. Although the
provision for review of the judgment of Special Martial Law Courts was
not changed, the review body was changed: the Chief Martial Law Administra-
*
53tor was substituted for the government as the reviewing authority. Along 
with these amendments, 'President' was included in the category of per­
sons mentioned in Regulation 11 against whom cases of corruption and
54criminal misconduct could be instituted.
51. Section 2 of the Martial Law (Twenty-third Amendment) Regulations, 
1976, Regulations No. XXXIII of 1976.
52. Section 4, ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Section 6, ibid.
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In summary, the position was that cases of corruption and criminal 
misconduct could be instituted against a person who had previously held 
the office of President. A Special Martial Law Court could be constituted 
by the Chief Martial Law Administrator with two of the three members, in­
cluding the dhairman, from the defence forces according to his own choice.
The right of limited appeal, against a decision of the Special Martial Law 
Court which was not unanimous, was now taken away altogether. The Chief 
Martial Law Administrator himself had the power to review the judgments 
of Special Martial Law Courts.
The Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976,were issued, 
as pointed out earlier, on 28 December 1976. The very next day, First Informa­
tion Reports in two cases were filed against Moshtaque on charges of corrup­
tion, favouritism, nepotism and abuse of official position under Regulation 
5511. This immediate lodging of First Information Reports after the promul­
gation of the said Regulation reveals that the Martial Law regime proceeded 
to prosecute Moshtaque in a calculated and pre-determined way.
Although there were two Special Martial Law Courts at Dhaka estab- 
)
lished by the government, the Chief Martial Law Administrator on 18 January 
1977 set up a third one in spite of the fact that there were thirteen dis­
tricts which had no Special Martial Law Court at all. This third Martial 
Law Court at Dhaka, called Special Martial Law Court No.VIII, Dhaka, tried 
the three cases relating to Moshtaque. Here it may be recalled that one 
Colonel, instead of a Sessions Judge, was appointed to head this Special 
Martial Law Court while a Lieutenant Colonel and a First Class Magistrate 
were to act as its members.^
Only one day after the constitution of this Special Martial Law Court, 
on 19 January 1977, a charge sheet was submitted in Martial Law Case No.l of
1977 and on 17 February 1977 a charge sheet was submitted in Martial Law
*
Case No.3 of 1977.
55. The BangAldesh Times, Dhaka, 30 December 1976.
56. See supra, p. 204.
The newly-created Special Martial Law Court No. VIII, Dhaka, 
began hearing the Martial Law Case No. 1 of 1977 against Moshtaque 
on 7 February 1977. In this case, the allegations against Moshtaque 
were that during his tenure of office as President, he had various 
construction works, including electric installations and the sinking 
of deep tube walls, done in his paternal village house at Daspara, 
Police Station,Daudkandi of Comilla district and in his private rest 
house at neighbouring Sandal Pur (maintained by his private family 
trust) at cfovernment expense. He was alleged to have abused his offi­
cial position by causing the sale of valuable construction materials 
like marble stones and Burma teak wood from the government stores (on 
credit-sale basis) at a much lower rate than the prevailing market 
price and utilised government men and materials for the construction 
works. It was further alleged that during his tenure Moshtaque as 
Minister for Commerce and Foreign Trade from 19 February 1974 to 14 
August 1975, passed orders for the supply of furniture (worth taka 
39,900) from the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh free of cost and 
it was taken to his private rest house. Thus he obtained pecuniary
advantage of a total sum of Taka 6,44,655by corrupt and illegal means
' 5 7resulting in economic and financial loss to the state.
In this case, the accused Moshtaque contended that these alle­
gations were maliciously false and fabricated; he pleaded not guilty.
He submitted his explanation under Section 342 of the Criminal Pro­
cedure Code in a written statement. The Court heard the case for ten 
days and examined seventy-two prosecution witnesses and delivered the 
judgment on 24 February 1977. It found Moshtaque guilty of the charges 
brought against him.
57. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 20 January 1977 and 9 February 1977.
The offenders convicted of offences of corruption and criminal 
misconduct under Regulation 11 were punishable "with death, or with 
transportation for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine or 
to suffer confiscation of the whole or any part of his property".
But Moshtaque was sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and 
to pay a fine of Taka one lakh, and in default to suffer rigorous 
imprisonment for another one year. The Court in its brief judgment 
in Dhaka said that though Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed was a former mem­
ber of Parliament, Cabinet Minister and President of the Republic, he 
indulged in corruption; and abuse of power, and as such deserved deter­
rent and exemplary punishment. However, it took a lenient view in 
consideration of his contribution both during and after the War of
Liberation and his old age and therefore sentenced him to five years
58rigorous imprisonment only.
In connection with Martial Law Case No. 3 of 1977, Moshtaque was
I
produced before the Special Martial Law Court No. VIII on March 12 1977.
He pleaded not guilty to the charges of corruption and abuse of official
position brought against him. The prosecution case was that Moshtaque
Ahmed, while he was a Minister for Commerce and Foreign Trade, illegally
issued import licenses worth Taka 60,28,340 to certain new commercial
importers and actual users for which there was no provision in the im-
60port policy for the relevant shipping periods, and thereby harmed 
the economic and financial interests of the State.
58. Ibid, 25 February 1977.
59. Here it is to be noted that in Martial Law Case No. 2 of 1977, the 
Special Martial Law Court No. VIII acquitted Moshtaque of the 
charges of corruption and abuse of official position.
60. The Bangaldesh Times, Dhaka, 15 March 1977. ’
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The hearing on the case began on 14 March 1977 and the Court
examined ninety-seven prosecution witnesses during the eleven days
of hearing, ~3he Court in its judgment (delivered on 31 March 1977)
said that "it has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the
accused Moshtaque Ahmed abused his official position by corrupt or
illegal means and has obtained valuable property or pecuniary advantage
for himself or for other persons. He has thus caused prejudice to the
economic or financial interests of the state and thereby committed an
offence punishable under Regulation Eleven of Martial Law Regulation
61One of 1975 as amended" on 28 December 1976. Therefore, it sentenced 
Moshtaque to three years’ rigorous imprisonment with the direction that 
this sentence would run concurrently with the sentence (i.e. five years 
rigorous imprisonment) passed in Martial Law Case No. 1 of 1977. The 
Court, however, said that though Moshtaque Ahmed was a "prominent 
public leader and a minister he unfortunately indulged himself in 
such illegal activities which were not expected out of him. The Court 
takes a lenient view in punishing the accused, considering his services 
rendered to the nation during the War of Liberation and also considering 
his old age."^
The Special Martial Law Court in both the judgments recorded that 
the proceedings of the cases be submitted to the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator for review as required under Regulation 4(3) of the 
Martial Law Regulations No. 1 of 1975 as amended on 28 December 1976.
The record of the Martial Law Cases Nos. 1 and 3 were sent to the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator soon after the passing of judgments, i.e. 
after 24 February and 31 March 1977 respectively.
61. Ibid., 1 April 1977.
62. Ibid.
1
Here it may be recalled that on 28 December 1976 the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator replaced the government as the reviewing 
authority in respect of the proceedings of Special Martial Law Courts, 
and on 4 June 1977 the power of review reverted back to the government. 
Yet the review of Moshtaque Ahmed's cases was not done by the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator during his tenure (until 4 June 1977) as 
the reviewing authority. Ultimately the government reviewed the 
matter and upheld the conviction of the accused in both the cases.
It passed the order of review on 6 October 1977 in Martial Law Case 
No. 1, nearly seven and a half months after the trial. Even the 
order of this belated review was never communicated to Moshtaque.
Later on, on taking a certified copy of the order-sheet of the case, 
he came to learn about the review.
In contrast, this did not happen in Martial Law Case No. 37 of 
1978, in which Ehteshamuddin Ahmed was tried by the Special Martial 
Law Court No. II, Dhaka, on a charge under Section 302 of the Bangladesh 
Penal Code on the allegation of murdering his wife. The Court sentenced 
him to death on 5 August 1978 and thereafter the proceedings were sub­
mitted to the government for review and the result of the review was
63communicated on 29 August 1978. This discriminatory treatment be­
tween the convicts suggests how there was an ulterior motive of the 
Martial Law regime in dealing with Moshtaque.
The manner of disposal of review in the case of Moshtaque shows 
the absence of the application of judicial mind by the government in 
disposing of the matter as it was done in a highly condensed manner 
in spite of voluminous evidence. "So many witnesses have been examined 
in these cases, but without referring to anything whatsoever, only in
63. Ehteshamuddin V. Bangladesh, and others, Dhaka Law Reports, 
Appellate Division, Vol. XXXIII, 1981, pp.156, 158.
three pages the orders of review have been passed stating that there
is nothing to interfere with the judgment of the Special Martial Law 
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Court.” Whereas in the case of Ehteshamuddin, review was done
by the government elaborately in twenty-nine pages, which evoked a 
favourable comment by two judges of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court. Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury said:
"....We have gone through the twenty-nine pages of the 
review note and we are fully satisfied that the review 
was done fairly and justly".65
Another Justice, Rahul Islam, went so far as to say with regard to the 
order of review passed in the case of .Ehteshamuddin:
"The note (of review) is so elaborate and contains full 
discussions on point of fact and law, it could very ^  
well be termed as a well written judgment by a Court”.
Therefore, it appears that in the case of Moshtaque there was no 
proper review.
The political observers of Bangladesh contended that the ulterior
motive that induced the junta to try Moshtaque was political. In
their view, the charges which were brought against him could be brought
against any person of Bangladesh who had held any high post in the
67
administration of the country. It is widely believed that the trial 
of Moshtaque was held to eliminate him from the political field as he 
was considered by the Chief Martial Law Administrator a formidable 
candidate for Presidency, who after the conviction of Moshtaque in 
April 1977 assumed the office of President replacing A.M. Sayem
64. As defence lawyer M.H. Khandker argued in the case of Khandaker 
Moshtaque Ahmed v. Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka Law Reports,
High Court Division Vol. XXXIII, 1981, p.357.
65. Ehteshamuddin v. Bangladesh, Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate 
Division, Vol. XXXIII, 1981, p.174.
66. Ibid, p.161.
67. in an interview, this view was expressed by a retired major-general 
who was very much involved in the 1975 Martial Law administration 
and had been a minister. But he declined to be identified.
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and who later in June 1978 contested the election for the office of 
President and was elected. Many critics of Martial Law justice ex­
pressed the view that in a major political trial like Moshtaque's, 
the sentence to be passed by the Martial Law Court is determined long 
before the trial starts and that the holding of the trial is no more 
than the completion of necessary formalities.
Nearly eight months after the withdrawal of Martial Law, on 
3 December 1979, writ petitions were filed in the High Court Division 
of the Supreme Court against two judgments of Special Martial Law 
Court No. VIII, Dhaka, and against the review made by the government.
It was stated in the writ petition that the arrest of Moshtaque was 
made simultaneously with the assumption of the office of the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator by the then Chief of Army Staff, that the 
amendments of Regulation 4 (withdrawing appeal to the Appellate Tribunal
in cases where the Special Martial Law Court would be divided in opinion,
I
replacing the government by the Chief Martial Law Administrator as the 
authority for review) and Regulation 11 (purporting to include President 
within the mischief of Regulation 11) were effected immediately after 
the arrest of Moshtaque by the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) 
Regulations, 1976, Regulations No. XXXIII of 1976 on 28 December 1976. 
These amendments, as it was contended by the petitioner, clearly indicated 
that there was manoeuvring for power, that they were being taken in a 
calculated manner to entangle the petitioner and to ensure his elimina­
tion from the field of political activity, by keeping him behind bars.
The Advocate for the petitioner argued that the amendment of Regulation 
No. 11 of 1975 by the Martial Law Regulations No. XXXIII of 1976, intro­
ducing "President" in the category of persons to be covered by the said 
Regulation, was mala fide.
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Justice A.W. Chowdhury of the High Court Division, who delivered 
the judgment of the Court rejected the contention that the subsequent 
inclusion of the word "President" in Martial Law Regulation 11 can be 
termed as mala fide:
"But merely because of the fact that the President was 
excluded from Regulation No. 11 at the inception, it 
cannot be said that the subsequent inclusion of President 
in the said Regulation No. 11 is mala fide. Moreover, 
the validity of a law shall not depend upon the mala 
fide or bona fide of a law"*^®
But after considering the other grievances of the petitioner, the learned 
Justice held:
" When the petitioner was arrested there was no charge 
against the petitioner under Regulation No. 11. F.I.R.
(First Information Report) was lodged after a month of 
his arrest. Regulation No. 11 of Martial Law Regulation 
No. I of 1975 was amended afterwards. From these facts 
it may appear that the amendment of Regulation 11 by 
M.L.R. (Martial Law Regulation)XXXIII of 1975 to include 
the 'President' was mala fide. These facts however 
colourful and mala fide might be, this court cannot go 
into that question in view of the fact that Martial Law 
Regulations by which the amendments have been made to 
implicate the President in an offence under Regulation 11 
are immune from challenge in any court. These Martial Law 
Regulations or for that matter any Proclamations, Martial 
Law Regulations and Orders are protected from challenge or 
scrutiny by any court in view of the provisions of Articles 
(d), (e) and (g) of Proclamation dated 20th August 1975.... 
since the law cannot be struck down on the ground of mala
fide, we do not find that the trial and convictions of the
petitioner are without any jurisdiction",^
Thereafter, with regard to the contention that the review orders made in
respect of the cases of Moshtaque did not show the application of the
mind of the reviewing authority, the learned Judge observed:
68. Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed v. Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka Law 
Reports, High Court Division, Vol. XXXIII, 1981, p.355.
69. Ibid., p.355.
"We, however, think that in reviewing the judgments of 
the Martial Law Courts the Government should exercise 
its judicial mind that should be apparent on the review 
order passed by thp Government and that is absent in 
the present cases".70
Therefore, it appears that the learned Justice was convinced, in view
of the sequence of events, that the amendments concerned and the pro-
71
ceedings were initiated mala fide and the review was not carried 
out properly. But he failed to provide a remedy by quashing the 
conviction. Since "the judicial mind having swung in the facts and 
circumstances of the case to the.extent that the proceedings were 
taken mala fide and in colourable exercise of power, the inevitable
7;
inferential consequence was to record the quashment of the conviction". 
It is true that the Superior Courts cannot call in question the validity 
of Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders. But mala fide pro­
ceedings are not immune from the scrutiny of the Superior Courts not­
withstanding any ouster clause in any Proclamation or Martial Law
73
Regulation. As in the case of the State v. Zia-ur Rahman, Chief 
Justice Hamoodur Rahman of Pakistan observed that:
70• Ibid., p .358.
71. "Mala fide literally means 'in bad faith'. Action taken in bad 
faith is usually action taken maliciously in fact, that is to 
say, in which the person taking the action does so out of personal 
motives either to hurt the person against whom the action is 
taken or to benefit oneself. Action taken in colourable exercise 
of powers, that is to say, for collateral purposes not authorised 
by the law under which the action is taken or action taken in 
fraud of the law are also mala fide". Chief Justice Hamoodur 
Rahman in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad.
All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol. XXVI, 1974, p.170.
72. Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court in the case of Khandaker Moshtaque v. Bangladesh, 
Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol. XXXIV, 1982, p.234.
73. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol. XXV, 1973, p.49.
"A mala fide act stands in the same position as an act done 
without jurisdiction, because, no Legislature when granting 
a power to do an act can possibly contemplate the perpetra­
tion of injustices by permitting the doing of that act mala 
fide .... Acts done mala fide .... would clearly not be acts 
'duly done' and, therefore, the protection would not extend 
to such acts".74
A similar view was expressed in 1965 by Justice Kaikaus of Pakistan in
75
the case of Mohammad Jamil Asghar v. the Improvement Trust:
"However, with respect to mala fides the jurisdiction of the 
civil court can never be taken away for a mala fide act 
is in its very nature an illegal and void act and the civil 
court can always pronounce an act to be mala fide and 
therefore void".76
To the same effect, there was also a decision of the Appellate Division
of the Bangladesh Supreme Court in the case of Ehteshamuddin v .
77Bangladesh:
"...when a proceeding or an action taken under the Martial 
Law Regulation is challenged on the ground of .... mala 
fide, the Superior Court in exercise of its writ juris- ^  
diction is competent to make the necessary declaration...."
Moshtaque filed appeals against the judgments of the High Cou^t Division 
in the Writ Petitions (Nos. 928 and 929 of 1979) before the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division allowed the 
appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court Division, and the 
Special Martial Law Court and the review order of government. The 
orders of conviction passed on Moshtaque were quashed.
Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury of the Appellate Division, 
who delivered the judgment of the Court, accepts the grievances of 
the appellant with regard to the amendments of Regulations 4 and 11 of 
Martial Law Regulations No. I of 1975 when he observes:
74. Ibid. , pp.89-89.
75. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, 1965, p.698.
76. Ibid., p.704.
77. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol. XXXIII, 1981, p.154.
78. Ibid., p.170.
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" Sequence of events show that the arguments of the learned 
Advocate (of the appellant) that all steps were being taken 
'in a calculated manner' .... and the machinery 'so organised 
according to the choice of the then Chief Martial Law Adminis­
trator' and the constitution of Martial Law Court 'that two 
of the members including the Chairman from the Army and of 
his own choice and the Chief Martial Law Administrator himself 
would review the judgment of such a Court' gives the impression 
that the celebrated principle .... that justice should not 
only be done but appear to have been done was not kept in 
view .... It is further to be observed that all these pro­
visional changes were made not by ordinary legislation process 
but by Martial Law Regulation which are but executive decree
of the head of the Government. The materials on record reveal
that all those changes were brought out to achieve a direct 
purpose of debarring the appellant from elective political 
activities.". 79
Thus the learned Justice, in effect, accepted the observation of Chief
80Justice Lord Hewart in Rex v. Sussex:
" ....a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of 
some importance but is of fundamental importance that 
justice should not only be done but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done .... Nothing is to
be done which creates even a suspicion that there has ^  
been an improper interference with the course of justice".
However, the learned Justice was convinced with regard to the complaints 
of Moshtaque that proceedings against him were initiated mala fide.
As he held:
"that the apprehension of the appellant that the proceedings 
have been initiated mala fide cannot be brushed aside. The 
learned Judges of the High Court Division thus have veered 
round this view .... The appellant has by affidavit clearly 
set out the particulars to build up his arguments on mala fide 
and these particulars are difficult to be assailed by the 
respondent .... The cumulative effect of these particulars 
lead to irresistible conclusion that the proceedings were 
instituted with ulterior purpose and such proceeding is mala 
fide .... the circumstances adds to the dimension of the 
contention that the arrest and subsequent proceeding was
79. Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed v. Bangladesh, Dhaka Law Reports, 
Appellate Division, Vol. XXXIV, 1982, pp.230-231.
80. The Law Reports, King's Bench Division, Vol. 1, 1924, p.256.
81. Ibid., p.259.
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mala fide. Power has not been given to exercise it 
illegally or with mala fide intention. Mala fide action 
do not get any protection from a Court of Law. The learned 
Judges of the High Court Division having come up to this 
point felt short of giving the remedy which inferentially 
leads to irresistible conclusion, namely, the quashment 
of the conviction. Since the conviction is to be quashed 
it is needless to go into the second point whether the 
review was done in accordance with law. Suffice it to say 
that the review was not done by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator who was the reviewing authority till 6.6.1977.
The only inference that can be drawn by such belated review 
by an authority e.g., the Government when the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator was the designated authority is that the 
apprehension of the accused that the proceedings have been 
initiated mala fide cannot be repudiated".62
Therefore, it is evident that the learned Judge has quashed the conviction 
in spite of the ouster provision in Martial Law Regulation 4(9), not on 
the ground that the Special Martial Law Court No. VIII in trying or 
convicting Moshtaque acted without jurisdiction or that the Court was 
not properly constituted or acted mala fide, but on the ground that 
the initiation of the proceeding was mala fide. Thus he accepted the 
traditional view that proceedings initiated mala fide are not saved 
from the scrutiny of the Courts by any ouster clause. Here it is to 
be noted that neither the High Court Division nor the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court entered into the question of whether the Special Mar­
tial Law Court No. VIII was justified in convicting Moshtaque on the 
charges brought against him in view of the evidence adduced. Perhaps
it did not do so in view of the decision of the Lahore High Court of
83
Pakistan in the case of Manzoor Elahi v. the State, wherein it was 
held that "this (the High) Court will have no jurisdiction to determine 
whether or not a finding, judgment or order of a Military Court was
82. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol. XXXIV, 1982, pp.235-237.
83. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol. XI, 1959, p.243.
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justified .... It is,.however, undeniable that, if it cannot be found 
that the order of the .... Military Court is without jurisdiction, no 
court of ordinary jurisdiction including this (the High) Court will 
have jurisdiction to declare that order to be incorrect in spite of 
the fact that the findings given by the Military Court were full of 
gross and inexplicable errors of any dimension or the sentence is con­
sidered to be of a severity which appeared to be uncalled for. The 
question whether the evidence before the .... Military Court justified
the conviction .... would not be open to determination by (the High)
84
Court ".
It is interesting to note that the Appellate Division of the Bangla­
desh Supreme Court asserted itself after the withdrawal of Martial Law 
and the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman, on 17 February 1982, 
when it gave the judgment that the proceedings against Moshtaque were 
initiated mala fide and on that basis quashed his conviction.
(c) The Trial of Eric N. Ford
The facts of the case in short are: Eric N. Ford was the commission 
agent of one accused Bodiur Rahman who was a clearing agent. Bodiur 
Rahman, along with his two sons who were also clearing agents, was pro­
secuted by a Summary Martial Law Court of Chittagong consisting of a 
First Class Magistrate in Case No. 1398 of 1976 (under Sections 419/420 
of the Penal Code, Section 156 of the Sea Customs Act read with Special 
Powers Act and Martial Law Regulation No. 10, 11 and 19 of Regulations 
I of 1975) for the possession of certain articles, including antiques,
84. Ibid.. pp.246-247.
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for alleged smuggling. In the charge-sheet submitted against them 
by the police officer concerned under Regulation 3, Eric N. Ford 
was cited,as prosecution witness No. 13 in the trial before the 
Summary Martial Law Court. After the completion of the examination- 
in-chief and cross-examination of Ford as prosecution witness, the 
Summary Martial Law Court by an order converted him from the position 
of witness to that of an accused, tried and convicted him.
It is to be noted here that although, under Section 190 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate can convert a witness into an
accused by taking a fresh cognizance of the case in question, no such
power was given to any Martial Law Court by any Martial Law Regulation. 
Under Regulation 3, a Martial Law Court could take cognizance of any 
case only upon a report in writing made by a relevant officer. Since 
Ford was never named either in the First Information Report or in the 
Charge-Sheet by the police officer concerned as an accused in the case 
under trial before the said Summary Martial Law Court, and instead he 
was cited as a witness in the Charge-Sheet for the prosecution, the 
Court had no lawful authority to try him. A first class magistrate 
sitting in the Summary Martial Law Court could not exercise his ordinary 
jurisdiction as magistrate.
(d) A Review Case
Here it may be recalled that the Sessions Judges were empowered 
to carry out reviews of the cases tried by Summary Martial Law Courts. 
The Sessions Judge of Bakergonj district in Martial Law Review Case 
No. 68 of 1978 converted a finding of acquittal passed by the Summary
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Martial Law Court into one of conviction although he was not given 
any such power under Regulation 4(5). Apart from the lack of juris­
diction, the manner in which the same Sessions Judge recorded different 
findings on two different occasions in the same case is very curious.
The facts of the case are as follows: One Murtaza Ali was con­
victed by the Summary Martial Law Court, Bakergonj (in Martial Law 
Case No. 28 of 1977) and sentenced under Regulation No. 11 for corruption 
and misconduct to suffer imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine 
of Taka2,00Q and in default to suffer a further imprisonment of three 
months. The Sessions Judge of Bakergonj, on review, set aside this 
sentence and sent the case back for retrial under the amended Regula­
tion 4(5) on the ground that there was nothing in the judgment of the 
Summary Martial Law Court which could warrant the conviction of the 
accused. Subsequently, on retrial, the Summary Martial Law Court 
found the accused, on the basis of the evidence already adduced earlier, 
not guilty of the charges and, as such, passed the order of acquittal 
on 6 March 1978. This time the same Sessions Judge passed the order 
on 13 July 1978 setting aside the decision of the Summary Martial Law 
Court and converted this subsequent finding of acquittal into one of 
conviction and sentenced the accused to the earlier sentence that had 
been passed by the Summary Martial Law Court in the first instance. It 
is not clear as to what caused the same Sessions Judge subsequently to 
find the accused guilty and to convert the order of acquittal into a 
conviction when the Summary Martial Law Court on retrial had based his 
finding upon the self-same evidence already adduced earlier.
249
Although under the Criminal Procedure Code there is no pro­
vision for review, there is power of revision and appeal. Even under 
the Criminal Procedure Code, the court can convert a finding of
acquittal into one of conviction only while exercising its appellate 
85jurisdiction, and cannot exercise such power while acting in its
86revisional jurisdiction. Obviously the Sessions Judge was not 
exercising his appellate jurisdiction; rather he was discharging his 
duties as a reviewing authority in respect of any sentence passed by 
the Summary Martial Law Court by virtue of Regulation 4(5) as amended 
on 14 November 1977 by the Martial Law (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Regu­
lations, 1977. Although this Regulation empowered a Sessions Judge, 
on review, "to set aside, vary or modify any order, judgment or sen­
tence or make orders for retrial or such other orders as he deems 
necessary for the ends of justice", no specific power was given to 
the Sessions Judge to convert a finding of acquittal into one of con­
viction while reviewing an order, judgment and sentence passed by a 
Summary Martial Law Court. Therefore, it is clear that the Sessions 
Judge had no jurisdiction to convert an acquittal into a conviction.
Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it can be said that when 
Martial Law is declared in time of peace and the ordinary criminal 
courts are allouMd to continue their functions, the setting up of Martial 
Law Courts to try offenders is unjustified. But the Martial Law regime
85. Section 423(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
86. Section 439(4) fo the Criminal Procedure Code.
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of Bangladesh established Martial Law Courts as an almost inevitable 
incident of the resort to Martial Law, declared under the common law 
doctrine of necessity to restore law and order. Most of the Special 
Martial Law Courts were composed of majority members from the armed 
forces and the single member-Summary Martial Law Court sometimes con­
sisted of army majors, who had no experience whatsoever in the adminis­
tration of criminal justice. The jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal 
courts was interfere with. The cases under ordinary law were un­
justifiably transferred from the criminal courts and Special Tribunals, 
which were open and functioning effectively, to the Martial Law Courts 
and this was done in an arbitrary manner. At the same time, the same 
group of cases was transferred from the criminal courts and Special 
Tribunals to both Summary Martial Law Courts and Special Martial Law 
Courts without any set standards or criteria which resulted in different 
treatments of the same type of cases or accused. Thus persons charged 
with ordinary crimes were deprived of the benefits (e.g. the right of 
appeal; the right of legal representation, if tried by a Summary Martial 
Law Court) of a civil trial. It would have been in line with the norms 
of justice if the ordinary cases had not been transferred to the Martial 
Law Courts. However, since the duties of the armed forces were to 
suppress and subdue the armed opponents of the state, the transfer of 
cases under the Arms Act, the Explosive Act, the Explosive Substance 
Act could be said to have some justification. As Justice Ataullah 
Sajjad said, "Any trial of a citizen by a Military Tribunal should be
relatable to the maintenance and discipline of the Armed Forces and
87other matters connected therewith."
87. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol. XXIV, 1972, p.402.
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CHAPTER V 
Martial Law Tribunals
Apart from the establishment of Special and Summary Martial Law 
Courts, the Martial Law Government of Bangladesh also set up Special 
Martial Law Tribunals in 1976 and Martial Law Tribunals in 1977. The
Regulations under which these tribunals were established are:
I. The Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976 
(Martial Law Regulation No.XVI of 1976); and
II. The Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977 
(Martial Law Regulation No.V of 1977).
I. The Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976
Ten months after the proclamation of Martial Law, on 14 June 1976, 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator, President A.M. Sayem, promulgated 
the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976. This Regulation 
laid down provisions for the constitution, jurisdiction, power and 
procedure of a Special Martial Law Tribunal.
(i) The Constitution of the Special Martial Law Tribunal
Regulation 3(1) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976, 
empowered the government to constitute, by issuing a notification in the 
official Gazette, Ha Special Martial Law Tribunal...for the whole of 
Bangladesh0. The tribunal was to consist of a chairman and four other 
members to be appointed by the government.* The chairman of the tribunal 
was to be appointed from among the officers of the Bangladesh army not 
below the rank of colonel. Of the four other members, one whs to be 
appointed from among the officers of the Bangladesh navy not below the rank 
of commander, one from among the officers of the Bangladesh air force not
1. Regulation 3(2), the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976
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below the rank of wing-commander and the remaining two were to be
• 2first-class magistrates.
Thus the majority of the members of the tribunal (three out of five
members, including the chairman) were officers of the armed forces who
had no legal training or experience. Although two of the members were
magistrates, no provision was made to include any member from the Judiciary
3
as had been done in the case of the Special Martial Law Court.
However, the fact that the majority of the members of the tribunal was 
from the armed forces carried the risk of miscarriages of justice, as 
such officers were part and parcel of the Martial Law Administration or 
the Executive.
(ii) The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Regulation 3(4) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation
invested the tribunal with the power to try any offence, whether committed
before or after 14 June 1976, punishable -
4 5
(A) Under ChaptersVI or VII of the Penal Code, 1860;
(B) Under the Army Act, 1952, the Air Force Act, 1953,
the Navy Ordinance, 1961, or any rules or regulations made 
thereunder; or
6 7(C) Under Regulations 13 or 17 of the Martial Law Regulations,
1975 (RegulationsNo.I of 1975).
Moreover, the tribunal was empowered to try such other offences as were
punishable under any other Martial Regulation or law for the time being
in force as the government might direct by order in writing.
2. Regulation 3(3), ibid.
3. See supra, Chapter III, pp.157-160.
4. Chapter VI of the Penal Code deals with offences against the state.
5. Chapter VII of the Penal Code deals with offences against the army, 
navy and air force.
6. Regulation 13 provides penalty for inciting the defence service
towards mutiny.
7. Regulation 17 deals with prejudicial acts.
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It is to be noted that such a tribunal with such extensive 
jurisdiction was never provided for before by any other Martial Law 
Regulation in the history of Martial Law administration of the subcontinent. 
It. seems that in order to try army, air force and navy personnel as well 
as civilians by a single tribunal for similar offences, the promulgation 
of a Regulation such as the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976, 
was a necessity.
(iii) The Power and Procedure of the Tribunal
(a) The Initiation of Proceedings
Regulation 4(1) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation 
embodied the conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings before 
the tribunal. It provided that "The Tribunal shall take cognizance of 
an offence on a report in writing made by a police officer not below the 
rank of Inspector". But there was a priviso to the effect that "no 
report under this Regulation shall be made by a police officer except 
with the prior permission of the Government".
g
Thus like Martial Law Courts, the tribunal was to take cognizance 
upon a report of the officer concerned. Unlike the Criminal Procedure
9
Code, Regulation 4(1) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation 
provided only one procedure for taking cognizance of an offence, namely, 
upon a report made by a police officer not below the rank of inspector.
It. is noticeable that although the tribunal was empowered to try any 
offence punishable under the Army Act, the Air Force Act, the Navy 
Ordinance and the Martial Law Regulations, no member of the armed forces 
was given the power of making a report before it. However, an officer 
of the armed forces had been given the power of making a report before the 
Martial Law Courts in respect of Martial Law o f f e n c e s . T h u s  it is clear
8. See supra, Chapter III, p.168.
9. Ibid'
10. Ibid.
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that Regulation 4(1) provided a very limited scope for the purpose of 
taking cognizance of an offence triable by the tribunal.
(b) Times and Places of the Sittings of the Tribunal
Regulation 4(2) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation 
provided: "The Tribunal may sit at such times and places as the Government
may direct..."
Thus this Regulation was virtually a reproduction of the provisions 
contained in Regulation 3(4)** of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975.
(c) Trial in Camera
The Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976, also provided
for trial in camera. It stipulated that "if the chairman so decides,
12the Tribunal shall sit in camera".
"Where the Tribunal sits in camera, the Chairman of the 
Tribunal may require any person attending or otherwise 
participating in the conduct of the trial to make an 
oath of secrecy that he will not disclose anything that 
has come to his knowledge in, or in connection with 
such trial; and disclosure of any information in 
contravention of the oath shall be punishable with fine 
and with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
three years.
These provisions relating to trial in camera were almost identical
with those of the Martial Law (Nineteenth Amendment) Regulations, 1976,
14
and the Martial Law (Twenty-First Amendment) Regulations, 1976.
Therefore, the discussion which has been made earlier in connection with
15the trial in camera by Special Martial Law Courts applies here.
11. See supra, Chapter III, p. 172.
12. Regulation 4(2), The Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976.
13. Regulation 4(10), ibid.
14. See supra, Chapter III, p. 173.
15. Ibid. PP, 173-V7h
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(d) Continuation of Trial in the Absence of Some 
Members of the Tribunal
Regulation 4(3) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation 
provided:
"If, in:.the course of a trial, not more than two 
members, other than the Chairman, of the Tribunal 
are, for any reason, unable to attend any sitting 
thereof, the trial may continue before the other 
three members, including the Chairman".
Thus the chairman's presence at the Special Martial Law Tribunal 
was a sine qua non for trying any cases. No trial could be held in the 
absence of the chairman. Such was not the situation in the case of a 
trial by a three-member Special Martial Law Court as it was provided that 
"If in the course of a trial any one of the members of a Special Martial 
Law Court is, for any reason, unable to attend any sitting thereof, the 
trial may continue before the other two members’'
(e) Majority Decisions
Regulation 4(6) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation,
1976, stated, "In the event of any difference of opinion among the 
members of the Tribunal, the opinion of the majority shall prevail".
(f) The Power of the Tribunal
Regulation 4(7) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation,
1976, provided' "The Tribunal may pass any sentence authorised by
the Martial Law Regulations or law for the punishment of the offence tried
by it". Thus this Regulation was substantially a reproduction of the
provisions of Regulation 2(7) of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975, in
17
respect of the Special Martial Law Court.
16. Regulation 4(a) as inserted in the Martial Law Regulations, 1975, by
the Martial Law (Amendment) Regulations, 1975, issued on 11 September 1975.
17. See supra, Chapter III, p.164.
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(g) Bar on Trial de Novo
Regulation 4(4) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation,
A
1976, stated:
"The Tribunal shall not, merely by reason of a change 
in its membership or the absence of any one or two 
members thereof from any sitting, be bound to recall 
or rehear any witness whose evidence has already been 
recorded, or to reopen proceedings already held and 
may act on the evidence already given or produced 
before it”.
The provisions contained in this Regulation were virtually a
18reproduction of those of Regulation 5 of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975.
(h) The Manner of Taking Evidence
Regulation 4(5) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation,
1976, stated:
"The memorandum of the substance of the evidence of 
each witness shall be taken down by the Chairman, 
or by such other member of the Tribunal as the 
Chairman may direct, and shall be signed by him or 
by such member, and shall form part of the record".
The provisions embodied in this Regulation resembled those of Regulation 5(a)
and Regulation 7(a) of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975, which were
19added by the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) Regulations, 1976.
They were also, largely, identical with sub-sections (1) and (2) of 
20
Section 355 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
(i) Appeal from the Judgment of the Special Martial Law Tribunal
Regulation 4(8) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976, 
provided: "No appeal shall lie to any authority whatever from any
decision or judgment of the Tribunal". Thus there was no scope for legal
18. Ibid., p. 180.
19. Ibid., p. 177.
20. For sub-section (1) of Section 355 of the Criminal Procedure Code, see
ibid. Sub-section (2) of Section 355 states that "Such memorandum
shall be written and signed by the Magistrate with his own hand, and
shall form part of the record”.
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redress by way of appeal against any judgment or sentence, including 
death sentences, or sentences of life imprisonment, passed by the Tribunal.
A
(j) Applications of Certain Provisions of Regulations No.I of 1975
Regulation 5 of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976, 
stated:
"The provisions of [original] Regulations 3, 4, 6 and 8 
of the Martial Law Regulations, 1'975 (Regulations No.I 
of 1975), shall, so far as they are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Regulation, apply to the 
proceedings of the Tribunal and all matters relating 
thereto as if the Tribunal were a Special Martial Law 
Court constituted under the said Regulations".
Thus the Special Martial Law Tribunal, like a Special Martial Law
Court, was to try an offence under Martial Law Regulation No.XVI of
1976 summarily and in trying such an offence it was to follow the
procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for summary
21trial of summons cases. The tribunal could try an absconding accused
in absentia if he had failed to appear before it in accordance with the
time specified in the order notified in the official gazette. The
property of the absconding accused might also be forfeited to the 
22
government. However, a person accused of an offence under the
Regulation would enjoy the right to be defended by a legal practitioner
23before the tribunal. All proceedings of the tribunal were to be 
submitted to the government for review and all sentences of death or
transportation for life passed by it would have to be confirmed by the
24 25
President. The government could, on review, reduce any sentence.
An accused or one convicted of an offence punishable under the Regulation
could not, if in custody, be released on bail by any court or tribunal
21. Regulation 3(5), the Martial Law Regulations of 1975.
22. Regulation 3(7), ibid.
23. Regulation 3(8), ibid.
24. Original Regulation 4(3), ibid.
25. Original Regulation 4(5), ibid.
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26
without the consent of the prosecution. The provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code so far as they were not inconsistent with the provisions
27
of the Regulation, were to apply to the proceedings of the tribunal.
No order, judgment, decision or sentence of a Special Martial Law Tribunal
could be called in question in any manner whatsoever in or before any
28
court, including the Supreme Court.
II. The Establishment and Composition of the 
Special Martial Law Tribunal No.1
Within minutes of the promulgation of the Special Martial Law
Tribunal Regulation, 1976, on 14 June 1976, the Government of Bangladesh
constituted a Special Martial Law Tribunal and appointed its chairman 
29
and members. Colonel Yusuf Haider of the Army Headquarters was 
appointed as-Chairman of the Tribunal, while Wing-Commander Mohammad Abdul 
Rashid of the Administration Wing, Jessore Air Base, Acting-Commander 
Siddique Ahmed of the Naval Headquarters and two First-Class Magistrates 
of Dhaka (Sadar South and North), Mohd. Abdul Ali and Hasan Morshed, 
were appointed as its members.
It is to be noted that the Government Notification announcing the 
formation of the Tribunal gave no further details as to who would be tried 
before it. However, it is obvious that the government had an ulterior 
| motive in establishing the Tribunal immediately after the promulgation
of the Regulation in so far as it was meant to deal with selected cases 
of arrests made after the Soldiers' Uprising of 7 November 1975.
i
!
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26. Regulation 6(2), ibid.
27. Regulation 8, ibid.
28. Original Regulation 4(9), ibid.
29. Notification No.430-JIV/lT-2/76 issued on 14 June 1976 by the 
Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs.
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III. The Trial of a Conspiracy Case by the Tribunal
On 15 June 1976, the day following the formation of the Tribunal,
the members of the Tribunal visited the Dhaka Central Prison to select
a courtroom inside it. Two days later, on 17 June, the Chairman of the
Special Martial Law Tribunal directed eleven persons, of whom four were
civilians’^  and seven members of the army and air force,^ to appear before
the Tribunal sitting in Dhaka Central Prison on or before 21 June 1976.
If they failed to appear, they were to be tried in absentia and their
32property was to be confiscated.
It is worthy of note that although the Tribunal was empowered to fix 
any period within which the absconding person would have to appear before 
it, it seems that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily as the persons 
concerned were given only four days for their appearance. It may be 
recalled here that under Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the 
absconding accused was to be given the minimum period of thirty days to 
appear before the court from the date of the publication of such an order.
However, the Tribunal was first convened on 21 June 1976 and charges 
were brought against thirty-three military and civilian men. Most of 
them were already under dentention since November 1975, and eighteen out 
of the thirty-three accused were members of the armed forces. The charges 
brought against each of the accused were:
(A) Conspiracy to overawe the government by means of 
criminal force (under Section 121A of the Penal Code); and
(B) Prejudicing and interfering with the discipline of, or 
the performance of duty by, the members of the defence 
services, seducing the members of the defence services
------------------------------------ .. . »  p..'.. i,y . n i ■ .. • i ~ i . . - . . ,—  .--- ---------------------------
30. The four: civilians were.::. Serajul Alam Khan Dada, Sharif Nurul 
Ambia, Engineer Anwar Siddique and Mohiuddin.
31. The seven members of the army and air force were: Corporal Altaf 
Hossain, Nayek Subedar Mohammad Jafaluddin, Havildar M.A. Barek,
Naik A. Bari, Sergeant Syed Rafiqul Islam, Flight-Seargeant Kazi 
Rokanuddin and Sergeant Kazi Abdul Kader.
32. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 18 June 1976.
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from their duty and allegiance to government, and
• attempting to induce such members to commit mutiny
or to indulge in anti-state activities (under Regulation 13 
of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975).
After charging the accused in its opening session, the Tribunal adjourned
for eight days to permit defence lawyers to prepare and organise their
defence for the conspiracy case of State v. Major (retd.) M.A. Jalil
and others. The defence lawyers, who met their clients on the day
proceedings began, protested to the Tribunal for allowing so little
time to prepare the defence. The accused, most of whom were in preventive
detention for several months, had been denied access to legal counsel
and communication with relatives. No interviews or private consultations
were permitted either. The accused were able to give instructions to
33
their lawyers for their defence only while in the courtroom.
In view of the gravity and complicated nature of the offences with 
which the accused were charged, it seems that the period of eight days 
was not sufficient to enable the defence lawyers to acquaint themselves 
with the facts or law of the case and defend the accused satisfactorily.
In this respect, the observations of Justice Muhammad Munir in Khadim v .
33athe Crown, in which only eleven days were given for taking the necessary 
steps to defend the accused in the murder trial, are noteworthy:
?Such unseemly hurry makes defence in important cases 
of crime impossible and is likely to affect the result 
of the trial. It also detracts from the public 
confidence in the administration of justice".^4
However, it seems that the accused in the conspiracy case did not, in
fact, have the kind of legal assistance that is contemplated in Section 340(1)
33. Only one accused - Hasanul Huq Enu - was allowed to meet his lawyer, 
Zulmat Ali Khan, privately. Based on an interview with defence 
lawyer S. Chaklader
33a. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.VI, 1954, p.69.
34. Ibid., p.72.
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of the Criminal Procedure Code as the right of legal defence given by 
that Section extends to access to the counsel for private consultation 
and to affording the latter sufficient time and opportunity for the 
preparation of a proper defence. In this context, the comments of a 
leading authority on constitutional law of India are of direct relevance:
"Assistance of counsel is effective only where the accused 
is afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel and counsel is afforded such opportunity to ^5 
consult with the accused and to prepare his defence".
A similar view was also expressed by Justice Muhammad Munir in Khadim
v. the Crown
"Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives 
to an accused person the right to a reasonable 
opportunity to defend himself by counsel".^
Article 14(3)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966, also requires that "in the determination of any criminal
charge against him, everyone shall be" given "...adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing".
It is to be noted that the total number of the accused in the
conspiracy case was forty, of whom seven were pardoned in order that
they could become approvers (state witnesses). The manner in which they
were pardoned was curious. On 15 June 1976, the day on which the members
of the Tribunal visited the Dhaka Central Prison to select a courtroom
inside it, the charge-sheet was submitted which showed these approvers as
accused Nos.1-7 in column No.3. On the same date, all the seven petitions
for pardon were filed and signed on the typed and carbon copies of a single
35. Basu, Durga Das, Commentary bn the Constitution of India, Calcutta, 
Vol.I, 3rd edition, 1955, p.283.
36. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, 1954, p.69.
37. Ibid., p.71.
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proforma. The First Information Report and the statements of these
petitioners before the magistrate, recorded under Section 164 of the
*
Criminal Procedure Code, had the same wording. However, all the seven
38
co-accused were pardoned on that very day of 15 June by the Tribunal.
It would, therefore, appear that a deliberate and assiduous effort 
| was made to persuade all these seven co-accused to turn state witnesses.
: It is worthy of note that, although the Tribunal granted pardons to the
j seven co-accused, the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976, had
I 39
| given no such power to it. Consequently, the provisions of Section 337
f
of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the granting of pardons ought 
to have come into operation as it was laid down that the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, which has been mentioned earlier, in so far as 
they were not inconsistent with the provisions of this Regulation, would 
apply to the proceedings of the Special Martial Law Tribunal.
However, the trial reopened on 29 June 1976. It started with the 
evidence or statement of prosecution witness No.l, Fakhrul Alam, a member 
of the air force and approver in this case. Thus the statement of this 
witness became the basis of the case. The Deputy Superintendent of 
Police of the Criminal Investigation Department, Safiuddin Ahmed, who was 
both complainant and investigation officer, was produced before the Tribunal 
as the last prosecution witness. It is interesting to note that the DSP,
38. Based on the notebook of a defence lawyer, Sharifuddin Chaklader.
39. Under Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a District 
Magistrate can tender pardon at any stage of investigation, inquiry 
or trial even though he himself may not be holding such inquiry or 
trial. District Magistrate also include the Additional District 
Magistrate on whom all the powers of the District Magistrate have 
been conferred under Section 10 of the Code. A Magistrate First- 
Class, not being the District Magistrate, can tender pardon only
(a) in which the offence is under investigation if he has jurisdiction 
in the place where the offence might be inquired into and tried, and 
the sanction of the District Magistrate has been obtained therefore, 
and (b) in the case where the offence is under inquiry or trial 
before him. 1
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who had lodged the First Information Report on 4 June 1976 at 1600 hours,
admitted in the course of.cross-examination that he had not held any
investigation, and that he had not visited any of the alleged places of
40secret meetings of the conspirators to draw a sketch map of the spots.
Moreover, the DSP did not even produce certain persons - Monsur and Rezwan -
on the basis of whose information he had lodged the First Information 
41Report. Therefore, it seems that he himself was deliberately used as 
a tool.
The prosecution alleged that, from August 1974 to November 1975,
some leaders of the now defunct Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, Major (retd.)
M.A. Jalil, A.S.M. Abdur Rab (both released on 8 November 1975), Serajul
Alam Khan, Professor Anwar Hossain, Hasanul Huq alias Ino, Lt.-Colonel
(retd.) Abu Taher and Major Ziauddin Ahmed (deserter) with several others
had conspired to wage war aginst the Government of Bangladesh, to overthrow
it through violent means and to undo completely the achievements of the
glorious revolution of 7 November 1975, a revolution of the people and
of the armed forces of Bangladesh. In pursuance of the conspiracy,
Lt.-Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher and some of his associates seduced or tried
to seduce members of the defence forces with a view to subverting and
destroying the defence forces and replacing them by the so-called Biplobi
Gano Bahini (Revolutionary People’s Army), an armed wing of the Jatiya
Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party). They conducted political
study classes, distributed prejudicial books, leaflets and funds to the
defence forces. It was the principal aim of the conspirators to eliminate
and destroy the regular forces and replace them by the so-called Biplobi 
42
Gano Bahini.
40. Based on the notebook of a defence lawyer, Sharifuddin Chaklader.
41. Ibid.
42. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 18 July 1976.
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The trial on the basis of the charges of conspiracy to overthrow the
government and of incitement of the defence services to mutiny occurred
at a time when there had been three governments in the preceding year
(1975), each succeeding other by force of arms. It is curious that, at
no stage of the trial did the prosecution specify which government the
accused had allegedly conspired to overthrow from August 1974 to November
1975, as there was a succession of governments from 15 August to 7 November 
431975. Therefore, it is evident that the charges were imprecise. It 
may be mentioned here that the August coup of 1975 was staged by six 
majors under the leadership of Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed and not by any 
of the accused in this case. None of the accused joined Brigadier Khaled 
Mosharraf on 3 November 1975 to oust the government of Moshtaque. One 
of the accused, namely Lt.-Colonel Abu Taher, was only involved in the 
Solders* Uprising of 7 November 1975 that led to the overthrow of 
Mosharraf*s four-day-old coup and the release of the deposed Chief of Army 
Staff, Major-General Ziaur Rahman, from captivity imposed on him. It 
is said, as pointed out earlier, that Abu Taher, commander of the Biplobi 
Shainik Sangstha (the Revolutionary Soldiers' Organisation), set in motion 
the soldiers' mutiny on the morning of 7 November. However, this Soldiers' 
Uprising of 7 November installed the existing government in power and the 
day was later declared a public holiday as the National Revolution and 
Solidarity Day.
The defence lawyer, Ataur Rahman, who defended all the thirty-three
accused (of whom two were tried in absentia) in this case, argued that
there could not have been any conspiracy after the successful completion
of the Soldiers' Uprising of 7 November. He argued that the cause of this
conspiracy case could be traced to the failure of the government to fulfil
44the 'Twelve Demands' of the soldiers issued by them on the morning of
43. Based on the notebook of the defence lawyer, Sharifuddin Chaklader.
44. See supra, Chapter II, pp.129-130.
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7 November, which set forth a philosophy of the role which soldiers
should play in a revolutionary army. According to him, the Investigation
Officer was used as a tool in this case merely to supply the First
45
Information Report which had no basis in fact.
Advocate Ataur Rahman*s argument attempted to show the hollowness
of the charge of conspiracy, as some of the accused were in fact outside
Bangladesh when the alleged conspiracy was said to have taken place.
For example, Flight-Seargeant Kazi Abdul Kader (who was ultimately acquitted)
was, during the conspiracy period, doing a course at the Aeroflot Aviation
School, Kirovogtrad, Ukraine, USSR, together with one of the members of the
46Tribunal, M.A. Rashid. So the story of the state witnesses (approvers)
that he attended secret meetings of conspirators was absolutely false.
The approver, Abul Kalam, who implicated Dr. AkMaqjur Rahman, Professor
of Economics at the Jahangir Nagar University, Bangladesh, in the case
could not identify him the court. Although it was alleged that contact
was made with Dr. Akhlaqur Rahman (who was ultimately acquitted) over
the telephone, it turned out that he had no telephone service at his 
47
residence.
It isnoteworthy that not only were the defence lawyers given 
inadequate time to prepare the defence and denied facilities for private 
consultations with the accused, but they were also not allowed to take 
any papers relating to the case out of the Dhaka Central Prison. They 
were not even given copies of the evidence recorded by the Tribunal. Thus 
the defence lawyers were deprived of the necessary opportunity to study
45. Based on the notebook of defence lawyer, Advocate Sharifuddin 
Chaklader.
46. Wing-Commander Mohammed Abdul Rashid, a member of the Tribunal, 
confirmed this fact.
47. Based on the notebook of Advocate Sharifuddin Chaklader.
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relevant documents. They were searched at the prison gate, which was 
itself degrading to them. They had to take an oath of secrecy and 
were required not to disclose anything learnt in the course of, or in 
connection with, the trial proceedings.^^
There were no defence witnesses in the case. One of the accused,
Lt.-Colonel Abu Taher, made an application to the Tribunal to summon 
President A.M. Sayem, three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators, namely, 
Major-General Ziaur Rahman, Rear-Admiral M.H. Khan and Air Vice-Marshal 
M.G. Tawab, and General (retd.) M.A.G. Osmani as defence witnesses, but 
the application was rejected. Even the application filed on 3 July 1976 
by the accused Abu Taher's lawyer for an opportunity to cross-examine
prosecution witness Fakhural Alam (with whose evidence the trial had
_ 49
begun) in depth, was rejected.
These decisions violated the provisions of Article 3(d) of the
European Convention on Human Rights which provides that everyone charged
with a criminal offence has the minimum right "to examine or have examined
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him’1. Article 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 1966, echoed exactly the same stipulations.
However, on 15 July 1976, the Tribunal ended its secret proceedings.
The Chief prosecutor, A.T.M. Afzal, concluded his argument at 4.00 pm on
14 July 1976 with the sentence that "the prosecution has established the
case" without specifying the range of punishment to be passed against
each of the accused.^ The Tribunal delivered the judgment at 3.00 pm
48. Based on an interview with defence lawyer Sharifuddin Chaklader.
49. Based on the notebook of Advocate Sharifuddin Chaklader, a defence 
lawyer.
50. Ibid.
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on 17 July 1976. Only one accused, Lt.-Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher,
was sentenced to death, while Major (retd.) M.A. Jalil and Abu Yusuf Khan
*
(brother of Abu Taher), were sentenced to life imprisonment. Fourteen
other accused were sentenced to various jail terms ranging from twelve
years to one year and the remaining sixteen were acquitted.
It is noteworthy that the convictions of the accused were reached
solely on the basis of evidence given by seven co-accused who had turned
state witnesses. There was no independent evidence to corroborate their
depositions.^* Therefore, it seems that the testimony at the trial was
hardly sufficient to justify convictions especially when they resulted
in severe penalties such as death and life imprisonment. Although under
Section 133 of the Evidence Act an accomplice is a competent witness
against an accused person and conviction is not illegal merely because
it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the rule
of caution demands that the evidence of an approver should be supported
by independent corroborative evidence implicating the accused in the crime.
In fact, the rule of prudence is to be found in illustration (b) of
Section 114 of the Evidence Act which provides that "The Court may presume
that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in
material particulars". Therefore, it seems that the Tribunal did not
exercise this discretion judicially in convicting the accused merely on
the basis of testimony of the approvers uncorroborated in material
particulars by other independent evidence. In this context, the observations
52
of Justice Inamullah in Yaru v. the State are of direct relevance:
"An approver is undoubtedly a competent witness under the 
Evidence Act. His evidence, however, cannot be acted 
upon as a rule of prudence unless it is corroborated in 
material particulars by other independent evidence. The 
reason for this caution is that the approver has participated 
in the commission of the offence himself. Such independent
51. Ibid.
52. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Karachi, Vol.XI, 1959, p.662.
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corroboration need not cover the whole of the prosecution 
story. It would not be safe to act upon such evidence 
merely because it is corroborated in minor particulars or 
incidental details. ? In such a case corroboration does^ 
not afford the necessary assurance for the conviction".
A similar view was expressed by Justice Rahman of the Pakistan Supreme
54
Court in Ghulam Qadir v. the State:
"As a matter of strict law, the uncorroborated testimony Of 
an accomplice could, if accepted, form the basis of a 
conviction in a criminal case. However, in the course 
of judicial precedents, a rule of prudence has been 
evolved under which it is always insisted that there ought 
to be independent corroboration of an approver's statement 
on material points suggesting a link between accused 
persons and the crime before such a statement could be 
accepted as a safe foundation for their conviction. The 
reason for the rule is obvious. There is always danger 
of substitution of the guilty by the innocent in such 
cases and it is realised that it would be extremely risky 
to act upon the statement of a self-confessed criminal 
who while trying to save his own skin, might be 
unscrupulous to accept suggestions of others to implicate 
a person unconnected with the crime in place of his real 
accomplice for whom he may have a soft corner. But 
the corroboration required would depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case and no hard-and- 
fast rules can be laid in his behalf. Surely one of 
the factors calling for consideration may be circumstance 
that the approver had no ostensible motive to involve any 
of the accused persons falsely in the case".55
It is to be noted that the judgment of the Tribunal was not unanimous.
One member of the Tribunal gave a note of dissent with the judgment
delivered by the majority. He sentenced Lt.-:Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher
55ato seven years rigorous imprisonment. In an interview with the author, 
the member of the Tribunal, who had given a note of dissent, claimed that 
two of the three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators asked him to pass 
death sentences against three of the accused, namely Lt.-Colonel (retd.)
Abu Taher, Major (retd.) M.A. Jalil and A.S.M. Abdur Rab.
53. Ibid., p.665.
54. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XI, 1959, p.377.
55. Ibid., pp.380-381.
55a. The interview with the member of the Tribunal, who does not wish to 
be identified, took place on 4 October 1984.
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Usually the proceedings of the cases tried by Special Martial Law 
Courts or Special Martial Law Tribunals were to be received by the 
Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs in due course during office 
hours for review. But this did not happen in the conspiracy case.
There was an unusual and unprecedented haste in reviewing the sentences 
passed against the^accused and confirming the sentences of death and 
life imprisonment.
! At about 8.00 pm on 17 July 1976, only five hours after the
i
i
pronouncement of the judgment the Chairman of the Tribunal took all the
|
papers relating to the case to Bangabhavan (the Presidential palace).
It is to be noted that this was done outside office hours. However, 
immediately thereafter a formal meeting of the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators, Home Minister, 
and Director-General of National Security Intelligence, was held and the 
judgment was read out. Then the Secretary, Ministry of Law and 
Parliamentary Affairs was asked to carry out the review in such a way
' as to support the sentences of death and life imprisonment.^
57During an interview with the author, the Secretary claimed that, 
as he was asked to submit the review on the following day (i.e., on 
18 July), he could not go through all the evidence recorded by the 
Tribunal. Consequently, he had to use very guarded words in supporting 
the sentences. He wrote that ’’the evidence as analysed by the Tribunal” 
would justify the conviction of the accused. In other words, he did not 
analyse the evidence himself, but simply let himself be guided by the 
analysis of evidence made by the tribunal. In accordance with the wishes 
of the President, the Secretary submitted to him his three-page review on
56. Based on an interview with A.R. Chowdhury, the then Secretary of 
Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. The interview took place 
on 3 October 1984.
57. Ibid.
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18 July which was a Sunday, the weekly holiday. Although the Secretary
supported the conviction, he made recommendations to the President to
commute the sentences in view of the revolutionary activities of the
convicts, especially those of Abu Taher, from 1974 to 7 November 1975.
The basis of his recommendations was that the activities of the accused
during that period had contributed directly first to the rescue of Ziaur
Rahman on the morning of 7 November 1975 (the day of the Soldiers’ Uprising)
and to his subsequent installation in power as Chief of the Army Staff
and one of the three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators.
However, after receiving the review, the President consulted all the
three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators. At one time, one of the
Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators told the Secretary that he had
58given all the credit for the Soldiers' Uprising of 7 November 1975 to
Lt.-Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher. Ultimately the last page of the review
which contained the recommendations for the commutation of the sentences
was struck out. On the very Sunday of 18 July, the President confirmed
the death sentence passed against Abu Taher and the sentences of life
imprisonment passed against M.A. Jalil and Abu Yusuf Khan by the Special
59Martial Law Tribunal on the previous day. Thus the review body was 
deliberately used as tool to serve the ulterior purpose of the Martial 
Law administration.
This description as to how the sentences were confirmed on a public 
holiday, (i.e., on 18 July) is supported by press reports as the Bangladesh 
dailies published the news of the President's confirmation of the sentences
58. See supra, Chapter II, pp.128-130.
59. Based on an interview with A.R. Chowdhury, the then Secretary 
of Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. The interview 
took place on 3 October 1984.
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of death and life imprisonment on Monday, 19 July 1976, quoting an 
official announcement.^
*
On 18 July 1976, one day after the passing of the judgment, the wife 
of the convicted Lt.-Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher, Mrs. Lutfa Taher, petitioned to 
the President under Article 57 of the 1972 Constitution for granting 
pardon in respect of the death sentence passed against her husband by
the Special Martial Law Tribunal No.I in Special Martial Law Tribunal
xt 1 ir t *.!.• ^ a Mrs* Lutfa Taher stated, interCase No.l of 1976. In this petition, *------
alia , that in spite of her best efforts she had not been allowed to have 
an interview with her husband either before or during the trial. As a 
result of which, she had neither been able to obtain the full details of 
the charges levelled against him nor was she able to arrange for his 
proper legal defence. She further stated that no copy of the Order 
Sheet, First Information Report, Charge Sheet, the depositions of prosecution 
witnesses or the Judgment and Order were made available to her. This 
petition for clemency was rejected by the President, although his decision 
was never communicated to the petitioner.
In contrast, in Ehteshamuddin v. Bangladesh, ^  as has been pointed 
out earlier, the accused was sentenced to death on 5 August 1978 by the 
Special Martial Law Court No.II, Dhaka, in Martial Law Case No.37 of 
1978 for murdering his wife. Thereafter the proceedings were submitted 
to the government for review and the result of the review was communicated 
on 29 August 1978. The government after review placed the proceedings
60. For example, the Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, wrote, "According to an 
official announcement, the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator 
has confirmed the sentence of death passed by the Special Military 
[sic] Tribunal in respect of Lt.-Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher....The 
President has also confirmed the sentences of transportation for 
life...in respect of Major (retd.) M.A. Jalil and Mr. Abu Yusuf Khan".
60a. The mercy petition was made available to the author by Abu Yusuf 
Khan, a brother of Lt.-Colonel (retd.) Abu Taher who had also been 
sentenced to life imprisonment in the conspiracy case and later 
released in 1984.
61. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol.XXXIII, 1981, p.154.
2 72
of the case before the President for confirmation of the death sentence.
The death sentence was confirmed on 21 September 1978. Six days later,
on 27 September 1978, a mercy petition was filed to the government under
Sections 401 and 402 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The convictr,s
62
father was informed on 8 June 1979 that it had been rejected.
Therefore, it is clear that in Ehteshamuddin1s case it took about
i
a month to carry out the review, nearly a month for the confirmation of the
I
f
[ death sentence, and almost eight-and-a-half months for the consideration of
|
! the mercy petition. But in the conspiracy case tried by the Special
!
| Martial Law Tribunal No.I, everything was done in one single day. Thus
the extraordinary speed with which the whole affair was conducted suggests
that the Martial Law administration had a political motive in bringing
the conspiracy case to a hasty conclusion.
However, in turning down the petition for clemency submitted by Abu
Taher's wife, President (Justice) Abusadat Mohammad Sayem himself acted
contrary to his own judgment which had been delivered in 1970 in the
63case of The State v. Purna Chandra Mondal. In that case, he observed:
"...Section 340 of the code of Criminal Procedure... 
confers a right on every accused person brought before 
a criminal court to be 'defended' by a lawyer, which 
is not the same thing as being 'represented' by a 
lawyer. That right evidently extends to access to 
the lawyer for private consultations and also 
affording the latter an adequate opportunity of 
preparing the case for the defence. A last-moment 
appointment of an Advocate for defending a prisoner 
accused of a capital offence...results...in a denial 
to the prisoner of the right conferred on him by 
Section 340 of the Code....The denial of this right 
must be held to have rendered the trial as one not 
according to law, necessitating a fresh trial".^4
At an interview,^ the author drew President Sayem's attention to the
contradiction of his approach to the two cases, i.e., the conspiracy case
62. Ibid., pp.172 and 174.
63. Dhaka Law Reports, Vol.XXII, 1970, p.289.
64. Ibid., pp.291-292.
65. The interview with former President Justice A.M. Sayem took place 
on 4 October 1984.
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and Purna Chandra's case. Sayem replied that in Purna Chandra's case
he had been acting in his capacity as a High Court Judge, but in the
*
conspiracy case he had been discharging his responsibility as the President
of Bangladesh. As President he had to take into account considerations
other than those of pure justice. According to him, after the revolution,
it had not been safe to keep the leaders of the revolution alive from the
administrative point of view. Sayem added that the reasons of state had
dictated that the death sentence should be passed against Abu Taher
because he had been the root cause of deep and widespread trouble. Abu
Taher had tried to destroy the armed forces by creating dissension and
disunity among the soldiers and wished to replace the regular armed forces
by the so-called Biplobi Gano Bahini - Revolutionary People's Army - an
armed wing of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal. President Sayem felt
that there should have been more than one death sentence. Had there
been more than one death sentence, there would not have been any further
arguments or controversy over the issue. He reminded the author that
during the whole of his tenure as the Chief Martial Law Administrator
(from November 1975 to November 1976) and as President of Bangladesh
(from November 1975 to April 1977) only one person was hanged.
Therefore, it is evident that the Martial Law administration was most
anxious to eliminate Abu Taher from the political scene by fair means or
foul, because he was considered a threat to the regime.
It is to be noted that, since the Special Martial Law Tribunal
Regulation, 1976, did not contain any provisions as to the procedure to
be followed regarding the execution of death sentences, the provisions
66
of ordinary law were to apply in this respect. In accordance with the
6 6 . See supra, p.258.
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67provisions of Section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Special
Martial Law Tribunal was to issue, after receiving the confirmation of
a death sentence, a warrant to the Superintendent of the prison concerned
in the Form XXXV of Schedule V of the Code authorising and requiring him
"to carry the said sentence into execution by causing the...[convict]
68to be hanged by the neck until he be dead..." On the other hand, the
Jail Code, 1919, provided for the conferment on the Superintendent the
authority of fixing the date of execution from twenty-one to twenty-eight
days of receiving such a warrant or information. As it was stated:
"The Superintendent of the jail will be authorised to 
fix the date of execution not less than twenty-one 
days or more than twenty-eight days ahead of the date 
on which he received such intimation....Mercy petition 
will be within seven days".
But these provisions were not followed in respect of the execution of Abu
Taher. Only three days after the confirmation of the death sentence, on
21 July 1976, he was hanged in Dhaka Cbntral Prison. This shows that the
Martial Law government was prepared to go to any lengths to achieve its
political object.
IV. The Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977
On 4 October 1977, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, President 
Ziaur Rahman, who had replaced A.M. Sayem as the Chief Martial Law
Administrator on 29 November 1976 and as the President on 21 April 1977,
promulgated the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977 (Martial Law 
Regulation No.V of 1977). This Regulation contained provisions for the 
constitution, jurisdiction, power and procedure of a Martial Law Tribunal.
67. Section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that "When a sentence of 
death passed by a Court of Session is submitted to the High Court for 
confirmation, such Court of Session shall on receiving the order of 
confirmation or other order of the High Court thereon, cause such order to be
carried into effect by issuing a warrant or taking such other steps as may
be necessary".
68. Form XXXV of Schedule V of the Criminal Procedure Code.
69. Sub-rule VI of Rule 991 of the Jail Code, 1919.
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(i) The Constitution of the Martial Law Tribunal
Regulation 4(1) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977,
empowered the government to constitute, by issuing notification in the
official Gazette, "such number of Martial Law Tribunals as it may deem
fit and each such Tribunal may be for such area or areas or for trial of
such cases or classes of cases as may be specified in the notification or
as the Government may direct". A tribunal was to consist of a chairman
70
and four other members to be appointed by the government. The chairman
was to be appointed from amongst the officers of the defence services and
the four other members were to be appointed from amongst the junior
commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the Bangladesh army
or their equivalent in the other defence services and other persons
71enrolled under the Defence Service Laws.
Thus unlike the Special Martial Law Tribunal, all the members of a 
Martial Law Tribunal were officers of the defence services.
(ii) The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Regulation 4(4) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, 
empowered the tribunal to try any offence, whether committed before or 
after 4 October 1977, punishable -
(a) Under Chapters VI or VII of the Penal Code, 1860;
(b) Under The Army Act, 1952, the Air Force Act, 1953, the 
Navy Ordinance, 1961, or any rules or regulations
made thereunder; or
(c) Under Regulations 13 or 17 of the Martial Law Regulations,
1975 (Martial Law Regulations No.I of 1975).
Thus like the Special Martial Law Tribunal, a Martial Law Tribunal
was invested with the power to try any offences under the Military Laws and
certain offences under Martial Law Regulations and the Penal Code.
70. Regulation 4(2), the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977.
71. Regulation 4(3), ibid.
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(iii) The Grant of Bail
Regulation 5(2) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, 
provided:
"No person accused or convicted of an offence 
punishable under this Regulation shall, if in 
custody, be released on bail by any Court or 
Tribunal without the consent of the prosecution".
Thus these provisions relating to the grant of bail were a
72
reproduction of those of Regulation 6(2) of the Martial Law Regulations, 
1975. It may be recalled here that the stipulations of Regulation 6(2) 
concerning the grant of bail had also been adopted by the Special Martial 
Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976.
(iv) The Power of the Tribunal
Regulation 6(9) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, stated:
"A Tribunal may pass any sentence authorized by the 
Martial Law Regulations or Laws for the punishment 
of the offence tried by it".
73Thus this Regulation is exactly identical with that of Regulation 4(7) 
of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976.
(v) The Procedure of the Tribunal
(a) The Initiation of Proceedings
Regulation 6(1) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, 
specified:
"A Tribunal shall take cognizance of an offence on 
a report in writing made by any officer of any of 
the Defence Services, or by any junior commissioned 
officer of the Bangladesh Army or equivalent in the 
other Defence Services’1.
Thus the Regulation provided only one procedure for taking cognizance 
of an offence by a Martial Law Tribunal, namely, upon a report of the
72. See supra, Chapter III, p. 182.
73. See supra, p. 255.
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officer concerned. It is significant that, whereas the Special Martial 
Law Tribunal had been allowed to take cognizance of an offence only upon 
a report of a police officer not below the rank of inspector, the Martial 
Law Tribunal was permitted to take cognizance of the same offence merely 
on a report of an officer of the defence services.
(b) Trial in Camera
The Martial Law Tribunal could sit in camera in accordance with the
, . 74
decision of its chairman.
"Where a Tribinal sits in camera, the Chairman may 
require any person attending or otherwise participating 
in the conduct of the trial to make an oath of secrecy 
that he shall not disclose anything that has come to his 
knowledge in, or in connection with, such trial; and 
disclosure of any information in contravention of the 
oath shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to three years and with fine.f!7^
These provisions concerning trial in camera were identical with those 
76
of Regulations 4(2) and 4(10) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal 
Regulation, 1976.
(c) Continuation of Trial in the Absence of Some Members of the Tribunal
Regulation 6(3) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, provided:
"If, in the course of a trial, not more than two 
members, other than the Chairman, are, for any reason, 
unable to attend any sitting thereof, the trial may 
continue before the other three members, including 
the Chairman".
Thus this Regulation is exactly a reproduction of the provisions
77
contained in Regulation 4(3) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal 
Regulation, 1976.
74. Regulation 6(2), the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977.
75. Regulation 7, ibid.
76. See supra, p.254.
77. Ibid., p.255.
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(d) Bar on Trial de Novo
Regulation 6(4) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, provided:
MA Tribunal shall not, merely by reason of a change 
in its membership or the absence of any one or two 
members, thereof from any sitting, be bound to recall 
or. rehear any witness whose evidence has already been 
recorded, or to reopen any proceedings already held, 
and may act on the evidence already given or produced 
before it”.
78These provisions were precisely the same as those of Regulation 4(4) 
of the Special Martial Law Tribunal, 1976.
(e) The Manner of Taking Evidence
Regulation 6(5) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, laid
down:
"The memorandum of the substance of the evidence of 
each witness shall be taken down by the Chairman, 
or by such other member as the Chairman may direct, 
and shall be signed by him or such other member, 
and shall form part of the record".
This Regulation was exactly a reproduction of the provisions of 
79Regulation 4(5) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976.
(f) Summary Trial
Regulation 6(6) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, provided:
"A Tribunal trying an offence under this Regulation 
shall try the offence summarily, in so far as it 
may be, in accordance with the procedure laid down 
in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V 
of 1898), for summary trial of summons cases".
80
These provisions were similar to those of Regulation 3(5) of the 
Martial Law Regulations, 1975. The provisions of Regulation 3(5) had 
also been adopted by the Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976.
78. See supra, p.256.
79. Ibid.,
80. See supra, Chapter III, p. 175.
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(g) Legal Representation
Regulation 6(14) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, stated:
* "No lawyer shall appear or plead before a Tribunal
on behalf of the accused but the accused may be
assisted and advised by any person he chooses who 
shall be called the friend of the accused".
81This Regulation was a reproduction of the provisions of Regulation 3(8) 
of the Martial Law Regulations, 1975, with the exception of the words 
"Summary Martial Law Court". It may be recalled here that the denial of 
the opportunity to be defended by a lawyer in a trial before a Martial 
Law Tribunal exposed the accused to the danger of being convicted upon 
insufficient, irrelevant or inadmissible evidence and without a proper 
charge. However, it is worthy of note that, whereas a person accused of 
an offence had been given the opportunity of the services of a lawyer in
a trial before a Special Martial Law Tribunal (by the Special Martial Law
Tribunal Regulation, 1976), a person accused of the same offence was 
denied this opportunity in a trial before a Martial Law Tribunal.
(h) Appeal from the Judgment of a Martial Law Tribunal
Regulation 6(12) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, provided: 
"No appeal shall lie to any authority whatever from any decision or judgment 
of a Tribunal".
This Regulation is exactly a reproduction of the provisions of 
82
Regulation 4(8) of the Special Martial Law Tribunal, 1976.
(i) The Confirmation of Certain Sentences Passed by the Martial Law Tribunal 
Regulation 6(10) of the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, stated:
81. Ibid., pp.180-181.
82. See supra, p. 256.
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"All sentences of death or transportation for life shall have to be 
confirmed by the Chief Martial Law Administrator".
4
Thus unlike the sentences of death or transportation for life passed 
by the Special Martial Law Court and the Special Martial Law Tribunal, 
the death sentences or sentences of transportation for life passed by the 
Martial Law Tribunal were to be confirmed by the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator. However, it seems that the power of confirmation given 
to the Chief Martial Law Administrator was merely a matter of routine as 
he was not empowered, instead of confirming a sentence of death or 
transportation for life, to pass any other sentence warranted by law, or 
set aside the conviction or acquit the convicted person. Perhaps 
realising this fact, only two days after the promulgation of the Martial 
Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, on 6 October 1977, the Martial Law Tribunal 
(Amendment) Regulation, 1977, was issued to invest the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator with such powers. As it was enacted:
"When a sentence of death or transportation for life 
is submitted to the Chief Martial Law Administrator 
for confirmation, he may either confirm the sentence 
or reduce it or set it aside or vary or modify it..."
Thus unlike the President, who as the confirming authority had no power
to interfere with a sentence of death or transportation for life passed
by the Special Martial Law Court and the Special Martial Law Tribunal,
the Chief Martial Law Administrator could either confirm a death sentence
or a sentence of transportation for life passed by the Martial Law Tribunal
or reduce it or set it aside or vary or modify it as he saw fit.
It may be recalled here that the only remedy provided against the
judgment of the Sepcial Martial Law Courts and the Special Martial Law
Tribunal was review by the government, but no such remedy was provided by
the Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977, against the judgment of a
Martial Law Tribunal. This contravened the provisions of Article 14(5)*
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which 
provided that "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his 
conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to 
law".
However, it appears that, in the absence of review as a redress, the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, as the confirming body, became the 
ultimate authority to give some relief at his discretion to a person 
against whom a sentence of death or transportation for life was passed 
by a Martial Law Tribunal.
V. The Establishment of the Martial Law Tribunals 
Immediately after the promulgation of the Martial Law Tribunal
Regulation, 1977, the Government of Bangladesh set up Martial Law Tribunals
to try those members of the army and air force who had been involved in
the abortive coup attempts in Bogra on 30 September 1977 and in Dhaka on 
83
2 October 1977. But the government notice announcing the formation of 
the tribunals gave no further details as to the number of mutineers
arrested who would be dealt with by these tribunals. Nor was the total
number of tribunals established given.
VI. The Trial of Cases by the Martial Law Tribunals
84
The tribunals started trying cases from 7 October 1977. On
18 October 1977, it was announced that so far 460 army and air force
personnel had been tried by the Martial Law Tribunals. It was also
mentioned that out of these 460 persons, 37 had been executed, 20 had been
sentenced to life imprisonment and 340 had been given various terms of
85
rigorous imprisonment while the remaining 63 had been acquitted. The
83. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 10 October 1977. .
84. Ibid.
85. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 19 October 1977.
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announcement added that the trials were continuing. Eight days later, 
on 26 October 1977, another announcement was made to the effect that 
the Martial Law Tribunals had concluded the trial of persons belonging 
to the Bangladesh army who had been involved in the attempted coup at 
the Bogra Cantonments on 30 September 1977. It was further reported 
that fifty-five persons had been sentenced to death and sentences of 
life imprisonment had been passed against fourteen persons. Eighteen 
persons had been sentenced to various jail terms while fourteen had been 
acquitted.**^
However, it is noticeable that the government announcement of
26 October 1977 made no mention of the completion of trial of those persons
who had been involved in the coup attempt in Dhaka on 2 October 1977.
It therefore meant that the trials of those persons were continuing.
87
It was also evident from a government notification, issued on 28 October 
1977, which constituted Martial Law Tribunal No.XXXII for the whole of
i
Bangladesh with Major Mohammad Zainul Abedin as its.chairman. However, 
it is to be noted that the government made no further announcement about 
the progress of the trial of those persons who had been involved in the 
coup attempt in Dhaka. There were no further reports in the national 
press either.
It is worthy of note that, in February 1978, the American press 
published only the total number of persons executed for their involvement 
in the two coup attempts of 1977 and quoted as its source a confidential 
cable from the American Embassy in Dhaka despatched on 19 January 1978 by 
chargg d ’affaires Alf E. Bergeson to the State Department. It was stated that:
86. Thfe Bangladesh Times, 27 October 1977.
87. Notification No.519-JIV/Sec-2/77, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary 
Affairs (Justice Branch).
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J’Our best estimate, drawn from sources available 
to the embassy as a whole, is that 217 military 
personnel were executed in the aftermath of the 
coup attempt. We tfiink it is possible that 
30-34 of these may have been executed prior to 
; formalization of military courts”.
An even higher figure was cited by the British press, according to which
89
about 600 persons, mostly from the air force, were executed. It further
stated that more than 800 armed forces personnel had been convicted by
|
■ the Martial Law Tribunals - in some cases little more than kangaroo
courts - after the uprisings in Bogra on 30 September and in Dhaka on 
I 2 October 1977.
90
f  During an interview with the author, a retired major-general, who
was very closely associated with the Martial Law administration, said 
that the total number of army and air force personnel executed for their 
i involvement in the two unsuccessful coup attempts would be a little more
than 200, although he could not remember the exact figure. Thus this 
version lends support to the statistics concerning the executions published 
in the American press. However, the capital sentences carried out in 
the aftermath of abortive coups were the first mass executions anywhere 
in the subcontinent.
It is noteworthy that the Martial Law Tribunals held their proceedings
i
in camera. In almost all the cases, sentences were passed on the basis of
91
insufficient evidence. At an interview with the author, a retired air 
force officer, who had given evidence before such a tribunal, said that, in 
many cases, the armed forces personnel had been convicted merely on the
88. The Washington Post, 10 February 1978.
89. The Sunday Times, 5 March 1978.
90. The interview with the (retired) major-general, who does not wish
to be identified, took place in September 1984.
91. The interview with the (retired) air force officer (group-captain)
took place on 4 October 1984. He wishes to remain anonymous.
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evidence that arms had been seen in their hands on 30 September or on 
2 October 1977. This shows that the tribunals were more interested in 
convicting the accused and making an example of them through severe 
punishment rather than dispensing justice.
It may be recalled here that there were eight coups and mutinies, 
three of them successful and five abortive, between 15 August 1975 and 
2 October 1977. It seemed as if the raison d'etre of the army was to 
manufacture endless coups while their professional duty was simply to 
defend the country against foreign aggression. In view of the successive 
coups and counter-coups, many believed that the stern action taken by the 
Martial Law government to execute a considerable number of the members of 
the armed forces had been essential to depoliticise the soldiers and 
restore discipline in the army. It was also believed that the government 
had at least staged trials of a sort when the,accused appeared before 
courts, whereas in the coups and counter-coups there had been many killings 
which were completely unaccounted for, with not even a show of trial.,
In this context, these executions seemed to be the lesser of the two evils 
as the objective was to restore discipline in the army by stem measures.
Conclusion
(i) The Special Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1976
The foregoing discussion reveals that for the first time in the 
history of Martial Law administration in the subcontinent, the Special 
Martial Tribunal Regulation, 1976, provided for the creation of a Special 
Martial Law Tribunal with a wide jurisdiction to try offences not only 
under the Martial Law Regulations, but also under the Penal Code and 
Military Laws. The majority of the members of the tribunal were officers 
of the armed forces who had no legal training, qualification or experience. 
Since they were part and parcel of the Martial Law administration, they
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could not always be expected to discharge their duties in an impartial 
manner. Moreover, no provision was made to include any members from 
the Judiciary. The trial was to be held under summary procedures.
The tribunal before the tribunal could be held in camera. Bail was very 
difficult to obtain as it depended upon the consent of the prosecution 
rather than the discretion of the tribunal. The minimum safeguard of 
the right of appeal to a court of law was denied. Only review was 
granted to the accused as a relief against the judgment of the tribunal, 
yet this review did not lie to a court of law but to the government.
Thus there was a clear absence of legal safeguards to protect the accused 
in a trial before the tribunalagainst the miscarriage of justice.
(i±) The Conspiracy CaSe Tried by the Special Martial Law Tribunal No.I
The foregoing discussion also shows that, in the trial of the accused 
of the conspiracy case, the requisites of a fair trial were not observed. 
Thus during the trial the accused were deprived of the opportunity to have 
private consultations with their lawyers. The lawyers were given too 
little time to prepare and organise the defence. Even a copy of the 
deposition of the state witnesses was not supplied to the defence counsels. 
The prayer for calling witnesses by accused Abu Taher was rejected. 
Permission to cross-examine one important witness for an additional hour 
was refused. The charges against the accused, which were imprecise, 
were not proved by sufficient evidence. There was no independent testimony 
to support the deposition of the approvers. The trial was held in camera. 
Attempts were made to influence the members of the tribunal. The review 
body, the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, was 
used as a tool of the Martial Law administration to serve its ulterior 
motive. The confirmation of the sentences of death and life imprisonment 
by the President was made on a public holiday. In fact, there was an
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unprecedented and unseemly haste in carrying out review and confirming 
the sentences; they were done in a matter of a single day and outside 
official hours. Only three days after the confirmation of the death 
sentence (and four days after the pronouncement of the judgment), Abu 
Taher was hanged on 21 July 1976 in clear violation of the provisions of 
the Jail Code.
Thus the observation of Justice Clark in Estes v. State of 
92
Texas that "History had proven that secret tribunals were effective
93instruments of oppression", came true in respect of the accused in the 
conspiracy case. However, it is to be noted that the trial in camera 
within the confines of prison was an entirely new development in Bangladesh. 
Never before was such a major trial held in the history of either 
Bangladesh or former East Pakistan. When Abu Taher was hanged in Dhaka 
Central Prison, his was the first political execution in Bengal since 1934 
and in Bangladesh since its inception. It also became a prelude to the 
mass execution of the members of the armed forces, involved in the two 
abortive coups, that followed in 1977.
(iii) The Martial Law Tribunal Regulation, 1977
The foregoing discussion further demonstrates that, like the Special 
Martial Law Tribunal, the Martial Law Tribunals were given jurisdiction to 
try offences under the Military Laws and certain offences under Martial Law 
Regulations and the Penal Code. Yet, unlike the members of the Special 
Martial Law Tribunal, all the members of the Martial Law Tribunals were 
officers of the defence services. Unlike the Special Martial Law Tribunal, 
the Martial Law Tribunals were to take cognizance of an offence only
92. United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' edition, second series, 
Vol.XIV, p.543.
93. Ibid., p.548.
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upon a report of the officer concerned of the defence services. Review 
was denied to the accused as a relief against the judgments of the Martial
A
Law Tribunals, a relief which had previously been allowed from the 
judgments of the Special Martial Law Tribunal and the Martial Law Courts. 
Although an accused before a Special Martial Law Court and a Special 
Martial Law Tribunal had been given the opportunity to defend himself by 
a lawyer, this opportunity was denied to an accused before a Martial Law 
Tribunal like that of an accused before a Summary Martial Law Court.
Unlike the sentences of death and life imprisonment passed by the Special 
Martial Law Courts and the Special Martial Law Tribunal, a death sentence 
or a sentence of life imprisonment pronounced by the Martial Law Tribunals 
was to be confirmed by the Chief Martial Law Administrator., The Chief 
Martial Law Administrator as the confirming authority could either 
confirm such a sentence or reduce it, or set it aside, or vary or modity 
it. But no such powers had been given to the President, the confirming 
authority of the sentences of death or life imprisonment passed by the 
Special Martial Law Courts and the Special Martial Law Tribunal. However, 
the other provisions relating to the procedure of the Martial Law Tribunals 
were identical with those of the Special Martial Law Courts and the Special 
Martial Law Tribunal. Thus a Martial Law Tribunal could sit in camera in 
accordance with the decisions of its chairman. The trial before it was 
to be held under summary procedures which meant that only what was deemed 
to be 'substantial evidence1 needed to be recorded. The minimum safeguard 
of the right of appeal against the judgment of a Martial Law Tribunal was 
denied. Bail could not be granted without the consent of the prosecution. 
Thus there was a conspicuous absence of legal safeguards to ensure a fair 
trial and to protect the accused persons from grave injustices.
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(iv) The Trial of Cases by the Martial Law Tribunals
Martial Law Tribunals were established to try the members of the army 
and the air force who had been involved in the abortive coups of 30 September 
1977 in Bogra and 2 October 1977 in Dhaka. The trials were held in camera. 
It is said that, in many cases, the accused were convicted on the basis of 
inadequate evidence. This shows that the tribunals were more interested 
in inflicting punishment on the accused to serve as a deterrent rather 
than dispensing justice. Thus the basic purpose of holding trials to 
endeavour to ascertain the truth or discover the guilt was not kept in 
view. However, in accordance with the judgments of the tribunals, more 
than 200 members of the army and the air force were executed in the 
aftermath of the two unsuccessful coups. They were the first mass 
executions ever carried out anywhere in the subcontinent.
CHAPTER VI
28
The Judicial Role, with Particular Reference to the Protection of 
Civil Rights, undef Martial Law (1975)
The following discussion will show how the civilian regime of the 
Awami League, prior to the proclamation of Martial Law in August 1975, 
changed the constitutional provisions relating to the appointment, and 
removal of the judges of the Supreme Court. It will also show how the 
powers of appointment, control and discipline of subordinate judicial 
officers were vested in the hands of the President. Similarly, it will 
further reveal how the powers of the High Court to enforce fundamental 
rights were taken away by the Awami League regime. All these measures 
taken by the Awami League administration in January 1975 had the effect 
of curtailing the power and independence of the Judiciary.
The discussion will also demonstrate how the 1975 Martial Law 
regime restored the independence of the Judiciary through fresh 
constitutional provisions and ordinances in respect of appointment, 
removal, control and remuneration of the judicial officers. In addition, 
it will show that although the Martial Law government restored the power 
of the Judiciary to enforce fundamental human rights, it yet imposed 
serious restrictions on the judicial powers.
I The Independence of the Judiciary in Bangladesh
(i) The Importance of Judicial Independence
The term ’Independence of the Judiciary1 means the independence 
and freedom of judges in discharging their duties, their freedom from 
interference by the Executive or Legislative organs with the exercise of 
their functions. "Judicial independence", says J. A. G. Griffith,
"means that judges are not dependent on Governments in any ways which 
might influence them in coming to decisions in individual cases.
1. Griffith, J. A. G., The Politics of the Judiciary, London, 1977, p.29.
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That is to say, the judges should be in a position to arrive at their 
decisions free from interference and apprehension for suffering 
personally as a result of exercising their judicial powers. Thus the 
independence of the Judiciary presupposes a highly advanced stage of 
development in the Judiciary where courts are the supreme authority, 
submitting to no other power but only to their own sense of justice.
In a free society professing the Rule of Law, it is essential that
the absolute independence of the Judiciary should be guaranteed. A
country may ensure all kinds of equality in the Constitution but unless 
and until the common man finds that the Judiciary upholds the
constitutional guarantees independently and earnestly, the roots of the 
Rule of Law cannot go deep into the society. The independence of the 
Judiciary, which is principally a result of the application of the 
doctrine of Separation of Powers, is indispensable to secure the people t 
against the intentional, as well as unintentional, usurpations of the 
Executive and Legislative departments. One of the Conclusions of the 
International Conference of Jurists, held in Bangkok in 1965, emphasized 
the importance of independence of the Judiciary thus: "The ultimate 
protection of the individual in a society governed by the Rule of Law 
depends upon the existence of an enlightened and, independent and 
courageous Judiciary and upon adequate provision for the speedy and 
effective administration of justice". The First Judicial Conference 
of the Americas, held in the city of San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico 
in May 1965, also solemnly declared: "A vigorous and independent 
Judiciary is a fundamental requisite, a basic element for the very 
existence of any society that respects the Rule of Law ...."
The Judiciary contributes vitally to the preservation of the 
social peace and order by settling legal disputes and thus promotes a 
harmonious and integrated society. The quantum of its contribution,
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however, largely depends upon the willingness of the people to present
their problems before it and to submit to its judgments. What matters
most, therefore, is the extent to which people have confidence in
judicial impartiality. So the independence of the Judiciary is
essential for maintaining the purity of justice in the social system
and enabling it to earn public confidence in the administration of
justice. "The independence of the judiciary lends prestige to the
2
office of a judge and inspires confidence in the general public."
"... Nothing", rightly says Viscount Bryce, "does more for the welfare
of the private citizen, and nothing more conduces to the smooth working
of free government, than a general confidence in the pure and efficient
administration of justice between the individual and the State as well
3as between man and man". "In all countries", he further adds, "cases, 
sometimes civil, but more frequently criminal, arise which involve 
political issues and excite party feeling. It is then that the courage 
and uprightness of the judges become supremely valuable to the nation, 
commanding respect for the exposition of the law which they have to 
deliver".^ Referring to the importance of the independence of the 
Judiciary, an eminent authority, namely, Henry Sidgwick, has gone so far 
as to say that "in determining a nation’s rank in political civilisation, 
no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice as defined by 
the law is actually realised in its judicial administration; both as 
between one private citizen and another, and as between private citizens 
and members of the Government".^
In order to enable the Judiciary to play an effective and vital
2. Robson, W. A., Justice and Administrative Law, London, 3rd edn., 1951, 
p.47.
3. Bryce, James, Modern Democracies, Vol.II, New .York, 1921, p.389.
4. Ibid., p.384.
5. Sidgwick, Henry, The Elements of Politics, London, 2nd edn., 1897, 
p .481.
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role, a democratic state must provide for the following to ensure its 
independence. The Judiciary must be free from any interference from 
Executive; a suitable provision for the appointment of judges must be 
made; the judges must enjoy security of tenure, pay and condition and 
must be able to look forward to adequate prospects of advancement and 
promotion.
(ii) Independence of the Judiciary Under the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, 1972, and Under Martial Law, 1975
The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh provides for the separation 
of the Judiciary from the Executive. Article 22 of the Constitution 
states that "The State shall ensure the separation of the judiciary 
from the executive organ of the State". In fact, this proposition lays 
down the foundation of the doctrine of the Rule of Law in Bangladesh. 
However, the Constitution also provides that, subject to its provisions, 
"the Chief Justice (of the Supreme Court) and the other Judges shall be 
independent in the exercise of their judicial functions".
(a) Appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court
(aa) Provisions Relating to the Appointment of Judges a,s in Force before 
the 1975,Martial Law
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh, which comprises the Appellate 
Division and the High Court Division, is the highest court of judgment 
in Bangladesh. With regard to the appointment of the judges of the 
Supreme Court, the 1972 Constitution originally provided that "The 
Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President, and the other 
judges shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the 
Chief Justice".^
6. Article 94(4), the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
7. Article 95, ibid.
293
Thus this procedure for the appointment of the Chief Justice and 
other judges of the Supreme Court was in accordance with the suggestion 
of the International Congress of Jurists, held in New Delhi in January 
1959, that, whatever body actually makes judicial appointment, it is 
desirable that the Judiciary should itself co-operate or at least be
i- j 8 consulted.
However, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, passed on 
25 January 1975 by Parliament during the Awami League regime, enacted 
that "The Chief Justice and other judges shall be appointed by the
9
President”.
Thus the President’s obligation to consult the Chief Justice while 
appointing puisne judges of the Supreme Court was dispensed with.
(ab) Provisions Relating to the Appointment of Judges as Amended by the 
1975 Martial Law Regime
The Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 (Second 
Proclamation Order No.IV of 1976), issued by the President and the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, A. M. Sayem, on 28 May 1976, replaced 
the Supreme Court with two separate Courts, namely the High Court and 
the Supreme Court.^ However, with regard to the appointment of Supreme 
Court judges, this Second Proclamation Order continued provided that 
"The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the 
President and other judges shall be appointed by the
8. Clause II of the Report of Committee IV, International Congress of 
Jurists, 1959.
9. Article 14(1) of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975.
10. It may be noted here that the High Court as a separate Court was to 
have all powers, functions,and jurisdictions as were originally 
conferred on the High Court Division of the Supreme Court by the 
1972 Constitution. On the other hand, the Supreme Court was to 
exercise appellate and advisory jurisdictions and power to review 
any judgment pronounced or orders made by it as were originally 
bestowed on the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
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President after consultation with the Chief Justice".^* With regard to 
the appointment of High Court judges, it was provided that "A Judge of 
the High Court shall be appointed by the President after consultation 
with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and, except where the 
appointment is that of Chief Justice, with the Chief Justice of the 
High Court".^
Thus in exercising his power of appointment, the President was to 
consult the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court and the High Court who 
were in the best possible position to assess the probable fitness of 
the men likely to prove successful on the bench. However, the provisions
relating to the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court were a
. . . .  13
reproduction of the provisions contained in Article 50(1) of the 1962
Constitution of Pakistan. Similarly, the provisions relating to the
appointment of judges of the High Court were identical with those of 
14Article 92(1) of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan except the words 
"with the Governor of the Province concerned".
Later, the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977 
(Second Proclamation Order No.I of 1977), which was issued on 
27 November 1977 by President Ziaur Rahman, restored the Supreme Court 
as it was originally in the Constitution, with two divisions, namely
11. Article 4 of the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order,
1976.
12. Ibid.
13. Article 50(1) of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, which was in
fact the reproduction of Article 149(1) of the 1956 Constitution
of Pakistan, provided that "The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
shall be appointed by the President, and the other Judges shall be 
appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice."
14. Article 92(1) of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, which was
virtually the reproduction of Article 166(1) of the 1956 Constitution,
stated that "A Judge of a High. Court shall be appointed by the 
President after consultation - (a) with the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court; (b) with the Governor of the Province concerned; and 
(c) except where the appointment is that of Chief Justice - with the 
Chief Justice of the High Court".
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the Appellate Division and the High Court D i v i s i o n . I t  provided that
16
"The Chief Justice and other Judges shall be appointed by the President".
Therefore, it is evident that this Proclamation Order freed the 
President from the obligation of consulting the Chief Justice in making 
appointments of the judges of the Supreme Court and restored the method 
of appointment as it was introduced by the Constitution (Fourth 
Amendment) Act, 1975. This left the door too wide open for the President, 
who could not be expected to know the bar properly, to exercise his 
power of appointing judges of the Supreme Court. He was likely to be 
moved by political considerations and to measure fitness in terms of 
political eminence rather than judicial quality. Thus the President’s 
power of appointment was not invested with safeguards to ensure that 
appointments would be made only with the needs of the office in view.
(b) Provisions Relating to the Appointments, Control and Discipline of 
Subordinate Courts Both Before and After the 1975 Martial Law
Regarding the appointment of subordinate judicial officers, it
was originally laid down in the Constitution that "Appointments of
persons to offices in the judicial services or as magistrates exercising
judicial functions shall be made by the President - (a) in the case of
district judges, on the recommendation of the Supreme Court; and (b) in
the case of any other person, in accordance with rules made by the^
President in that behalf after consulting the appropriate Public Service
Commission and the Supreme Court".^
Therefore, it is evident that the methods of appointment of
persons to offices in the judicial services or as magistrates exercising
15. The powers, functions and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were, 
in effect, restored as it was originally in the 1972 Constitution 
of Bangladesh. ,
16. Article 2 of the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977.
17. Article 115 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
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judicial functions were also in conformity with the proposal of the
International Congress of Jurists held in New Delhi that, whatever
body actually makes judicial appointment, it is desirable that the
18
Judiciary should itself co-operate or at least be consulted.
Later, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act.. 1975 enacted that
"Appointments of persons to offices in the judicial service or as
magistrates exercising judicial functions shall be made by the President
19
in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf".
Thus the President was given wide and unfettered power to appoint 
such subordinate judicial officers. He could not always be expected to 
take a non-partisan stance. He could sometimes use his power of 
appointment to elevate members of his own party.
However, the Martial Law regime did not change the system of 
appointments introducd by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, 
relating to the appointment of persons to offices in the judicial 
service or as magistrates exercising judicial functions.
Article 116 of the 1972 Constitution originally provided that 
"The control (including the power of posting, promotion and grant of 
leave) and discpline of persons employed in the judicial service and 
magistrates exercising judicial functions shall vest in the Supreme 
Court".
It appears that this procedure was ,we 11 calculated to maintain 
the integrity and independence of the subordinate courts for it empowered 
the highest court of justice in Bangladesh, the Supreme Court, only to 
control and discipline such courts.
By the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 (Act II of 1975),
18. Supra, footnote 8, p.293.
19. Article 19, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975.
297
the Supreme Court was replaced by the President as the authority to
20
control and discipline subordinate courts. The conferment of such 
powers on the President made it possible that a political protege 
would be too rapidly promoted.
Later, the Second Proclamation (Fifteenth Amendment) Order, 1978 
(Order No.IV of 1978), issued by the President and the Chief Martial 
Law Administrator, Ziaur Rahman, on 18 December 1978, provided that 
"The control (including the power of posting, promotion and grant of 
leave) and discipline of persons employed in the judicial service and 
magistrates exercising judicial functions shall vest in the President 
and shall be exercised by him in consultation with the Supreme Court".
Therefore, it is evident that some restriction was imposed on 
the unfettered power of the President to control and discipline 
subordinate courts. It was made obligatory that the President should 
consult the Supreme Court in exercising such powers. Thus although 
the Martial Law regime did not restore the original power of the Supreme 
Court to control and discipline subordinate courts, it gave the Supreme 
Court the opportunity to express its opinion with regard to such 
matters.
(c) Tenure of Office of Judges of the Supreme Court
(cc) Provisions Relating to the Tenure of Office of Judges of the 
Supreme Court as in Force Before the 1975 Martial Law
Nothing can contribute so much to the firmness and independence 
of the Judiciary as permanency in office since it enables the judge to 
decide a case without fear of the consequences regardless of whether 
the decision does or does not please some other person or persons.
20. Article 20, ibid.
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Therefore, once appointed, a judge should obviously hold office for a
long term, preferably for life or during good behaviour. He should be
removable during his tenure only for misconduct. Such removal must of
necessity be made a difficult process, involving careful consideration
by more than one person; otherwise a judge cannot acquire that habit
of independence requisite in his office. The guarantee of personal
independence shields the judge from any personal political pressure on
the part of the Executive.
Considering this reality, it was originally enacted in the 1972
Constitution of Bangladesh that "A judge of the Supreme Court shall
21
hold office until he attains the age of sixty-two years". "A judge
shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President
passed pursuant to a resolution of Parliament supported by a majority of
not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of Parliament,
22
on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity". Parliament might
by law regulate the procedure in relation to its resolution for removal,
investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge of
23
the Supreme Court.
Thus it is evident that under the original constitutional
provisions, the permanency of tenure of the judges of the Supreme Court
was ensured. They were to hold office for a long term and could riot be 
removed during their tenure, even for misbehaviour or incapacity, by the 
President acting alone. The support of an absolute majority of at
least two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament was necessary
to pass an effective resolution for removal. Thus the procedure for 
the removal of the judges of the Supreme Court was made difficult and
21. Article 96(1), the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
22. Article 96(2), ibid. ,
» 23. Article 96(3), ibid.
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cumbersome, providing an important safeguard of the rule of law.
Although the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, kept
intact the original provision of the Constitution that a judge of the
Supreme Court would hold office until he attains the age of sixty-two
years, it introduced a new provision that "A judge may be removed from
his office by order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour or 
24
incapacity". There was a condition to the effect that "no judge shall
be removed until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing
25
cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him".
Therefore, the tenure of the office of judges of the Supreme Court 
was, in effect, made dependent on the will of their appointing authority, 
the President. This provided the scope for the President to remove 
judges he did not like and to appoint those he favoured and thus to have 
cases decided according to his own preference. Thus the independence of 
the Judiciary virtually came to an end.
(cd) Provisions Relating to the Tenure of Office of Judges of the
Supreme Court and the High Court as Amended by the 1975 Martial 
Law Regime
Later, the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976,
which separated the High Court from the Supreme Court, laid down that
"a Judge of the Supreme Court shall hold office until he attains the
26age of sixty-five years". But "a Judge of the High Court shall hold
27
office until he attains the age of sixty-two years". "A Judge of 
the Supreme Court or of the High Court shall not be removed from his 
office except by an order of the President made pursuant to a resolution .
24. Article 15, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975.
25. Ibid.
26. Article 4, the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976.
27. Ibid.
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of Parliament passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
total number of members of Parliament on the ground of proved
28misbehaviour, or incapacity11. "Parliament may b^ law regulate the 
procedure in relation to a resolution ... (of removal) and for
investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge
29
of the Supreme Court or of the High Court” . "A Judge of the Supreme
Court or of the High Court may resign his office by writing under his
30
hand addressed to the President".
Thus the Martial Law regime made a distinction in respect of the 
tenure of office between the judges of the Supreme Court and the judges 
of the High Court. It gave the judges of the Supreme Court longer 
tenure of office (i.e. sixty-five years) than it was originally provided 
by the Constitution (i.e. sixty-two years). Moreover, the original 
procedure for removing the judges of the Supreme Court, which was 
dropped by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, was 
reinstated.
Later, the Proclamations(Amendment) Order, 1977 (Proclamations 
Order No.I of 1977), issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator,
Ziaur Rahman, only a day after his assuming the office of the President, 
on 22 April 1977, changed this method of removal of judges of the 
Supreme Court and the High Court. As it provided that a judge of the
Supreme Court or of the High Court was only to be removed from office
. 3 1
by the President on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.
The Supreme Judicial Council "... shall consist of the Chief Justice of
32Bangladesh, and the two next senior Judges of the Supreme Court".
28. Ibid. .
29. lETH~.
30. Ib id.
31. Article 2 of the Proclamations (Amendment) Order, 1977.
32. Ibid.
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But "if, at any time, the Council is inquiring into the capacity or
conduct of a Judge who is a member of the Council, or a member of the
%
Council is absent or is unable to act due to illness or other cause,
the Judge of the Supreme Court who is next in seniority to those who
33are members of the Council shall act as such member". "The functions 
of the Council shall be - (a) to prescribe a Code of Conduct to be 
observed by the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court; and
(b) to inquire into the capacity or conduct of a Judge of the Supreme 
Court or of the High Court or of any other functionary who is not
removable from off ice except in like manner as a Judge of the Supreme
34Court or of the High Court". "Where, upon any information received
from the Council or from any other source, the President has reason to
apprehend that a Judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court -
(a) may have ceased to be capable of properly performing the functions
of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity, or (b) may
have been guilty of gross misconduct, the President may direct the
35
Council to inquire into the matter and report its finding". "If,
after making the inquiry, the Council reports to the President that in
its opinion the Judge has ceased to be capable of properly performing
the functions of his office or has been guilty of gross misconduct, the
36President shall by order, remove the Judge from office". For the
purpose of such an inquiry "the Council shall regulate its procedure
and shall have, in respect of issue and execution of processes, the
37
same power as the Supreme Court". However, "A Judge of the Supreme 
Court or of the High Court may resign his office by writing under his
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
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38
hand addressed to the President".
It seems that this amendment of the procedure for removing the 
judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court was necessary in view 
of the fact that Parliament had been dissolved on 8 November 1975 and, 
as such, the removal of judges by an order of the President made
pursuant to A resolution of Parliament passed by a majority of not less
than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament on the 
grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity was not possible. However, 
the Proclamations (Amendment) Order introduced substantial changes in 
the removal procedure of the judges from their offices. This change 
was a salutary step towards the independence of the Judiciary of 
Bangladesh as the independent constitutional body, the Supreme Judicial 
Council, provided security of tenure to judges. This new procedure for
removing a judge was well calculated to maintain the integrity and
independence of the Judiciary for it only empowered the most senior 
judges of the Supreme Court to perform disciplinary functions, rather 
than leaving it to the whim of the Executive or to the control of the 
Legislature.
This new method of removal of judges of the Supreme Court and the
High Court by the President on the recommendation of the Supreme
Judicial Council was in conformity with the suggestion of the
International Congress of Jurists held in New Delhi in 1959 that "The
reconciliation of the principle of irremovability of the Judiciary with
the possibility of removal in exceptional circumstances necessitates
that the grounds for removal should be before a body of judicial
character assuring at least the same safeguards to the judge as would
. 3 9
be accorded to an accused person in a criminal trial". Moreover,
38. Ibid.
39. Clause IV of the Report of Committee IV, International Congress of 
Jurists held in New Delhi in 1959.
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this procedure for removing the judges resembled the procedure that 
had been introduced by Article 128 of the 1962 Constitution of 
Pakistan.^
Later, the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977, 
which merged the High Court with the Supreme Court, incorporated into 
it the provisions for the Supreme Judicial Council with regard to the
40. Article 128 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan provided that
"(1) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan, 
in this Article referred to as ’the Council’.
(2) The Council shall consist of
(a) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.*
(b) the two next most senior Judges of the Supreme Court; and
(c) the Chief Justice of each High Court.
(3) If, at any time, the Council is inquiring into the 
capacity or conduct of a Judge who is a member of the Council, 
or a member of the Council is absent or is unable to act as a 
member of the Council due to illness or some other cause, the 
Judge of the Supreme Court who is next in seniority below the 
Judges referred to in paragraph (b) of clause (2) of this 
Article shall act as a member of the Council in his place.
(4) The Council shall issue a code of conduct to be observed 
by Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts. .
(5) If, on information received from the Council or from any 
other source, the President is of the opinion that a Judge of 
the Supreme Court or of a High Court -
(a) may be incapable of properly performing the duties of his
office by reason of physical or mental incapacity; or
(b) may have been guilty of gross misconduct, the President 
shall direct the Council to inquire into the matter.
(6) If, after inquiring into the matter, the Council reports 
to the President that it is of the opinion -
(a) that the Judge is incapable of performing the duties of 
his office or has been guilty of gross misconduct; and
(b) that he should be removed from office, the President may 
remove the Judge from office. '
(7) A Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court shall not 
be removed from office except as provided by this Article."
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removal of judges of the Supreme Coutt. Under this new Proclamation,
a judge was to "hold office until he attains the age of sixty-two 
A2
years". Thus the original tenure of office of judges was restored.
(d) Remuneration and Privileges of Judges of the Supreme Court
(dd) Provisions Relating to the Remuneration and Privileges of Judges 
as in Force Before the 1975 Martial Law of Bangladesh
If the judges are to be independent, they should be given adequate 
salaries and granted appropriate privileges so that they remain free 
from any outside pressure or temptation to better their pecuniary 
conditions by illegal means. Their salaries and privileges must not be 
reduced or withheld during their tenure of office. In this respect, the 
views expressed by the International Congress of Jurists held in New 
Delhi in 1959, is noteworthy:
"It is implicit in the concept of the independence of the 
Judiciary that provision should be made for the adequate 
remuneration of the Judiciary and that a judge’s right to 
the remuneration settled for his office should not during 
his term of office be altered to his disadvantage."^^
Considering this concept, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh provides
that the remuneration, privileges and other terms and conditions of
service of a judge of the Supreme Court "shall not be varied to ...
44(his) disadvantage ... during his term of office."
These provisions resembled those of Article 175(1) of the 1956
41. Article 2(4) of the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order,
1977.
42. Ibid.
43. Clause I of Report of Committee IV, International Congress of
Jurists held in New Delhi in 1959.
44. Clauses (2) and 4(e) of Article 147 of the 1972 Constitution of
Bangladesh.
3 0 5
45
Constitution of Pakistan.
Only three and a quarter months after the 1972 Constitution came 
into effect on 22 March 1973, the Supreme Court Judges (Terms and 
Conditions of Service) Order, 1973, (President's Order No. 21 of 1973) 
was promulgated. This Order provided that "There shall be paid to the
Chief Justice a salary of Taka 2,500 per mensem and to every other Judge
A6 •a salary of Taka 2,000 per mensem". "The Chief Justice shall be
entitled to a rent-free and furnished residence and shall be exempt from
payment of any charges in respect of such residence including electric,
. . 47water and gas charges, municipal tax and local rates." Similarly
"Every Judge shall be entitled to a rent-free and furnished residence
and shall be exempt from payment of any charges in respect of such
residence including electric, water and gas charges, municipal tax and
local rates, or a residence allowance of Taka 850 per mensem in lieu 
48thereof." "The Chief Justice and every other Judge shall be entitled
to free transport for attending Court or to other official business or
49a car allowance of Taka 650 per mensem in lieu thereof." They "shall
50
be entitled to telephone at their residence free of all charges."
'.’The Chief Justice arid every other Judge and their families shall be 
entitled to medical facilities admissible under the Special Medical 
Attendance Rules, except that they and their families shall be entitled 
to receive medical treatment at their r e s i d e n c e " S u b j e c t  to the
45. As Article 175(1) of the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan provided 
that "The remuneration and other conditions of service of a 
Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court shall not be varied 
to his disadvantage during his tenure of office.
46. Article 3, the Supreme Court Judges (Terms and Conditions of 
Services) Order, 1973.
47. Article 4, ibid.
48. Article 5, ibid.
49. Article 6, ibid.
50. Article 7, ibid. ,
51. Article 8, ibid.
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provisions of this Order, the Chief Justice and every other Judge shall
be entitled to all the privileges and allowances and to all the rights
in respect of leave, pension, gratuity and provident fund to which the
Chief Justice and the other Judges of the Supreme Court were entitled
52
immediately before” 22 March 1973. "The Chief Justice and every
other Judge shall be exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries
53and on any allowances payable to them under this Order."
It should be noted here that the judges of the Supreme Court were
given a salary which was well above average. The remuneration payable
54to them is to be charged upon the Consolidated Fund and "so much of the
annual financial statement as relates to expenditure charged upon the
Consolidated Fund may be discussed in, but shall not be submitted to,
55the vote of Parliament". Besides giving a guarantee of a reasonable 
salary, the judges were granted considerable privileges so that they 
could maintain a good standard of living without resorting to corruption.
(de) Provisions Relating to the Remuneration and Privileges of Judges as 
Amended by the 1975 Martial Law Regime
The Supreme Court Judges (Terms and Conditions of Service)
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (Ordinance No.LIII of 1975), which was issued
by President Abusadat Mohammad Sayem on 27 November 1975, and was deemed
to have come into force on 1 August 1974, provided that the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court would be paid a salary of Taka 3,000 per mensem and
56every other judge a salary of Taka 2,500 per mensem. It also enacted
52. Article 9, ibid.
53. Article 10, ibid.
54. Article 88(b)(li), the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
55. Article 89(1), ibid.
56. Article 2, the Supreme Court Judges (Terms add Conditions of Service)
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1975.
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that
"The Chief Justice and every other Judge shall be entitled 
to the use of official transport on the same terms as are 
admissible to a Secretary to the Government or, in lieu 
thereof, a car allowance of Taka 650 per mensem.
Therefore, it is evident that the Mattial Law regime enhanced the
salary of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from Taka 2,500 to
Taka 3,000 per month and that of other judges from Taka 2,000 to Taka
2,500 per month. Previously the Chief Justice and every other judge
was entitled to free transport for attending court or other official
business. But under the new provisions, they "shall be entitled to the
use of official transport on the same terms as are admissible to a
Secretary to the Government".
Later, on 13 August 1976, President A. M. Sayem promulgated the
Supreme Court and the High Court Judges (Remuneration and Privileges)
Ordinance, 1976 (Ordinance No.LXV of 1976) which repealed the Supreme
Court Judges (Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1973. Yet the
provisions relating to the privileges in respect of residence and
telephone as provided by the Supreme Court Judges (Terms and Conditions
58
of Service) Order, 1973, were enacted in the new Ordinance. Moreover,
57. Article 3, ibid.
58. The new Ordinance, the Supreme Court and the High Court Judges 
(Remuneration and Privileges) Ordinance, 1976, provided that:
”3. (1) There shall be paid to the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court a salary of Taka 3,000 per mensem and to every other 
Judge, including the Chief Justice of the High Court, a salary 
of Taka 2,500 per mensem.
(2) No income-tax shall be payable in respect of salary payable 
to a Judge.
4. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would be paid a sumptuary 
allowance of Taka 700 per mensem; a Judge, other than the Chief 
Justice, of the Supreme Court would be paid’Taka 600 per mensem 
and the Chief Justice of the High Court Taka 500 per mensem.
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
the provisions concerning salary and use of official transport were the
same as they had been under the Supreme Court Judges (Terms and Conditions
*
of Service) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975. But the new Ordinance for the
first time provided for the payment of a sumptuary allowance of Take 700
per month to the Chief Justice and of Taka 600 per month to other judges
of the Supreme Court. Similarly, the Chief Justice of the High Court
was to be given a sumptuary allowance of Taka 500 per month. Apart from
the inclusion of medical facilities as had been granted before by the
Supreme Court Judges (Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1973, the
new Ordinance went so far as to lay down that "such medical facilities
shall continue to be admissible after the Judge has retired or otherwise
59ceased to held office".
5. A Judge shall be entitled to, and provided with, -
(a) a furnished residence free from the payment of any rent and 
charges on account of municipal taxes and local rates and of the 
use of electricity, water and gas and, until such residence is 
provided, a Judge shall be paid a residence allowance of Taka 
850 per mensem;
(b) an official transport on the same terms as are admissible to 
a Secretary to the Government and, until such transport is 
provided, a Judge shall be paid a car allowance of Taka 650
per mensem; and
i
(c) a telephone at his residence at Government expense.
6. A Judge and the members of his family shall be entitled to medical 
facilities admissible under the Special Medical Attendance Rules, 
except that he and the members of his family shall be entitled
to medical treatment at the residence of the Judge; and such 
medical facilities shall continue to be admissible after the 
Judge has retired or otherwise ceased to hold office.
7. Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, a Judge shall be 
entitled to all the rights, privileges and allowance in respect 
of leave, pension, gratuity and provident fund as were admissible 
to him immediately before" 13 August 1976.
59. In fact, these provisions were first laid down in Article 2 of the 
Supreme Court Judges (Terms and Conditions of Service) (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1976 (Ordinance No.XXXI of 1976) which was issued by 
President A. M. Sayem on 12 May 1976.
i t
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II Restrictions Imposed on the Powers and Jurisdiction of the 
Judiciary by the Martial Law Regime
The Proclamation of 20 August 1975, which was issued by
President Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed and provided the legal framework
for the new order, stated that:
"no Court, including the Supreme Court, or tribunal or 
authority shall have any power to call in question in any 
manner whatsoever or declare illegal or void this 
Proclamation or any Martial Law Regulation or Order (or 
other order) made by me in pursuance thereof, or any 
declaration made by or under this Proclamation, or 
mentioned in this proclamation to have been made, or 
anything done or any action taken by or under this 
Proclamation, or mentioned in this Proclamation to have 
been done or taken, or anything done or any action taken 
by or under any Martial Law Regulation or Order (or other 
o r d e r ) m a d e  by me in pursuance of this P r o c l a m a t i o n . " ^
Thus all courts, including the Supreme Court, were precluded
from questioning any Proclamation, Martial Law Regulations or Order
or any action taken by or under them. These provisions resembled
63
those of Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958,
64 . .
and of Article 5 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, issued 
by President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan on 10 October 1958, and Chief 
Martial Law Administrator General Yahya Khan on 31 March 1969 
respectively.
60. The words within first brackets were inserted after the words 
"Regulations or Order" by Proclamation Order No.I of 1975.
61. Ibid.
62. Clause (g) of the Proclamation,
63., Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force), Order, 1958, 
provided that "No court or person shall call or permit to be 
called in question - (i) the Proclamation (ii) any Order made 
in pursuance of the Proclamation or any Martial Law Order or 
Martial Law Regulation ...."
64. ,Article 5 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969, stated 
that "No Court, tribunal or other authority shall call or permit 
to be called in question: (a) the Proclamation; (b) any Order 
made in pursuance of the Proclamation or any, Martial Law 
Regulation or Martial Law Order ...."
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Here it may be recalled that Regulation 4(9) provided that no 
court, including the High Court and the Supreme Court, should have any 
power to call in question any order, judgment, decision or sentence of 
a Martial Law Court. The calling for the records of the proceedings 
of such a Court by any court, including the High Court and the Supreme 
Court, was prohibited by the Martial Law (Twenty-Third Amendment) 
Regulations, 1976.
Nearly two years after the proclamation of Martial Law, on 
6 March 1977, the Courts' Jurisdiction (Restriction) Regulation, 1977 
(Martial Law Regulation No.XXXIV of 1977) was issued by the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator, Ziaur Rahman, This Regulation imposed 
serious restrictions on the powers of the High Court and other courts 
of the country.
Clause 2 of the Courts' Jurisdiction (Restriction) Regulation, 
which placed limitation on the power of the High Court to make 'interim 
orders' provided that:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, 
where on an application made before the High Court under 
clause (2)66 or sub-clause (a)6 ? of clause (3) of article 
102 of the Constitution an interim order is prayed for, the 
High Court shall not make an interim order unless the person
65. See infra, footnote 76 of this chapter.
6 6 . Clause 2 of Article 102 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh as 
amended by the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976, 
provided that "The High Court, on the application of any person 
aggrieved, may give such directions or orders to any person or 
authority, including any person performing any function in 
connection with the affairs of the Republic, as may be appropriate 
for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by 
Part III of this Constitution".
67. Sub-clause (a) of Clause (3) of Article 102 of the 1972 Constitution
as amended by the.Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order,
1976, stated that "The High Court may, if satisfied that no other
equally efficacious remedy is provided by law -
*
(a) on the application of any person aggrieved, make an order -
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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or authority against whom or which the interim order is 
prayed for has been given a reasonable notice of the 
application and has been given an opportunity of being 
heard, and the High Court is satisfied that the interim 
order would not have the effect of prejudicing or inter­
fering with any measure designed to implement any 
development plan or programme or any development or public 
work, or of being otherwise harmful to the public 
interest ...."68
Similarly,,Clause 3(1) of the Regulation provided that "The Court 
shall not make or pass an order of temporary or ad-interim injunction 
unless ...." it "is satisfied that the order of temporary or ad-interim 
injunction would not have the effect of prejudicing or interfering with 
any measure designed to implement any development plan or programme or
(i) directing a person performing any functions in connection 
with the affairs of the Republic or of a local authority to 
refrain from doing that which he is not permitted by law to do 
or to do that which he is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken by a person 
performing functions in connection with the affairs of the 
Republic or of a local authority has been done or taken without 
lawful authority and is of no legal effect."
68. Almost similar provisions were inserted in clause 4 of Article 102 
of the 1972 Constitution by the Second Proclamation (Tenth 
Amendment) Order, 1977 (issued by President Ziaur Rahman on 
27 November 1977) which also rearranged Article 102 that contains 
the power of the High Court Division to issue certain orders and 
directions; clause 4 provides that "Where on an application made 
under clause (1) (previously clause 2, see footnote 66) or sub­
clause (a) of clause (2) (previously sub-clause a of clause (3), 
see footnote 67) an interim order is prayed for and such interim 
order is likely to have the effect of -
(a) prejudicing or interfering with any measure designed to 
implement any development programme, or any development work; or
(b) being otherwise harmful to the public interest, the High 
Court Division shall not make an interim order unless the 
Attorney-General has been given reasonable notice of the 
application and he (or an advocate authorised by him in that 
behalf) has been given an opportunity of being heard, and the High 
Court Division is satisfied that the interim order would not have 
the effect referred to in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b)."
These provisions resemble those of sub-clauses (a) and (b) 
of clause 4 of Article 98 of the 196? Constitution of Pakistan as 
amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 (I of 
1964).
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any development, or public work, or of being otherwise harmful to the 
public interest."
Clause 4 of the Regulation, which imposed severe restrictions on 
the power of the courts to issue writs, injunctions, etc., in certain 
cases, stated:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution or 
in any other law for the time being in force or in paragraphs 
2 and 3, no Court, including the High Court, shall -
(a) entertain any petition, plaint, application or prayer which 
asks for any writ, injunction or other order seeking to prohibit 
or restrain the Government or any Public Service Commission or 
other authority constituted by or under the Constitution or any 
other law or any corporation or other statutory body from making 
any appointment to any post or service or from conducting any 
test, examination or other proceeding for selection of candidates 
for appointment to any post or service or from performing any 
other functions in respect of such appointment, test, 
examination or other proceeding; or
(b) issue, make or pass on any petition or in any suit or other 
proceeding any writ or any temporary or ad-interim injunction or 
any other order or direction which prohibits, restrains, obstructs 
or in any manner interferes with, or has the effect of 
prohibiting, restraining, obstructing or in any manner inter­
fering with, the making of any appointment to any post or service 
or the conduct of any test, examination or other proceeding or 
the performance of any function connected therewith.
(2) All petitions, suits and legal proceedings pending in any
Court including the High Court in which any such writ, injunction
*
or order as is referred to in clause (a) of sub-paragraph (1) has
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been asked for, in so far as it relates to such writ, injunction 
or order, shall abate forthwith and shall not be further 
proceeded with.
(3) Any writ, injunction, order or direction made, passed or 
issued in contravention of clause (b) of sub-paragraph (1), shall 
be void ...."
Therefore, it is evident that restrictions were imposed on the
powers of the High Court and other courts to make interim orders and to
pass temporary or ad-interim injunctions respectively that would have
the effect of prejudicing or interfering with any measure designed to
implement any development plan or programme or any development or public
work, or of being otherwise harmful to the public interest. Similarly,
limitations were placed on all courts, including the High Court, to
issue, make or pass any writ or any temporary or ad-interim injunction
or any other order or direction that would prohibit, restrain, obstruct
or in any manner interfere with the making of any appointment to any
post or service or the conduct of any test, examination or other
proceeding or the performance of any function connected therewith. The
courts, including the High Court, were even prohibited to receive or
entertain any petition, plaint, application or prayer which would ask
for any writ, injunction or other order seeking to restrain the
government, or any Public Service Commission or other statutory body
or any corporation from making any appointments to any post or service
or from conducting any test, examination or other proceeding for
selection of candidates for appointment to any post or service or from
performing any other functions connected therewith. These provisions
struck at the very root of the judicial power of the courts to hear
and determine any matter or controversy which is brought before them,
*
even if it is to decide whether they have the jurisdiction to determine
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such a matter or not. It denied to the courts the performance of
their judicial function, a step opposed to the concept of law as it is
essentially within the jurisdiction of courts to determine whether
their jurisdiction to try a dispute is precluded by law. In this
context, the observation of Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury of the
High Court Division of the Supreme Court in the case of Haji Joynal Abedin 
69
v. the State are worthy of note:
,fthe judicial power of the superior courts can never be 
taken away. This power exists as long as the court 
exists. This power is available even where the ^
jurisdiction of the superior courts have been barred."
Similar views were expressed by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman of 
Pakistan in the case of Asma Jilani v. Government of the Panjab^  in 
connection with the provisions of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal 
of Doubts) Order, 1969 (President’s Order No.3 of 1969, issued on 
30 June 1969) that no court, tribunal or other authority, including 
the Supreme Court and a High Court would receive or entertain any 
complaint, petition, application or other representation whatsoever 
against, or in relation to the exercise of any power or jurisdiction 
by, any Special Military Court or Summary Military Court, or any Martial 
Law Authority or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction derived 
from Martial Law Authority:
"... ’judicial power1 is different from ’jurisdiction’ and 
so far as judicial power is concerned it must exist in 
Courts as long as the Courts are there ... these provisions 
of the Presidential Order No.3 of 1969, which seek to take
69. Dhaka Law Reports, Vol.XXX, 1978, p.371
70. Ibid., p.384. ,
71. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XXIV, 1972, 
p.139.
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away the judicial power itself. . .(are) 'absurdities1... 
that the Courts have and must have the power to determine 
all questions of their own jurisdiction. It is a 
proposition so well-settled that no one can challenge it... 
that the Constitution can confer or restrict the 
jurisdiction of even superior Courts but this is not the 
same thing as saying that it can also restrict or curtail 
the judicial power, because, that in effect would be 
denying to the Court the very function for which it exists, 
i.e. to decide a controversy even if it relates to its own 
jurisdiction."^
In the same case, Justice Sajjad Ahmad declared similar views even more 
forcefully and clearly:
"... Order Nd.3 of 1969 must be struck down, as it seeks 
to destroy the judicial power which vests inherently and 
constitutionally in the judicature of the country ....
The totality of judicial power resides in the judicature 
of Pakistan, whose powers for dispensation of justice as 
the trustee of the Society, are indestructable, and 
cannot be taken away by the arbitrary will of an individual. 
To the judiciary is committed the duty of being the watch­
dog of the actions and virtues of the other co-ordinate 
limbs of the State . . . while the jurisdiction of superior 
Courts may be regulated by the Constitution, any effort to 
destroy the judicial power is a senseless exercise....
The absurdity of Order No.3 of 1969 is heightened by its 
presumptuous effort to lay down that no Court, including 
the Supreme Court and the High Court, shall even receive 
or entertain any complaint, petition or application or 
other representation whatsoever against or in relation to 
the exercise of any power or jurisdiction by any Special 
Military Court or Summary Military Court or any Martial Law 
authority or any person exercising the authority or 
jurisdiction from Martial Law authority. It can never be 
disputed that the Courts alone have the power to determine 
all questions of their own jurisdiction, including the 
negative that they do not have the jurisdiction."'^
It should be stressed here that never before in the history of Martial 
Law Administration in the subcontinent was such a Regulation (i.e. the 
Court’s Jurisdiction (Restriction) Regulation, 1977) issued restricting
72. Ibid., p.198.
73. Ibid., p.261.
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the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, including the superior courts, to
supervise the functions of the civilian administration of the country.
During the previous Martial Law regimes in the subcontinent, the
jurisdiction of civil courts was excluded only to the extent of
questioning the legitimacy of the Martial Law administration. For
example, the Sholapur Martial Law Ordinance, 1930 (IV of 1930) and
the Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance, 1930 (No.VIII of 1930), promulgated
by the British government in India, allowed civil courts to continue
to function in the Martial Law administration area provided they, in
the exercise of their jurisdiction, did not interfere with the Martial
Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders. The Laws (Continuance in
Force) Order, 1958 (President’s Order (Post-Proclamation) Order No.I
of 1958 of Pakistan), which allowed the Supreme Court of Pakistan and
the High Courts of the Provinces to continue to issue the writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
provided that "No writ shall be issued against the Chief Administrator
of Martial Law, or the Deputy Chief Administrator of Martial Law, or
any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under the authority of 
74either". Similarly, the (Pakistan) Provisional Constitution Order, 
1969, stated that "No judgment, decree, writ, order or process 
whatsoever shall be made or issued by any Court or tribunal against the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator or a Deputy Chief Martial Law 
Administrator or any Martial Law Authority exercising powers or 
jurisdiction under the authority of either".^
However, it is evident that the constitutional provisions
74. Article 2(5) of the Laws (Continance in Force) Order, 1958.
75. Article 3(4) of the Provisional Constitution Order of Pakistan, 
1969.
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76relating to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court were neither abrogated nor suspended; only restrictions 
were imposed on such powers by the First Proclamation and the Martial 
Law Regulations. Since the Proclamation, Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders were to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the 
1972 Constitution and the Constitution was allowed to remain operative 
subject to the Proclamation, Martial Law Regulations and Orders, the 
Constitution as such assumed the status of subordinate legislation like 
any other law. Therefore, the writ jurieidiciton of the High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court as provided for by Article 102 of the 
Constitution was to be exercised subject to the restriction imposed by 
the Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations. As Justice Ruhul
76. It should be pointed out that Article 102 of the 1972 Constitution 
of Bangladesh, which was originally almost the same to that of 
Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, speaks of powers 
of High Court Division to issue! certain orders and directions and 
not various kinds of prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari that can be 
issued by it. Although the nameis of various writs have not been 
used in Article 102, the true content of each of the major writs 
has been set out in self-contained propositions. See supra, 
footnotes 66 and 67. In addition to those described in footnotes 
66 and 67, Article 102 also provided that the High Court Division 
may, if satisfied that no other equally efficacious remedy is 
provided by law - "(b) on the application of any person, make an 
order -
(i) directing that a person in custody be brought before it so that 
it may satisfy itself, that he is not being held in custody 
without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner; or
(ii) requiring a person holding or purporting to hold a public 
office to show under what authority he claims to hold that 
office11.
Further it is to be mentioned that the powers to issue orders 
and direction has not been conferred on the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court. Therefore, no writ or petition for an ’order' 
or direction can be moved directly to the Appellate Division except 
in appeal by leave under Article 103 of the Constitution.
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Islam in the case of Banladesh v. Haji Joynal Abedin^ observes:
"So long the Constitution is in force as the supreme law 
of the country, any act done or proceeding taken by a person 
purporting to function in connection with the affairs of the 
Republic or of a local authority may be made the subject- 
matter of review by the High Court in exercise of its writ 
jurisdiction as conferred by Article 102 of the Constitution. 
The moment the country was put under Martial Law, the above 
noted constitutional provision along with other civil laws 
of the country loses its superior p o s i t i o n ? * *  .... The writ 
jurisdiction of the High Court Division as conferred under 
Article 102 of the Constitution is to be exercised subject 
to the bar put under the Proclamations and the Martial Law
Regulations."?9
But the provisions of the Martial Law Regulations that excluded the 
jurisdiction of any court, including the High Court Division and the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, to question orders, 
judgments, sentences or proceedings of a Martial Law Court, were in 
extremely general terms. It was not in all cases that the court’s 
jurisdiction with regard to orders, judgments or sentences of a Martial 
Law Court had been taken away. While the High Court Division would 
not and could not interfere if the order or sentence passed by a 
validly constituted Martial Law Court was within its jurisdiction, there 
was no ouster of jurisdiction where the order or sentence of the Martial 
Law Court was in excess of or without jurisdiction. If a Martial Law 
Court passed a sentence on a person it could not try, or tried an 
offence it had not the power to try, or passed a sentence it was not 
competent to pass, the sentence would be without jurisdiction and would 
not enjoy the immunity from scrutiny by the High Court Division. By 
no declaration could such a sfentence be saved from scrutiny as the
77. Bangladesh Supreme Court Reports, Vol.Ill, No.l, January 1979, p.21.
78. Ibid, p.35. «
79. Ibid, p.40.
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sentence was a nullity and the High Court Division exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 102 of the Constitution could strike down
the sentence. Similarly, when a Martial Law Court was not properly
constituted, that is to say, was coram non judice or acted mala fide,
the High Court Division in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under
Article 102 was competent to make the necessary declaration. Because
the ouster provision in the Martial Law Regulation was never meant to
give protection to judgments delivered, orders made, or proceedings
taken without jurisdiction, or coram non judice or mala fide. In this
context, the observations of the then Chief Justice, Hamoodur Rahman,
80
of Pakistan in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad are 
noteworthy. As he say el:
"... that acts done, proceedings taken or orders made 
incompetently without jurisdiction would not be covered 
by the ouster clause .... Indeed, mala fide acts stand 
on the same footing as acts done without jurisdiction. 
Similarly, acts coram non judice also stand on the same 
footing, because, these words literally mean that they 
have been done by an authority or a body exercising 
judicial or quasi-judicial powers which was not properly 
constituted even under the law under which it was set up 
and that its decision is not a decision of a competent 
authority. If this be so then such acts do not also 
qualify for validation and they have not been saved from 
scrutiny by the ouster clause, no matter how widely that 
ouster clause may be worded".81
The above view was echoed by Justice Ruhul Islam of the Appellate
Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court in the case of Ehteshamuddin 
82
v. Bangladesh, when he observed:
80. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XXVI, 1974, 
p.151.
81. Ibid, p.168, *
82. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol.XXXIII, 1981, p.154.
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"The moment any Martial Law Court is found to have acted 
without jurisdiction, more precisely, has taken cognizance 
of an offence not,triable by such Courts under the Martial 
Law Regulation, or the Martial Law Court is not properly 
constituted, the Superior Court's power to declare the 
proceedings wholly illegal and without any lawful authority 
in exercise of its power under Article 102°the Constitution 
cannot be denied. The power of the superior Courts can be 
extended to examine jurisdiction of Martial Law Court when 
it is found that it is coram non judice^?.. when a Martial 
Law Court ... has acted mala fide, the power of the superior 
Courts under Article 102 of the Constitution in a appropriate 
case may be exercised".®^
This view was also held by Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury in the same 
case:
"No ouster clause can operate to oust the jurisdiction of 
a superior Court, unless the superior Court itself is 
satisfied that by such ouster clause the jurisdiction is 
ousted because the actions that had been performed are not 
mala fide or in excess or in coram non judice and in violation
of the statute".85
Therefore,,it is clear that, in spite of the exclusion of the jurisdiction
of courts by express words, the superior courts could still retain the
jurisdiction to question the proceeding taken without jurisdiction,
coram non judice or mala fide. In fact, this view was consistently
followed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh
in a number of other cases. For example, in civil petition no. 42 of
86
1980 in the case of Ismail Howlader v. Government of Bangladesh where 
no Challenge was made against the order of a Special Martial Law Court 
on the ground of mala fide or coram non judice, the Appellate Division 
observed that:
83. Ibid., p.164.
84. Ibid., p.170.
85. Ibid., p.172.
86. Unreported.
321
"The order of the Martial Law Court cannot be challenged
... except on the ground of male fide or want of
jurisdiction ... (the) two principle requisites for 
interference with an order of Martial Law Courts".
Similarly, in criminal appeal no. 24 of 1980 in the case of Government
88
of Bangladesh v. Syed A. M. Mahbubur Rashid (arising out of writ
petition no. 805 of 1979), the Appellate Division held that the Supreme
Court had "the power ... to interfere with a decision of Martial Law 
authorities or Martial Law Court in case of total absence of
89jurisdiction or in the case of mala fide exercise of power".
Thus the views of the superior courts of Pakistan and Bangladesh
with regard to ouster provision are in conformity with that of
Lord Thankerton of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the
90
case of Secretary of State v. Mask and Company, wherein the latter 
had observed:
"It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction 
of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but 
that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or 
clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if 
jurisdiction is so excluded,'the Civil Courts have 
jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of 
the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory 
tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental 
principles of judicial procedure,"9i
87. Ibid.
88. Unreported.
89. Ibid.
90. All India Reporter, Privy Council, Vol.XXVIL, 1940, L.R., 671, 
A, p.105.
91. Ibid., p.110.
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III The Judicial Role in the Protection of Fundamental Rights
(i) Nature of the Fundamental Rights Guaranteed by the 1972 
Constitution of Bangladesh
Like most Constitutions of the World, the 1972 Constitution of
Bangladesh guarantees ’Fundamental Rights’ under Part III. The object
of their incorporation into the Constitution, as indicated in the
Preamble, is that:
”... it shall be a fundamental aim of the State to 
realise through the democratic process a socialist 
society, free from exploitation - a society in which 
the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, 
equality and justice, political, economic and social, 
will be secured for all citizens.”
Some of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution are
limited to citizens, while some are applicable to all persons,
citizens and non-citizens alike.
The rights which are available to all persons are: (i) Protection
92of right to life and personal liberty; (ii) Safeguards as to arrest
93 . . .  94
and detention; (lii) Prohibition of forcedilabour; (iv) Protection
95 96in respect of trial and punishment; (v) Freedom of religion;
97and (vi) the Right to constitutional remedies.
The rights given to citizens only are; (i) Equality before-the
98law; (ii) Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,
99 . .
race, caste, sex or place of birth; (iii) Equality of opportunity m
92. Article 32, the 1972 Constitution of Pakistan
93. Article 33, ibid. It may be noted that some of the safeguards as
to arrest and detention do not apply to an enemy alient. Article 
33(3)(a).
94. Article 34, ibid.
95. Article 35, ibid.
96. Article 41, ibid.
97. Article 44, ibid.
98. Article 27, ibid.
99. Article 28, ibid.
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public employment;100 (iv) Abolition of titles, honours and 
decorations;'*^'*' (v) Right, to■ protection of law;"*"^ (vi) Freedom of 
movement;^^ (vii) Freedom of assembly; (viii) Freedom of 
a s s o c i a t i o n ; ( i x ) Freedom of thought and conscience, and of 
s p e e c h ; ( x )  Freedom of profession or o c c u p a t i o n ; ( x i )  Rights to 
property^^ and Protection of home and privacy of correspondence.'*'^
It is generally acknowledged that the individual can have no 
absolute or unfettered right. Only a few of the fundamental human 
rights can be Stated in the form of absolute propositions. Most of 
them require qualification in the general interests of society, 
particularly in a, welfare state, where the individual’s interest is 
considered to be subordinate to the public welfare. "There cannot be 
any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty," observes 
Justice Mukherjee in A./K. ,Gppalan v. the State of Madras,'*''*'^ "wholly 
freed from restrainfc;for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The 
possession and enjoyment of all rights ... are subject to such 
reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of 
the country essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and 
morals of the community .... What the Constitution, therefore, attempts 
to do in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a balance 
between individual liberty and social control."^ ''*''*'
100. Article 29, ibid.
101. Article 30, ib id.
102. Article 31, ibid.
103. Article 36, ibid.
104. Article 37, ibid.
105. Article 38, ibid.
106. Article 39, ibid.
107. Article 40, ibid.
108. Article 42, ibid.
109. Article 43, ibid.
110. The Supreme Court Reports, India, Vol.I, 1950, p.88
111. Ibid., pp.253-254.
Following this principle, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh 
has struck a balance between guaranteeing individual rights and 
protecting the collective interest of the community. In respect of
some of the rights, no limitations can be imposed by the Legislature.
In other words, certain rights have been stated in absolute terms 
without reference to restrictions or qualifications. In respect of
certain other rights, the Legislature has been permitted to make
valid exceptions within the limits imposed by the Constitution. Some 
rights, however, have been practically left to the discretion of the 
Legislature.
The rights which are immune from any limitation by the
Legislature are: (i) Equality before the law; (ii) Prohibition of
forced labour; (iii) Freedom from punishment under an ex post facto 
112
legislation; (iv) Religious safeguards m  educational 
113institutions, and (v) Freedom of thought and conscience.
Reasonable restrictions may be imposed by law in respect of:
(i) Freedom of movement, (ii) Freedom of assembly; (iii) Freedom of 
association; (iv) Freedom of speech; and (v) Freedom of religion. They 
may be imposed in respect of these rights on certain specified 
grounds, e.g. "in the public interest", "in the interest of public 
order or public health" "in the interest of morality or public order", 
"in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations 
with foreign states, public order, decency.or morality, or in relation 
to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence".
The rights which have been practically left to the discretion of 
the Legislature by using phrases ’’save in accordance with law", "save
112. Article 35(1), the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh,
113. Article 41(2), ibid.
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by authority of law" and "except in accordance with law" are:
(i) Protection of right to life and personal liberty, (ii) Right to 
protection of law, and (iii) Protection of property rights, Any 
restrictions may also be imposed by law upon the right to enter upon 
any lawful profession or occupation and to conduct any lawful trade 
or business. Similarly, the right to acquire, hold, transfer or 
otherwise dispose of property may be subjected to any restrictions. 
Since the word Reasonable* has not been used to qualify the expression 
'restrictions* used in respect of these two rights, it is likely to 
impair the power of the court to intervene even if restrictions with 
regard to any such rights would appear to be entirely unreasonable.
It may be mentioned here that the fundamental rights which have 
been incorporated into the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh in general 
resemble those in the Constitutions of Pakistan, 1956 and 1962.115
(ii) Provisions for the Judicial Enforcement of the Fundamental Rights 
under the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
A mere declaration and insertion of fundamental rights in the 
Constitution is meaningless unless an effective and easy remedy or 
machinery is provided in the Constitution itself for enforcing these 
rights, or unless their enjoyment is effectively guaranteed by a 
provision for judicial process and judicial review. "The basic
114. Clause 1 of Article 42 of the 1972 Constitution. This clause
provides inter alia, that no property shall be compulsorily
acquired, nationalised or requisitioned save by authority of law".
115. The fundamental rights as guaranteed by the 1956 Constitution of
Pakistan are to be found in Part II of the Constitution. The 
1962 Constitution of Pakistan, instead of inserting fundamental 
fights as had been provided 'in the 1956 Constitution incorporating 
certain "principles of law'-making" which could not be enforced
in a court of law. Later, the Chapter on Fundamental Rights was 
inserted in the Constitution by the Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act, 1963, See Part II, Chapter I of the Constitution.
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principle", says Justice Hamoodur Rahman in Saiyyid Abul A/la Maudoodi v .
116the Government of West Pakistary "underlying a declaration of Fundamental
Rights in a: Constitution is that it must be capable of being enforced
not only against the Executive but also against the legislature by
judicial process". The importance of guaranteeing remedies to
enforce fundamental rights was recognised in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in the following words: "Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating
118the Fundamental Rights granted to him by Constitution or by law".
Hence the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh has invested the courts
with the power to declare laws inconsistent with or made by the
119 . . 120
’State* in derogation of the fundamental rights to be void. The
Bangladesh Constitution not only expressly provides for judicial review
of legislation in regard to its conformity with fundamental rights but
also guarantees a constitutional remedy for the enforcement of these
rights.
Originally, Article 44 of the Constitution, which is included in
116. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, Vol.XVI, 1964, p.673.
117. Ibid., p.783.
118. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
Universal Declaration was adopted on 10 December 1948 by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations and contained a list of 
30 Human Rights as "a common standard of achievement for all 
people and nations".
119i The term "State" has been used in Article 152 of the 1972
Constitution of Bangladesh to include "Parliament, the Government 
and statutory public authorities".
120. Article, 26 of the Constitution provides that "(1) All
existing law inconsistent with the provisions of this Part (Part
III) shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, become void on 
the commencement of this Constitution;(2) The State shall not 
make any law inconsistent with any provisions of this Part, and 
any. law so made shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be 
void. (3) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment 
of this Constitution made under article 142," It may be 
mentioned here that clause 3 was added to Article 26.by (Article 
2 of) the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 (Act.
No. XXIV of 1973) passed on 22 September 1973.
Part III entitled "Fundamental Rights" provided that "(1) The right
to move the Supreme Court in accordance with clause (1) of article 102
%
for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) Without prejudice to the powers of the Supreme Court under article
102, Parliament may by law empower any other court, within the local
limits of its jurisdiction, to exercise all or any of those powers".
Article 102(1) in its original form stated that "The High Court
Division, on the application of any person aggrieved, may give such
directions or orders to any person or authority, including any person
performing any function in connection with the affairs of the Republic
as may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution".
Thus Article 44 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh was
121
almost a reproduction of clauses (1) and (3) of Article 32 of the
1949 Constitution of India. Similarly, the provisions relating to
the powers of the High Court Division to enforce fundamental rights
were, to a great extent, a reproduction of those of clause (2)(c) of 
122
Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, as inserted by
121. As clause 1 of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution provides 
that "the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this 
Part (Part III) is guaranteed". And clause (3) of Article 32 
states that "Without prejudice of the powers conferred on the 
Supreme Court by clause (1) ... Parliament may by law empower 
any other court to exercise within the local limits of its 
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme 
Court ...."
122. As clause (2)(c) of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution provided 
that the High Court could, if it was satisfied that no other 
adequate remedy was provided by law - "on the application of any 
aggrieved person, make an order giving such directions to any 
person or authority, including any Government, exercising any 
power or performing any function in, or in relation to, any 
territory within the jurisdiction of that Court as may be 
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights 
conferred by chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution".
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Article 6 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 (1 of 1964),
However, Article 44(1) provided A guaranteed remedy for the
enforcement of fundamental rights, and this remedial right is itself
made a fundamental right by being included in Part III of the
Constitution. The "significant aspect is that", as Justice Badrul
123
Haider Chowdhury in Haji Joynal Abedin v. State, "Article 44 finds
with Part III of the Constitution and Part III is captioned as
’Fundamental Rights'. Therefore the guarantee in the Article 44
124
itself is a fundamental right". The guarantee for the enforcement 
of fundamental rights was given through the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court. Thus the High Court Division of the Supreme Court was 
made the guardian and guarantor of fundamental rights and, as such, 
could not refuse to entertain applications or petitions for the issue 
of directions or orders or writs to enforce the fundamental rights so 
long as they remained in force. The appeal from an order of the High 
Court Division with regard to enforcement of fundamental rights lay to 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, if leave to appeal was 
granted by it under Article 103(3), or a certificate to appeal was 
granted by the High Court Division under Article 103(2) of the 
Constitution. Moreover, without prejudice to the powers of the Supreme 
Court to issue these orders or directions, Parliament could by law 
empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its 
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court 
in this respect. Perhaps the object of these provisions was to 
provide easy and speedy remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental 
rights.
123. Dhaka Law Reports, Vol.XXX, 1978, p,371,
124. Ibid., pp.392-393.
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(iii) The Suspension of Fundamental Rights During the Emergency
(a) Constitutional Provisions
The need for an emergency provision and suspension of
fundamental rights and the remedies for their enforcement during an
emergency is obvious. When the state’s very life is in jeopardy,
internally or externally, the rights of the individuals must not
obstruct the government in taking any action necessary for the
protection and safety of the state, for if the state survives, these
rights survive, and if the state does not survive, these rights do
not survive. "However precious the personal liberty of the subject
125
may be", says Lord Atkinson in Rex.v.Halliday, "there is something
for which it may well be, to some extent sacrificed by legal
enactment, namely, national success in the war or escape from national
126
plunder or enslavement". Therefore, apart from enacting the
procedure for the amendment of the Constitution to suspend or abolish 
fundamental rights, most of the Constitutions of the world lay down 
provisions for the suspension of enforcement of some of the 
fundamental rights in an emergency declared by the head of the 
Executive.
Hence the Constitution Amendment) Act, 1973 . (Act No* *.xiv
of 1973, passed on 22. 1973), which for the first time inserted
. 1 2provisions for the proclamation of emergency as pointed out earlier, 
provides for the suspension of some of;the fundamental rights and 
enforcement of fundamental rights during an emergency proclaimed at 
a time when the security or economic life of Bangladesh is threatened 
by war or external aggression or internal disturbance. A newly
125. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 1917, p.260.
126. Ibid., p.271.
127. Supra, Chapter I, p.27.
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inserted Article 141B provides:
"While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, 
nothing in articles 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 shall 
restrict the power of the State to make any law or 
to take any executive action which the State would, 
but for the provisions contained in Part III of this 
Constitution, be competent to make or to take, but 
any law so made shall, to the extent of the 
incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the 
Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects 
things done or omitted to be done before the law so 
ceases to have effect."
Article 141C states:
"(1) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, 
the President may, by order declare that the right to 
move any court for the enforcement of such of the 
rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution as may 
be specified in the order, and all proceedings pending 
in any court for the enforcement of the right so 
specified, shall remain suspended for the period during 
which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter 
period as may be specified in the order. (2) An order 
made under this article may extend to the whole of 
Bangladesh or any part thereof. (3) Every order made 
under this article shall, as soon as may be, be laid 
before Parliament."
Thus these provisions almost exactly reproduced clauses (9) 
12 8
and (10) of Article 30 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, as
128. As the newly inserted clause 9 of Article 30 of the 1962
Constitution of Pakistan provided that "Nothing contained in 
paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 (i.e. freedom of movement, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of trade, 
business or profession, freedom of speech, and right to 
acquire hold and dispose of property respectively) of the 
fundamental rights conferred by chapter 1 of Part II of this 
Constitution shall, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
force, restrict the power of the State as defined in Article 5 
of this Constitution to make any law or to take any executive 
action which it would but for the provisions contained in the 
said paragraphs, be competent to make or tq take, but any law 
so made shall to the extent of incompetency, cease to have 
effect, and shall be deemed to have been repealed, at the time
CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE
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inserted by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act No.XVII 
of 1965).
However, while the proclamation of an emergency is in force, only 
the fundamental rights of freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of association, freedom of thought and conscience and of 
speech, freedom of profession or occupation and rights of property 
guaranteed in Articles 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 respectively can be 
suspended so as to remove the restrictions imposed by these Articles on 
the power of the Legislature to make any law or the Executive to take 
any action. Thus in respect of these fundamental rights, the authority 
of the Legislature and the Executive is made wider, but all other rights 
remain unaffected. If the Legislature makes laws or the Executive 
takes actions which are inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by 
those Articles, their validity is not open to challenge either during 
the continuance of the emergency or even thereafter. As soon as the 
proclamation ceases to operate, the legislative enactments passed and 
the executive actions taken 'during the course of the said emergency 
shall be inoperative to the extent to which they conflict with the 
rights guaranteed under those Articles because as soon as the emergency 
is lifted, those Articles which were suspended during the emergency 
are automatically revived and begin to operate. Article 141B, however, 
makes it clear that things done or omitted to be done during the
when the Proclamation is revoked.
Clause (10) of Article 30 stated that "While a Proclamation of 
Emergency is in force, the President may, by Order, declare 
that the right to move any Court for the enforcement of such of 
the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of this 
Constitution as may be specified in the Order, and any proceeding 
in any Court which is for the enforcement, or involves the 
determination of any.question as to the infringement, of any of 
the rights so specified, shall remain suspended for the period 
during which the Proclamation is in force, and any such Order 
may be made in respect of the whole or any part of Pakistan".
emergency cannot be challenged even after the emergency is over.
Clause (1) of Article 141C empowers the President to issue an 
order suspending the right to move any court for the enforcement of 
such of the rights conferred by Part III of the 1972 Constitution as 
may be specified in the order for the period during which the 
Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be 
specified in the order. Thus the order need not be restricted to the 
fundamental rights mentioned in Article 141B. Although Article 141C 
does not purport to suspend expressly any of the fundamental rights, 
the suspension of the constitutional remedies for the enforcement of 
such of the rights as are specified in the order in effect results in 
the suspension of these rights during the period the order is in 
operation. Clause 1 of Article 141C and the Presidential Order issued 
under it constitute a sort of blanket ban against the institution of 
fresh proceedings and continuance of all pending proceedings for the 
enforcement of rights specified in the order. /Any pending proceeding, 
which remains suspended during the time when- the order is in operation, 
may be revived when the said order ceases to be operative.
(b) Suspension of the Enforcement of Fundamental Rights During the 
Proclamation of Emergency, 1974
Here it may be recalled that President Mohammadullah issued a 
Proclamation of Emergency on 28 December 1974 as he was satisfied 
that a grave emergency existed in which the security and economic life 
of Bangladesh were threatened by internal disturbance. As a 
consequence of this Proclamation, the President passed an Order on the 
same day which declared that "the right of any person to move any 
court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 27, 31,
32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42 and 43 of that Constitution, and 
all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the said
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rights, shall remain suspended for the period during which the
Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of Article 141A
129
thereof on the 28th December, 1974, is in force".
Thus the Presidential Order issued under clause (1) of 
Article 141C of the 1972 Constitution suspended the enforcement of 
most of the fundamental rights which is depicted in the following 
Table I
Table I
Fundamental Rights Whose 
Enforcement was Suspended
Fundamental Rights Whose 
Enforcement Remained Unaffected
(i) Equality before the Law;
(ii) Right to protection of 
law; (iii) Protection of right 
to life and personal liberty;
(iv) Safeguards as to arrest 
and detention; (v) Protection 
in respect of trial and 
punishment; (vi) Freedom of 
movement; (vii) Freedom of 
assembly; (viii) Freedom of 
association; (ix) Freedom of 
thought and conscience and of 
speech; (x) Freedom of 
profession or occupation;
(xi) Rights to property; and
(xii) Protection of homd and 
privacy of correspondence
(i) Prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of religion, race, 
caste, sex or place of birth;
(ii) Equality of opportunity in 
public employment; (iii) Abolition 
of titles, honours and decorations;
(iv) Prohibition of forced labour;
(v) Freedom of religion; and
(vi) Right to enforcement of 
fundamental rights (partially 
unaffected).
Table I shows that the enforcement of twelve of the fundamental 
rights in a court of law was suspended for the period during which the 
Proclamation of Emergency was in force while only six were available 
for enforcement. However, the prohibition in respect of the initiation 
of fresh proceedings and the suspension of pending proceedings for 
the enforcement of certain rights, e.g. freedom of profession, or
129. Notification No. 3(51)/74-CD(CS), issued by the Ministry of Law, 
Parliamentary Affairs, and Justice,
occupation, and rights to property, are difficult to justify as the 
Emergency was declared in times of internal disturbance.
(iv) Taking Away the Power of the High Court Division to Enforce
Fundamental Rights Before the 1975 Martial Law
The citizen’s right to move the High Court Division 6f the 
Supreme Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights was taken 
away by the substitution of the original Article 44 by a new one 
inserted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, which was passed 
during the Awami League regime only twenty-nine days after the 
Proclamation of Emergency, on 25 January 1975. The newly inserted
Article 44 provided that ’’Parliament may by law establish a
constitutional court, tribunal or commission for the enforcement of 
the rights conferred by this Part” III of the Constitution. The 
Fourth Amendement also omitted the provisions of the original Article 
102(1) under which the High Court Division could give directions or 
orders to any person or authority for the enforcement of any of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh.
Thus the High Court Division of the Supreme Court, which is 
likely to command respect both of the rulers and the ruled more than 
any other constitutional court, tribunal or commission to be set up
under an Act of Parliament, was deprived of the role of "a sentinel
on the qui vive" with regard to fundamental rights. The power of 
enforcing fundamental rights, which is essentially a function of the 
Judiciary, was taken away from the hands of the High Court Division. 
Instead the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act provided for a unique 
and unprecedented machinery (constitutional court, tribunal or 
.commission) for the enforcement of fundamental fights. This marked a 
clear-cut departure from the normal constitutional pattern followed 
elsewhere in relation to enforcing fundamental rights. However, since
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the Fourth Amendment was passed during the emergency in January 1975 
and the enforcement of all the important fundamental rights was 
suspended in December 1974, the setting up of a constitutional court, 
tribunal or commission by Parliament, during the civilian regime 
preceding the imposition of Martial Law in August 1975, did not arise.
(v) Restoration of the Power of the High Court Division to Enforce
Fundamental Rights and Ultimate Restoration of Suspended Enforcement 
of Most of the Fundamental Rights by the 1975 Martial Law Regime
The Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 (Second
Proclamation Order No.IV of 1976), issued on 28 May 1976 by
President A. M. Sayem, provided, inter alia, that "The right to move
the High Court in accordance with clause (2) of article 102, for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part (i.e. Part III
entitled as ’Fundamental Rights') is guaranteed". "Without prejudice
to the powers of the High Court under article 102, Parliament may by
law empower any other court, within the local limits of its
jurisdiction, to exercise all or any of those powers". Clause 2 of
Article 102 of the 1972 Constitution, as amended by the Second
Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Otfder, 1976 stated that "The High
Court, on the application of any person aggrieved, may give such
directions or orders to any person or authority, including any person
performing any function in connection with the affairs of the Republic,
as may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution", Later clause 2 of
Article 102 was rearranged as clause 1 of Article 102 and the High
Court Division was substituted for the High Court as the machinery for
the enforcement of fundamental rights by the Second Proclamation
(Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977 (Second Proclamation Order No.I of 1977),
*
issued on 27 November 1977,
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Thus the right of the citizen to move the High Court Division, 
and the power Of the High Court Division to give directions or orders 
to any person or authority for the enforcement of any of the 
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, were 
restored by the Martial Law regime.
Although the right of the citizen to move the High Court Division 
and the power of the High Court Division to give directions or orders 
to any person or authority for the enforcement of the fundamental 
rights were restored, the Proclamation of Emergency, and the 
Presidential Order suspending the enforcement of most of the 
fundamental rights in a court of law were not repealed. Therefore, in 
view of clause (f) of the Proclamation of 20 August 1975, which 
provided that all Acts, Ordinance, President’s Order and other Orders, 
Proclamations, rules, regulations, by-laws, notifications and other 
legal instruments in force on the morning of 15 August 1975 would 
continue to remain in force until repealed, revoked or amended, it is 
obvious that the Proclamation of Emergency and the Presidential Order 
suspending the enforcement of most of the fundamental rights remained 
in force. But the restoration of the right of the citizen to move 
the High Court Division and the power of the High Court Division to 
give directions or orders to any person or authority for the 
enforcement of the fundamental rights and the amendment of certain
provisions of the Emergency Power Rules, 1975, with regard to
130 . . . . .
preventive detention was interpreted by the High Court Division
of the Supreme Court to mean repeal of the Proclamation of Emergency 
and the Presidential Order of 28 December 1975 by implication and
130. The amendment of certain provisions of the Emergency Power Rules, 
1975, relating to preventive detention would be discussed in the 
next chapter
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consequent re-appearance of fundamental rights. As in Haji Joynal Abedin v . 
131 .
the State Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury observes:
"It will be seen that Article 33 (which deals with 
safeguards as to arrest and detention) ... was mentioned 
in the Presidential Order dated 28.12.74. Article 33(4)(5) 
of the Constitution prohibits any law providing for 
preventive detention unless it ensures four things in 
case of preventive detention, namely (1) right to be 
informed regarding the grounds of his detention, (2) right 
of the representation, (3) reference to Advisory Board 
and (4) action upon the report of the 'Advisory Board.
These rights are essentially rights within the concept of 
fundamental rights.... (If) the Proclamation and 
Presidential Order dated 28.12.74 is still in force, 
then the rights mentioned in Article 33(4)(5) are not 
available.... By amendment of the Emergency Powers Act 
(Sic) on 18.8.77 communication of the grounds of the 
detention order and constitution of Advisory Committee 
and a reference thereto and the action upon the report 
of this Advisory Committee have been provided for. As 
already been noted these are essential concepts within 
the fundamental rights. If these rights are available 
by. amendment of the Emergency Powers Act (Sic) then the 
fundamental rights have been re-conferred. If not, how 
was it necessary for a regime during Martial Law to 
confer the rights upon the citizens which have been taken 
away by Proclamation of Emergency unddr Constitution.
Either the Proclamation of Emergency and Presidential 
Order is dead or alive. If it is dead then the rights 
have re-appeared. If it is not, the rights simply are 
not there. Assuming that these Proclamations and Orders 
are still alive then how this Emergency Powers Act (Sic) 
was amended for bringing into the conception of fundamental 
rights and how correspondingly Articles 44 and 102 of the 
Constitution were amended by Martial Law Order for the 
enforcement of these rights?.... Re-conferment of these 
two provisions in its original character and colour by 
(the) Second Proclamation (7th Amendment) Order dated 
28.5.76 which was reiterated by the Second Proclamation 
(10th Amendment) dated 27.11.77 bringing the entire 
jurisdiction in its original position and introducing the 
provisions of Article 33 into the Emergency Powers Act 
(Sic), the opinion is the fundamental rights which were 
taken away ... have been reconferred by these two Martial 
Law Proclamations. If Article 33 had been reconferred 
there is no doubt that other rights are also available 
because proclamation said that such proclamation is in 
force until it is amended, revoked and repealed. It is a
131. Dhaka Law Reports, Vol.XXX, 1978, p.371.
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case of repeal by implication .... (Thus) the 
fundamental rights have re-appeared and Article 44 
has given guarantee for the enforcement of these 
rights through the machinery of Article 102 of the 
Constitution."132
It seemsr that the learned Justice misinterpreted the position.
The more realistic approach would be that although the High Court
Division got back the power to give direction or orders to any person
or authority, including any person performing any function in
connection with the affairs of the Republic, as may be appropriate
for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution, this power could be exercised in
relation to only those fundamental rights which were available for
enforcement. There can be no question of re-appearance of the
suspended fundamental rights as a result of the restoration of the
right of the citizen to move the High Court Division for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. The citizen could move
to the High Court Division for the enforcement of only those rights
whose enforcement were not suspended by the Presidential Order of
28 December 1976. This analysis also receives support from the
attitude of the then politicians of the country as the restoration of
suspended fundamental rights was put forward by the politicians as one
of the prerequisites to participate in the parliamentary election to
133
be held early in 1979. At last, on 27 December 1978, the Martial 
Law regime decided to concede this demand: the President and the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator, Ziaur Rahman, ordered restoration of those
*j o  /
fundamental rights that had been suspended on 28 December 1975 by
132. Ibid., pp.391-392.
133. The Ittefaq, Dhaka, 8 December 1978.
134. The Asian Recorder, 8-14 January 1979, p.14683 (corrected page 
101435).
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a Presidential Order issued in consequence of the Proclamation of
Emergency. It is interesting to note that the President passed such
an order without revoking the Proclamation of Emergency although the
Presidential Order of 28 December 1975 suspending the right of the
citizen to move for the enforcement of most of the fundamental rights
provided that such right "shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued ... on the
135
28th December, 1974, is in force". However, eleven months later, 
on 27 November 1979, the Emergency proclaimed on 28 December 1975 
was revoked.
Conclusion
(i) The Independence of the Judiciary
The foregoing discussion reveals that originally the 1972 
Constitution of Bangladesh attempted to ensure the independence of 
the Judiciary. Later the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, 
passed during the Awami League regime, curbed the independence of 
the Judiciary to a great extent. The tenure of office of the judges 
of the Supreme Court was placed at the mercy of the President. The 
President was substituted for the Supreme Court as the authority to 
control and discipline subordinate courts. However, the Martial Law 
regime of 1975 restored the independence of the Judiciary. Although 
the Martial Law regime did not restore the original power of the 
Supreme Court to control and discipline subordinate courts, it made 
it obligatory for the President to consult the Supreme Court while 
exercising the power of controlling and disciplining subordinate 
courts, It guaranteed security of tenure to the judges of the
, 135. See supra, p.333.
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Supreme Court ultimately by establishing the Supreme Judicial Council, 
consisting of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, and the two next 
senior judges, on whose recommendation a judge of the Supreme Court 
was to be removed by the President. Moreover, the Martial Law regime 
provided better remuneration and privileges for the judges of the 
Supreme Court. It enhanced the salaries of the Chief Justice and 
other judges. Provisions were made for the first time to pay them a 
sumptuary allowance and the medical facilities enjoyed by them were 
allowed to continue after their retirement or "otherwise ceasing to 
hold office". The judges were accorded the privilege to use official 
transport on the same terms as are admissible to a Secretary to the 
Government. All these provisions strengthened their freedom, improved 
their financial position and reduced their likely temptation to resort 
to corruption.
(ii) Curtailment of the Powers of the Judiciary
Although the Martial Law administration adopted various measures
to restore the independence of the Judiciary, it severely curtailed
the jurisdiction of the Judiciary by various Proclamations and Martial
Law Regulations. Where the Martial Law regime required a free hand
and where interference by the courts might prove a hindrance or.dn
inconvenience, the jurisdiction of the courts was specifically
excluded. However, as a result of the imposition of restrictions on
the power of the judiciary, the Superior Courts in Bangladesh had to
work from 1975 to 1979 under conditions which were not conducive to
the discharge of their duties of administering justice and protecting
the innocent from injury and usurpation. Yet they gave a liberal
interpretation to the Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations
%
which restricted their jurisdictions. They consistently held the
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view that, in spite of the ouster provisions, the power of the 
superior courts could not be taken away if the proceeding taken was 
without jurisdiction or coram non judice or mala fide, In other 
words, when a proceeding before a Martial Law Court or an action 
taken under the Martial Law Regulation is challenged on the ground 
of want of jurisdiction or mala fide, the superior court, in exercise 
of its writ jurisdiction, was competent to make the necessary 
declaration. Thus the Superior Courts in Bangladesh did not wish 
to depart from the traditional view taken with regard to the 
provisions providing for exclusion of the jurisdiction of courts.
(iii) Fundamental Rights and Judicial Powers
The foregoing discussion also shows that the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh are neither
indefensible nor permanent, for certain fundamental rights as well
as their enforcement may be suspended during a proclamation of
emergency and may be taken away or abridged by an amendment of the
Constitution. In fact, the Presidential Order, issued as a
consequence of the Proclamation of Emergency on 28 December 1974
during the regime of the Awami League, suspended the enforcement of
most of the fundamental rights. Later, on 25 January 1975, the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, took away the constitutional
rights of the citizen to move the High Court Division of the Supreme
Court and the power of the High Court Division to issue directions or
orders to any person or authority for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights. But the Martial Law regime by promulgating the
Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976, not only restored
this right of the citizen and the power of the High Court, ultimately
1
in December 1978, it also lifted the prohibition in respect of
enforcement of most of the fundamental rights imposed by the 
Presidential Order of 28 December 1974,
343
CHAPTER VII
Laws of Preventive Detention: Before and After 
the Imposition of Martial Law (1975)
I. Definition of Preventive Detention
Preventive detention means the detention of a person, without
trial in a court of law, by an order of the Executive, not with a view
to bringing a criminal charge against him, but with the intention of
preventing him from engaging in activities prejudicial to the safety
and security of the State. It is "uded to describe detention by order
of an authority empowered under a statute on his subjective satisfaction
that the person detained is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to
one or more of the matters described in the statute, such as national
defence or public order. Normally the authority acts on information
supplied by police or other public authority without taking any
evidence."*- Thus preventive detention is an extraordinary measure,
as a man's personal liberty is taken away by the Executive not because
of his commission of an offence but because of the apprehension of the
Executive that he is about to commit acts which are detrimental to
the maintenance of public order and peace, defence and security of the
2
State. "Preventive justice", says Lord Atkinson in Rex v. Halliday ,
"as it is styled, which consists in restraining a man from committing
a crime he may commit but has not yet committed, or doing some act
injurious to members of the community which he may do but has not yet
3done, is no new thing in the laws of England ....preventive justice 
proceeds upon the principle that a person should be restrained from 
doing something which, if free and unfettered, it is reasonably probable
1. Gledhill, Alan, Pakistan: The Development of its Laws and Constitution. 
London, 2nd edn., 1967, p.198 ,
2. The Law Reports. Appeal Cases, London, 1917, p.260
3. Ibid., p.273
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he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent,
4
on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof."
Thus preventive detention is not a punitive but a precautionary 
measure. The word 'preventive’ is used in contradistinction to the 
word ’punitive'. To quote the views of Lord Finlay, expressed in Rex 
v. Halliday,** "one of the most obvious means of taking precautions 
against dangers .... as are enumerated is to impose some restriction 
on the freedom of movement of persons whom there may be any reason to 
suspect of being disposed to help the enemy .... The measure is not 
punitive but precautionary."^ Thus the question of punitive detention 
arises after an offence is actually committed, whereas the question of 
preventive detention comes before the actual commission of a harmful 
act and is based merely on a reasonable apprehension or probability.
"The object of preventive detention," observes Justice Mukherjee 
in A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras,^  "is not to punish a man for 
having done something but to intercept him before he does it to prevent 
him from doing it. No offence is proved, nor any charge formulated, 
and the justification is suspicion or reasonable probability and not
g
criminal conviction which only can be warranted by legal evidence."
Therefore "any preventive measures, even if they involve some restraint
or hardship upon individuals, do not partake in any way of the nature
of punishment, but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief 
q
to the State."
Thus preventive detention has four salient features, namely,
(i) it is detention and not imprisonment, (ii) it is detention by the 
order of the Executive and not by any kind of judicial officer; (iii)
4. Ibid.,p.275
5. Ibid., p .260 i
6. Ibid ., p .269
7. The Supreme Court Reports, India, vol.I, 1950, p.88
8. Ibid., p.249-250
9. Lord Finlay in Rex v. Halliday, The Law Reports, Appeal cases, London, 
1$17, p.265 ---
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it is not made after any formal enquiry as to prejudicial acts which a
person detained was likely to commit; and (iv) the object is not punitive
$
but preventive.
II. Necessity of Preventive Detention
The use of preventive detention is alleged to be justified by the 
fact that there may be a person, who indulges in activities calculated 
to encourage violence and public disorder, against whom a judicial trial 
cannot be initiated as the evidence in possession of the authorities will 
not be sufficient to found a legal charge or to secure his conviction by 
legal proof; but the evidence is deemed sufficient to place him in detention 
in the interests of the state. If the Executive leaves him at liberty and 
is obliged to go through the lengthy process of collecting evidence to 
support a judicial conviction, it may or may not succeed, but the person 
concerned may succeed in his object to cause harm to the safety and 
security of the State. Hence his liberty has to be taken away temporarily, 
in the interests of the State, without trial. As Professor Alan Gledhill 
says, preventive detention "is an administrative necessity....and likely 
to cause less human misery than might result from likely alternative 
measures to deal with persons who cannot be successfully prosecuted for 
their activities, though they are a menace to public security and order.
Thus one of the most effective ways of preventing a man from committing 
prejudicial acts is to detain him although "in almost every case where 
preventive justice is put in force some suffering and inconvenience may 
be caused to the suspected person. That is inevitable. But the suffering 
is....inflicted for something much more important than his liberty or 
convenience, namely, for securing the public safety and defence of the realm.
10. Gledhill, Alan, Fundamental Rights in India, London, 1955, p.126
11. Lord Atkinson in Rex v Halliday, The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 
1917, p.273 *
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Therefore,preventive detention in case of such an emergency as
war is well recognised. There are very few persons who will dispute
its necessity during a war. To say in the words of Lord Atkinson, as
pointed out earlier, "However precious the personal liberty of the
subject may be, there is something for which it may well be, to some
extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, namely, national success in the
12
war, or escape from national plunder or enslavement”. In recent times, 
the necessity of having provisions for preventive detention in time of 
peace has been felt in newly independent countries to prevent anti­
social and subversive elements from imperilling the welfare of the State.
Ill. The Possible Abuse of the Power of Detention
The power of preventive detention carries with it the risk of abuse
of power. The ruling party may misuse it in time of peace for its own
benefit to suppress opposition, to keep the critics of its policy behind
bars. "Vested with this power of proscription", says Lord Shaw of
13Dunfermline in Rex v. Halliday, "and permitted to enter the sphere of
opinion and belief, they, who alone can judge as to public safety and
defence, may reckon a political creed their special care, and if that
creed be socialism, pacifism, republicanism, the persons holding such
creeds may be regulated out of the way, although never deed was done or
word uttered by them that could be charged as a crime. The inmost citadel
14of our liberties could be thus attacked." In the same case, with 
regard to Regulation 14B of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) 
Regulations made under the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, 
Lord Dunedin said, "....preventive measures in the shape of internment
12. Ibid., p.271
13. Ibid., p.260
14. Ibid., p.293
1
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of person likely to assist the enemy may be necessary under the 
circumstances of a war like the present is really an obvious consider- 
ation. Parliament has...., in order to secure this and kindred objects, 
risked the chance of abuse which will always be theoretically present 
when absolute powers in general terms are delegated to an executive 
body; and has thought the restriction of the powers to the period of 
the duration of the war to be a sufficient s a f e g u a r d . L a t e r  in this 
chapter (and in the next chapter) it will be seen that the courts can 
act as a check on the exercise of the power of detaining persons by the 
Executive mainly for political purposes and the courts can help those 
who are innocent victims of the Executive.
IV. Preventive Detention and the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
The law providing for preventive detention was introduced in the
Indian subcontinent by the British government in India.^ Such a law
was considered necessary by the British Indian government to maintain
law and order, and suppress subversive political activities of the people.
But after achieving independence in August 1947, the Governments of India
and Pakistan continued to resort to laws authorising the detention of a
17person without trial although the framers of the Constitutions of both 
India and Pakistan provided for certain limitations on the power of the 
Legislature to enact provisions for preventive detention and that of the
15. Ibid., p.271
16. Some of the laws providing for preventive detention enacted by the 
British Government in India are: (a) the Bengal State Prisoners' 
Regulation III of 1818, (b) the Madras State Prisoners' Regulation II 
of 1819, (c) the State Prisoners' Act III of 1858 for Madras and Bombay, 
(d) the Defence of India Act, 1915, (e) the Defence of India Act, 1939
17. Some of the laws relating to preventive detention enacted in India 
after independence are: (a) the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (b) 
the Internal Security Act, 1971, (c) the National Security Act, 1980. 
Similar laws enacted in Pakistan after independence are, for example,
(a) the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1949, (b) the Security of 
Pakistan Act, 1952, (c) the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965
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Executive to detain a person without trial.
But the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, which ensures that "No
person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance 
19with law", did not originally contemplate any kind of preventive 
detention and, as such, the question of providing for restrictions on 
legislation in respect of preventive detention did not arise. As Article 
33 of the Constitution, that contained safeguards as to arrest and 
detention, stated:
"(1) A person who is arrested shall not be detained in custody 
unless he has been informed of the grounds of his arrest, nor 
shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a 
legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall 
be brought before a Court within twenty-four hours of his arrest 
(excluding the time required to transport him to the Court), and 
shall not be further detained save by order of the Court.
(3) Nothing in the foregoing clauses shall apply to an enemy alien.” 
Later, on 22 September 1973, this original Article 33 of the
Constitution was replaced by a new one by the Constitution (Second Amend­
ment) Act, 1973. This newly inserted Article empowered the Legislature 
to pass laws relating to preventive detention and provided certain safeguards 
to mitigate the harshness of law for preventive detention by placing 
restrictions on legislative power. The amended Article provided as follows: 
"(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody 
without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for 
such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and
18. See Article 22 of the 1949 Constitution of India, Article 7 of the 
1956 Constitution of Pakistan and Article 2 of the 1962 Constitution 
of Pakistan
19. Article 32 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
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be defended by legal practitioners of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall 
be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 
twenty-four hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary 
for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the 
magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in custody 
beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply to any person 
- (a) who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) who
is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive 
detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise 
the detention of a person for a period exceeding six months 
unless an Advisory Board consisting of three persons, of whom 
two shall be persons who are, or have been, or are qualified 
to be appointed as, Judges of the Supreme Court and the other 
shall be a person who is a senior officer in the service of the 
Republic, has, after affording him an opportunity of being 
heard in person, reported before the expiration of the said 
period of six months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient 
cause for such detention.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under 
any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making 
the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person
the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford
him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against
the order: provided that the authority making any such order may
refuse to disclose facts which such authority considers to be
*
against the public interest to disclose.
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(6) Nothing in clause (3) or clause (5) shall affect dure 
to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under 
clause (4).”
Thus the amended Article 33 of the Bangladesh Constitution is
20almost the same as Article 2 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan.
It deals with two distinct matters, namely (i) persons arrested under 
the ordinary law, and (ii) persons detained under the law of preventive 
detention. In fact, it embodies two limitations on the powers of the 
legislature in depriving a person’s liberty. Firstly, clauses (1) and
(2) of the Article lay down conditions with which laws providing for 
arrest and detention with the object of bringing a person to trial for 
a criminal offence must comply. Secondly, clauses (4) and (5) impose
20. As Article 2 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, which was almost 
a reproduction of Article 7 of the 1956 Constitution, provided that:
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall 
be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner 
of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be 
produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four 
hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from 
the place of arrest to the Court of the magistrate, and no such 
person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without
the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply to a person - 
(a) who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) who is arrested 
or detained under any law providing for preventive detention:'
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the 
detention of a person for a period exceeding three months unless the 
appropriate Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the 
said period of three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient 
cause for such detention.
Explanation - In this sub-paragraph ’the appropriate Advisory Board’ 
means - (i) in the case of a person detained under a Central Law, 
a Board consisting of a Judge of the Supreme Court, who shall be 
nominated by the Chief Justice of that Court, and a senior officer 
in the service of Pakistan, who shall be nominated by the Governor 
of that Province.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under 
any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making 
the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the 
grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the 
earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order: 
provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to 
disclose facts which such authority considers it to be against the 
public interest to disclose.”
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certain limitations on the power of the legislature to pass laws 
providing for detention. As a matter of fact, these two clauses lay- 
down certain fundamental principles as to preventive detention.
(i) Safeguards regarding Arrest
(a) The Right to be informed of the Grounds of Arrest and the Right to
be defended by a Legal Practitioner
Clause (1) of Article 33 gives an arrested person two fundamental
rights: (i) the right to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds
of his arrest, and (ii) the right to consult and to be defended by a legal
practitioner of his choice. They are the two mandatory privileges
available to the arrested person and operate as constitutional requirements
to be followed subsequent to the arrest. The object of the right to be
informed of the grounds is that on learning the grounds of arrest, the
person arrested or detained may be in a position to make an application
to the competent court for bail or to move the High Court Division of
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus or other appropriate writs
or orders or directions under Article 102 of the 1972 Constitution. The
right to consult a lawyer of his choice from the moment of arrest is a
fundamental right of great importance as it enables flthe arrested person
to be advised about the legality or sufficiency of the grounds for his
arrest. The right of the arrested person to be defended by a legal
practitioner of his choice postulates that there is an accusation against
21which he has to be defended”.
It may be recalled here that Section 340(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code confers on a person accused of an offence before a criminal 
court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under the Code in any
21. Justice Das in State of Punjab v Ajaib Singh. All India Reporter, 
Supreme Court, 1953, p.15
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such court, the right to be defended by a lawyer. But this right is 
not a guaranteed right and is always subject to amendment and repeal 
by ordinary legislation. Moreover, this right is limited to an accused 
person in his trial in a criminal case. But the right given by clause 1 
of Article 33 is general and not limited to a person accused of an 
offence before a criminal court but applies to all persons who are 
arrested. Thus the Constitution has conferred a much wider and more 
effective right, which cannot be taken away by any enactment of the 
legislature without the Constitution being altered.
(b) The Right to be produced before the nearest Magistrate after Arrest
Clause 2 of Article 33 gives a person arrested and detained in
custody the (i) right to be produced before the nearest magistrate within
twenty-four hours of his arrest, the time necessary for the journey from
the place of arrest to the court being excluded, and (ii) the right
not to be detained in custody beyond the period of twenty-four hours
without the authority of the magistrate. The underlying object of
producing an arrested person before a magistrate is to ensure to him
the magisterial scrutiny of the prima facie justification of his arrest
and detention and also afford him an opportunity to meet a judicial officer
at the earliest opportunity so as to place before him his grievance, if any.
In fact, an arrested person is assured of a judicial verdict as to the
validity of his arrest as early as possible. Thus clause 2 of Article 33
gives protection against arbitrary arrest as it guaranteed that the
Executive cannot place any person under detention at its own will and
pleasure for an indefinite period.
It may be mentioned here that clause 2 of Article 33 only affirms
22
and gives constitutional foundation to the provisions of Section 61 and
22. Section 61 of the Criminal Procedure Code states: "No police officer 
shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer 
period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, 
and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a
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23167 of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the production of an 
arrested person before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of his 
arrest and his detention beyond this period save by an order of the 
magistrate.
Thus clauses (1) and (2) together ensure to an arrested person
(i) the right to be informed of the grounds of his arrest, (ii) the 
right to legal assistance, (iii) the right to be produced bi|«.iu the 
nearest magistrate within twenty-four hours, and (iv) the right not to 
be detained beyond this period, except by an order of the magistrate.
(ii) Enemy Alien and Detenu
Clause 3 o^ Article 33 curtails the scope of the four rights 
guaranteed by clauses (1) and (2). As under it, the four rights embodied 
in clauses (1) and (2) are applicable only to the citizens and aliens, 
not to a person who is an enemy alien during the existence of hostilities 
between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and a foreign State. Similarly, 
the aforesaid rights are not applicable to any person who is arrested or 
detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
magistrate under Section 167, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive 
of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to 
the magistrate's court."
23. Section 167 provides that whenever any person is arrested and
detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot 
be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 
61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or 
information is well-founded, the police officer is required to send 
a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case along with 
the accused to the nearest magistrate. The magistrate to whom the 
accused is forwarded may authorise the detention of the accused for 
a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole, including one or 
more remands.
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(iii) Safeguards regarding Preventive Detention
(a) The Advisory Board
Clause 4 of Article 33 of the 1972 Constitution imposes restrictions 
upon the power of Parliament to enact a law of preventive detention 
providing for detention beyond six months unless the sufficiency for 
the cause of the detention is investigated by an Advisory Board within 
the said period of six months. An embargo is imposed that a law 
providing for preventive detention shall not authorise the detention 
of a person for a period exceeding six months without the concurrence of an 
Advisory Board. It is evident that clause 4 does not expressly provide 
for the creation of any special machinery or independent body for the 
purpose of reviewing every executive order of detention which is to be 
found in the laws of many democratic countries.^ It speaks of an Advisory 
Board, but the question of such a Board arises only when a person is to 
be detained for a longer period than six months. It is only in cases 
where the period of detention exceeds six months that the opinion of the 
detaining authority is made subject to a quasi-judicial review by an 
Advisory Board consisting of two sitting judges, or person qualified to 
be judges of the Supreme Court, and a senior officer in the service of
24. For example, under the American Internal Security Act, 1950, (popularly 
known as McCarron Act), every order of detention is reviewabie by 
the Detention Review Board. The Act empowers the Attorney-General to 
issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he believes to be 
dangerous in an emergency like war. The arrested person is brought 
before a preliminary hearing within forty-eight hours of his arrest 
when he may be represented by a counsel and may introduce evidence.
The hearing officer may issue a detention order if he finds that there 
is a probably cause for detention. Against the order of detention, 
the dltenu may appeal to the Detention Review Board which may modify, 
confirm or revoke the detention order and may indemnify the detainee 
for loss of income. In proceedings before the Detention Review Board, 
the Attorney-General is required to furnish the detainee with the 
particulars of evidence against him as full as possible. A detenu 
aggrieved by the order of the Board is entitled to a judicial review 
by way of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeals. It is evident that 
this elaborate procedure is designed to reduc& the possibility of abuse 
of power and to safeguard the rights of the individual.
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Bangladesh. Thus the Constitution fails to give a person detained in 
preventive custody for less than six months any quasi-judicial protection 
from a hasty, or ill-considered order of the detaining authority. In 
other words, the Constitution seeks to rely on the discretion of the 
detaining authority alone for a period of six months. In this respect, 
the observations of Justice Kayani in Ghulam Muhammad Khan Londkhawar v.
7 C 9 A
The State, with regard to clause 4 of Article 7 of the 1956
Constitution of Pakistan, which corresponds to clause 4 of Article 33
of the Bangladesh Constitution, are worth quoting:
"if preventive detention is to exceed three months, it must 
have the approval of an Advisory Board....This reduces the 
'satisfaction1 of Government to a period of three months, 
and it is pertinent to remark that the halo of subjectiveness 
and immunity from judicial scrutiny with which the judicial 
authority has surrounded it since the last Great War, both 
here and in England, has suffered perceptibly in visual charm 
by reason of this constitutional safeguard. It is as though 
the Constitution were saying to the detaining authority: 'I 
appreciate the occasional urgency of a situation when you may 
be called upon to take away the liberty of a citizen on your 
own responsibility for law and order, but my experience of 
your past, what with your implicit trust in police reports 
and what with your doubtful morals in the political field, 
constrains me to rely on your discretion for no more than 
three months."2?
It is regrettable that the Constitution does not make it obligatory that 
every law providing for preventive detention should invariably provide 
for an Advisory Board. Thus if the period of preventive detention in 
an Act is less than six months, a provision for the constitution of an 
Advisory Board would not be necessary.
25. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, vol.IX, 1957, p.497
26. Clause 4 of Article 7 of the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan stated 
that "No law providing for detention shall authorise the detention
of a person for a period exceeding three months unless the appropriate 
Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period 
of three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for 
such detention".
27. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, 1957, p.504
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However, the function of the Advisory Board itself is only to 
report to the Executive branch of the Government, after examining the 
materials placed before it by the Government only, and hearing the 
detenu in person, whether there is sufficient cause for keeping a person 
in detention for more than six months. The report of the Board must, 
however, be before the expiration of six months from the date of 
detention. But the Advisory Board has not been given any power to 
express any opinion as to how much longer than six months, if at all, 
the detenu should be kept in custody. Of course, if it reports against 
detaining a person any further, the detained person cannot be kept in 
detention over the six months period and should be forthwith released.
The Government is bound to accept the report that there are not sufficient 
grounds for detention beyond six months. Thus the reference to the 
Advisory Board is a safeguard against Executive vagaries and high-handed 
action in detaining persons without trial. It is a procedural check 
on the arbitrary exercise of the power of detention by the Executive.
It may be mentioned that the opinion of the Advsiory Board does 
not make the detention valid, if it is ultra vires of the Constitution 
or contrary to the Preventive Detention Act, or mala fide. Nothwithstanding 
the report of the Advisory Board, the writ of habeas corpus lies in the 
High Court against the order of detention. The power of the High Court 
to determine the validity of the order of detention will be considered 
towards the close of this discussion under the Special Powers Act, 1974.
It is pertinent to mention here that the Bangladesh Constitution
28does not prescribe the maximum period of detention. Unlike Article 22(7)
28. Article 22(7) of the Indian Constitution provides that "Parliament may 
by law prescribe - ....(b) the maximum period for which any person may 
in any class or class of cases be detained under any law providing for 
preventive detention; and (c) the procedure to be followed by an 
Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4)." Clause 
4 of Article 22 states that "No law providing for preventive detention 
shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than 
three months unless - (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who
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of the 1949 Constitution of India, Article 33 of the Bangladesh Constitution 
even does not state that parliament may prescribe the maximum period for 
which any person be detained under any law providing for preventive 
detention and the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an 
inquiry with a view to reporting to the Government whether a detenu is 
liable to be detained for a period of more than six months. This makes 
it possible to pass any Preventive Detention Act providing for detention 
for an unlimited period and allowing the Advisory Board to follow any 
procedure it likes, however arbitrary it may be, in discharging its duties.
(b) The Communication of Grounds of Detention and the Right of Representation 
Clause 5 of Article 33 confers two distinct though interrelated 
procedural rights on a detenu, namely (i) the right to be informed, as 
soon as may be, of the grounds of his detention, and (ii) the right to be 
afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the 
order of preventive detention. Grounds, which means the conclusions 
drawn by the authorities from the facts or particulars, must be in 
existence when the order of detention is made. There can be no satisfaction 
of the detaining authority if there are not grounds for the same. As
29
Justice Fazle Munim observed in Golam Kabjr v. Government of Bangladesh 
that:
"Grounds must....offer the basis upon which the detaining 
authority must be satisfied that it was necessary to make 
the order of detention. Necessarily, they must exist at or 
before the time the order was being made."
An identical view was expressed by Chief Justice Kania of the Indian
are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of 
a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period 
of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for 
such detention:
provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention 
of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by 
Parliament under sub-clause '(b) of clause (7).„.."
29. Dhaka Law Reports, vol.XXVII, 1975, p.199
30. Ibid., p.216
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Supreme Court in the case of the State of Bombay v Atma Ram Shridhar 
Vaidya:*^
"It is obvious that the grounds for making the order are the 
grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that 
it was necessary to make the order. These grounds, therefore, 
must be in existence when the order is made."32
The obligation to furnish grounds by the detaining authority is inextricably
connected with the right extended to the detenu to have an earliest
opportunity to make a representation. The obligation to communicate the
grounds is coupled with a duty to supply as soon as possible such
particulars which would enable an effective and intelligent representation
at the earliest opportunity. As Justice Kemaluddin Hossain of the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh observed in Abdul
33
Latif Mirza v Government of Bangladesh that:
"Grounds (to be supplied to the detenu)....must be clear, 
precise and give such information to the detenu that he could 
make a representation; it must not be vague or indefinite and 
that the grounds must be relatable to existing facts."3**
To the same effect, there was an observation of Justice A.S. Chowdhury
of the East Pakistan High Court in Rowshen Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan v.
35
Government of East Pakistan:
"Making a representation clearly requires that he (the detenu) 
should be provided with grounds with sufficient clarity in 
order to enable him to make an effective representation against 
his detention3^....on the basis of which the authority concerned 
may make an order of release and the grounds must be furnished' 
in such a manner that a layman can understand what are the 
grounds on which he is being detained."3^
A similar view was expressed by Chief Justice Kania of the Indian Supreme
38
Court in the case of the State of Bombay v . Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya:
31. All India Reporter, Supreme Court, 1951, p.157
32. Ibid., p.161
33. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, vol.XXXI, 1979, p.l
34. Ibid., p.10
35.
36.
All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Dhaka, vol 
Ibid., p.247
.XVII, 1965, p.241
37. Ibid., p.256
38. All India Reporter, Supreme Court, 1951, p.157
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"It is....clear that if the representation has to be intelligible 
to meet the charges contained in the grounds, the information 
conveyed to the detained person must be sufficient to attain 
that objection....Without getting information sufficient to make 
a representation against the order of detention, it is not 
possible for the man to make the representation. Indeed, the 
right will be only illusory but not a real right at a l l . " 3 ^
It may be noted here that although clause 5 of Article 33 confers on the 
detenu the right to have the earliest opportunity of making representation 
against the order of detention, it does not specify to whom the represent­
ation is to be made or how the representation is to be dealt with. It 
seems that clause 5 contemplates that the representation is to be made 
before the detaining authority. However, since the detenu is not placed 
before a magistrate and there is no remedy by trial, this right of 
representation is valuable as it gives a person detained in preventive 
custody an opportunity to establish his innocence.
(c) Non-disclosure of Facts
"Facts" means the evidence or data from which conclusions are 
derived; it is the evidence upon which the bases of the allegations are 
to be established. While clause 5 of Article 33 makes it obligatory upon 
the detaining authority to communicate the grounds to the detenu. the 
proviso to that clause gives the detaining authority a wide discretion 
not to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest 
to disclose. The discretion to withhold certain facts from disclosure 
implies that other facts, to which no such objection applies, must be 
disclosed. Thus all grounds have to be disclosed, not all facts, partic­
ularly those which, in the opinion of the detaining authority it is 
undesirable should be disclosed, in the public interest. It appears that
the proviso to clause 5 of Article 33 is based on the doctrine enunciated
40
by Lord Maugham in Liversidge v. Anderson in connection with Regulation
39. Ibid., pp.161-162
40. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 1942, p.206
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18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, which vested the power
to issue detention orders in the Home Secretary, who was answerable
to the House of Commons for his actions:
"It is beyond doubt that he (the Home Secretary) can decline 
to disclose information on which he has acted on the ground 
that to do so would be contrary to the public interest, and
that this privilege of the Crown cannot be disputed....there
must be a large number of cases in which the information on 
which Secretary of State is likely to act will be of a very 
confidential nature."4*
In the same case, Lord Macmillan held that:
"....the public interest must, by the nature of things, 
frequently preclude the Secretary of State from disclosing 
to a court or to anyone else the facts and reasons which 
have actuated him."42
However, it seems that the conferment on the detaining authority of
the power to determine whether the disclosure of any fact would be against
the public interest practically renders the so-called constitutional
safeguard of making a representation illusory as there is the possibility
of an arbitrary withholding of all material facts, which will not enable
the detenu to make an effective representation to establish his innocence.
It would have been better if the Constitution had provided for the
scrutiny of the action of the Executive by a court of law, especially
during peace-time, in order to determine whether the facts withheld by
the detaining authority were really in the public interest or were
actuated by a capricious act. In fact, Justice Hamoodur Rahman of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan claimed this power of the court even in the
absence of such a provision in the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965, in
43
Mir Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Government of Pakistan when he observed that:
if any materials upon which the detaining authorities had 
purported to act "is of a nature for which privilege can be 
claimed, then that too would be a matter for the court to
41. Ibid., p.221
7 42• Ibid., p.254
43. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, vol.XX, 1968, p.313
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decide as to whether the document concerned is really so
privileged.”^
Similarly, with regard to'the wide latitude given to the detaining
authorities in the matter of the disclosure of facts, Justice Chagla
45
in Sushila v. Commr. of Police, Greater Bombay held that
"the exercise of the discretion vested in the detaining 
authority....may be challenged on the ground that the discretion 
has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or mala fide"^ an(j 
the court would be entitled to see whether the exercise of 
discretion was tainted in any way. 11
It may be mentioned here that, as in the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions 
of Pakistan and in the 1949 Constitution of India, preventive detention 
has found a place in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh in the Part 
on ’Fundamental Rights’. It is evident that clauses (4) and (5) of 
Article 33 of the Bangladesh Constitution, which has given legal recognit­
ion to preventive detention, embody certain special constitutional safe­
guards regarding persons detained under the law relating to preventive 
detention. They only require certain safeguards to be incorporated and 
read into any law that provides for preventive detention. In view of 
the fact that preventive detention is a normal feature of our Constitution, 
and no express provision is to be found in the Constitution as to when 
a law providing for preventive detention can be passed, it seems that 
Parliament can legislate on this subject, not only in times of emergency, 
but also in times of peace for reasons of public safety, public interet, 
public order, defence and the security of Bangladesh.
V. Preventive Detention and the Criminal Procedure Code
Preventive detention, as contemplated in clauses (4) and (5) of 
Article 33 of the Bangladesh Constitution, has reference to detention 
made by an order of the Executive, not to detention made by an order of
44. Ibid., p.325
45. All India Reporter, Bombay, 1951, p.252
46. Ibid., p.254
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court, purporting act under a law authorising such detention. So this 
kind of preventive detention is quite distinct from that ordered under
R
the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code although the Code, in
certain cases, seeks to achieve an object similar to that attained by
47
preventive detention ordered by the Executive. While an order for 
detention under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code is issued 
by a magistrate, on the basis of sufficient reasons established by the 
evidence and after full judicial enquiry, an order for detention under 
the preventive detention law is issued in general by an executive authority 
without full inquiry and merely on the ipse dixit of a police officer.
This detention under the Criminal Procedure Code can be avoided by giving 
security, whereas in preventive detention under an executive order there 
is no such choice. A person detained under the provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code has the right of moving the Supreme Court in appropriate 
cases for relief and has also the right to defence by a lawyer of his 
own choice, but a detenu under a preventive detention law is not required 
to be produced before any court and has no right to defence by a legal 
practitioner of his own choice.
VI. Preventive Detention and the Special Powers Act, 1974
Only four months and twelve days after the amendment of Article 33 
of .the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, on 5 February 1974, the Special Powers
47. Chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code contains provisions which 
are preventive in their scope and object. Under this chapter, security 
can be demanded for keeping the peace - (a) on conviction (Section 106); 
and (b) on likelihood of a breach of the peace (Section 107). Security 
for good behaviour may be taken from - (a) persons disseminating 
seditious matter (Section 108); (b) vagrants and suspects (Section 109); 
and (c) habitual offenders (Section 110). When a person fails to give 
security, the court may order under Section 123 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code to detain him in prison. The fact that imprisonment 
follows as the result of a failure or refusal to give security does 
not make it a punishment inflicted for a crime.
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Act was passed by Parliament. The Act came into force on 9 February
1974. Like the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act of the United
Kingdom, 1914, which authorised two kinds of detention - punitive and 
48preventive - the Special Powers Act, 1974, has combined in itself the 
laws relating to preventive detention as well as to punitive detention.
The Special Powers Act itself starts with the statement that it is "An 
Act to provide for special measure for the prevention of certain prejudicial 
activities, for more speedy trial and effective punishment of certain 
grave offences and for matters connected therewith." Thus the Act 
provides that a person can be subjected to preventive detention if the 
detaining authority is satisfied that he has indulged, or is about to 
indulge, in certain prejudicial acts defined in it. At the same time, 
it provides a special procedure and Special Tribunals for the trial of 
the offences defined or mentioned in it. There is no bar in the Act 
to the prosecution of a person who is alleged to have committed any of 
the offences mentioned in it if he is preventively detained. Thus a 
person who is held in preventive detention can be simultaneously prosecuted 
before a Special Tribunal, as is provided by the Special Powers Act, for 
the commission of any of the offences defined or mentioned in it.
It should be noted here that, whereas in the United Kingdom the 
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act was passed at a time of supreme 
national danger and was limited in its operation to the duration of the 
First World War, the Special Powers Act in Bangladesh was not passed 
during any grave emergency, although the government of the day claimed 
that it was necessary to control the prevailing lawlessness, turbulance, 
terrorist activities by extreme left-wing groups and the public use of 
firearms. The Special Powers Act was passed as a piece of permanent 
legislation. It seems that this Act was passed in clear violation of the
48. See sub-section 1 of Section 1 of the Defence of the Realm Consolidation 
Act, 1914
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criteria required to be satisfied under international agreement for
passing such an Act. International agreements contemplate the passing
of laws providing for preventive detention only on the grounds of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation and
of such a nature that normal measures or restrictions are plainly
inadequate; furthermore such a law may be passed on a temporary basis only. As
Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966) provides:
"In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, 
the State Parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation "
Similarly, Article 15(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights states:
"In time of war or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation, any High Contracting Party may take 
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation...."
However, if the Special Powers Act providing for preventive
detention was necessary, it could have been passed as temporary
legislation which would then have been subject to periodic review by
Parliament if its renewal was thought necessary, as had been done in
49the case of the Indian Preventive Detention Act, 1950.
It is pertinent to mention here that the provisions of the 
Special Powers Act relating to preventive detention are virtually a 
reproduction of those of the Indian Maintenance of Internal Security 
Act, 1971, passed to "provide for detention in certain cases for the
49. Originally enacted as a temporary measure for a period of one 
year only, the Indian Preventive Detention Act, 1950, continued 
to be on the statute book as a result of periodic extensions and 
renewals, until it lapsed on 31 December 1969
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purpose of maintenance of internal security and matters connected 
therewith.
(i) Definition of Prejudicial Act
Under the Special Powers Act, an order may be issued detaining 
any person with a view to preventing him from doing any prejudicial act. 
Section 2(f) of the Act defines 'prejudical act1 thus:
"prejudicial act means any act which is intended or likely -
(i) to prejudice the sovereignty or defence of Bangladesh;
(ii) to prejudice the maintenance of friendly relations of 
Bangladesh with foreign states;
(iii) to prejudice the security of Bangladesh or to endanger 
public safety or the maintenance of public order;
(iv) to create or excite feelings of enmity or hatred between 
different communities, classes or section of people;
(v) to interfere with or encourage or incite interference with 
the administration of law or the maintenance of law and 
order;
(vi) to prejudice the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the community;
(vii) to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of 
the public;
(viii) to prejudice the economic or financial interests of the 
State".
It appears that the definition of prejudicial acts is very wide and 
inexact. It does not specify the nature of activities that will constitute 
a prejudicial act. The provisions of Section 2(f) are so wide, sweeping 
and general that it would be difficult to reach a definite conclusion 
as to what does or what does not constitute a prejudicial act in a 
particular case. Whether a particular act does or does not constitute
50. The provisions of Sections 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 of the Special
Powers Act are almost a reproduction of those of Sections 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 
11,12,14,15 of the Maintenance of the Internal Security Act, 1971.
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a prejudicial act would entirely depend upon the personal assessment 
or judgment of an individual authority concerned, which may operate 
to the prejudice or detriment of a person subjected to the order of 
preventive detention. In short, it can cover any situation and may 
easily be misused and abused in the interests of the party in power.
I
(ii) Authorities invested with the Power of Preventive Detention 
I Section 3 of the Special Powers Act provides:
! "(1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person
i
with a view to preventing him from doing any prejudicial act it
is necessary so to do, make an order -
(a) directing that such person be detained;....
(2) Any District Magistrate or Additional District Magistrate 
may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view 
to preventing him from doing any prejudicial act within the 
meaning of section 2(f) (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) or (viii)
it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person
be detained.
(3) When any order made is under sub-section (2), the District 
Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate making the order 
shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with 
the grounds on which the order has been made and such other 
particulars as, in his opinion, having a bearing on the matter, 
and no such order shall remain in force for more than thirty days 
after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been 
approved by the Government....”
Therefore| it is evident that the Executive branch of the government
has been given wide and unfettered powers to pass an order to detain any
*
person, whether a citizen or an alien, with a view to preventing him from
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committing any prejudicial act. It has been invested with the sole 
authority to determine whether a particular person should be detained 
to prevent him from committing any of the activities which come within 
a generic expression 'prejudicial act1. On the other hand, the district 
magistrate or the additional district magistrate has been empowered to 
make an order of detention only if he is satisfied that it is necessary 
to detain a person with a view to preventing him from committing any 
prejudicial act with the exception of those acts which are intended 
or likely - (i) to prejudice the sovereignty or defence of Bangladesh 
and (ii) to prejudice the maintenance of friendly relations of Bangladesh 
with foreign states. But after making such an order, the district 
magistrate or additional district magistrate is required to report the 
fact to the government together with the grounds for passing the order 
and relevant particulars. The order of detention passed by the district 
magistrate or the additional district magistrate is to remain in force 
for thirty days from the date it is passed unless in the meantime it 
has been approved by the government. Thus the Special Powers Act provides 
the deprivation of the liberty of the person concerned for thirty days 
at the discretion of the district magistrate or the additional district 
magistrate. However, the satisfaction of the district magistrate or 
the additional district magistrate is made subject to the approval or 
review by the government. In approving the order of detention made by 
the district magistrate or the additional district magistrate, the 
government is to form an independent opinion that the detention is 
necessary. This serves as a safeguard against possible mistakes or 
errors of judgment, and acts as a check against the arbitrary exercise 
of power by the district magistrate or the additional district magistrate.
Thus the ultimate powers of preventive detention lie in the hands of the 
Executive arms of the government. However, it is worth mentioning that 
an order to detain a person is passed both by the government and by
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the district magistrate or the additional district magistrate according
to their own respective discretion on a report or information which may
not always be true and correct.
It is noteworthy that Section 3 of the Special Powers Act does
not use the word ’’reasonable” to qualify the "satisfaction” of the
Government or any District Magistrate or Additional Magistrate in
passing order of detention against any person. But whether there is
a specific reference to reasonableless or not, it seems that such a
power must be exercised reasonably. As it is held in Md. Mukhlesur
Rahman v. State^* that it is now an established principle of law that
when an authority makes an order of preventive detention, he must show
that there are reasonable grounds for such detention. Similarly in
52Asmatullah Mia v. Bangladesh, it is observed that it is a fundamental 
requirement of law that the satisfaction of the detaining authority 
must be based on sufficient materials.
(iii) The Communication of Grounds for Detention
Section 8 of the Special Powers Act provides that:
"(1) In every case where an order has been made under Section 3, 
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but 
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), communicate to ' 
the person affected thereby the grounds on which the order has 
been made to enable him to make a representation in writing 
against the order, and it shall be the duty of such authority 
to inform such person of his right of making such representation 
and to afford him the earliest opportunity of doing so:
Provided that nothing in this section shall require the authority 
to disclose the facts which it considers to be against the public 
interest to disclose.
51. Dhaka Law Reports, vol.XXVIII, 1976, p.172
52. Ibid., p.22
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(2) In the case of a detention order, the authority making the 
order shall inform the person detained under that order of the 
grounds of his detention at the time he is detained or as soon 
thereafter as is practicable, but not later than fifteen days 
from the date of detention.”
Tfyus sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Special Powers Act has, 
in fact, incorporated the requirements laid down in clause (5) of Article 
33 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh which has been discussed 
earlier. That is, the authority of making the order of detention is 
required, as soon as may be, (a) to communicate to the affected person 
the grounds on which the order has been made in order to enable him to 
make a representation in writing against the order, (b) to inform such 
person of his right of making such representation and (c) to afford him 
the earliest opportunity of doing so. Although clause 5 of Article 33 
of the Constitution has left the time limit for the communication of 
the grounds of detention to the detenu indeterminate, by using the 
expression "as soon as may be”, Section 8(2) of the Special Powers Act 
has fixed the maximum limit of fifteen days for communicating the 
grounds of detention to the detenu: it provides that the grounds of 
detention must be conveyed by the detaining authority to the detenu at 
the time of his detention, and, if that is not practicable, to inform 
him as soon as possible thereafter, but not later than fifteen days from 
the date of detention. This sub-section provides an important protection 
to the dStenu for in this matter he is not at the will of the detaining 
authority in so far as the grounds of detention must be communicated to 
him within fifteen days from the date of the order. The provision 
prevents the detaining authority from taking advantage of the vague 
expression "as soon as may be” and goes some way towards mitigating 
the hardship of the arrested persqn.
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(iv) The Constitution of, and Reference to, the Advisory Board 
Section 9 of the Special Powers Act states that:
"(1) The Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute an 
Advisory Board for the purposes of this Act.
(2) The Advisory Board shall consist of three persons, of whom
I
I two shall be persons who are, or have been, or are qualified
to be appointed as, Judges of the Supreme Court and the other 
shall be a person who is a senior officer in the service of the
i  Republic, and such persons shall be appointed by the Government.
|
(3) The Government shall appoint one of the members of the 
Advisory Board who is, or has been, or is qualified to be 
appointed as, a Judge of the Supreme Court to be its chairman.” 
Section 10 of the Act, which deals with the reference to the
Advisory Board, provides:
”In every case where a detention order has been made under this
f
Act, the Government shall, within one hundred and twenty days 
from the date of detention under the order, place before the 
Advsiory Board constituted under Section 9 the grounds on which 
the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by 
the person affected by the order.”
It may be recalled here that clause (4) of Article 33 of the 1972
Constitution of Bangladesh does not expressly provide for the creation of
an independent body for the purpose of reviewing executive orders of
detention. This lacuna has been removed by the Special Powers Act which
provide for the creation of an Advisory Board. Although sub-section (1)
of Section 9 empowers the government to constitute an Advisory Board
"whenever necessary”, it appears that, in fact, the government does not
have any discretion in the matter as Section 10 requires the government, in
*
every case where a detention order has been made under the Act, to place 
before the Advisory Board within one hundred and twenty days from the date
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of making the detention order the grounds of detention and the representation,
if any, made by the detenu. Therefore an Advisory Body must be constituted
to review or consider all initial orders of detention and the representations
made by the detenu. In view of the fact that the grounds on which the
detention was made have to be communicated to the detenu soon after his
arrest and in any event within fifteen days from the date on which he
has been taken into custody, it is quite clear that the maximum limit
of one hundred and twenty days for placing the case of the detenu before
the Advisory Board is excessive.
Here it may be noted that, like clause (5) of Article 33 of the
1972 Constitution, as mentioned earlier, sub-section (1) of Section 8
of the Special Powers Act does not specify to whom the representation 
/
of the detenu is to be made against the order of detention or how the
representation is to be dealt with although it confers on the detenu
the right to have the earliest opportunity of making such a representation.
But in view of the provisions of Section 10, which require the government 
to place before the Advisory Board "the grounds on which the order has 
been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected 
by the order,” it seems that the representation of the detenu against 
the order of detention is to be made to the government. If the government 
after considering the representation of the detenu, decides not to 
release him, the grounds of detention along with his representation 
must be placed before the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Special 
Powers Act.
(v) The Procedure of the Advisory Board
Section 11 of the Special Powers Act provides that:
”(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials 
placed before it and calling for such further information as it 
may deem necessary from the Government or from the person concerned
37 2
and after affording the person concerned an opportunity of 
being heard in person, submit its report to the Government 
within one hundred and seventy days from the date of 
detention.
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a 
separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board 
as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned.
(3) When there is a difference of opinion among the members 
of the Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such 
members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Board.
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against 
whom a detention order has been made to appear by any legal 
practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to 
the Advisory Board, and the proceedings of the Advisory Board 
and its report, excepting that part of the report in which 
the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be 
confidential.”
Thus the function of the Advisory Board is limited to the consider­
ation of the materials placed before it by the government and such 
further materials as it may call for from the government or from the 
person concerned and to afford the person concerned an opportunity of 
being heard in person in order to prepare a report containing, inter alia, 
its opinion as to whether it approves or disapproves the detention order. 
The Board has not been given the power to inquire into the accuracy of 
the materials or information placed before it, or the source from which 
they have been collected, whether they are verified statements collected
from reliable sources and not hearsays or rumours from any quarter,
*
tainted or otherwise. Further it has not been empowered, while approving
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the detention order, to express any opinion as to the period for which a 
detenu should be kept in preventive custody. It seems that the proceedings 
of the Board are conducted, to a great extent, in a restricted manner. 
Despite the fact that the detenu has been given the opportunity of being 
heard in person by the Board, sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act 
does not allow him to be represented before the Board by a legal practit­
ioner. The denial of this elementary right of defence by a lawyer is 
likely to make an effective representation of the detenu1s case difficult, 
though not impossible. Moreover, the detenu is not allowed to see or 
have an access to the materials or information placed before the Board, 
as well as its report, are to be treated as confidential, with the 
exception of that part of the report which contains the opinion of the 
Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the 
detention of the person concerned. However, the report of the Board is 
to be submitted to the government within one hundred and seventy days 
from the date of detention, which is in conformity with the constitutional 
provision. Thus the government may hold a person in preventive detention 
for a maximum period of one hundred and seventy days (i.e. five months 
and twenty days) without the approval of the Advisory Board.
(vi) Action upon the Report of Advisory Board
Section 12 of the Special Powers Act, which deals with the action that 
is to be taken upon the Report of Advisory Board»provides:
"(1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there 
is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, 
the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the 
detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit: 
Provided that the Advisory Board shall, after affording the person 
concerned an opportunity of being heard in person, review such 
detention order, unless revoked earlier, once in every six months
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from the date of such detention order and the Government shall 
inform the person concerned or the result of such review.
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there 
is in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of 
the person concerned, the Government shall revoke the detention 
order and cause the person to be released forthwith.”
Thus it is evident that if the Advisory Board reports to the 
government that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention 
of a person, this will enable the government to continue the detention 
of the person concerned for an indefinite period; because taking advantage 
of the lacuna in the 1972 Constitution - which does not prescribe the 
maximum period of preventive detention - the Special Powers Act, which 
was passed as a peace-time law and can be resorted to in times of both 
peace and emergency, does not specify any period for which the detention 
may last. This is a clear-cut departure from the principle which is 
generally to be found in the laws of democratic States that preventive 
detention must be for a period of limited duration as it is an exceptional 
measure. For example, Section 13 of the Indian Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971, provides that "the maximum period for which any person 
may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been 
confirmed....(by the appropriate government) shall be twelve months from 
the date of detention....” The provisions of this Section have not been 
incorporated into the Special Powers Act, 1974, although most of the 
provisions of the Act relating to preventive detention have been reprod­
uced from the Indian Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. Although
in most of the democratic countries, war-time or emergency laws providing 
for preventive detention have not specified the maximum periods for which 
persons may be detained in preventive custody, as no one can predict when 
the war or emergency will end, they normally stipulate that the power of
preventive detention will terminate upon the cessation of war or emergency.
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For example, in the United Kingdom the Defence of the Realm Regulations
and the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, which were formulated under
*
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, and the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, respectively, invested the Executive with 
the power of detaining a person in preventive custody, which could 
only be exercised during the period of war. The restriction of the
power to detain to the war years was considered by Lord Dunedin
53 54
in his judgment in Rex v. Halliday as a ’’sufficient safeguard”.
As in the United Kingdom, in the United States the power of preventive
detention can only be exercised under the Internal Security Act, 1950,
during the currency of an emergency proclaimed by the President pursuant
to the invasion of the United States or of its possessions or on the
declaration of war against another State, or in the event of insurrection
within the United States in aid of a foreign enemy. Similarly, the
French Ordinance of 1944 made it clear that the exceptional measure of
preventive detention could only last till "the legal cessation of
hostilities”. Thus all these enactments, in effect, show that a person
cannot be detained in preventive custody beyond the period of war or
emergency.
Although Section 12(1) of the Special Powers Act does not specify 
the maximum period of detention, the proviso to this Section provides 
for review of a detention order by the Advisory Board every six months 
from the date of such a detention order in which the detenu is to be 
given an opportunity of being heard in person and thereafter the 
Government is required to inform the detenu the result of such a review. 
This may act as a check on the power of the Executive to detain a person
53. The Law Reports, Appeal Gases, London, 1917, p.260
54. Ibid., p.271
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for an indefinite period as the Advisory Board may every six months
express its opinion, that there is no sufficient cause for the detention
of the person concerned. However, it is not clear as to what will
lead the Advisory Board to form such an opinion.
55
Unlike para 6 of Regulation 18B of the Defence (General)
Regulations, 1939, which empowers the Secretary of State (Home Secretary) 
to decline to follow the advice of an Advisory Committee, sub-section
(2) of Section 12 of the Special Powers Act contains a salutary provision 
to the effect that if the Advisory Board expresses its opinion that there 
is no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the 
Government must revoke the detention order and release the person 
forthwith. Thus the 'satisfaction1 of the government, when making a 
detention order against a person, is made subject to the opinion of the 
Advisory Board. The binding effect given to the opinion of the Advisory 
Board means how it is rather more than an "Advisory" Board. In fact, 
the mandatory force of the opinion of the Advisory Board serves as an 
important safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of the power of 
preventive detention by the Executive.
(vii) The Revocation of Detention Orders
Section 13 of the Special Powers Act provides that "A detention 
order may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the Government."
Unlike Section 3(9)^ of the Security Act of Pakistan, 1952, which 
empowered the detaining authority to make a fresh order of detention 
after it had cancelled the previous one, Section 13 of the Special Powers
55. As para 6 of Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, 
provided that "The Secretary of State shall make a report to Parliament 
at least once in every month as to the action taken under this regulation 
(including the number of persons detained under orders made thereunder) 
and as to the number of cases, if any, in whicK he has declined to follow 
the advice of any such advisory committee "
56. As Section 3(9) of the Security Act of Pakistan, 1952, stated that "The 
revocation, otherwise than on the recommendation of the (Advisory) Board, 
of an order (i.e. detention order) made under clause (b) of sub-section
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Act does not contain such a provision. It only empowers the government 
to revoke or modify the order of detention made earlier by itself.
Perhaps the framers of the Special Powers Act thought that the constitut­
ional requirement of the necessity to obtain the report of the Advisory 
Board within a period of six months, as embodied in Article 33(5) of 
the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, would be frustrated if the government 
was allowed to make fresh orders of detention in succession, thereby 
making the computation of the period of aforesaid six months difficult. 
Similarly, they may have thought that the computation of the period of 
one hundred and twenty days from the date of the order of detention, as 
required by Section 10 of the Special Powers Act for the purpose of 
referring the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board would be difficult 
if the government was given the power to make (successive) fresh orders 
of detention.
(viii) The Temporary Release of Persons Detained
Section 14 of the Special Powers Act, 1974, provides:
"(1) The Government may, at any time, direct that any person 
detained in pursuance of a detention order may be released for 
any specified period either without conditions or upon such 
conditions specified in the direction as that person accepts, 
and may, at any time, cancel his release.
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), 
the Government may require him to enter into a bond, with or 
without sureties, for the due observance of the conditions 
specified in the direction.
(1) against any person, or the expiry of any such order, shall not 
bar the making against the person and on the same grounds, of a 
fresh order under that clause."
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(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender
himself at the time and place, and to the authority, specified
*
in the order directing his release or cancelling his release, 
as the case may be.
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender 
himself in the manner specified in sub-section (3), he shall 
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
two years, or with fine, or with both.
(5) If any person released under sub-section (1) fails to fulfil 
any of the conditions imposed upon him under the said sub-section 
or in the bond entered into by him, the bond shall be declared
to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to 
pay the penalty thereof."
Thus the government has been given wide and unfettered powers to 
make orders for the temporary release of a detenu, unconditionally or 
upon such conditions as the person concerned will accept. The government 
has also been given the power to cancel an order of release at any time. 
There are no guidelines as to the way in which these powers of passing 
order of temporary release or cancellation of release order can be 
exercised. Since the government is not required to give any reasons 
or follow any criteria for its action, it possesses virtually arbitrary 
power to release a detenu or cancel his release order. It seems that
the provision for temporary release was designed to induce a person
concerned to behave in accordance with the wishes of the government in 
order to gain its favour and secure his final release.
(ix) Bar on Jurisdiction of Courts
Section 34 of the Special Powers Act provides:
"Except as provided in this Act, no order made, direction issued, 
or proceeding taken under this Act, or purporting to have been so
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made, issued or taken, as the case may be, shall be called
in question in any court, and no suit, prosecution or other
legal proceeding shall lie against the Government or any 
person for anything in good faith done or intended to be 
done under this Act.'1
Thus all the courts have been precluded from questioning any order 
of preventive detention made under the Act. Yet this restriction does
not protect the order of detention passed in bad faith, in excess of power
or in clear violation of the provisions of the Act providing for preventive 
detention. The cherished right of personal liberty of an individual 
cannot be taken away at the mere whim of the Executive. If personal 
liberty is encroached upon arbitrarily, the person concerned has every 
right under the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh to test and determine 
by means of a writ of habeas corpus in the High Court Division the
legality of the order by virtue of which he is taken into custody.
Article 102(2)(b)(i) of the 1972 Constitution provides that the High 
Court Division may, if satisfied that no other equally efficacious 
remedy is provided by law, "on the application of any person, make an
order - (i) directing that a person in custody be brought before it so
that it may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without 
lawful authority or in an unlawful manner". Thus the High Court has the 
power to determine that a detenu is not held without lawful authority 
or in an unlawful manner. In other words, it is the duty of the High 
Court to see that the provisions of the Act relating to preventive 
detention are strictly complied with in detaining a person in preventive 
custody. In discharging this duty, the High Court cannot be expected 
to be satisfied on the mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority without 
having before it the materials upon which the authority has purported to 
act. In this respect, the observations of Justice Kamaluddin Hossain of 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Abdul Latif
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Mirza v. Government of Bangladesh are worth quoting;
"The Constitution, therefore, has cast a duty upon the High 
Court to satisfy itself, that a person in custody is being 
detained under an authority of law, or in a lawful manner.
The purpose of the Constitution is to confer on the High Court 
with the power to satisfy itself that a person detained in 
custody, is under an order which is lawful.... The Bangladesh 
Constitution, therefore, provides for a judicial review of an 
executive action.... The High Court, therefore, in order to 
discharge it's constitutional function of judicial review, may 
call upon the detaining authority to disclose the materials 
upon which it has so acted, in order to satisfy itself that the 
authority has not acted, in an unlawful manner.
To the same effect, Justice Hamoodur Rahman of the Supreme Court of
I
Pakistan expressed his views in the case of Mir Abdul Baqi Baluch v. Government 
59of Pakistan with regard to the scope .of Article 98(2)(b)(i) of the
1962 Constitution of Pakistan, which is identical with Article 102(2)(b)(i)
of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh:
"It is not uncommon that even high executive authorities act 
upon the basis of information supplied to them by their sub­
ordinates. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that it 
would be unreasonable for the court, in the proper exercise of 
its constitutional duty, to insist upon a disclosure of the 
materials upon which the authority had so acted so that it 
should satisfy itself that the authority had not acted ... 
without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner. The wording 
of clause (b)(i) of Article 98(2) shows that not only the 
jurisdiction but also the manner of the exercise of that juris­
diction is subject to judicial review."60
A similar view was expressed by Lord Atkin in the case of Eshugbayi Eleko
61
v . Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria:
"In accordance with British jurisprudence, no member of the 
Executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a 
British subject except on condition that he can support the 
legality of his action before a Court of Justice. And it is 
the tradition of British justice that judges should not shrink 
from deciding such issues in the face of the Executive,
57. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, 1979, p.l.
58. ibid., p.9-10.
59. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Supreme Court, vol.XX, 1968, p.313.
60. Ibid., pp.324-325,
61. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 1931/ p,662,
62. Ibid., p.670.
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VII. Preventive Detention and the Emergency Powers Rule, 1975
It may be recalled here that President Muhammadullah issued a 
Proclamation of Emergency on 28 December 1974. After the declaration 
of Emergency, the President promulgated the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 
1974, which was to remain in force during the operation of the said 
Proclamation of Emergency, Yet the Emergency Powers Act, 1975 (Act I of 
1975), which was passed by Parliament and which received the assent of 
the President of 25 January 1975, repealed the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 
1974. However, Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Ordinance, which was 
also reproduced as Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act, provides:
"(1) The Government may.,,,make such rules as appear to it to 
be necessary or expedient for ensuring the security, the public 
safety and interest and for protecting the economic life of 
Bangladesh, or for securing the maintenance of public order, 
or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life 
of the community.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred 
by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for, or may empower 
any authority to make orders providing for..,.
(viii) the apprehension and detention of any person with respect 
to whom the authority empowered by or under the rules to 
apprehend and detain is of the opinion that this appreh­
ension and detention are necessary for the purpose of 
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to 
Bangladesh’s relation with foreign powers, or to the 
security, the public safety or interest of Bangladesh, 
the maintenance of supplies and services essential to 
the life of the community or the maintenance of peaceful 
condition in any part of Bangladesh;
Explanation - For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that
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the sufficiency of the grounds on which such opinion as aforesaid
is based shall be determined by the authority forming such opinion;...
(xi) the apprehension and detention in temporary custody of
or any person whom the authority empowered by or under
the rules to apprehend and detain suspects on grounds
appearing to such authority to be reasonable of having
acted, being about to act, being likely to act in any
such prejudicial manner as is mentioned in clause (viii)..."
In exercise of the powers conferred by this Section, the government framed
the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, which was issued on 3 January 1975, and
was also allowed to remain in force by the Emergency Powers Act.
The provisions of the Emergency Powers Rules relating to the powers
63
of detention were virtually a reproduction of those of the Defence of 
Pakistan Rules, 1965, formulated under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 
1965, Rule 5(1)(a) and Rule 30 of the Emergency Powers Rules contained 
provisions regarding preventive detention.
(i) The Power of the Government to make Detention Orders 
Rule 5 of the Emergency Powers Rules provided:
”(1) The Government, if satisfied with respect to any person that
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial
to the security, the public safety or interest of Bangladesh,
Bangladesh’s relation with any foreign power, the maintenance of 
public order, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part 
of Bangladesh or the maintenance of supplies and services essential 
to the life of the community it is necessary so to do, may make
63. The provisions of Rules 5(la), 5(4), and 30 of the Emergency Powers 
Rules of Bangladesh, 1975, are almost a reproduction of those of 
Rules 32(1) (b), 32(4), 204(2) and 204(4) of the' Defence of Pakistan 
Rules, 1965
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an order -
(a) directing that such person be detained;...
(4) A person who is ordered to be detained under sub-rule (l)(a) 
shall be detained in such place and under such conditions as to 
maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline 
as the Government may from time to time determine....
(6) An order under sub-rule (1)(a) may be executed at any place 
in Bangladesh in the manner provided to the execution of warrants 
of arrest under the Code M
It is pertinent to mention here that the grounds for which the
Emergency Powers Rules empowered the Government to pass detention orders
were not new: they were already the grounds for passing detention orders
64under the Special Powers Act, 1974.
(ii) The Special Powers of Arrest and Detention
Rule 30 of the Emergency Powers Rules provides:
” (1) Any police officer, or any other officer of Government 
empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the 
Government, may arrest without warrant any person whom he 
reasonably suspects of having acted, of acting, or of being 
about to act in a manner prejudicial to the security, the 
public safety or interest of Bangladesh or the maintenance 
of supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community.
(2) Any officer who makes an arrest under sub-rule (1) shall 
forthwith report the fact of such arrest to the Government, 
and, pending the receipt of the orders of the Government, may, 
by order in writing, commit any person so arrested to such 
custody as the Government may by general or special order
64. See, supra, pp.365-366.
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specify: Provided that - (i) no person shall be detained 
in custody under this sub-rule for a period exceeding 
fifteen days without the order of the Government; and
(ii) no person shall be detained in custody under this 
sub-rule for a period exceeding two months.
(3) On receipt of any report made under the provision of
sub-rule (2), the Government may, in addition to making
such order, subject to the proviso to sub-rule (2), as may 
appear to be necessary for the temporary custody of any 
person arrested under this rule, make, in excerise of any 
power conferred upon it by any law for the time being in force 
such final order as to his detention, release, residence or any 
other matter concerning him as may appear to it in the circum­
stances of the case to be reasonable or necessary."
Thus Rule 30(1) of the Emergency Powers Rules also provided for 
preventive detention as a police officer or an officer of government 
could be given the power of arresting without warrant a person whom he 
reasonably suspected of, Inter alia, "being about" to act in a manner 
prejudicial to the security, the public safety, or interest of Bangladesh 
or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the
community. Whereas the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965, conferred on
any police officer or any other officer of government by general or 
special order of the government the special powers of arrest and detention 
in times of Emergency declared on the eve of the threatened war with India 
in 1965,^,the Emergency Powers Rules of Bangladesh, 1975, conferred on 
any police officer or any other officer of government such powers in 
times of emergency declared as a consequence of threatened "internal 
disturbance". However, the person so arrested could not be detained
65. See Rule 204(la) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965
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in custody for a period exceeding fifteen days without the concurrence 
of the government. Thus the Emergency Powers Rules provided for the 
deprivation of the liberty of the person concerned for fifteen days at the 
discretion of a police officer or an officer of the government. It 
invested the Government with the ultimate authority to make a final order 
as to the detention or release of the person concerned, after considering 
the report of the fact of arrest submitted to it. Thus the government 
had to come to an independent decision with regard to the final orders 
of detention.
(i-J-i) Non-Existence of the Constitutional Safeguards Regarding Preventive 
Detention in the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975
It is noteworthy that although the Emergency Powers Rules provided 
for preventive detention, they did not incorporate any of the safeguards 
laid down in clauses 4 and 5 of Article 33 of the 1972 constitution.
Thus they made no provision for the constitution of an Advisory Board 
to examine the case of a detenu and to report to the government its 
opinion whether the person concerned should be detained for more than 
six months. In other words, no review of the legality of detention by 
an independent and impartial quasi-judicial body was prescribed. No 
provision was made for guaranteeing the detenu the right to be informed, 
as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention was 
made, as required under clause 5 of Article 33 of the Constitution. 
Similarly, the Emergency Powers Rules did not provide for the right 
of the detenu to have the earliest opportunity of making a representation 
against the order of detention, as was necessary under the aforesaid 
clause.
Thus the Emergency Powers Rules provided no machinery for giving 
any relief against any possible abuse or misuse of the power of preventive 
detention. It gave the detaining authority the power to detain a person 
without trial for any length of time, without giving him any reasons or 
atny opportunity even of making a representation against the order of
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detention to prove his innocence. These were very extraordinary 
powers for taking away the most cherished right to personal liberty 
of a citizen in a most arbitrary manner. Therefore, it is clear that 
the Emergency Powers Rules violated the constitutional guarantees 
embodied in clauses 4 and 5 of Article 33 of the 1972 Constitution 
of Bangladesh.
(iv) The Insertion of the Constitutional Safeguards Regarding Preventive 
Detention irt the Emergency Powers Rules by the 1975 Martial Law 
Regime
The Special Powers Act, 1974, and the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, !■.
which were enacted during the Government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
remained in force after the imposition of Martial Law in 1975. The
salutory step taken by the Martial Law administration was that, on
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18 August 1977, it introduced certain amendments to the Emergency 
Powers Rules which fulfilled the constitutional requirements in respect 
of preventive detention. This amendment of the Emergency Powers Rules 
provided for the communication of the grounds of detention order, the 
constitution of the Advisory Committee, references to the Advisory 
Committee, the procedure of the Advisory Committee and the action to be 
taken upon the report of the Advisory Committee.
(a) The Communication of the Grounds of Detention Orders
The newly inserted sub-rule 5(A) of the Emergency Powers Rules 
provided:
"(1) In every case, where an order of detention has been made 
under rule 5(1)(a), the Government shall, as soon as may be, 
but subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), communicate to
66. Notification No.S.R.O. 278-L/77 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Bangladesh, on 18 August 1977,
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the person affected thereby the grounds on which the order has 
been made to enable him to make a representation in writing 
against the order, and shall also inform such person of his 
right of making such representation and afford him the earliest 
opportunity of doing so:
Provided that nothing in this rule shall require the Government 
to disclose facts which it considers to be against public interest 
to disclose.
(2) In the case of a detention order under rule 5(1)(a), the Government 
shall inform the person detained of the grounds of his detention 
at the time he is detained or as soon thereafter as practicable, 
but not later than fifteen days from the date of detention:
Provided that when a person has been already under detention 
being committed to custody under sub-rule (2) of rule 30, 
the Government shall inform the person detained of the grounds 
of his detention at the time the order under rule 5(1)(a) is 
made."
It may be mentioned here that the provisions of sub-rule 5(A)
of the Emergency Powers Rules regarding the communication of the grounds
67
of detention order were virtually a reproduction of those of Section 8 
of the Special Powers Act, 1974, with the exception of the proviso to 
clause (2) of sub-rule 5(A).
(b) The Constitution of the Advisory Committee
The newly added sub-rule 5B of the Emergency Powers Rules stated:
"(1) The Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute 
an Advisory Committee for the purpose of these rules,
(2) The Advisory Committee shall consist of a chairman who 
shall be judge of the High Court and two other members of
67. See Supra, PP*368-369.
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whom one shall be a senior officer in the service of the 
Republic and the other a person who has, for not less than 
ten years, held judicial office in the territory of Bangladesh.
(3) The Chairman and the members shall be appointed by the 
Government."
The above provisions relating to the constitution of the Advisory
68Committee resembled those of Section 9 of the Special Powers Act.
However, it may be mentioned here that whereas in Section 9 of the
Special Powers Act the machinery to review the cases of detention was
called the 'Advisory Board', in sub-rule 5B of the Emergency Powers
Rules such a body was termed an 'Advisory Committee', perhaps following
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the example of para 3 of Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) 
Regulations, 1939. Moreover, the Advisory Board, as discussed earlier, 
was to consist of a chairman who was, or had been, or was qualified to be 
appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court and two other members*of 
whom one was to be of similar qualification to that of the Chairman 
and the other was to be a senior civil servant. On the other hand, 
the Advisory Committee under the Emergency Powers Rules was to consist 
of a chairman who was to be a sitting judge of the High Court and two 
other members, of whom one was to be a senior civil servant and the 
other was to be a person who had held judicial office in the territory 
of Bangladesh for ten years.
(c) Reference to the Advisory Committee
The newly added sub-rule 5C of the Emergency Powers Rules provided:
68. See supra, p.370.
69. Para 3 of Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, 
which empowered the Secretary of State to make order of detention, 
stated that "for the purposes of this regulation, there shall be one 
or more advisory committees consisting of persons appointed by the 
Secretary of State."
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"In every case where a detention order has been made under rule 5(1)
(a), the Government shall, within one hundred and twenty days, from
the date of detention place before the Advisory Committee constituted
under rule 5B the grounds on which the order has been made and the
representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order."
In fact, the provisions of the Emergency Powers Rules concerning
reference to the Advisory Committee were a reproduction of those of 
70
Section 10 of the Special Powers Act.
(d) The Procedure of the Advisory Committee
The newly introduced sub-rule 5D of the Emergency Powers Rules 
stated that
"(1) The Advisory Committee shall, after considering the materials 
placed before it and calling for such further information as it 
may deem necessary from the Government or from the person concerned 
and after affording the person concerned an opportunity of being 
heard in person, submit its report to the Government within one 
hundred and seventy days from the date of detention.
(2) The report of the Advisory Committee shall specify in a 
separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Committee as 
to whether or not there is sufficient cause for detention of • 
the person concerned.
(3) Where there is a difference of opinion among the members 
of the Advisory Committee, the opinion of the majority of such 
members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Committee.
(4) Nothing in this rule shall entitle any person against whom 
a detention order has been made to appear by any legal practit­
ioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory 
Committee; and the proceeding of the Advisor^ Committee and its
70. See supra, p.370.
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report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion 
of the Advisory Committee is specified, shall be confidential." 
It is noteworthy that'the provisions of sub-rule 5D of the Emerg­
ency Powers Rules relating to the procedure of the Advisory Committee
71
were a reproduction of those of Section 11 of the Special Powers Act 
with the exception of the words "Committee" and "rule" as occurred in 
sub-rule 5D.
(e) Action on Receipt of Report from the Advisory Committee
The newly inserted sub-rule 5E of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, 
laid down:
"(1) In any case where the Advisory Committee has reported that 
there is, in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of 
a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and 
continue the detention of the person for such period as it 
thinks fit:
Provided that the Advisory Committee shall, after affording the 
person concerned an opportunity of being heard in person, review 
such detention order, unless revoked earlier once in every six 
months from the date of such detention order, and the Government 
shall inform the person concerned or the result of such review.
(2) In any case where the Advisory Committee has reported that 
there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention 
of the person concerned the Government shall revoke the detention 
order and inform the person to be released forthwith."
It should be noted here that the provisions of sub-rule 5E of the
72
Emergency Powers Rules were the exact reproduction of those of Section 12 
of the Special Powers Act, barring the word "Committee" in sub-rule 5E.
71. See supra, pp.371-372.
72. See supra, pp.373-374.
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(f) Revocation of Detention Orders
The newly introduced sub-rule 5F of the Emergency Powers Rules 
stated:
"(1) A detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified 
by the Government."
It may be noted here that the provisions of sub-rule 5F relating 
the revocation of detention orders reproduced exactly those of section 
of the Special Powers Act, 1974.
Conclusion:
(i) Preventive Detention and the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
The foregoing discussion reveals that the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh did not originally contain any provisions recognising and 
regulating preventive detention. Later, on 22 September 1973, the 
Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, added clauses 4 and 5 
to Article 33 which embody certain safeguards in order to mitigate the 
harshness of preventive detention. Any legislation providing for 
preventive detention should conform with the requirements of clauses 
4 and 5 of Article 33 of the Constitution. Thus the Constitution 
prohibits any law from authorising the detention of a person in* 
preventive custody beyond six months without the approval of an Advisory 
Board. It is evident that the Constitution does not expressly stipulate 
the creation of any independent body to review or consider any initial 
orders of detention, which is a provision to be found in the legal system 
of the United States (as seen earlier). It speaks of an Advisory Board, 
the question of which arises only when a detenu is to be detained for 
a longer period than six months. Thus the Constitution fails to
to
1373
73. See supra, p.376.
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contemplate any quasi-judicial protection to a detenu held for a period
not exceeding six months against the arbitrary deprivation of his
personal liberty by the detaining authority. Moreover, whereas the
1962 Constitution of Pakistan and 1949 Constitution of India require
that a law authorising preventive detention shall not authoriise the
detention of a person for a period exceeding three months without the
concurrence of an Advisory Board, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
requires the concurrence of an Advisory Board only when a person is to
be detained for a longer period than six months. Yet unlike those
/
Constitutions, the Bangladesh Constitution has given the detenu the right 
of hearing before the Advisory Board. However, the Constitution 
requires the detaining authority to communicate, as soon as may be, to 
the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made 
and the detenu is to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make repres­
entation against the order. But the Constitution has given the 
detaining authority a wide discretion not to disclose facts which it 
considers to be harmful to the public interest to disclose. This may 
practically render the constitutional safeguard of making representation 
illusive as there is the possibility of an arbitrary withholding of all 
material facts by a detaining authority, which will make an effective 
representation difficult. It would have been better if the Constitution 
had provided for judicial scrutiny, especially in times of peace, of the 
facts withheld by the detaining authority in order to determine whether 
they were held back really in the public interest.
The Bangladesh Constitution does not precribe the maximum period 
of detention. Unlike the Indian Constitution, it does not even state 
that Parliament may prescribe the maximum period for which any person 
be detained under any law providing for preventive detention. This 
makes it possible to pass any Act authorising preventive detention,for 
an unlimited period. Moreover, the Constitution does not contain any
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provision as to when a Preventive Detention Act is to be passed.
Therefore, it seems that Parliament can pass a Preventive Detention 
Act not only in times of emergency but also in times of peace.
(ii) Preventive Detention and the Special Powers Act, 1974.
Only four months and twelve days after the amendment of Article 
33 of the 1972 Constitution, on 5 February 1974, the Bangladesh 
Parliament passed the Special Powers Act, 1974. Like the Defence 
of the Realm Consolidation Act of the United Kingdom, 1914, this Act 
has combined both punitive and preventive provisions. Unlike the 
Defence of the Realm Regulations, 1914, and the Defence (General) 
Regulations, 1939, which were formulated in the United Kingdom under 
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, and the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, respectively providing for prevention 
detention at a time of supreme national danger and limited to the duration 
of the World Wars, the Special Powers Act was passed in peace-time. As 
in India and Pakistan, the power of preventive detetnion in Bangladesh 
is designed to be used in times of both peace and emergency. Unlike the 
Indian Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the Special Powers Act has 
been passed as a piece of permanent legislation. However, the provisions 
of the Special Powers Act relating to preventive detention are virtually 
a reproduction of those of the Indian Maintenance of Internal Security 
Act, 1971. Yet taking advantage of a lacuna in the Constitution^which 
does not require a law providing for preventive detention to prescribe 
the maximum period of detention, unlike the Indian Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, the Special Powers Act does not specify any limit as to 
the period for which the d/tenu can be kept in detention. However, the 
Special Powers Act incorporates the requirements laid down in clauses 4 
and 5 of Article 33 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. Thus it 
provides for, inter alia^ the communication of the grounds of detention
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order to the detenu, the right of representation to the detenu against 
detention order, and the constitution of an Advisory Board to review the 
cases of detenus. Although the Constitution left the time for communi­
c a t i n g  t h e  grounds of detention to the detenu indeterminate by using 
the vague expression "as soon as may beM, the Special Powers Act has 
prescribed a maximum time-limit of fifteen days for such a communication.
Yet it has unjustifiably allowed the Government the maximum period of 
one hundred and twenty days to place the case of the detenu before the 
Advisory Board. Whereas the Constitution speaks of an Advisory Board 
to review only those orders of detention in respect of detenus who are 
to be detained for a longer period than six months, the Special Powers 
Act has made a salutary provision requiring the Advisory Board to review 
every order of detention. Notwithstanding, the Advisory Board has not 
been given any power to express an opinion as to how long, if at all, the 
detenu should be kept in custody. Yet unlike the Defence (General) 
Regulations, 1939, the Special Powers Act contains a provision to the 
effect that if the Advisory Board expresses its opinion that there is 
no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the 
government must revoke the detention order and release the person forthwith. 
Thus the opinion of the Advisory Board constitutes an important safeguard 
against the vagaries and arbitrary action of the detaining authority. 
However, it is to be noted that the proceedings of the Board are conducted, 
to some extent,in a restricted manner; because the detenu is not given the 
right of defence by a lawyer and is denied the access to the materials 
placed before the Board to help him prepare his defence. The Special 
Powers Act has invested the Government with the powers to make an order 
for the temporary release of a detenu and to cancel an order of release 
at any time. Yet it does not contain any guidelines as to the exercise 
of such powers. The absence of such guidelines provides the scope for 
the government to exercise the power of temporary release by a process
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of picking and choosing. Similarly, it enables the government to 
exercise the power of cancelling the order of release arbitrarily.
(iii) Preventive Detention and the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975
Six days after the declaration of emergency, on 3 January 1975, 
the Awami League government issued the Emergency Powers Rules formulated 
under the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1974. These rules empowered 
the government to pass detention orders on the grounds which had 
already been the reasons for passing detention orders under the Special 
Powers Act, 1974. However, the provisions of the Emergency Powers 
Rules relating to preventive detention were almost a reproduction 
of those of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1965.
(a) Non-Existence Of the Constitutional Safeguards regarding Preventive
Detention in the Emergency Powers Rules
However, the Emergency Powers Rules did not originally provide
for procedural safeguards against the improper exercise of the power
of detention as required by clauses 4 and 5 of Article 33 of the
1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. Thus it did not contain any provision
at all for communicating the grounds of the detention to a detenu and
for affording him the opportunity of making representation, against' such
an order to establish his innocence, in clear violation of the provisions
of clause 5 of Article 33 of the Constitution. The framers of the
Emergency Powers Rules failed to realise that constitutional "Insistence
on making provision for serving grounds is not for more ceremony but
really in the interest of justice so that the person deprived of his
liberty may have adequate information about the allegations against him
74
and give explanations for securing his release." Moreover, the
74. Justice A.S. Chowdhury in Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan v. Government 
of East Pakistan, All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Dhaka, Vol.XVII, 1965, 
pp.256-257
3 9Emergency Powers Rules did not provide an independent and impartial 
machinery for the purpose of investigating into the sufficiency for the 
cause of detention for more than six months in clear violation of clause 4 
of Article 33 of the 1972 Constitution. Thus the non-inclusion of the 
provisions for an independent machinery to review detention orders 
permitted the detaining authority to deprive the detenu of his most 
cherished fundamental right of personal liberty in a most arbitrary manner.
(b) The Insertion of the Constitutional Safeguards regarding Preventive 
Detention in the Emergency Powers Rules by the 1975 Martial Law Regime
The Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, enacted during the rule of the Awami 
League regime, remained in foce after the imposition of Martial Law in 
August 1975. Two years and three days after the imposition of Martial Law, 
on 18 August 1977, the Martial Law regime introduced certain amendments to 
the Emergency Powers Rules which fulfilled the constitutional requirements 
in respect of preventive detention. Thus the amendement provided for the 
communication of the grounds of a detention order, representation by the 
detenu, the constitution of the Advisory Committee, referente to the 
Advisory Committee, procedure of the Advisory Committee and the action upon 
the report of the Advisory Committee. These provisions virtually reproduced 
those of the Special Powers Act, with thfe exception of the name and 
composition of the machinery to review the cases of detention. However, 
seven months and eleven days after the withdrawal of Martial Law, oh 
27 November 1979, the government announced that the emergency - proclaimed 
on 28 December 1974 - had been revoked and that the Emergency Powers Act 
and the Emergency Power Rules of 1975 had forthwith ceased to exist.
The actual operation of these provisions for preventive detention, 
and the judicial response in a number of cases, will be the subject of 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VIII
The Operation of the L&ws Relating to Preventive 
Detention under the Martial Law Regime
Having discussed the provisions relating to preventive detention 
in the previous chapter, attention will now be given to the release 
of detenus under general amnesties by the Martial Law regime, and their 
release by the order of the Superior Courts. The discussion will also 
depict the cavalier attitude which the detaining authority sometimes 
adopted towards the detenus. and the cynical way in which the spirit of 
the Court Orders was flouted by the immediate re-arrest of some of the 
persons released by such orders.
I. The Release of Detenus: The Martial Law Government’s Declaration
Only one month and nineteen days after assuming the office of
President, on 3 October 1975, Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, in a nation-wide
address by radio and television, whilst outlining the political programme
of his government, declared his decision to release political detenus
unconditionally after a review of their cases, in order to help create a
salutary democratic atmosphere in the country.* He further said that
no-one would be kept in custody only for his political views and that no
person would lose his liberty merely for holding political views different
from those of the government. The President also announced that a high-
level Review Board had been set up consisting of three eminent former 
2
judges of the Supreme Court to examine allegations against political 
leaders or workers who had been arrested and detained under specific 
charges. If the allegations or charges were found untrue and unfounded, 
a political ddtehu ' would.be honourably released.
1. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 4 October 1975. ,
2. The Chairman of the three-member Review Board was Justice Abdus Sattar.
The other two members were Justice Mujibar Rahman Khan and Justice
Abdullah Jabir.
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Similarly, on 7 November 1975, President A.M. Sayem, who had replaced 
Moshtaque Ahmed on 6 November 1975, announced that political leaders and 
other people who had been detained in preventive custody for reasons of
3
political ideology would be released immediately. He also declared that 
a high-powered judicial commission would be set up to examine the cases 
"of political prisoners against whom criminal charges were made.
It is clear that both the Presidents, withiri the space of a month, 
declared their intentions to release political prisoners after proper 
review. Since these declarations were made within a very short interval 
of one month, it would appear that when they were speaking about political 
prisoners, they were referring mainly to the political detenus held 
under the preventive detention provisions of the Special Powers Act, 1974, 
and the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, by the previous regime, namely the 
Awami League administration. However, the commitment of both the Presidents 
to release political prisoners after review demonstrated their intentions 
not to pursue the politics of repression. In fact, a substantial number 
of political detenus were released under various amnesties during the 
Martial Law period (1975-1979).
II. Statistics of Detentions and Releases
It is pertinent to mention here that the exact number of persons 
detained under the Special Powers Act, 1974, and the Emergency Powers 
Rules, 1975, and released at various times during the Martial Law period, 
cannot be precisely ascertained as no official total figures were published 
and all official records relating to such arrests and releases up to 1982 
have been destroyed in accordance with the order of the 1982 Martial Law
4
regime of Bangladesh. However, on some occasions, the 1975 Martial Law
3. The Asian Recorder, 10-16 December 1975; The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 
8 November 1975.
4. Information received by the author at an interview with Osman Ghani, 
Section Officer for the Ministry of Home Affairs, Bangladesh, in 
October 1984.
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regime disclosed the number of persons detained in preventive custody 
and released under general amnesties. On the other hand, although the 
Bangladesh press did not publish regularly the news of persons arrested 
on the grounds of prejudicial activities, it regularly published the 
statistics about the number of detenus released under various general 
amnesties. Nevertheless, the number of detenus released under general 
amnesties and court orders shows that several thousand persons were in 
detention at some time during the Martial Law period.
The Martial Law government announced in January 1976 that it had 
released 180 detenus since 1 November 1975 by way of general amnesties.^
The official statement mentioned that the detenus were released in 
fulfilment of the government's commitment, as a result of which it had 
been constantly reviewing the cases of persons detained under the Special 
Powers Act and the Emergency Powers Rules. Throughout all the months of
1976 except those of April, May and October, the government published
statistics about the release of d e t e n u s The statistics published on
16 December 1976 showed that by then 2,827 political detenus had been
7
released under various amnesties declared by the government. Some of the 
amnesties were declared on solemn occasions, such as Independence Day on 
26 March, the first anniversary of the National Revolution and Solidarity 
Day on 7 November, Victory Day on 16 December, and certain Muslim religious 
festivals.
In 1977 also, the government released a large number of dgtenus 
by way of various amnesties. The official announcement published on 
26 March 1977 stated that on the occasion of Independence Day, the government
5. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 13 January 1976.
6. Ibid., 24 January 1976; 21 February 1976; 9 and 26 March 1976;
5, 29, and 30 June 1976; 1, 6, 9, 16, 18, 20 and 24 July 1976;
11, 18, 25 and 27 August 1976; 8 and 23 September 1976; and
7 November 1976.
7. Ibid., 16 December 1976.
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had released 285 political detenus. On 21 April 1977, the government
g
ordered the immediate release of eleven detenus; next day, it ordered
the release of 737 more.1^ In August 1977, 250 detenus were set free.11
The release of 110 detenus was announced on the eve of the Eid-ul-Fitr in 
12September. However, the next three government statements of statistics 
in 1977 did not give the breakdown of figures of those detenus who 
were released and those who were under trial. Thus on 5 November the 
government announced the release of 830 political detenus and prisoners on 
trial on the eve of the National Revolution and Solidarity Day of 7 November. 
Again, on 19 November, 800 political detenus and prisoners on trial were
14
set free to mark the occasion of the religious festival of thte Eid-ul-Azha. 
Later, to mark the anniversary of the Victory Day of 16 December, the 
government announced the release of 935 political detenus and prisoners on 
trial.15
Thus the eight amnesties announced by the government in 1977 involved
the release of 3,958 prisoners, an unknown number of whom had been on trial.
In 1978, the government announced the release of political detenus under
five amnesties in fulfilment of its commitment. In March, the government
ordered the immediate release of 336 political detenus on the eve of
Independence Day;1,^ in July, 107 detenus on the eve of the religious festival
17of the Shab-e-Barat; and in September, 99 detenus on the eve of the holy
18festival of the Eid-ul-Fitr. On the occasion of. Victory Day of 16 December, 
the government released 167 d£tenus^and on 30 December-it released 82 detenus.^
8. Ibid., 26 March 1977.
9. Ibid., 22 April 1977.
10. Ibid., 23 April 1977.
11. Ibid., 14 August 1977.
12. Ibid., 14 September 1977.
13. Ibid., 6 November 1977.
14. Ibid., 20 November 1977.
15. Ibid., 16 December 1977.
16. Ibid.. 26 March 1978.
17. Ibid.. 22 July 1978.
18.1 Ibid.. 3 September 1978.
19. Ibid.. 16 December 1978.
20. Ibid,, 31 December 1978.
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Thus as a result of five amnesties declared by the government in 1978,
the total number of detenus released amounted to 791.
In fulfilment of the President's pledge to the nation to release
detenus after review, the government ordered the immediate release of
^  21 22 
105 detenus on 9 January 1979, and 267 detenus on the following day.
Thus the two amnesties declared by the government in 1979 involved
the release of 372 detenus altogether.
The annual statistics relating to the detenus released by the Martial
Law government from 1975 to 1979 are shown in the following Table I.
TABLE I
Year of Release
November 1975 to December 1976
1977
1978
1979 {January}
TOTAL
Number of Detenus Released 
2,827 
3,958*
791
.372
7,948
fThis figure also includes some prisoners on trial.
It will thus be seen from the above Table that till January 1979,
7,948 detenus were released as published in the Bangladesh press. But
in a speech on 30 November 1978, President Ziaur Rahman claimed that his
government had released 10,135 political workers, leaders and detenus
because "we do not believe in political repression and never took
23
recourse to such method".
21. Ibid., 10 January 1979.
22. Ibid., 11 January 1979.
23. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 1 December 1978.
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Yet the President's statement cannot be accepted to mean that 
no arrests were made during the Martial Law period on the grounds of
i
prejudicial activities. Neither does it mean that the Martial Law
government did not exercise the power of preventive detention arbitrarily.
Sometimes the release of detenusvunder a general amnesty was followed
by new arrests under the Special Powers Act and the Emergency Powers
Regulations. However, only in a few cases was the news of such arrests
published in the Bangladesh press. The Bangladesh press published, on
26 November 1975, the news of the arrest of nineteen political leaders on
24
the grounds of their alleged prejudicial activities. In 1976, it
announced the arrest of thirty-one persons, including certain ex-Members of
Parliament and politicians, under the Special Powers Act and the Emergency 
25
Powers Rules. The news of the arrest of twenty-five persons, seventeen
of whom were alleged to have been members of the underground East Pakistan
Communist Party (MarxistrLeninist) on charges of prejudicial activities was
published in 1977.^
Thus between 1975 and 1977, the Bangladesh press only announced the
arrest of seventy-five persons on grounds of prejudicial activities.
But in May 1978, a senior minister, Moshiur Rahman, disclosed that by then
27 *
there were 950 political detenus in different jails of the country. 
Nevertheless, before this disclosure, the press had reported the release 
of 7,121 djtepus. On the other hand, on 30 November 1978, President 
Ziaur Rahman had claimed, as mentioned earlier, that 10,135 political 
workers, leaders,* arid detenus ‘ were freed which was followed by the 
release of 249 detenus in December 1978, and 372 detenus in January 1979.
24. Ibid., 26 November 1975.
25. Ibid., 5 January, 27 February, 4 April, 4 June, 15 October and 
1 December 1976.
26. Ibid., 11 January, 1 and 13 March, and 10 August 1977.
27. The Dainik Barta, Rajshahi, 5 May 1978.
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Thus the total number of detenus released under various amnesties 
stands at 10,135 + 249 + 372 * 10,756. If we take into account the release
of 178 detenus in accordance with the orders of the High Court Division of
28 * the Supreme Court, then the total number of detenus released was 10,934.
It would, therefore, appear that several thousand persons were detained
in preventive custody by the Martial Law regime. In spite of the release
of as many as 10,934 detenus by various amnesties and court orders, a
considerable number of political prisoners still remained in detention.
Fifty days after the withdrawal of Martial Law, on 27 May 1979, the Home
Minister said in Parliament that there was a total of 339 detenus in
29
various prisons till April 1979. Out of the 339 detenus, 338 were 
arrested under the Emergency Powers Rules, while one was held under 
the Special Powers Act.
Thus the release of 10,934 detenus under various amnesties and court 
orders, and the detention of 339 detenus till April 1979 show that there 
were 11,273 persons held in preventive custody at various times during 
the Martial Law period. But it should be noted here that not all of 
these detenus were arrested by the Martial Law regime. A considerable 
number of them were a legacy from the previous civil administration, 
although the exact number cannot be established because all the relevant 
official records were destroyed by the 1982 Martial Law regime.
III. Some Examples of the Arbitrary Exercise of the Power 
of Preventive Detention
i)i The Case of Kamrul Ahsan
Sometimes the persons arrested in connection with criminal offences
28. This figure is prepared on the basis of information collected from the
Writ Registers of 1976-1978 of the Supreme Court.
29. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 27 May 1979.
404
were served the orders of detention in the course of their trial. For
example, one Kamrul Ahsan Khan alias Khasru was arrested on 23 August
1976, but no reasons for his arrest were given. Later, he was informed
that he was arrested in connection with a criminal case for his assault
on the police. He was, however, found not guilty and acquitted by the
Special Tribunal on 22 June 1977. Yet while he was in custody and under
trial, an order of detention, signed by the Additional District Magistrate
of Dhaka under the Emergency Powers Rules on 3 March 1976, was served on
30
him on 15 February 1977.
It is evident that at the time of arrest the person concerned was 
not served with the order of detention, although when it was eventually 
served on him it shows that the order had been signed four months and 
twenty days before his arrest. Moreover, the order was served on the 
ddtenu ten months and twelve days after it was signed by the Additional 
Magistrate concerned. Therefore it seems that the detaining authority 
deliberately abused the power of detention for ulterior motives, and 
back-dated the order or simply had the order passed so as to continue his 
detention in case he was acquitted by the Special Tribunal.
ii) The Case of Mahmudur Rahman
Sometimes the persons acquitted after trial were not released from
prison and detention orders were served on them. For example, one
Mahmudur Rahman alias Manna was arrested in Dhaka on 18 March 1976.
Later, he was made an accused in the conspiracy case of State v. Major
31[retired) M.A. Jalil and other for conspiring to overthrow the government 
by means of criminal force and seducing members of the defence services
30. Ibid., 17 August 1977.
31. See, supra, Chapter V, pp.259-274.
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from their duty and allegiance to the government, and attempting to induce
such members to commit mutiny or to indulge in anti-state activities.
The trial was held in camera in the Dhaka Central Prison by a Special
Military Tribunal in July 1976 and the accused was acquitted of the
charges brought against him on 17 July 1976. But after his acquittal,
"tin order of detention dated 25 July 1976 was issued by the Additional
District Magistrate, Dhaka, under the Emergency Powers Rules, which was
32
read over to the detenu at the Dhaka Central Prison.
It should be stressed here that as Mahmudur Rahman was already in
custody, it was not possible for the detaining authority to satisfy
himself reasonably that his detention was necessary in order to prevent
him from acting in any prejudicial manner. The basis of passing the
order of detention by the detaining authority under Rule 30(1) of the
Emergency Powers Rules was that if the said order was not passed against
him, he might act in a prejudicial manner. Since the said Rule postulated
that if an order of detention was not passed against a person, he would
be free and able to act in a prejudicial manner, it implies that at a time
when the order of detention was passed, the person concerned must have
freedom of action. This alone could justify the passing of the detention
order. As Mahmudur Rahman was in custody and acquitted of the aforesaid
charges, it is clear that the detention order was passed against him for
purposes other than those postulated in the Emergency Powers Rules. In
this context, the observation of Justice Gajendragadkar of the Indian
Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan 
33and another, in which an order of detention was served on the petitioner 
under Section 3(1) of the Indian Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in Burdwan 
Jail where he had been kept as a result of a remand order passed by a
32. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 9 October 1977.
33. The Supreme Court Reports, India, Vol.IV, 1964, p.921.
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criminal court that had taken cognisance of a criminal complaint against 
him, are noteworthy:
"...the past conduct or antecedent history of the person 
on which the authority purports to act, should 
ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have 
a rational connection with the conclusion that the 
detention of the person is n e c e s s a r y ..The first stage 
in the process is to examine the material adduced against 
a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent 
history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner.
If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, 
then the authority has to consider whether it is likely 
that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in 
future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of 
detention.... It is obvious that before an authority can 
legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of 
the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a 
prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that 
if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial 
manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to 
the said person at the relevant time. If a person is 
already in jail custody, how can it rationally be postulated 
that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial 
manner? At the point of time when an order of detention 
is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that 
the said person would act prejudicially if he is not 
detained and that is a consideration which would be absent 
when the authority is dealing with a person already in 
detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to 
detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from 
acting in a prejudicial manner is thus the basis of the 
order under Section 3(1)(a) and this basis is clearly 
absent in the case of the petitioner".35
IV. Continued Detention of a Detenu in Spite of a General Amnesty
Although the Martial Law government ordered the immediate release of 
detenus at different times under various general amnesties, some of those 
d6tenus were not released. For example, Captain Abdul Majed, who was 
detained under the Emergency Powers Rules and whose name appeared in the 
list of detenus directed to be released on 7 November 1976 on the solemn 
occasion of the first anniversary of the National and Revolution and
34. Ibid., p.927.
35. Ibid., pp.930-931.
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36Solidarity Day of 7 November, continued to be held in detention.
Neither were the reasons for this action given.
The facts of the case briefly are as follows: after the coup of
7 November 1975, the government sent Captain Abdul Majed to Libya along with 
some other army officials connected with the August coup of 1975. While 
in Libya, the Captain applied to the Government of Bangladesh for his 
repatriation, but permission was refused. Later, Captain Majed flew 
into Bangladesh on receiving the news of the serious illness of his mother, 
and, on his arrival at Chittagong Airport, was arrested on 26 June 1976.
He was taken to Chittagong Prison where an order of detention under the 
Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, was served on him. Later, his sister 
filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the legality of his 
continued detention after general amnesty without a further order of 
detention. The High Court found that Captain Majed's detention was 
unlawful and ordered his release accordingly.
V. Some Examples of Writ Petitions and Supreme Court Orders
It should be pointed out that, during the Martial Law period, writ
petitions were filed in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court in
the first instance challenging the validity of the detention orders in
some cases. Altogether 139 such petitions were either discharged or
37
summarily rejected. On the other hand, 178 writ petitions, as mentioned
earlier, were successful and the Court ordered the release of the detenus 
38
concerned. Here some of the decisions of the Court ordering the release 
of detenus may be mentioned which will show, inter alia, the manner in which 
sometimes the power of preventive detention was exercised.
36. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, 20 September 1977.
37. This figure is prepared on the basis of information collected from the
Writ Registers of 1978-1978 of the Supreme Court.
38. Ibid.
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39In Amresh Chandra Chakrabarty v. Bangladesh and othfers, where 
the detention order, issued by the Martial Law government, merely 
mentioned that the detenu was required to be detained to prevent him 
from doing prejudicial acts as described in Rules 2(e)/5(l) of the 
Emergency Powers Rules, Chief Justice Kemaluddin Hossain observed that:
9The [detention] order merely refers to Rule 2(e) of the 
Emergency Powers Rules and then invokes the power under 
Rule 5(1)(a) in passing the order of detention against the 
detenu. It is to be noticed that Rule 2(e) -defines 
prejudicial acts wherein there are included sixteen 
different species of activities which come within a 
generic expression 'prejudicial act1, but Rule 5(1) includes 
only some of the activities which could be a ground for 
passing the detention order. Unfortunately in this 
particular case excepting making a casual and careless 
reference to the numbers of two clauses nothing has been 
mentioned in the detention order which could at all be 
said to be an order passed under Rule 5(1) of the Emergency 
Powers Rules...no ground whatsoever has been mentioned 
excepting repeating the number of two clauses and on this 
ground alone apart from anything else the order of detention 
must be struck down as invalid as the very manner of 
articulation shows a total lack of application of the mind 
of the detailing authority. It is declared that the order 
of detention is without lawful authority and the detenu is 
being held in unlawful custody. It is directed that the 
detenu be released forthwith".^
It is noteworthy that, since the Emergency Powers Rules did not originally 
provide for communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu and the 
order of detention was made before its amendment of 18 August 1977, the 
question of such a communication did not arise. It is interesting to 
note that when the order of detention was challenged in a writ petition, 
the government in the affidavit-in-opposition alleged that the detenu 
was attached to the Awami League, which ruled the country before the 
imposition of Martial Law in 1975, obtained a licence for a dealership in 
government rations at Khulna, and also became a visa agent of the Indian
39. Bangladesh Supreme Court Reports, 1978, p.429.
40. Ibid., pp.430-431.
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High Commission at Dhaka and thereby established close liaison with the 
Indian High Commission Office. His aforesaid associations were alleged 
as acts of indulgence in prejudicial activities.
It is evident that the charges were made in the most general terms.
The mere association with the Indian High Commission for purposes of 
commercial gains cannot be termed as a prejudicial activity.
In Saleha Begum v. the Government of Bangladesh,^ the dfetenu 
was arrested on 27 June 1976 without any warrant and no reason was given. 
Later, a bail petition was moved and the Additional Sessions Judge, 
Faridpur, granted bail to the detenu. While the bail matter was being 
processed, an order of detention was served upon the detenu under 
Rules 5(1)(a) of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, perhaps with the 
ulterior motive of frustrating and negativing the order of bail. When 
the legality of the order of detention was challenged in a writ petition, 
the government filed an affidavit. In the affidavit, it was stated 
that some miscreants were arrested from the house of the detenu one 
day before his arrest, on 26 June 1976, with prejudicial documents; and 
that the detenu used to harbour the underground armed cadre of the so- 
called t,M^l_obiL_GanQ_Bahini,f (Revolutionary People's Army) for carrying 
on sabotage, subversive and prejudicial activities. It was further 
stated that although the d6tenu was not present at the time of arrest 
of some miscreants, it was a fact that "his house was a den of miscreants". 
However, it is apparent that the affidavit mentioned some vague accusations 
without referring to any specific activities that would constitute 
prejudicial acts. Nevertheless, the petitioner's advocate submitted 
that "the order of detention is vague, indefinite and that it does not 
indicate that the order was passed on proper application of mind and on
41. Dhaka Law Reports, Vol.XXIX, 1977, p.59.
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satisfaction as contemplated under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Emergency Powers 
Rules, 1975M. He also submitted that while on the night of 26 June 
1976, the local boys and neighbours were watching the television show 
of the boxing between Muhammad Ali and Inoki, held in Tokyo, in the 
’out-house1 of the detenu in his absence, a contingent of the police 
force surrounded the house and arrested about 100 boys of different ages
!
t
on the allegation that some prejudicial leaflets were found in the 
possession of some of them. But ultimately all the boys with the 
exception of a few were released. The advocate for the petitioner argued 
that in the manner these boys were arrested from the house of the detenu it 
could not be said that he gave shelter to them as alleged in the affidavit. 
Justice Ruhul Islam accepted the reasoning of the advocate for the 
petitioner when he observed:
’’From the order of detention it appears that the Additional 
District Magistrate passed the order merely at the 
instance of the police report, because, excepting the 
police report no other materials were placed before him.
If the grounds as mentioned in the impugned order are 
considered vis-et-vis the police reports and the instances 
; of prejudicial activities as enumerated in the affidavit
in opposition, it becomes clear that the order of 
detention cannot be said to have been passed in 
conformity with the law. Even if it is accepted that 
the d6tenu entertained some young boys alleged to be 
members of the so-called armed cadre of Jatiya Samajtantri^k 
Dal with food etc., that by itself, in the absence of 
any specific activity ascribed to the d6tenu, is not 
sufficient to bring the case within the scope of 
'prejudicial act' as enumerated in Rule 2(e) and as 
such he cannot be described as a 'miscreant' endangering 
the public security, far less, injuring the interest of 
the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Mere recovery even 
of some prejudicial printed materials from his house does 
not bring the case within the scope of Rule 5(1)(a) of 
the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975. Categorical 
statement made by the petitioner that the police rounded 
up some boys when they were enjoying the television show 
at night along with many others, has not been controverted 
in the affidavit in opposition does not justify the 
impugned action of treating the detenu as a miscreant*...
In our opinion the extra-ordinary power of preventive 
detention provided under Rule 5(1)(a) was not properly
411
exercised by the detaining authority, and as such 
detention...[of the detenu] is wholly illegal and 
without lawful authority’1. ^
4 3In Abdul Latif Mirza v. Bangladesh, the main ground of detention was 
that the detenu belonged to the Jatiya Samajtahtrik Dal, whose declared 
object was to overthrow the Awami League government which preceded the 
imposition of Martial Law in August 1975. It was alleged that he 
started lawless activities at different places in furtherance of the 
programme of the Party, although the nature of such activities was not 
particularised, nor was the time or place of those activities specified. 
However, in spite of the fact that the Awami League government was 
overthrown in August 1975 by a coup d ’etat, the detenu, who was taken 
into custody on 22 April 1974, continued to be held in preventive custody. 
The Martial Law government failed to realise the truth that, with the 
overthrowing of the Awami League administration, the basis of the grounds 
of detaining the detenu also disappeared. As Justice Kemaluddin Hossain 
observed whilst declaring the order of detention illegal and directing 
that the ddtenu be released forthwith,
. f,...the principal ground [of detention] was that the detenu 
belonged to a political party whose object was to overthrow 
the government established by law. This was in 1974 when the 
composition of the government was different. The then 
government has been overthrown and a new government installed. •
There have been some changes in the Constitution as well.
Judicial notice of these facts can be taken. The detenu, 
we find, is in continuous detention from 22 April 1974 till 
today [i.e., till 2 September 1977, the day on which the 
judgment was delivered] and this change has taken place 
during the period of his continued detention. The moot 
question is, whether the basis of the ground that was 
existent in 1974, i,s still existing....The ground clearly 
stated that the aim of the party was directed against the 
political government of the day, but it has now been 
overthrown....The main basis of the grounds of detention has, 
in the present context of facts, become non-existent, and
42. Ibid., pp.61-62.
43. Dhaka Law Reports, Appellate Division, Vol.XXXI, 1979, p.l.
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therefore the principal ground has lost its cogency and 
has become irrelevant. It is to be remembered that 
this ground was the foundation of all other grounds, and 
the rest are but superstructures. The foundation having 
gone, the supersturctures must collapse". ^
VI. The Defiance of the Spirit of the High Court Order in 
Respect of Release of Detenus
In some cases, political prisoners who were released in accordance 
with the orders of the High Court were immediately re-arrested at the 
prison gate under a different law. At an interview with the author in 
October 1985, the Special Law Officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
stated that such a course of action was adopted "in a number of cases". 
Here one such case may be considered.
One Khaliquzzaman, a political and labour leader of Comilla District 
and President of the Jatiya Samaj tantrik Dal, Chandpur, Comilla, was 
arrested on 18 March 1974 by the Awami League government. Later, on 
27 March 1974, an order of detention was passed under the Special Powers 
Act. It stated that it was necessary to detain him for reasons of 
(i) security, (ii) public safety, and (iii) maintenance of law and order. 
At first he was detained in Comilla Central Prison, and later he was 
transferred to Dhaka Central Jail. The detention was challenged in Writ 
Petition No.1493 of 1974, which was allowed and finally disposed of on 
20 January 1977. The High Court by its order of 20 January 1977 made 
the Rule absolute and the detention was declared illegal. In accordance 
with the direction of the High Court, the detenu was released from Dhaka 
Central Prison on 28 January 1977. Yet whilst he was about to come out 
of the prison, another order of detention was served on him at the prison 
gate under the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, and he was taken back to 
the prison. The order of detention was issued by the Additional District
44. Ibid., pp.11-12.
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Magistrate, Dhaka, in exercise of powers under Rule 30(1) of the 
Emergency Powers Rules, 1975. It stated that complaint was made before 
the Additional Magistrate that Khalequzzaman was 'acting' in a manner 
prejudicial to the security or interest of Bangladesh, and to the public 
safety and the maintenance of law and order. On consideration of the 
'charges', the Additional District Magistrate was satisfied that the 
detenu should be detained in Dhaks Central Prison until 10 March 1977. 
Subsequently, on 9 March 1977, this order was extended up to 10 April 
1977. After 10 April, the detenu was not released as another order 
of detention, issued by the government on 12 April 1977, was served on 
him. It is to be noted that although the Additional Magistrate was 
empowered under Rule 30(1) of the Emergency Powers Rules to detain a 
person for a period of fifteen days, in this case he held the person in 
question in detention for about two-and-a-half months, from 28 January 
1977 to 10 April 1977.
It is interesting to note that whilst the Additional District 
Magistrate passed the order of detention because the person concerned 
was acting in a manner prejudicial to the security or interest of 
Bangladesh and to the public safety and the maintenance of law and order, 
the order of detention issued by the government on 11 April 1977 stated 
that detention was necessary for preventing the detenu from acting in a 
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential 
to the life of the community and also from prejudicing the economic and 
financial interest of the state. Later, on 21 July 1977, it was 
discovered that the government's order of detention was passed in a 
'wrong form' 'due to oversight' and, as such, on the same day a fresh 
order was issued which was .served on the detenu in the prison. The new 
order stated that with a view to preventing the detenu "from acting in 
a manner prejudicial to the security, or interest of Bangladesh or the
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public safety or the maintenance of law and order, it is necessary to 
detain him". Thus ultimately the grounds of detention were brought
i
into conformity with those contained in the order of detention passed 
by the Additional District Magistrate.
However, it is noteworthy that whilst the Additional District 
Magistrate in his order of detention alleged that the detenu was 'acting' 
in a prejudicial manner, the order of detention issued by the government 
stated that it was intended to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial 
manner.
It should be stressed here that the detention order of 28 January 
1977, which was served on the detenu, immediately after his release from 
about three years captivity, at the prison gate, was a clear instance of 
an arbitrary exercise of power. As the detenu was virtually in 
preventive custody at the time of serving on him the said order, it . 
could not be rationally postulated that if he was not detained he would 
act in a prejudicial manner. The conduct of the detenu could not 
have any rational connection with the conclusion that his detention was 
necessary, because he had, in effect, no freedom of action at the 
relevant time. Thus the satisfaction that is necessary to detain a 
person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial 
manner is the basis of the order of detention, and this basis was plearly 
absent in the case of this detenu. Moreover, it is evident that the 
Martial Law authorities obeyed the order, passed by the High Court for the 
release of the detenu, in form only, and proceeded to get round it, 
and defied the spirit of the court order by re-arresting him at the 
prison gate under a different law.
Mrs. Shamsun Nahar, sister of the detenu, Khalequzzaman, filed a writ 
petition in the High Court challenging the first order of detention made 
on 28 January 1977 under the Emergency Powers Rules. The lawyer for the
4 15
petitioner argued that as the detenu was in custody since 1974, he was 
incapable of acting prejudicially to the interest of the state. Moreover, 
as a result of the High Court order, passed on 20 January 1977, to 
release him, the detenu was not actually released, because he was re­
arrested at the prison gate under the Emergency Powers Rules. He further 
argued that the detention order contained the expression 'acting1, but 
as the detenu himself was in prison as a result of a previous detention 
order which was found illegal by the High Court, "how then was he 
acting in a prejudicial manner?" It was also asserted that the 
respondents had acted arbitrarily in respect of the detenu. Against 
this background, as the petitioner's lawyer claimed, it was easy to see 
that the order dated 28 January 1977 demonstrated the 'mala fide* of 
of the respndents who had acted cynically and in utter disregard of the 
liberty of the citizen and had detained the d6tenu only for 'collateral 
purposes'. He also affirmed that the respondents could make use of 
the Prisons Act if the detenu acted in breach of the discipline of the 
prison, but they were not entitled to take recourse to the Emergency 
Powers Rules.
On the other hand, the Deputy Advocate-General, appearing for the 
respondents contended that the detenu had acted prejudicially inside 
the prison and had started maintaining clandestine liaison with other 
members of his party who were at large and organising the cadres of his 
party by giving direction, etc., with the help of some corrupt jail 
officials, and accordingly the detaining authority was satisfied that it 
was necessary to re-arrest and keep him in preventive detention. He 
also proceeded to justify the detention order on the ground that when the 
impugned order of detention was passed, the detenu was a free man.
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Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury, who delivered the judgment of 
the Court, in fact accepted the arguments of the petitioner's lawyer 
when he observed that:
"The argument of the respondents is devoid of any substance 
and there is considerable force in the argument of Mr.
Haider [the lawyer for the petitioner] that the 
respondents could in such a contingency take recourse to 
the Prisons Act if the detenu was really acting a manner 
which was contrary to the discipline of the prison. The 
Prison Act deals with the management, administration, 
discipline, conduct and all other affairs regulating 
the life of the prisoners who happen to be lodged therein.... 
For violation of any of the rules of the Prisons Act 
penalty is provided vide Section 42, for communicating 
with his feLlow-prisoner without any authority....
Therefore, the stand that was taken by the respondents 
that a fresh order of detention was passed on 'fresh 
grounds and prejudicial activities committed by him while 
in jail-custody* may be considered....The desperate 
argument that was advanced on behalf of the respondents 
that he was maintaining liaison in clandestine manner 
with his party cadre through the agency of a jail 
warder is not appreciated. Such things could be 
stopped by resort to the provisions of the Prisons Act 
which sufficiently deals with such contingency. But 
to say that security or interest of Bangladesh or public 
safety and maintenance of law and order is being threatened 
by the action of a prisoner who is detained in jail is to 
bring the proposition to an absurdity and such proposition 
should not be allowed to be argued...certainly the 
provisions of the Emergency Powers Act are not available 
to respondents for detaining such a person who is already 
in jail".45
With regard to the contention of the Deputy Advocate-General that when 
the impugned order of detention was passed on 28 January 1977 the detenu 
was a free man, Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury observed that it
"is not tenable because the whole affair was an idle 
ceremony. While the Court said his detention is illegal, 
the government obeyed by bringing him up to the jail gate; 
then allowing the detenu to have a glimpse of the outside 
world, promptly another order was served and this was 
under the Emergency Powers Act (sic). How can it be said that 
when the order of detention was served he was a free man?
To say the least it is mere words and since the words only
45. In Shamsun Nahar Begum v. Bangladesh, Dhaka Law Reports. Vol.XXX, 
1978, pp. 36, 38, 39 and 40.
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mean to convey ideas, the least that can be said is that 
the detaining authority paid little regard to the 
declaration that was made by the Court in Writ Petition 
No.1493 of 1974".46'
With regard to the discrepancy of the ground of detention between the 
order passed by the Additional Magistrate on 28 January 1977, and that 
of the government passed on 11 April 1977, the learned Justice held:
’’Liberty of a citizen..*can only be circumscribed by 
arriving at a decision that it is so necessary to 
preventing him from acting prejudicially. The 
degree of consideration, the degree of care, the 
degree of duty that is cast on the respondents is 
of highest order and slightest deviation from 
such care, from such consideration, from such duty 
will render the act as not a good one....We conclude 
by saying that the respondents have displayed utter 
carelessness and deviated from their duties and 
the degree of carelessness renders the action as 
colourable exercise of power". 7
Consequently, the learned Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury expressed his
opinion that "the detention of Khalequzzaman is illegal and without
lawful authority. In the result...it is directed that the respondents
should set Khalequzzaman at liberty forthwith if not wanted in any
48other connection".
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion reveals that the Martial Law government, 
immediately after coming into power, declared its intention, after 
proper review, to release those political prisoners who had been 
detained for holding political views different from those of the 
government in power. It seems that most of the political prisoners 
were a legacy from the Awami League administration and were held in
46. Ibid., pp.37-38.
47. Ibid., p.40.
48. Ibid.
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preventive detention under the provisions of the Special Powers Act, 1974, 
and the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975. However, in order to fulfil 
its commitment to release detenus in suitable cases, the Martial Law 
government had to keep the cases of persons detained in preventive 
custody under constant review. Consequently, the government announced 
several general amnesties during the Martial Law period (August 1975 to 
April 1979) which involved the release of 10,756 political detenus.
The amnesties were generally declared to mark solemn occasions, such as 
Independence Day, National Revolution and Solidarity Day, Victory Day, 
and certain other religious festivals.
Although the Martial Law regime released a large number of detenus, 
it was not free from resorting to the politics of repression as, in spite 
of the various general amnesties, new arrests took place under the 
Special Powers Act and the Emergency Powers Rules. Sometimes the 
persons arrested for criminal offences and held in custody were served 
the orders of detention in the course of their trial. Similarly, on 
a few occasions, persons acquitted after trial were not released and 
detention orders were served on them. In some cases, detenus who were 
released in accordance with the orders of the High Court, were re-arrested 
immediately at the prison gate, in general under the Emergency Powers 
Rules. Moreover, in a few cases, detenus whose release was announced 
in the press were, in fact, continued to be held in custody. However, 
the Martial Law administration preferred the exercise of the power of 
preventive detention under the Emergency Powers Rules to that of the 
Special Powers Act. This preference seems to emanate from the fact 
that the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, did not originally provide either 
for the communication of grounds to the detenu, or for his right to make 
a representation against the order of detention. Further, it did not 
provide for the constitution of an Advisory Board 'to review such orders 
of detention until the Emergency Powers Rules were amended on 18 August 1977.
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It is to be noted that, on many occasions, the Superior Courts of 
Bangladesh stood between the ddtenu and the encroachment on his liberty 
by the Executive. They issued the order of release in respect of 178 
detenus in consequence of writ petitions challenging their orders of 
detention. The decisions of the courts also show that, in some cases, 
the orders of detention were passed in a casual or cavalier manner 
without due process of thought and consideration. The grounds 
themselves were vague and in the most general terms. However, the 
wide, frequent and arbitrary use of preventive detention in Bangladesh 
in times of peace shows the indifference and insensitivity of the 
government in power to the serious encroachment on the personal liberty 
of the individual. It became an instrument of detaining the political 
adversaries of the party in power for an indefinite period. Thus the 
government of the day failed to realise that frequent use or misuse of 
the power of preventive detention makes a mockery of the cherished 
liberty of the individual in a democratic state.
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CHAPTER IX 
Conclusion
I. What is Martial Law?
We have already seen in Chapter I how the meaning of Martial Law 
has evolved in the common law over several centuries. Its contemporary 
usage is quite different from its former meanings.
i
i
(i) The Historical Evolution of the Term Martial Law 
| The term 'Martial Law' has been used in various senses by different
i
authors at different times.
Firstly, in earlier times, the expression 'Martial Law' was used to
mean what we now call military law, the law for the discipline and government
of the armed forces. It had this connotation up to the latter part of the
eighteenth century. Prior to that period, no distinction was made between
the military law and the Martial Law of the present day as they had had a
common historical origin in the law that had been administered in medieval
England in the Court of the Constable and the Marshal.
TheuLaw of the Marshal which then ruled the prerogative 
of the Crown during war or insurrection, included both 
the law necessary for the government of the army [raised 
for the occasion], and also for the government of the 
[people of the] occupied territory or disturbed district 
while the ordinary law was in abeyance".
Secondly, the term 'Martial Law' was commonly used in the sense of 'military
government in occupied foreign territory' and meant the law administered by
a military commander in occupied foreign territory in time of war. Martial
Law in the sense of 'military government' took the place of a suspended or
destroyed sovereignty and replaced the previous governmental agencies. In
this sense, Martial Law is quite outside the scope of municipal or constitutional
1- Tovey, Hamilton, Martial Law and the Custom of War, London, 1886, p.66.
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law; it is a part not of municipal but of international law. It is
recognised in international law as a part of the jus belli and is incidental
2
to the state of war.
Thirdly, and finally,
"Martial Law is sometimes employed as a name for the 
^ common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel 
force by force in the case of invasion, insurrection, 
riot, or generally of any violent resistance to the law.
This right, or power, is essential to the very existence 
of orderly government, and is most assuredly recognised 
in the most ample manner by the law of England"^
In this sense, Martial Law is a part of the English Constitutional Law and
is called Martial Law in the English sense. Martial Law, in this form,
may amount to no more than the deployment of troops, in aid of, and under
the direction of, the civil authorities to suppress riot, insurrection or
other disorders in the land without the proclamation of Martial Law. During
such a deployment, the military does not supersede the civil authority and
the question of setting up of military courts to govern the country does
not arise. It is to be noted that the right to enlist the support of
the military forces by the civil authority in its effort to restore order
is common to the law of every civilised country. In Bangladesh, in times
of disorder, a magistrate can, under Section 129 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, call in the military to suppress a riot, and, under Section 130 of
the same Code, in the absence of a magistrate, a commissioned military
officer may disperse an unlawful assembly by force and nothing done in good
faith by such an officer is an offence. These rights of the Executive and
military forces cannot properly be called Martial Law. Justice Muhammad. Munir
4
observed in Muhammad Umar Khan v. The Crown.
2. Opinions of the Attorney-Generals, Vol.VIII, Washington, 1868, p.369.
3. Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Stu dy of the Law of the Constitution, 
8th edition, 1915, p.284.
4. Pakistan Law Reports, Lahore, Vol.VI, 1953, p.825.
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"It is, however, a misuse of the term to describe these 
rights and duties (of citizens, including servants of 
the Crown and the Military in suppressing riots and 
restoring law and order) as martial law; they are no 
more than a part of the civil law of the land".
It seems that, for the lack of an alternative name, the expression 'Martial
Law* is used to mean the use of military forces in the aid of the civil
authorities in suppressing riots and other public disorders.
ii)The Modern Meaning of Martial Law
The term Martial Law is used in modern times in a restricted sense. It 
is that law which is brought into operation in the territory of a country 
in a state of insurrection or war when the civil government becomes 
inoperative or powerless by the insurrectionary or enemy forces, and the 
military assumes the function of the government in order to preserve law 
and order and rises superior to the civil authorities. In its restricted 
or proper sense, Martial Law can, therefore, be defined as that kind of law 
which is generally promulgated and administered by and through military 
authorities in an effort to maintain public order in times of insurrection, 
riot or war when the civil government is unable to function or is inadequate 
to the preservation of peace, tranquillity and enforcement of law and by which
the civil authority is either partially or wholly suspended or subjected
to the military power. "Martial Law, in the proper sense of that term", 
says A.V. Dicey
"in which it means the suspension of ordinary law and the 
temporary government of a country or parts of it by 
military tribunals, is unknown to the law of England.
We have nothing equivalent to what is called in France 
the 'Declaration of the State of Siege', under which 
the authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for
the maintenance of order and police passes entirely to
the army".^
Thus Martial Law in its proper or narrow sense is equivalent to the 'state
5. Ibid., p.835.
6. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., pp.283-284.
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of siege' which is so commonly called in the civil law countries of
continental Europe and Latin America. The ',state of siege1 is the civil law
7
counterpart of Martial Law which obtains in common law countries. It 
is sometimes called 'Martial Law in the continental sense' as opposed to 
'Martial Law in the English sense'.
(iii) The Bangladeshi Version of Martial Law
Martial Law promulgated for the first time in Bangladesh on 15 August 
1975 represents a radical change from both its traditional and modern 
meanings. Although Martial Law had been applied in Pakistan in 1953, 
and 1969 (before the birth of Bangladesh), Martial Law as declared in 
Bangladesh represents a significant departure even from the Pakistani 
precedents; for unlike Pakistan, Martial Law was proclaimed in Bangladesh 
as a means to implement a coup d'6tat. The aim was not to restore law and 
order but to obviate any public opposition which might be provoked as a
result of the assassination of President Sheikh Mujib and the seizure of
power by the army. Although the country had already been in a state of
emergency imposed on 28 December 1974, the leaders of the coup d'6tat felt
that they needed further powers to strengthen their hold on the country.
Thus it would appear that Martial Law declared in Bangladesh on 15 August 
1975 was sui generis - fundamentally different from the common usage of 
its meaning.
II. How is the Proclamation of Martial Law Justified?
The doctrine of 'necessity' renders lawful that which otherwise is 
unlawful - id quod alias non est licitum, necessitas licitum facit. In 
constitutional law, Martial Law finds its justification in this doctrine -
7. Rossiter, C.L., Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948, p.9.
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for its promulgation and continuance; all measures taken in exercise of 
the power of Martial Law must be justified by requirements of necessity 
alone. In this respect, all the relevant authorities, as we have seen 
in Chapter I, appear to be unanimous.
Since Martial Law is an emergency measure and is the great law of 
social self-defence, it can be employed in times of grave emergency, when 
society is disordered by civil war, insurrection or invasion by a foreign 
enemy, for the speedy restoration of peace and tranquillity, public order
i
and safety in which the civil authority may function and flourish. The 
declaration of Martial Law would, in cases of foreign invasion, mainly serve 
the purpose of enabling the forces of the country to be better utilized 
for its defence and in cases of rebellion or other serious internal disorder, 
would enable the government to arrest persons resisting its authority, 
summarily try and promptly punish them when the ordinary course of justice 
is, for its slow and regulated pace, utterly inadequate in an emergency when 
every moment is critical.
The true test of the right to establish Martial Law is whether the 
civil authorities are able, by the ordinary legal processes, to preserve 
order, punish offenders and compel obedience to the laws. In other words, 
the test is whether the interference by military is necessary when it becomes 
evident that the civil authorities are unable to function, or that because 
of impending grave danger it would be unsafe for them to function, in order 
to perform the duty of repelling force and restoring such condition of things 
as will enable the civil government to resume charge.
Thus Martial Law is a measure which may be used as a last resort when 
less drastic measures have failed and when even the support of the military 
authorities, acting under civil direction, is also found to be inadequate.
As A.V. Dicey says:
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’’...Martial Law comes into existence in times of 
invasion or insurrection when, where, and in so 
. far as the King’s peace cannot be maintained by- 
ordinary means.. *
A similar view was expressed by Attorney-General Sir John Campbell and
Solicitor-General Sir R.M. Rolfe:
f’The right of resorting to such an extremity is a 
right arising from and limited by necessity of the 
case - quod necessitas cogit, defendif’P - what 
necessity forces, it justifies.
Whereas as A.V. Dicey referred to 'immediate n eces s i t y ' a n d  Sir Frederick
Pollock wrote of 'apparent necessity'** regarding the degree of necessity
that will be sufficient for the declaration of Martial Law, it may be
suggested that reasonable necessity should now be preferred as the most
appropriate phrase for this purpose. As J.I.C. Hare said:
’’Nothing short of a necessity can justify a recourse to 
martial law; but such a necessity may exist before 
the blow actually falls....All that can be said with 
certainty is that there must be reasonable and probable 
cause for believing in the imminency of a peril that 
suspends the ordinary r u l e s . . ."12
It is said that the role of the doctrine of necessity in promulgating Martial
13Law "cannot be separated from the concept of open court”. This concept
of 'open court' may be traced from early English history through the Theobold
Wolf Tone*'* case, its transfer to America and its adoption as law in Ex parte 
15
Milligan where the majority held that, "Martial rule can never exist where 
the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
8. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., p.539. • - • •
9. Forsyth, William, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and Various
Points of English Jurisprudence, London, 1869, p.198.
10. Dicey, A.V., op.cit., pp.549, 552.
11. Pollock, Frederick, "What is Martial Law?", Law Quarterly Review,
Vol.XVIII, 1902, pp.155-156.
12. Hare, J.I.C., American Constitutional Law, Vol.II, Boston, 1889, 
pp.964-965.
13. Justice M. Afzal Zullah in Zia-ur Rahman v. the State, All Pakistan
Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXIV, 1972, p.397.
14. Howell, T.B., State Trials, English, Vol.XXVII, 1798, p.613.
15. Wallace, United States, Vol.IV, 1866, p.2.
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jurisdiction".*^ This view does not receive unqualified support. Westel
W. Willoughby criticised this decision when he said:
*
"...it is not correct to say that this necessity cannot 
be present except when the courts are closed and 
deposed from civil administration, for, as the minority 
justices correctly pointed out, there may be urgent 
necessity for martial rule even when the courts are 
open....Certainly the fact that the courts are open and 
undisturbed will in all cases furnish a powerful 
presumption that there is no necessity for a resort to 
martial law, but it should not furnish an irrebuttable 
presumption". ^
It is worthy of note that even in the eighteenth century, the framers of 
the Irish Act, 1799, realized the fact that there could be the necessity of 
promulgating Martial Law even when the civil courts were open. As it was 
declared:
"that Martial Law should prevail, and be put in force 
whether the ordinary courts of common or criminal 
law were or were not open".*®
However, in the twentieth century, the doctrine, that where the courts are
open, Martial Law cannot prevail, has been abandoned by the Judicial Committee
19of the Privy Council in Ex parte D.F. Marais. As it was held that the
fact that some courts were exercising uninterrupted jurisdiction was not
20conclusive that war was not raging.
Since modern scientific knowledge and technological developments have
revolutionized the very concept of warfare, it is possible for the civil
courts to be open and functioning and yet be in the actual fighting zone,
as, for example, in December 1941, Martial Law was declared in Hawaii following
the Japanese bombing on 7 December 1941 when "the federal court in Hawaii
21
was open...and was capable of exercising criminal jurisdiction".
16. Ibid., p.127.
17. Willoughby, Westel Woodbury, The Constitutional Law of the United 
States, 2nd edition, 1910, Vol.Ill, p.1602.
18. Clode, Charles M., The Military Forces of the Crown: Their 
Administration and Government,1 Vol.11, London, 1869, p.171.
19. The Law Reports, Appeal Cases, London, 1902, p.lb9.
20. Ibid., p.114.
21. United States Supreme Court Reports, Vol.327 [CCCXXVII], 1945, p.332.
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Therefore, it can be said that the concept of open court should be considered 
as one of many factors (e.g., failure of the civil authorities to preserve
t
law and order) in determining the necessity to promulgate Martial Law.
"The necessity for Martial Law arises rather from the proximity of a
danger than from the fact that the courts continue or do not continue to
..22sit."
Since Martial Law owes its existence to necessity, it is to be continued 
only as long as the necessity giving rise to its declaration prevails.
Martial Law, therefore, ceases as soon as the civil authorities are able 
to resume the unobstructed exercise of their ordinary functions.
In view of the fact that the promulgation of Martial Law depends on 
necessity, the justification of all measures adopted during the period of 
Martial Law should also be based on necessity. Necessity alone justifies 
the taking of those measures which are necessary for the suppression of 
rebellion, insurrection or riot and the establishment of civil authority.
The role of 'necessity' in the proclamation, and continuation of Martial 
Law and in the justification of all measures taken during the period of 
Martial Law, can be summed up in the words of Sir James Mackintosh, one of 
the most accomplished jurists Britain has ever produced. Speaking in the
House of Commons on 1 June 1824 in support of Lord Brougham's motion 
condemning the use of Martial Law in Demerara, he made the following
observations which would seem timeless in their wisdom and validity:
"The only principle on which the law of England tolerates 
what is called Martial [law] is necessity; its 
introduction can be justified only by necessity; its 
continuance requires precisely the same justification of 
necessity; and if it survives the necessity on which 
alone it rests for a single minute, it becomes instantly 
a mere exercise of lawless violence....While the laws are 
silenced by the noise of arms, the rulers of the armed 
force must punish, as equitably as they can, those crimes 
which threaten their own safety and that of society."23
22. Richard, H. Earle, "Martial Law", The Law Quarterly Review, Vol.XVIII, 
April 1902, p.141.
23. Hansard, T.C., Parliamentary Debates, New Series, Vol.XI, March-June 1824, 
London, p.1046.
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III. Was the Proclamation of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975 Justified?
Since Martial Law was proclaimed in Bangladesh in peace-time and there
was no question of suppressing riot, rebellion or insurrection, the 
proclamation of Martial Law on 15 August 1975 did not satisfy the test of 
the doctrine of necessity and, as such, was unjustified. It was not realized 
that Martial Law is an extreme measure used in the last resort and can only 
find its justification in the necessity to restore law and order. Evidently, 
the tradition established by the British government in India in respect of 
the declaration of Martial Law was not followed. Although on some 
occasions controversies arose as to the justification of the imposition of 
Martial Law by the British government in India (e.g., proclamation of Martial 
Law in the Panjab in 1919, in Sholapur and in Peshawar in 1930), it should 
be stressed here that it declared Martial Law only for the purpose of 
preserving, safeguarding or restoring law and order.
IV. How is Martial Law Established?
In the subcontinent, under different types of governments, Martial Law 
has been introduced in a variety of ways. For example, the British 
government in India, as we have seen in Chapter I, declared Martial Law in 
the subcontinent in the following three ways: firstly, by the Executive,
in pursuance of the authority previously conferred by the Bengal State 
Offences Regulation, 1804, as in the five districts of the province of 
the Panjab in 1919; secondly, by ordinance, issued by the Governor-General 
(under Section 23 of the India Councils Act, 1861, which empowered him 
'"in cases of emergency, to make and promulgate, from time to time, ordinances 
for the peace and good government"), as in Malabar in 1921, in Sholapur in 
1930, and in Peshawar in 1930; thirdly, and finally, by instruction from the 
civil authorities to the armed forces in reliance upon the common law rule 
which justifies the repelling of force by force, as in Sind in 1942.
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However, in this respect also, Bangladesh presents an exceptional experience, 
for Martial Law was declared in none of the ways mentioned above.
V. What Other Principal Conclusions Can be Drawn from the 
Experience of Martial Law in Bangladesh?
(i) Was the Declaration of Martial Law in 1975 Legal?
The declaration of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 1975 has to be seen as 
an extra-constitutional act since throughout the text of the 1972 Constitution 
no reference whatsoever has been made to Martial Law. As the Constitution 
is the supreme law of the land and does not contain the term Martial Law, 
it seems that it excludes the common law rule as a basis for Martial Law 
for the purpose of restoring law and order. Thus it is not possible to 
maintain that the proclamation of Martial Law in Bangladesh in 15 August 1975 
had any legal basis.
(ii) Did the Military Takeover: in. 1975 Constitute a Revolution?
Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh, as mentioned earlier, after
a coup d ’6tat in order to forestall any public opposition. This kind of 
Martial Law is in a class by itself and ’’has nothing to do with constitutional 
Martial Law”. The military takeover in Bangladesh could not be called a 
revolution, from a juristic point of view, as the basic norm or the total 
legal Order of the country, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, was neither 
abrogated nor suspended. The Constitution remained the fundamental law of 
the country and, in fact, co-existed with Proclamations, Martial Law 
Regulations or Orders. Therefore, it seems that the military takeover in 
Bangladesh constituted a constitutional deviation rather than a 'total new 
dispensation'.
4
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(iii) Was the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh to Remain the 
Supreme Law of the Land?
It should, however, be’stressed here that although the 1972 Constitution 
of Bangladesh continued in force during the period of Martial (1975 to 1979), 
it ceased to exist as the Supreme Law of the country as it was made subject 
to the First Proclamation, Martial Law Regulations or Orders. Hence, it 
assumed a subordinate status.
(iv) What was the Nature of Martial Law Offences?
The 1975 Martial Law administration of Bangladesh created a large number 
of offences under Martial Law Regulations. Most of these offences had 
already been offences under the ordinary law and were mainly related to 
anti-social activities. The Martial Law government, in general, only 
provided for more severe punishments for these offences. Thus it failed 
to realize that the creation of offences under Martial Law Regulations 
during the period of Martial Law is limited to the necessity for the 
restoration of law and order.
(v) What was the Impact of the Establishment and Operation of
Martial Law COurts on the Ordinary Criminal Courts?
Although Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh in peace-time and the 
ordinary criminal courts were allowed to continue to exercise their functions, 
Martial Law Courts were established as an almost inevitable incident of 
the resort to Martial Law, declared under the doctrine of necessity to 
restore law and order. The Martial Law Courts, which were established 
parallel to the existing civilian courts, tried not only offences under 
Martial Law Regulations, but also offences under the ordinary law. But 
it is ironical that the criminal courts were not given concurrent 
jurisdiction to try Martial Law offences which constituted a clear-cut 
departure from the tradition established by various MArtial Law governments
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at different times in the subcontinent. However, cases were transferred 
from the criminal courts and special tribunals to Martial Law Courts in an
arbitrary manner without following any set guidelines. These arbitrary
transfers not only violated the right of equality before the law, but also 
deprived the person charged with the ordinary offences of the benefits 
(e.g., the right of appeal; the right of legal representation, if tried 
by a Summary Martial Law Court) of a civil trial. In many cases, the
same group of cases were transferred from the ordinary courts to both Summary
Martial Law Courts and Special Martial Law1Courts without any set standards 
or criteria which also resulted in different treatments of the same type of 
cases or accused. In fact, most of the cases tried by Martial Law ,Courts 
were cases under the ordinary law transferred to them for trial. Thus the 
establishment and operation of the Martial Law-Courts, withdrew the powers 
and jurisdiction from the ordinary criminal courts, functioning under 
well-established legal procedures.
(vi) Did the Procedure of Martial Law Courts Ensure a Fair Trial?
Most of the Special Martial Law Courts comprised the majority of 
members from the armed forces and the single member-Summary Martial Law,Court 
sometimes consisted of army majors, who had no legal training, qualification 
or experience whatsoever in the administration of criminal justice and 
were, therefore, not fully equipped to exercise a 'fair legal judgment'. 
Moreover, the holding of trial under summary procedures, the denial of the 
minimum safeguards of the right of appeal, the deprivation of the right of 
defence by a lawyer in a trial before the Summary Martial Law Court, the 
obligation to obtain consent from the prosecution for granting bail - all 
these eroded the constitutional and legal safeguards to ensure a fair trial 
and, indeed, allowed for the miscarriage of justice.
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(vii) Was the Procedure of Martial Law Courts Abused?
Sometimes certain existing Martial Law Regulations, especially those
concerning the procedure of Martial Law Courts, were amended in a calculated
way to serve the ulterior motives of the military junta; trials were
initiated mala fide and the only relief of review against the judgment of
24
Martial Law Courts was not carried out in a proper manner.
(viii) Were the Accused in the Conspiracy Case Fairly Dealt With?
The Special Martial Law Tribunal which comprisediUtw*jwuty' of members from 
the armed forces and was given wide jurisdiction to try offences under the 
Military Laws and certain offences under Martial Law Regulations and the 
Penal Code, mainly followed the procedures of Special Martial Law Courts.
It tried a very important and significant case, the conspiracy case of the 
State v. Major Jalil and others. The trial was held in camera within the 
confines of the prison which formed a new development in Bangladesh. In 
this trial, the requisites of a fair trial were not observed. Moreover, 
there was an unseemly and unprecedented speed in carrying out the review 
of the sentences passed against the accused and confirming the sentences 
of death and life imprisonment. This suggests that the Martial Law 
administration had a political motive in bringing the conspiracy case to a 
hasty conclusion. Moreover, only three days after the confirmation of 
the death sentence, one of the convicts, Abu Taher, was hanged on 21 July 
1976 in clear violation of the stipulations of the Jail Code. Thus the 
accused in the conspiracy case were unfairly dealt with and unjustly 
condemned and the trial in camera, in their cases, proved an "effective 
instrument of oppression".
24. See supra, Chapter IV, p. 229-246.
4 33
(ix) Were the Martial Law Tribunals Just and Fair?
Although the Martial Law Tribunals were given the same jurisdiction
»
as had been granted to the Special Martial Law Tribunal, they were composed
entirely of members of the defence services. These tribunals did not
differ with the Special Martial Law courts and the Special Martial Law
Tribunal in respect of their procedures except in a few particulars.
However, the Martial Law Tribunals restricted themselves to the trial of 
the members of the army and air force who had been involved in two abortive 
coups of 1977. They held the trials in camera and, in most cases, gave 
their judgments on insufficient evidence. Therefore, it seems that the 
tribunals were more interested in meting out severe punishment to serve as 
a deterrent rather than dispensing justice.
(x) What was the Effect of Martial on the Fundamental
Rights and the Independence of the Judiciary?
The Martial Law administration restored the independence of the Judiciary 
which had been severely curbed by the civilian regime of Sheikh Mujib 
through the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975. It also provided 
better remuneration and privileges for the judges of the Supreme Court which 
strengthened their freedom, improved their financial position and reduced 
their likely temptation to resort to corruption. It further re-established 
the right of the citizen to move the High Court Division of the Supreme 
Court and the power of the High Court Division to issue necessary directions 
or orders, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights which had been 
taken away by the government of Sheikh Mujib in 1975 under the Constitution 
(Fourth Amendment) Act. Even during the continuance of Martial Law, in 
December 1978, the Martial Law government lifted the prohibition in respect 
of the enforcement of most of the fundamental rights that had been imposed 
by the Presidential Order issued as a consequence of the Proclamation of
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Emergency on 28 December 1974 by the civilian regime which had preceded it.
In spite of adopting all these healthy measures, it imposed severe
i
restrictions on the powers and jurisdiction of the Judiciary under various 
Proclamations and Martial Law Regulations which caused a hindrance to the 
proper discharge of their duties of administering justice and protecting 
the innocent from injury and injustice.
(xi) What was the Impact of Martial Law on Preventive Detention?
The laws relating to preventive detention, the Special Powers Act,
1974, and the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, enacted during the civilian rule 
of Sheikh Mujib, remained in force under Martial Law. The Emergency 
Powers Rules did not originally contain procedural safeguards against the 
improper and arbitrary exercise of the power of detention as required by 
the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. It was the Martial Law government 
which, in August 1977, introduced certain amendments into the Emergency 
Powers Rules that fulfilled the constitutional safeguards in respect of 
preventive detention. Immediately after coming into power, the Martial Law 
administration declared its intention, after proper review, to release 
those political prisoners who had been held in preventive custody for holding 
political views different from those Of the government in power. In fact, 
in order to fulfil this commitment, the Martial Law regime announced several 
general amnesties during the currency of Martial Law which involved the 
release of 10,756 political detenus, most of whom were admittedly a legacy 
from the civilian administration that had preceded it. Although the Martial 
Law government released a large number of detenus, it was not free from 
resorting to the politics of repression.
VI. What Assessment can be made of the 1975 Martial Law Administration.
in Bangladesh?
To sum up, the unnecessary interference with the powers and jurisdiction
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of the civilian courts to try ordinary offences under well-established legal
procedures, the arbitrary transfer of cases from the criminal courts to
the Martial Law Courts, the conspicuous absence of legal safeguards to
ensure a fair trial before the Martial Law Courts or Tribunals and to
protect the accused from possible miscarriage of justice, the occasional
abuse and manipulation of the procedures of these courts or tribunals, the
misuse at times of the power of preventive detention - all showed that, the
Martial Law administration was far from upholding the rule of law. But
if the liberal steps taken by the Martial Law regime, contrary to general
expectations, were to be considered, it would give a different impression.
Thus the restoration of judicial power to enforce fundamental rights, the
lifting of prohibition with regard to the enforcement of most of the
fundamental rights, the re-establishment of the independence of the Judiciary,
the incorporation into the Emergency Powers Rules of the constitutional
safeguards (including the reference to the advisory committee) in respect
of preventive detention, the release of a large number of political detenus
through various general amnesties - all these steps taken by the Martial Law
government constituted a distinct improvement on the record of the civilian
administration which had preceded it. It also compared favourably with the
Martial Law administrations of 1958 and 1969 of Pakistan which had abrogated
the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions, abolished fundamental rights and mullified
the effect of the provisions "in law providing for the reference of a
25detention order to an advisory board".
VII. What Recommendations may be offered for Constitutional and Legal 
Changes to limit possible Abuse of Power under Martial Law Regimes 
in Future?
From the Bangladesh experience of Martial Law already discussed,
25. Article 7 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Ord&r, 1958, and
Article 7(2) of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1969.
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various proposals can be put forward which would contribute to the 
prevention or limitation of abuses of power if Martial Law is proclaimed 
again in future.
(i) Is There a Need for Constitutional Provisions in Respect of Martial Law?
Although the summary power conferred by Martial Law 'is occasionally
essential for the safety of the community at large, and the only means of
averting wholesale outrage and rapine', it is, no doubt, a 'great evil'.
It is a somewhat dangerous measure to use as its declaration usually affects
the ordinary rights of citizens. In this respect, the observations of
Chief Justice Innes of the Union of South Africa in Krohn v. Minister for 
26Defence are of direct relevance:
"In no respect can Martial Law be regarded as a good 
thing; it is at the best a lamentable necessity.
It imposes a great responsibility upon the executive 
Government; it operates with inevitable harshness in 
certain cases, and it saps the political fibre of the 
people".27
Therefore, it appears that there is the possibility or risk that Martial Law 
might degenerate into the uncontrolled and arbitrary will of the commander. 
It is an evil which can become worse if it is introduced regularly. If 
there are constitutional and legislative provisions concerning the 
promulgation and administration of Martial Law, this would reduce the scope 
of the abuse of power by the Executive. It is worthy of note that, in 
France, in order to check the abuse of the power of declaring a 'state of 
siege' by the Executive when there is a threatened or actual invasion by a 
foreign army or when there is an insurrection of considerable magnitude 
in any part of the country, it (the 'state of siege') has been made a 
constitutional and legal institution, and brought under some measure of
26. South African Law Reports, Appellate Division, 1915, p.191.
27. Ibid., p.202.
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legislative control, at least in the provisions that Parliament may 
authorize its extension beyond twelve days. But in the Commonwealth 
countries, including Bangladesh, and in the United States of America, there 
are no statutory provisions for a crisis government of the type envisaged 
under Martial Law. As Charles Fairman wrote:
"In France the declaration of a 'state of siege' and 
particularly the legal results consequent thereto are 
regulated by Statute. The 'state of siege' is a 
definite legal status. Quite different is the 
situation in the United States (and, for that matter, 
in Anglo-Saxon countries generally), where the law 
governing an exercise of martial rule is largely 
customary and judge-made".^8
Like Pakistan, in Bangladesh Martial Law has become a deep-rooted cancer,
for after the withdrawal of the 1975 Martial Law in April 1979, Martial Law
was again proclaimed in March 1982 to implement a coup d'dtat which is
still (in 1985) in force. In view of the fact that Martial Law has become
a periodic feature of Bangladesh, it may be suggested that, following the
example of France, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh should be amended to
incorporate into it the provisions relating to the proclamation and
administration of Martial Law. These provisions should attempt to eliminate
the possibility of the abuse of power by the Executive officials through
recourse to Martial Law. This may be done by widening the scope of
judicial review, with regard to the proclamation as well as the
administration of the Martial Law, both during the currency of Martial Law
and after its withdrawal. It would also seem desirable to empower
Parliament to determine the period during which Martial Law should remain
in force.
2:8. Fairman, Charles, "Martial Rule and the Suppression of Insurrection" 
Illinois Law Review, Vol.XXIII, 1929, p.776.
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(ii) Is it necessary to establish Martial Law Courts?
What should be the Jurisdiction of Martial Law Courts?
Martial Law Courts are 'almost an inevitable concomitant of the
promulgation of Martial Law to try those offences promptly and speedily
which the Martial Law Administrator has found it necessary to formulate
for the purpose of restoring law and order. The jurisdiction of Martial
Law Courts is, therefore, restricted to the trial of offences of causing,
aiding and abetting riot, rebellion or invasion. The question of trying
civil offences by the Martial Law Courts can arise only when the ordinary
courts have ceased to function and, as such, civil offences cannot be tried
normally. When the ordinary courts are allowed by the Martial Law regime
to continue to exercise their functions, Martial Law Courts should not, in
general, be given jurisdiction to try offences under the ordinary law.
The greatest care should be taken to limit the jurisdiction of Martial Law
Courts to the narrowest limits practical to attain the declared object of
restoring law and order. In fact, a kind of practical modus vivendi should
be adopted. The ordinary courts would continue to function unimpeded as
far as possible and the Martial Law authorities would not interfere with
their jurisdiction except for military reasons. As it was held by the
law officers of the Crown, Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, Sir John
Campbell and Sir R.M. Rolfe, who were called upon to give an opinion as to
the legality of adopting punitive measures against the Canadian insurgents
in the rebellion of 1837 to 1838:
"It is hardly necessary for us to add that, in our view 
of the case, Martial Law can never be enforced for the 
ordinary purposes of civil or even criminal justice, 
except, in the latter, so far as the necessity arising 
from actual resistance compels its adoption".^9
Aii similar view was expressed by Robert M. King:
2!9. Forsyth, William, Cases and Opinions oh Constitutional Law and 
Various Points of English Jurisprudence, London, 1869, p.199.
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"It is, however, the duty of those enforcing Martial 
Law not to interfere unnecessarily with the exercise 
by the ordinary courts of their civil and criminal 
functions, in matters hot affecting the conduct of
the war".30
However, it may be suggested that in order to administer Martial Law
declared for the purpose of restoring law and order, mixed courts should
be set up as had sometimes been done by the British Martial Law administration
in India. For example, in Malabar in 1921, during the continuance of
31Martial Law, three types of courts, namely summary courts (consisting of
32magistrates), special tribunals (consisting of one High Court Judge and
33two Sessions Judges) and military courts were set up for the effective 
administration of Martial Law. Similarly, the Peshawar Martial Law 
Ordinance No.VIII of 1930 provided for the constitution of five classes of 
special courts - special tribunal, special judge, special magistrate, summary 
court and military court - to deal with the offences declared by it. It 
is worthy of note that although this Ordinance provided for the constitution 
of five types of special courts, no such court was established by the 
Peshawar Martial Law administration.
When Martial Law is declared in peace-time and the ordinary courts are 
allowed to continue their functions, the setting up of Martial Law Courts 
to try offenders should not arise at all although, in practice, unfortunately 
enough, it has come to be, in some countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
an almost inevitable incident of the resort to Martial Law. It seems more 
appropriate that, even when Martial Law is declared with a view to restoring 
law and order, the existing criminal courts, instead of establishing Martial 
Law Courts or special courts, should be given exclusive jurisdiction to
30. King, Robert M., "Martial Law", The Cape Law Journal, Vol.XVII, 1900, p.136.
31. The Malabar Martial Law Ordinance No.ll of 1921.
32. The Malabar Martial Law (Supplementary) Ordinance No.Ill of 1921.
33. The Malabar Martial Law (Military Courts) Ordinance, 1921.
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deal with Martial Law offences as had been done by the British Martial Law
34
administration in India in Sholapur in 1930. The Peshawar Martial Law 
Ordinance No.VIII of 1930 also granted to the ordinary criminal courts the 
limited power to try offences against a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial 
Law Order with the exception of those which were to be tried by the special 
courts created by the Ordinance. In this context, the joint opinion 
given by the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, Sir John Campbell and 
Sii* R.M. Rolfe, in January 1838 in respect of the trial of Canadian rebels by 
Martial Law .Courts while the civil courts were open, are worthy of note:
"...we are of opinion that the prerogative (of His 
Majesty for the public safety to resort to the exercise 
of martial law against open enemies or traitors) does not 
extend beyond the case of persons taken in open resistance, 
and with whom, by reason of the suspension of the ordinary 
tribunals, it is impossible to deal according to the regular 
course of justice. When the regular courts are open, so 
that criminals might be delivered over to them to be dealt 
with according to law, there is not, as we conceive, any 
right in the Crown to adopt any other course of proceeding.
Such power can only be conferred by the Legislature, as 
was done by the Acts passed in consequence of the Irish 
rebellions of 1798 and 1803, and also of the Irish Coercion 
Act of 1833".
jA similar view was expressed by Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah in the case
36
oof Zia-ur Rahman v. the State:
"When the Courts are open and functioning effectively 
under the normal law, there is no justification for 
establishing Special Military Courts for trial of 
civilians".
((iiij What Procedure should Martial Law Courts adopt?
The procedure of Martial Law Courts should ensure a fair trial; it 
should be conducive to discovering guilt or innocence and not causing grave
234. See Section 7 of the Sholapur Martial Law.Ordinance,
No.IV of 1930.
335. Forsyth, William, op.cit., pp.198-199.
336. All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, Vol.XXIV, 1972, p.382. 
357. Ibid., p.397.
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injustices. There must be a definite charge against the accused; the 
accused should be given a reasonable notice of the charge; the charge must 
be proved by sufficient evidence especially in those cases where the 
sentences are capital. The accused should be given an opportunity of 
cross-examining and calling witnesses for the defence. The accused should 
not only be given the opportunity to be defended by a lawyer but every 
reasonable facility should be provided for the preparation of a proper 
defence. In this respect, the views expressed by W.F. Finlason are 
directly relevant:
"There must be a fair hearing, and a reasonable opportunity 
for answer and defence; if these substantial rules are 
observed, the non-observance of the more formal or 
technical rules of procedure, which cannot be applicable 
to such exceptional tribunals (i.e., Martial Law Courts) 
with such an irregular procedure, can work no substantial 
injury or injustice to the accused".
However, the proceedings of the Martial Law Courts should be reviewed by
a higher authority, preferably by a court of law, before »y the sentence
is carried into effect. The right of appeal to the High Court should be
provided for, at least against the sentences of death and life imprisonment
passed by the Martial Law,Courts as had been allowed in Malabar in 1921
39and in Peshawar in 1930 by the British Martial Law administration in India.
38. Finlason, W.F., Commentaries upon Martial Law, London, 1867, p.237.
39. The Malabar Martial Law (Supplementary) Ordinance, 1921 (No.Ill of 1921) 
and the Peshawar Martial Law Ordinance, 1930 (No.VIII of 1930), which 
made provisions for the constitution of Special Tribunals to try any 
offence connected with the events which necessitated the enforcement and 
continuance of Martial Law, provided that in case of a sentence of death, 
transportation for life or for imprisonment for ’ten years or more, an 
appeal would lie to the High Court.
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APPENDIX
Government of the People'& Republic of Bangladesh
President’s Secretariat
Proclamation
The 20th August, 1975
WHEREAS I, Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, with the help and mercy of 
the Almighty Allah and relying upon the blessings of the people have 
take over all the full powers of the Government of the Peopler,s Republic 
of Bangladesh with effect from the morning of the 15th August, 1975;
AND WHEREAS I placed, on the morning of the 15th August, 1975, the 
whole of Bangladesh under Martial Law by a declaration broadcast from all 
stations of Radio Bangladesh;
AND WHEREAS, with effect from the morning of the 15th August, 1975,
I have suspended the provisions of article 48, in so far as it relates
to election of the President of Bangladesh, and article 55 of the 
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and modified the 
provisions of article 148 thereof and form I of the Third Schedule 
thereto to the effect that the oath of office of the President of 
Bangladesh shall be administered by the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and 
that the President may enter upon office before he takes the oath;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, in exercise of all 
powers enabling me in this behalf, do hereby declare that -
(a) I have assumed and entered upon the office of the President
of Bangladesh with effect from the morning of the
15th August, 1975;
(b) I may make, from time to time, Martial Law Regulations and
Orders -
(i) providing for setting up Special Courts or Tribunals 
for the trial and punishment of any offence under such 
Regulations or Orders or for contravention thereof, and 
of offences under any other law;
(ii) prescribing penalties for offences under such Regulations 
or Orders or for contravention thereof and special 
penalties for offences under any other law;
(iii) empowering any Court or Tribunal to try and punish 
any offence under such Regulation or Order or the 
contravention thereof;
(iv) barring the jurisdiction of any Court or Tribunal 
from trying any offence specified in such Regulations 
or Orders;
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(c) I may rescind the declaration of Martial Law made on the 
morning of the 15th August, 1975, at any time, either in 
respect of the whole of Bangladesh or any part thereof, and 
may again place the whole of Bangladesh or any part thereof 
under Martial Law by a fresh declaration;
(d) this Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations and Orders 
made by me in pursuance thereof shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything contained in the Constitution of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh or in any law for the time being in force;
(e) the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh shall, 
subject to this Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations 
and Orders made by me in pursuance thereof, continue to remain 
in force;
(f) all Acts, Ordinances, Presidents' Orders and other Orders, 
Proclamations, rules, regulations, bye-laws, notifications and 
other legal instruments in force on the morning of the 15th August, 
1975, shall continue to remain in force until repealed, revoked or 
amended;
(g) no Court, including the Supreme Court, or tribunal or authority 
shall have any power to’call in question in any manner whatsoever 
or declare illegal or void this Proclamation or any Martial Law 
Regulation or Order made by me in pursuance thereof, or any 
declaration made by or under this Proclamation, or mentioned in 
this Proclamation to have been made, or anything done or any 
action taken by or under this Proclamation, or mentioned in this 
Proclamation to have been done or taken or anything done or any 
action taken by or under any Martial Law Regulation or Order 
made by me in pursuance of this Proclamation;
(h) I may, by order notified in the official Gazette, amend this 
Proclamation.
KHANDAKER MOSHTAQUE AHMED 
President.
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